Some Thoughts on Hillary Clinton’s February 13 Speech

Hillary Clinton’s 13 February speech at the Asia Society in New York, two days before her trip to Japan, South China, South Korea and Indonesia, has already been widely reported and is available in its entirety, including the Q&A, here. As English-language speakers no doubt are already aware, a substantial part of her talk is about the financial crisis, North Korea’s nuclear program, and climate change and China. I hope my comments shed some light on her talk that has otherwise not been covered.

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The substantive part of Hillary Clinton’s speech begins with a tribute to the progress that Asia has made in the fifty years since the founding of the Asia Society. In the process, she gives a list of the traditional sights and sounds of Asia that have caught her attention in her travels over the years.

I think of the elegant temples of Kyoto, or the rituals of nomadic life outside Ulaanbaatar, the intricate handwork of traditional craftspeople in Chiang Rai, the vibrant markets of Hanoi, Hong Kong, and Dhaka; the grand hotels of Singapore and Manila, the calligraphers practicing their art in Xi’an, the historic dress of Seoul and the traditional dances of Jakarta, or the strum of the sitar in New Delhi.

In doing so, she implicitly refers to: Japan, Mongolia, Thailand, Vietnam, China (twice: one state, two systems), Bangladesh, Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, and India. They can be sorted into: Northeast Asia (four; excluding North Korea and Russia), ASEAN (four; with Malaysia the one major member missing), and South Asia. Her visits to Central Asia—she visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as First Lady—Pakistan, West Asia (Afghanistan) and the Middle East (Iraq) go unmentioned.

These omission are not unreasonable, since she is weaving a story of progress as the backdrop for a “new era of diplomacy and development in which [the United States] will use smart power to work with historic allies and emerging nations to find regional and global solutions to common global problems.” The “common global problems” that she specifically cites here are: financial instability and economic dislocation, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (for all practical purposes nuclear proliferation), food security and health emergencies, climate change and energy vulnerability, stateless criminal cartels and human exploitation. The U.S. outreach, using smart power, will extend beyond governments and “engage civil society.”

There is a strong emphasis here on dialogue; “we are ready to listen”. This is very much Obamaesque. But it is in this context that a couple of other countries (as well as China) receive less favorable attention when she says, “As part of our dialogues, we will hold ourselves and others accountable as we work to expand human rights and create a world that respects those rights, one where Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi can live freely in her own country, where the people of North Korea can freely choose their own leaders, and where Tibetans and all Chinese people can enjoy religious freedom without fear of prosecution.”That’s Burma and North Korea, as well as China. (Note, though, the carefully crafted ambiguity of the phrase “Tibetans and all Chinese people”—not “Tibetans and Chinese” of course, but not “all Chinese people, including Tibetans,” either.

Of these global concerns, Clinton first takes up global financial crisis and its economic impact. Nothing really new here; I’ll just note that she invokes the importance of international partnerships and avoiding protectionism.

The second major item on the ticket is North Korea’s nuclear program. But before that, she touches briefly on “maintaining our historic security alliances in Asia and building on those relationships to counter the complex global threats we face” and goes on to state “I’m very pleased that Japan and South Korea this week agreed to joint assistance for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, and that both countries continue to work with us on global security, especially in combating piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of the main opposition party, has reportedly been spouting some unrealistic thoughts about dispatching the Japan Coast Guard there. No wonder he has been doing his best to avoid Clinton’s outstretched hand. At least she didn’t mention the refueling operations.

Back to North Korea: she states the obvious with regard to the Obama administration’s continued commitment to the Six-Party process and her intent to discuss this with Japan, China, and South Korea on this visit. The U.S. position is clear and unchanged from the central premise, however unrealistic, of the Six-Party process:

“If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula’s longstanding armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic needs of the North Korean people.”

After 165 words on this subject (out of a total 3,382 words for the entire speech, frills and all) she follows with 32 words on—what else?

“On a related matter, I will assure our allies in Japan that we have not forgotten the families of Japanese citizens abducted to North Korea. And I will meet with some of those families in Tokyo next week.”

It is now all about not forgetting, it seems. Such meetings have become a rite, sealed in a place where time goes by so slowly, until regime change—or something very similar—heralds the beginning of the end for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and hauls Japan’s financial assistance into the picture..

Next, Clinton expends 276 words on climate change and the need for clean sources of energy. She emphasizes the need for “partnerships that promote cleaner energy sources, greater energy efficiency, technology transfers that can benefit both countries, and other strategies that simultaneously protect the environment and promote economic growth”, and sees such collaboration as “a real opportunity to deepen the overall U.S.-Chinese relationship”. Nothing remarkable here about the substance, but note the careful distinction here between the plural “partnerships” and the singular “relationship”.

But I digress. Before leaving climate change and energy behind, note that Clinton also mentions working with Japan and South Korea, as well as Indonesia, on clean energy. Not that anything dramatic is going to happen any time soon—is it my imagination, or are pundits with the least energy background the most enthusiastic supporters of collaboration?—but it’s not all China here.

This is followed by a riff on “development” as one of the three D’s—the others are defense and diplomacy—that are vital to U.S. security, and cites Indonesia, and more broadly ASEAN, favorably in this context, saying, “we look forward to working with our other partners and friends in the regions, allies like Thailand and the Philippines, along with Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, to ensure that ASEAN can live up to its charter, to demonstrate the region’s capacity for leadership on economic, political, human rights, and social issues.” A shoutout to Australia, which is not on the itinerary, follows. After that, it’s a rundown of specific, bilateral issues that she will be discussing on her visit.

The key sentence with regard to Japan:

“Our security alliance with Japan, 50 years old next year, has been, and must remain, unshakable.”

. It’s not easy to be more explicit than that. Her agenda: signing the Guam International Agreement to move U.S. troop out of “the peace and stability of Asia and increasingly focuses on global challenges”. Again, a problem for the Ozawa DPJ, given its challenge of the price tag, the Japanese,, trillion-yen and upwards, payout. At the bilateral level, China receives by far the most space (295 words to Japan’s 159). But it’s a desire for “a positive, cooperative relationship.” Speaking of which…

Earlier, I took note of the care with which Clinton used the words “relationship” and “partnerships”. The same care can be seen in her use of words regarding bilateral issues here. More broadly, I was reminded of the sentence that touched the nerves of the Japanese establishment in her Foreign Affairs essay where she said:

”Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century.”

It had MOFA officials counting the number of times “Japan” and China” appeared in this essay as well as her campaigning speeches and reportedly asking visiting Japan hands to divine the meaning of it all. All too often, The Japanese authorities and the Japanese media fail to see that Clinton, as well as other responsible U.S. figures, routinely distinguish between “relationship(s)”, “partnership(s)”, and “alliance(s)”. Then of course there’s “engagement”. This is not a mere quibble. These distinctions are essential to understanding, constructing, and explaining the conceptual framework that is the foundation of the foreign and national security policies of Japan, indeed, of any sovereign state.

After China, the speech ends on a positive if unremarkable note, with the following call:

Let us commit ourselves to providing the kind of outreach and responsiveness, understanding, and commitment that will lead not just to a better understanding, but positive actions to improve the lives of our own people here and those who live in Asia today.

And who can disagree with that?

Open Season on the Beijing Olympics: A Morning-After Quickie

Thomas Boswell sees the choice of “Lopez Lomong, one of the ‘Lost Boys’ of Sudan who is a member of Team Darfur, to carry their colors” as “a far-from-subtle commentary on China's dismal record on human rights at home and abroad.”

Mr. Boswell sympathizes with the US athletes who made the choice, yet closes the article with the reserve and sense of balance that makes him a rarity among sports writers, if not all journalists:

In the months of prelude to these Games, America has, through its protesters, its feisty press and even its choice of flag bearer, presumed to judge China, or at least its government. And with cause, no doubt.

However, now that the Olympic flame has been lit and the smoggy Beijing sky streaked with joyous rockets, perhaps that emphasis can start to shift. As this night's spectacle reminds us, there's 5,000 years of culture here to learn and 1.3 billion people whose vast progress deserves respect.

Okay, maybe the ending is a little weak. But how many sportswriters or food critics can pull this off?

The Japanese media missed the political message on Darfur, but caught the more significant one, this time from the Chinese side, in the surprise choice of Li Ning, the Gold-medalist-turned-entrepreneur (think, Michael Jordan literally owning Nike) to light the Olympic fire at the opening ceremonies. Li Ning is one of 18 million Zhuangs, the largest minority ethnic group among the 1.3 billion Chinese. This reminds me of Jin Yong’s wuxia sagas, where so many of the heroes and their friends have non-Han backgrounds yet fight for China, sometimes against their own kinfolk. The Western media seems to have completely missed this one—so far.

The Japanese delegation sent their own message of Care-Bear love with their choice of Ai Fukuhara, the table tennis player, as flag bearer. Ms. Fukuhara is the overwhelmingly most popular Japanese athlete in China, partly because she is cute as a button, as your grandparents used to say, but also because she played two years in the top pro league in China and speaks Chinese very fluently.

But that’s public diplomacy. The real political exchange came in Prime Minister Fukuda’s meetings with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Mr. Fukuda brought up the Chinese dumplings with both Chinese leaders, while he reserved the beatings that two Japanese journalists received at the hands of the Chinese security police in Xinjiang at the site of the terrorist attack that killed 16 policemen.

And that’s only the beginning. I don’t think that I’ve ever seen so much political coverage during any of the past Olympics. In today’s morning Yomiuri, there are approximately five full pages on and around the Olympics outside of the sports pages. The opening ceremonies take up a third of the front page featuring a large photo of the Japanese delegation—advertisements and the masthead take up half; the remainder is shared by Mr. Fukuda’s meetings with his Chinese counterparts and the battle between Georgian and Russian forces in South Ossetia. The national team takes up two-thirds of the penultimate page, where the best human interest stories (murders, etc.) usually wind up, ads taking up most of the remainder except for an Olympics-related airliner bomb threat in Japan—and a crappy cartoon. Otherwise, the Yomiuri carries stories that have at least some element of criticism; ethnic minorities (one headline reads “Tibet ‘We Can’t Welcome Olympics’ チベット「五輪歓迎できぬ」 ), political repression (“’Ceremony of Peace under a Dictatorship 独裁下の「平和の祭典」” —yes, that’s the real headline), R-E-S-P-E-C-T (“The Greatest Olympics Diplomacy in History 史上最大の五輪外交”—yes, bigger than… 1936… kidding), Security threats and food contamination (“Special Menus for Both Food and Security 食事も警備も特別メニュー”), authoritarian regime on the run (“Controls Eroding, Hu Regime Fearful ほころぶ統制、恐れる胡政権”), slagging Europe (“‘Gold Medal for Hypocrisy’ 「偽善の金メダル」”—to flip-flopping Sarkozy for going to the opening ceremonies). I could go on, but you get the idea.

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I may have more to say later, but only if the Nadeshiko Japan, hanging on by their cleats after barely tying their opening soccer match against unheralded New Zealand, kick Yanqui ass this afternoon.

The men’s soccer team just about bombed out before the opening ceremonies by losing to the U.S. side, so the big story there was Tadanari Lee, a forward who subbed in at 64 minutes and didn't score. His human interest angle? Mr. Lee is a third-generation Korean in Japan who became a Japanese citizen last year to hopefully play on the Japanese national teams. (He hadn’t enjoyed his experience when South Korea called him up for an U-19 training camp.) He professes genuine love for both nations, a story that Shinzo Abe would have loved, had he remained Prime Minister.

日本は、クリントン先生のクラスの、あのおとなしくて行儀のいい男の子なのです

(translation of the previous post)

ヒラリー・クリントンが民主党の大統領予備選の本命に戻ったところで、“Foreign Affairs”の記事を読み返してみるのもいいのではないかと思いました。

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ヒラリー・クリントンがForeign Affairsの「私が大統領に選ばれれば」シリーズに寄稿したエッセーは、日本の政官界のリーダーシップの間でかなりの動揺を引き起こしました。というのも、彼女が「我々と中国との関係は、今世紀で最も重要な二国間関係になる」と述べて、日本についてはほんのついでにしか言及しなかったからです。この動揺は、一つには、この人々の間で、一般的に言って共和党政権のときのほうがうまくいくと広く信じられている*ことに根ざしています。もっと具体的に言うと、かつてのクリントン政権のときは、中国に対しては全面的な友好外交を展開したのに、日米関係は通商問題をめぐる異例のとげとげしさの中で停滞しました。

では、これは、単に悪い連想が働いているだけなのでしょうか。いや、そんなことはありません。対外関係に関するクリントン氏のトップ・アドバイザーであるマデリン・オルブライト元国務長官、リチャード・ホルブルック元国連大使を始めその他クリントン・チームの面々の多くがクリントン政権（ややこしい）のときも枢要な役割を果たしていたのです。しかも、クリントン氏は、ファースト・レディー時代の8年間を自分の経験として援用しているのです。

だが・・・

第一に、対外関係で大きく取り上げられることは、いいことずくめというわけにはいきません。というのも、中国は、「21世紀に直面する国家、政府でない当事者、そして自然そのものからの脅威という、かつてない多種多様な挑戦的課題」のリストの中でまず登場するのです。「二つの戦争、グローバルなテロのネットワークに対する長期の戦い、そして、核兵器を取得しようとするイランとの緊張の高まり、成り行きが不明なままに再生を遂げるロシア、急速に成長する中国の国際システムへの統合、イスラエルを脅かすとともに石油供給の中断によって世界経済を崩壊させかねない中東の予測不可能かつ危険な状況、そして、気候変動及び世界規模の疫病の新たな波という長期的な脅威」といっしょくたにして言及されることには、いくらあまのじゃくでも喜びを感じることができないでしょう。第一、以前に本気でアメリカに挑戦状をたたきつけた時どうなったか、ご存知でしょう。

クリントン氏は、これら挑戦のそれぞれについて、自分の立場を説明していますが、「最も重要な二国間関係」というのも、こうした文脈で理解する必要があります。実際、クリントン氏は、日本は問題解決のほうから、ここで初めて言及して、「米国は、新しくクリーンなエネルギー源を開発し、より高い水準の省エネルギーを奨励し、気候変動と戦うために中国及び日本と共同プログラムに取り組むべきである」と書いています。

「同盟関係の強化」－ これは明らかにブッシュ大統領のユニラテラリズムと彼女が描き出しているものと対照をなしている － は、こうした挑戦に取り組むための彼女の戦略の礎石の一つですが、これには、それなりにもっと心配すべき理由があります。昔からの三極のもう一つの極であるヨーロッパは、「同盟関係の強化」に関してはトップを占め、また、アジアでは、日本をインドと豪州と一緒くたにして「オーストラリア、インド、日本、そして米国が効力してテロとの戦い、気候変動を制限するための協力、グローバルなエネルギー供給の保全、経済発展の深化を含め、共通の関心事項について協力するすべを今以上に追求する必要がある」と述べています。彼女はさらに「欧米が協力すればグローバルな諸目標も実現可能になる」と述べていますが、結構なことで。また、アジアのスターはインドであって、「新興経済国として、また、世界でもっとも人口の多い民主主義国として特別の意義を持っている。上院のインド関係議員連盟の共同代表として、インドの勃興が与えてくれる素晴らしい機会、そして国連等の国際、地域諸機関でもっとインドの発言力を強化することの必要性を理解する」とも述べています。

だが、この、一見して目に付く不均衡には、意味を込めすぎないように気を付ける必要があります。というのも、ヨーロッパは、「同盟諸国を安心させること」が必要だという文脈の中で登場するからです。具体的には「安心と信頼というヨーロッパとの間の伝統的な関係を再構築しなければいけない」というわけです。インドはと言えば、「途方もない」とは言うものの、あくまでも「機会」なのです。というわけで、次のように考えることができるのではないでしょうか。つまり、クリントン上院議員の立場に立って考えると、日本との関係は（インドとは対照的に）成熟した安定的な関係であって、（ヨーロッパとは対照的に）癒しを必要としていないのです。別の言い方をすると、私たちは、昔、どのクラスにもいた、宿題をいつもきちんとやって、それ以外にも先生方に迷惑をかけることのなかった、あの目立たず、地味な男の子なのです。

で、それがそんなにまずいことなのでしょうか。国民の大部分がそれ以上のことを望んでもいないというのに。

* 1・2月号には、ビル・リチャードソン州知事がマイケル・ハッカビー元州知事とともにＦＡの紙面を飾っています。クリス・ドッド、ジョー・バイデン両上院議員は、掲載の機会を得る前に脱落しました。フレッド・トムソンは、もし残っていれば掲載されるでしょう。だが、ロン・ポール上院議員やデニス・クシニッチ下院議員まで載せてくれるでしょうか。

** セオドア・ルーズベルトは共和党、フランクリン・デラノ・ルーズベルトは民主党でした。

*** 注**をご参照のこと。

Japan Is the Quiet Little Boy in Mrs. Clinton’s Class

Now that Hillary Clinton is back as the frontrunner, I thought that it would be worth my while to reread her Foreign Affairs article.

Hillary Clinton’s contribution in the Foreign Affairs series of “If elected I would” essays by the presidential candidates* caused considerable distress within the Japanese establishment because it said that “[o]ur relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century”, while mentioning Japan only in passing. Part of the dismay is rooted in the widely held belief among these people that, generally speaking, the alliance has gone smoother when Republicans have been in charge**. More specifically, the Clinton administration put on a full-court charm offensive on China, while Japan-U.S. relations languished under an uncommon level of animosity over trade issues.

So is this guilt by association? No. Not when Mrs. Clinton’s top foreign policy advisors, Madeline K. Albright and Richard Holbrooke, as well as much of the rest of her team also figured prominently in the Clinton administration. No. Not when she lists her eight years in the White House on her résumé under Experience. But…

First of all, in foreign affairs, top billing is often a mixed blessing, or worse. For China’s name first comes up in the list of “unprecedented array of challenges in the twenty-first century, threats from states, nonstate actors, and nature itself”. It would be hard to derive even a twisted sense of satisfaction from being mentioned in the same breath as “two wars, a long-term campaign against global terrorist networks, and growing tension with Iran as it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons[;] … a resurgent Russia whose future orientation is uncertain[;]… a rapidly growing China that must be integrated into the international system (my italics)[;]… an unpredictable and dangerous situation in the Middle East that threatens Israel and could potentially bring down the global economy by disrupting oil supplies[;]… and the looming long-term threats of climate change and a new wave of global health epidemics.” And you know what happened the last time we really challenged the United States***.

Mrs. Clinton goes on to explain her position on these challenges one-by-one, and it is in this context that “the most important bilateral relationship” must be understood. Indeed, Japan is first mentioned here as part of the solution, as she writes, “The United States should undertake a joint program with China and Japan to develop new clean-energy sources, promote greater energy efficiency, and combat climate change.”

“Strengthening Alliances” － in an obvious contrast to her protrayal of the Bush administration’s unilateralism － is a cornerstone of her strategy in meeting such challenges. Here, there is somewhat more reason for concern. The other corner of the old Trilateral, Europe, is given top billing where “Strengthening Alliances” is concerned, while in Asia, Japan is lumped together with India and Australia, as she says that “[w]e must find additional ways for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including combating terrorism, cooperating on global climate control, protecting global energy supplies, and deepening global economic development.” She claims, “When America and Europe work together, global objectives are within our means”, uplifting thoughts indeed. And the star of Asia is India, which “has a special significance both as an emerging power and as the world's most populous democracy. As co-chair of the Senate India Caucus, I recognize the tremendous opportunity presented by India's rise and the need to give the country an augmented voice in regional and international institutions, such as the UN.”

But we must be careful not to read too much into this seeming imbalance. Europe comes up in the context of the need “to reassure our allies.” Specifically, she says, “We must reestablish our traditional relationship of confidence and trust with Europe.” And India remains an “opportunity”, albeit “tremendous”. So you can look at it this way: From Senator Clinton’s point of view, its relationship with Japan is a mature, stable relationship (contrast India) that requires no healing (contrast Europe). To put it another way, we’re that quiet boy who used to be in your class, the kid who always did his homework and otherwise never made any trouble for the teachers.

Now is that such a bad thing to be? Especially since the Japanese public is not looking for more?

* Bill Richardson shares the Jan/Feb edition with Michael D. Huckabee, while Chris Dodd and Joe Biden dropped out before they got the chance. Fed Thompson will surely have his day if he stays in, but you wonder if FA will ever let Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich have their say.

** Teddy Roosevelt was a Republican; Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Democrat. Case closed. Kidding.

*** See footnote **

The "History Issues" Trope on Japanese Leadership Is a Crock

A popular trope among people writing about Japan is that Japan will never assume a leadership role in Asia unless it deals with its "history issues". I've never been able to understand it. Literally. I don't understand what they mean by Asia, and I don't understand what they mean by "leadership". I think I know what set of issues they mean by "history issues", but I have a very different understanding of "history issues" when it comes to the effect on our international standing. Let me explain.

When a pundit first stakes his claim, he begins by assuming that Asia begins and ends with China and the Koreas, and possibly though never explicitly Taiwan. As he develops his argument, he usually feels compelled to implicate ASEAN, and rely on Singapore and the Philippines for provenance thereof. The Indian subcontinent is rarely touched upon; West Asia, including the Anatolian and Arabian Peninsulas, are to be strictly avoided.

Now the Philippines are a mainly Christian, former US colony; Singapore is heavily Chinese. It is clear that the pundit is, for the most part, talking about the Northeast Asia, with arguments bleeding out to the broader Sinic civilization plus a Southeast Asian outlier. There is probably greater awareness on the part of the pundit since the Six-Party talks began and the Shangahai Cooperation Organization took off that Russia is also part of Northeast Asia. It is, however, is usually ignored when the pundit expounds on this theme, since the term "history issues" would take on a very different and inconvenient coloring if Russia were to be included in the narrative.

More generally, consistency is usually sacrificed to convenience of the story, as he wantonly switches from one geographical dimension to another without so much as a warning.

And what does he mean by leadership? On what? If we confine the question to security issues in Northeast Asia, the most important arena is the Six-Party talks. But Japan is not the one who holds the most important cards there. China and South Korea continue to provide sustenance for North Korea.

It is at least conceivable that if Japan agreed to normalize relations with North Korea and cough up the billions of dollars of assistance as the means to "settle the past", the argument could be made that Japan and South Korea could make peace with North Korea and tell the US that there is no longer a security threat in Northeast Asia so thank you we no longer need your services. Leaving aside my suspicions that the current North Korean regime will not like that turn of events, the one thing that is standing in the way of Japan amending its ways has nothing to do with the "history issues".

I am talking, of course, about the abductees issue.

So much for the situation on the Korean Peninsula. As for Taiwan, the one other substantial, if much smaller, cloud on the horizon, our strategic ambiguity is only remotely related to "history issues", in the sense that many pro-Taiwan politicians in Japan harbor a very positive view of the pre-WW II Japanese role there, which independence-minded Taiwanese exploit to the fullest. But it is far more driven by the need to accommodate the national security relationship Japan has with the US, again only tangentially connected with "history issues". For lesser issues, such as the disagreement over the Senkaku Islands and the more pressing dispute over the conflicting claims over EEZ covering most significantly offshore gas fields, there is little reason to believe that China would be any more accommodating if Japan were to officially and unconditionally accept Beijing's line on "history issues". On both issues, each state will do what it can get away with; at most, "history issues" have a marginal effect on the rhetoric.

More important in this respect are the low-key but substantive coordination based on mutual interests that continue between the two states. Most recently, Japan and China reached agreement on the substance of a bilateral treaty for mutual assistance on criminal law enforcement. More broadly and to the point, our military vessels and defense ministers are now calling on each other and the two states are gearing up to set up hotlines and other means of cooperation. And all it has taken is Prime Minister Abe staying away from Yasukuni Shrine.

The one example often given by the pundit that is related to the leadership question is China's opposition to Japan's bid to become a member of the UN Security Council. Leaving aside for this occasion the existence of other constraints (including US opposition to the substantial expansion of the Security Council to accommodate the wishes of other nations and groups there of that believe that they too should be permanently represented), as well as my highly skeptical views on the value of the UN, it has mainly been the US that has used the Security Council for its purposes. The other permanent members are either fellow travelers or obstacles for the US. Will it be any different with Japan on board?

The pundit's arguments have little to do with the realities on the ground and very much to do with the sequence of events that Prime Minister Koizumi's Yasukuni visits touched off that nobody, not least of all Beijing, wanted, and everybody but the pundit has worked assiduously to roll back, with the singular, symbolic act of Yauskuni abstinence on the part of our current Prime Minister.

A final point. By now, you may have guessed what my personal subset of "history issues" is. It is the legacy from the more than 90 years since the arrival of the Black Ships and more specifically since 1937 (1931? 1941?) up to the end of WW II. It is the resultant fear of overseas military engagement and, to a much lesser degree, the vague sense of guilt towards our Northeast Asian Sinic neighbors that is holding us back. Politicians, given their professional interests, tend to feel strongly about this, if the left and the right are diametrically opposed to each other in drawing their policy implications from this. For the public in general, this is a matter of decidedly low-priority. Having seen the awful outcome of international intervention in the Middle East, I tend more and more to side with the - relatively speaking - non-committal masses here.

What, Us Worry? The Chinese Product Safety Scare

China has its own "Oh, no, not again" problem, as WaPo puts Mattel's third recall of Chinese-made products on the first page of the Sept. 5 Business section. In fact, rarely a day seems to go by without media reports on the Chinese product safety issue. The public outcry seems to be quite substantial, and Congress is likely to pass legislation – mainly symbolic in the short run – that in effect targets Chinese exports to the US by the end of the year. The trail does not stop at the borders either, as the WaPo front page on the same day has another article that displays a less accommodating attitude to its Southeast Asian trading on the same issue.

Compared to this, worries and protests seem to be muted in usually safety-conscious, risk-averse Japan. True, grown-in-China eel disappeared from one of the nearby supermarkets (but not the other) more than a month ago, and I myself have been avoiding Chinese food products (but not Chinese food) when I have the choice, like buying twice-as-expensive domestic garlic. Still, the processed foods shelves continue to display a wide array of Chinese products and products with Chinese ingredients. I'm both too old and too young to have a handle on toys, but the formaldehyde-clothing scare that swept the US, Australia and New Zealand seems to have passed little noticed here.

Like I said, the Japanese public tends to be safety-conscious and risk-averse to a fault. Is it just the lack of domestic victims to stoke the fire? Heavy direct investments into China with concomitant product control easing public concerns? Lack of special interests lobbying against Chinese products? I don't have the confidence to offer any kind of definitive answer. In fact, I may be overestimating the difference between Japan and China on this issue. But I do think that it's real, and I'd like how you feel, and what, if you agree with me, the reasons are.

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As I wrote here, there will be times when it is the Japanese media that runs with the China angle. But note that Yomiuri carried it as a US news item, without any reference to any Japanese implications.

AFL-CIO Hosts the Democratic Presidential Candidates Forum, and Yomiuri Goes with Senator Clinton Bashing China.

The headline of the Japanese-language article reads: "I Won't Eat Horrible Quality Chinese Food Products" Senator Clinton Declares.. According to the article, she said that "we need to deal with Chinese manipulation of its currency" and went on to state that "strict standards should be imposed on imports from China" and that she "wouldn't eat horrible quality Chinese food, nor would [she] buy toys that made children sick." She received "applause and cheers". Barack Obama and John Edwards were also quoted in what "created an appearance of China bashing". (The online Asahi does not mention the debate at all.)

Compare this with the US media, such as the WaPo, which focused on the efforts of the candidates to show off their pro-labor credentials, as well as the war on terror (with Mr. Obama's designs on targets in Pakistan serving as the bone of contention); the NYT, which went mainly with immigration as a labor issue, with a brief Obama/Pakistan coda; and the AP by way of WaPo, which covered more or less the same ground as the lengthier WaPo original. But nowhere in any of these articles, or anywhere else on the English-language sites that I follow, is there any mention of China. Even AFL-CIO's own weblog, which covered the event extensively, ignores it altogether.

This contrast in media perspective reflects a huge gap in the ways the two nations each see the world. In Japan, the US and China are seen as the main external forces shaping our policy agenda. In the US, the China question still lacks immediacy in the political debate. It will figure more prominently there as various pieces of protectionist legislation make their way through Congress and presidential candidates work hard to show their pro-American credentials and look responsible at the same time. The human right issue should also become an important part of mainly the Democratic debate as the August 2008 Beijing Olympics draws near. But even then, China does not figure to be a decisive issue in the 2008 elections.

The number one external issue for the US is, of course, the conflation of the war on terror and the war in Iraq. In bypassing the commotion altogether, the Japanese media reminds us that, for us, the war on terror and the war on Iraq are distant events on foreign shores and hills and vales. And it is this gap that complicates the most immediate problem facing the divided Diet: the extension of the anti-terrorism act, which expires on November 1.

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You can find what the candidates said about China here and here. For your convenience, I've copied Ms. Clinton's comments here:

SEN. CLINTON: I want to say amen to Joe Biden, because he’s 100 percent right. You know, six and a half years ago, we had a balanced budget and a surplus; now we are in deep debt with a rising deficit, and it is absolutely true that George Bush has put it on the credit card, expecting our children and grandchildren to pay for it. We’ve got to get back to fiscal responsibility in order to undercut the Chinese power over us because of the debt we hold.

We also have to deal with their currency manipulation. We have to have tougher standards on what they import into this country. I do not want to eat bad food from China or have my children having toys that are going to get them sick. So let’s be tougher on China going forward. (Cheers, applause.)