The latest DPJ idea of proposing to continue the deliberation of the new anti-terror bill aimed at resuming refueling operation in the next Diet session had been at best a symbolic gesture, since the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition would be using the Lower House supermajority override during this Diet session regardless of what course the Upper House did (vote it down, extend or let it die*). The idea was that the ruling coalition would look more unreasonable in exercising the override in the face of an offer to continue Upper House deliberations rather than a no-vote or outright vote-down**. However, this distinction seemed to be lost on all but the DPJ’s leadership, giving rise to speculation in the media that the real reason for its latest maneuver stemmed from its fear that some of its Upper House members would actually vote for the bill. In any case, the other opposition parties in the Upper House, who had become increasingly annoyed at the DPJ since Ichirō Ozawa’s ill-fated attempt at a Grand Coalition, mercifully put it down.
In gauging the significance of this latest in the twist and turns that the DPJ has taken on the Japanese response to the War on Terror***, it is worth noting that most of the changes in direction except Mr. Ozawa’s initial opposition have had everything to do with poll-driven tactics and nothing to do with statecraft. In fact, some DPJ leaders such as Yukio Hatoyama were quite frank about this, routinely admitting that the DPJ would decide whether to do this (say, introduce a bill of its own) or that (say, hold an vote on the bill before the 60-day deadline) depending on the dictates of public opinion. This dithering and drifting on the part of the DPJ leadership is, of course, a reflection of deep fissures within the party on defense policy and more broadly on Article 9, a part of which can be traced to its varied origins. Luckily, the Japanese public had long decided that there were other, more compelling issues on the table****, so it appears to be doing little lasting damage to its credibility.
And with that out of the way, everybody should be ready for the popularity contest － will they bribe us with our (and your gaijin) money? － in the regular Diet session to begin. With the budget-related laws on deck － passing the budget itself will be a snap, since it is the de facto prerogative of the Lower House － the twisted Diet goes into truly uncharted waters. Keep in mind that it’s the measures that expire on April 1 that will be at the center of attention. If you have to keep an eye on one key item in that group, the gasoline tax, for mainly technical reasons but partly because of dissent within the LDP and DPJ, is the one. The unfolding Moriya et al scandal will serve as an unpredictable Greek chorus*****.
* A bit of parliamentary arcana: At the end of a Diet session, the two Houses must each make a decision on any bill (or any other issue that requires the decision of the Diet) that remains outstanding in that House. It can do nothing, which causes the bill to die, or decide by the usual simple majority vote to continue deliberation in the next Diet session. In the first case, the bill, if desired, must be introduced and go through the full legislative process all over again. In the latter, deliberations resume where it went off, and all previous decisions (such as the adoption of the bill by the other House) remain valid.
** Even more arcane arcana: The extension traditionally is given at the end of the Diet session in a single vote covering all the outstanding bills that the House has agreed to extend deliberations for; the DPJ wanted to vote for the extension of the anti-terror billbefore the 60-day limit expired and the Lower House could hold the override vote.
*** Which, I repeat is a policing action, not a war in the legal sense. The term itself is a mixed-up metaphor that the Bush administration used to its advantage
**** Mystifying to me is why the DPJ isn’t hitting the LDP harder on the Moriya et al scandal. Granted, this is still national security, but potential exposure of corruption has a visceral appeal that is lacking in the image of JSDF boats going back to the Indian Ocean.
.
***** I think that the chances of Fumio Kyūma being thrown under the bus has increased substantially.
Wednesday, January 09, 2008
バラック・オバマは小泉ならず
これは、直前のポストの日本語版です。説明のための語句を若干加えたほかは、内容に変更がありません。
Since the previous post may be making a self-evident point with regard to American readers, I’ve done a Japanese language version as well. There are a few minor explanatory additions. Otherwise, it’s a straight translation.
ニュー・ハンプシャーの大統領予備選をフォローしているのですが、ヒラリー・クリントンが順調に票を伸ばしていることに極めて驚いています。どうやら、米国のメディアが全体としてクリントン氏をあれだけ貶める一方でバラック・オバマのオーラに感服するのがあまりにも説得的だったので、実際に結果がでるまで私の脳が待ちきれなくなっていたようです。このポストを書いている現在、クリントン氏がわずかにリードしているという状況であって、結果が反対に転ぶこともありえます。だが、予備選全体との関連でいえば、それはもはや関係ないことです。というのも、クリントン氏が、共和党支持者や浮動票はともかくとして、本当の民主党支持者を自分の下にとどめておくことができることをすでにここで証明したからです。それでアイオワでの敗北後に懸念された政治献金も引き続き入ってくるでしょうし、クリントン陣営に取り込まれている人々も逃げ出さないでしょう。
というわけで、ニュー・ハンプシャーでの最終結果の如何にかかわらず、かつて小泉純一郎がやったように澎湃とわき起こる草の根の支持（と言っても、小泉氏の場合と同様、そう受け止められる、という部分もあるわけですが）をもとに党幹部達やクリントン陣営に乗っかった人々に自分への支持を余儀なくさせる、ということをオバマ氏がやってのける可能性は、がくんと下がってしましました。これでクリントン氏が2月5日の特特大版予備選シリーズ、いわゆるSuper Duper Tuesdayまでの間、引き続き全力投球するということ以外にするべきことと言えば、オバマ氏と並んでもう一人の「変革の候補者」であるジョン・エドワーズが早々に撤退しないよう祈ることぐらいです。
もしこれがギャンブルの対象になるのであれば、共和党のジョン・マケインとクリントン氏の戦いになるという目に賭けるでしょう。イラクへの兵力増派が － あくまで軍事的にという点においてですが － うまくいっていることがイラク戦争への姿勢でそれぞれ批判を受けてきている候補者二人を意外なところで助けている、というわけです。さあ、これで誰か、イラクの全面的な内戦が発生するのを大規模な米軍が恒久的に駐留することなく阻止する計画を持っている向きがいらっしゃればいいのですが・・・
Since the previous post may be making a self-evident point with regard to American readers, I’ve done a Japanese language version as well. There are a few minor explanatory additions. Otherwise, it’s a straight translation.
ニュー・ハンプシャーの大統領予備選をフォローしているのですが、ヒラリー・クリントンが順調に票を伸ばしていることに極めて驚いています。どうやら、米国のメディアが全体としてクリントン氏をあれだけ貶める一方でバラック・オバマのオーラに感服するのがあまりにも説得的だったので、実際に結果がでるまで私の脳が待ちきれなくなっていたようです。このポストを書いている現在、クリントン氏がわずかにリードしているという状況であって、結果が反対に転ぶこともありえます。だが、予備選全体との関連でいえば、それはもはや関係ないことです。というのも、クリントン氏が、共和党支持者や浮動票はともかくとして、本当の民主党支持者を自分の下にとどめておくことができることをすでにここで証明したからです。それでアイオワでの敗北後に懸念された政治献金も引き続き入ってくるでしょうし、クリントン陣営に取り込まれている人々も逃げ出さないでしょう。
というわけで、ニュー・ハンプシャーでの最終結果の如何にかかわらず、かつて小泉純一郎がやったように澎湃とわき起こる草の根の支持（と言っても、小泉氏の場合と同様、そう受け止められる、という部分もあるわけですが）をもとに党幹部達やクリントン陣営に乗っかった人々に自分への支持を余儀なくさせる、ということをオバマ氏がやってのける可能性は、がくんと下がってしましました。これでクリントン氏が2月5日の特特大版予備選シリーズ、いわゆるSuper Duper Tuesdayまでの間、引き続き全力投球するということ以外にするべきことと言えば、オバマ氏と並んでもう一人の「変革の候補者」であるジョン・エドワーズが早々に撤退しないよう祈ることぐらいです。
もしこれがギャンブルの対象になるのであれば、共和党のジョン・マケインとクリントン氏の戦いになるという目に賭けるでしょう。イラクへの兵力増派が － あくまで軍事的にという点においてですが － うまくいっていることがイラク戦争への姿勢でそれぞれ批判を受けてきている候補者二人を意外なところで助けている、というわけです。さあ、これで誰か、イラクの全面的な内戦が発生するのを大規模な米軍が恒久的に駐留することなく阻止する計画を持っている向きがいらっしゃればいいのですが・・・
Obama Will Not Do a Koizumi
I’ve been watching the New Hampshire primary and am very surprised to see Hillary Clinton doing so well. Apparently, the media did such a good job of putting her down overall and being awed and inspired by Barack Obama that my brain stopped waiting till the facts actually came in. As of this moment, Mrs. Clinton’s lead is fairly slim in the reported vote count and the result could go the other way. That does not really matter for the primaries and caucuses, since Mrs. Clinton has already shown here that she can carry the party faithful. That should keep the money flowing and her extended team on the wagon.
So regardless of the ultimate outcome, the chances of Mr. Obama doing a Koizumi and taking a groundswell of grassroots support (if, as in Koizumi’s case, partly the perception thereof) to force the party leadership and people riding on the Clinton machine to back him have fallen precipitously. Now, all Mrs. Clinton has to do, other than continue to work like hell, until the February 5 Super Duper Tuesday bash is pray that John Edwards does not drop out any time soon.
McCain vs. Clinton, if I were a betting man. Amazing how the success － militarily － of the troop surge in Iraq is working out. Now if only anyone had a plan to avoid an all-out civil war in Iraq without a substantial and permanent U.S. presence there…
ADD: Boy, talk about a short shelflife…
So regardless of the ultimate outcome, the chances of Mr. Obama doing a Koizumi and taking a groundswell of grassroots support (if, as in Koizumi’s case, partly the perception thereof) to force the party leadership and people riding on the Clinton machine to back him have fallen precipitously. Now, all Mrs. Clinton has to do, other than continue to work like hell, until the February 5 Super Duper Tuesday bash is pray that John Edwards does not drop out any time soon.
McCain vs. Clinton, if I were a betting man. Amazing how the success － militarily － of the troop surge in Iraq is working out. Now if only anyone had a plan to avoid an all-out civil war in Iraq without a substantial and permanent U.S. presence there…
ADD: Boy, talk about a short shelflife…
Saturday, January 05, 2008
Good Example of the Need to Look behind the Numbers
National Journal debunks an estimate of Iraqi deaths since the U.S. went to war there in 2003. It highlights the dangers of failing to look behind the numbers. I found it through the Real Clear Politics website.
Glenn Greenwald Comments on Media Bias
In case you haven’t seen this, Glenn Greenwald posts on a phenomenon that I’ve commented on here, namely the media’s tendency to play favorites. Management and creative skills do not always come packaged with a pleasant demeanor. To use the examples in Glenn Greenwald’s post, Let me put it this way, who would you rather live next door to, Hillary Clinton the Clintons or George Bush the Bushes? Assuming, of course, that you can put Iraq out of your mind.
Parsing the Recent Flurry of Inactivity over the North Korea’s Nuclear Program
The 31 December deadline for North Korea to disable three nuclear facilities including the Yongbyon reactors and to provide a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear program passed without comment from the North Korean government. It did not escape notice by the Bush administration though, which issued this statement through the U.S. State Department on December 30. The following is a somewhat ungrammatical excerpt that initially reveals its displeasure, putting the blame on the North Korean side on both counts:
It is unfortunate that North Korea has not yet met its commitments by providing a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs and slowing down the process of disablement.
However, the following day, the White House seemed to give North Korea a pass, as the following excerpt from this press gaggle* at the White House shows:
“The United States actually slowed down part of the disablement process, and that is not something that we blamed the North Koreans for, but we wanted that to be done in a safe and secure manner. So we are not blaming the North Koreans for the slowdown in that disablement process”.
North Korea, took the bait and bit off more by way of a January 4 Foreign Ministry statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency of D.P.R.K., the state wire service (but not yet available on the KCNA English page). The following is an excerpt of sorts from this NYTarticle:
North Korea said the disablement work at Yongbyon was “completed within the technologically possible scope as of Dec. 31.”
But since the aid** delivery “has not been done even 50 percent,” the North had to “adjust the speed of the nuclear disablement process,” it said. The work of unloading spent fuel rods from the North’s nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, a crucial part of the disablement, will take an additional 100 days, it said.
North Korea appears to agree with the White House that they carry no blame for not meeting the deadline. Although there is a whiff of that maddening ESL/partial-quote vagueness here, it appears that the North Korean “adjustment” is the threat of a post-December 31 delay, and does not refer to the pre-deadline “slowdown”. The following excerpt from a subsequent January 4 press briefing shows the U.S. State Department also taking that tack and choosing to all but ignore the North Korean threat:
We also look forward to their completing the disablement phase up at Yongbyon. That is moving forward and there is good progress on that.
So the opening North Korean bid for 2008 seems to be:
Half of Phase Two for half the 1,000,000 tons HFE.
Clearly, this part of the deal is doable. But the other half － the “complete and correct declaration” of the North Korean nuclear program － looks far more difficult. On that point, KCNA has, again according to the NYT article, the following:
The [North Korean Foreign Ministry’s] statement said that North Korea had already conducted “enough discussions” with the United States officials after they demanded more negotiations on its November draft declaration and that “[a]s far as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some quarters is concerned, the D.P.R.K. has done what it should do.”
This claim could have been interpreted to mean that North Korea would not give any more information on the uranium enrichment program that it had denied having once the Six-Party talks began, or on its plutonium stockpile and nuclear explosive devices. The State Department Spokesman chose to give it a positive spin, reminding us of the following:
[T]he fact is they haven't turned in a final declaration yet. They're going to turn that in to the Chinese as chair, conveners of the six-party meetings and we don't have that yet. We look forward to a full and complete declaration.
Further:
And part of the reasons why they are not right now is we are breaking new ground in terms of what we're doing, in terms of disabling Yongbyon and in terms of working with North Korea in the six-party talks to get a full, complete picture of their nuclear program, not something that has ever been done before***.
But even the amount of processed plutonium is in dispute, if the following excerpt from thisWaPo article is to be believed:
A Japanese newspaper quoted North Korean and U.S. officials as saying that the North has reported making about 66 pounds of plutonium, considerably less than U.S. estimates.
The article continues with the following riff on the state sponsors of terrorism list, injecting another element into speculation over North Korean motives:
In Pyongyang, there appears to be anger and frustration over the U.S. government's reluctance to remove North Korea from its list of states that sponsor terrorism.
The Bush administration suggested in October that it would pursue such a removal, but has since made clear that all promises regarding nuclear facilities and programs must first be met.
And there the article abruptly ends, without even a mention of a Japanese role in the alleged U.S. step-back. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the Bush administration standing up to Congress and large segments of the Republican constituency for a deal that takes North Korea off the list without a satisfactory and explainable rendering of its nuclear program. Japanese insistence on the abductees issue should cast a shadow there as well, particularly in light of the 2007 House of Representatives resolution on the comfort women.
As for the Six-Party talks as a whole, the State Department spokesman stated the following in his response to the question on the North Korean statement on the nuclear program:
The first thing I'll note about what they said is that they are committed to the six-party process. That is, I think, the kicker line in their statement and there is every evidence that they are still committed to the six-party process and are moving forward with the implementation of this phase of the agreement as was outlined back in October.
So it looks like the talks will continue, with North Korea extracting the maximum possible from the disablement process and prolonging the nuclear program declaration as long as they can.
It is barely conceivable that the lame-duck Bush administration could bring the North Koreans around to a deal on the declaration that it can defend against Congressional accusations of caving in. But that would require North Korea to make a couple of difficult decisions, at least one of which would completely strip North Korea of the strategic ambiguity that it currently enjoys.
First, the two sides must come up with a plausible explanation of the scope and extent of North Korea’s uranium program, or, much less likely, a convincing case that there is no such thing. This is possible if North Korea determines that its uranium enrichment program is so rudimentary and its lead time accordingly so long that its strategic value is small enough to trade it in for delisting and the rest of the 1,000,000 tons. Let me put it this way; I don’t have any information that shows that to be impossible. But second, the two sides must come up with a plausible explanation of the scope and extent of North Korea’s plutonium stockpile and nuclear arsenal, such as there is. This is far more problematic than the enrichment program. The power, real and imagined, of these two elements that comprise the bulk of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent and serve as the symbol of the conflict with the U.S. is substantially amplified by the opacity of North Korea’s nuclear program. The perception of vulnerability as the result of a defensibly (from the viewpoint of the Bush administration of course) transparent deal will have serious domestic implications for the North Korean regime. Frankly, I don’t see North Korea jumping this shark any time soon, though I hope to be wrong.
Beyond 2008, a Democratic administration could very well re-inject a human rights angle into the picture, adding further complications, even if the Chris-Hill approach survives regime change. Given that the perception of a U.S. threat and the resultant perpetual state of emergency are actually a stabilizing element for the authoritarian regime, and that South Korea and China appear willing to continue to buy off the North Korean regime indefinitely, my money is on phase two extending itself deep into the foreseeable future. And in the less probable case of a North Korean decision to effectively conclude phase two, North Korea will find reasons to perpetuate the Six-Party talks at the threshold of phase three.
The upside, if you can call it that, to these short- and long-term outcomes that I find likely is that they entrench the status quo. The nuclear threat lies dormant in a North Korea in near-institutional stasis, while everyone waits for Kim Jong Il to pass away. This is obviously not the worst case scenario for Japan. For the Fukuda administration, this situation allows it to table a decision on the abductees issue at least until after the next Lower House election, a decision that could open the Prime Minister’s flank to an attack from the LDP right wing.
* Official term.
** The “aid” refers to the 1,000,000 tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent.
*** Note that on this point, the NYT article erroneously links the two sides of the deal, saying, “The State Department’s spokesman, Sean McCormack, said that the United States and the other countries involved in the talks had not reacted more strongly to the missed deadline because foreign nuclear experts were continuing their work to dismantle the Yongbyon plant, hoping through that work to learn more about aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program.” Such discrepancies happen because the State Department correspondent cannot be expected to fully understand a press briefing that covers anything from North Korea’s nuclear program to Kenya’s presidential election. But someone should have checked it against the transcript.
It is unfortunate that North Korea has not yet met its commitments by providing a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs and slowing down the process of disablement.
However, the following day, the White House seemed to give North Korea a pass, as the following excerpt from this press gaggle* at the White House shows:
“The United States actually slowed down part of the disablement process, and that is not something that we blamed the North Koreans for, but we wanted that to be done in a safe and secure manner. So we are not blaming the North Koreans for the slowdown in that disablement process”.
North Korea, took the bait and bit off more by way of a January 4 Foreign Ministry statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency of D.P.R.K., the state wire service (but not yet available on the KCNA English page). The following is an excerpt of sorts from this NYTarticle:
North Korea said the disablement work at Yongbyon was “completed within the technologically possible scope as of Dec. 31.”
But since the aid** delivery “has not been done even 50 percent,” the North had to “adjust the speed of the nuclear disablement process,” it said. The work of unloading spent fuel rods from the North’s nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, a crucial part of the disablement, will take an additional 100 days, it said.
North Korea appears to agree with the White House that they carry no blame for not meeting the deadline. Although there is a whiff of that maddening ESL/partial-quote vagueness here, it appears that the North Korean “adjustment” is the threat of a post-December 31 delay, and does not refer to the pre-deadline “slowdown”. The following excerpt from a subsequent January 4 press briefing shows the U.S. State Department also taking that tack and choosing to all but ignore the North Korean threat:
We also look forward to their completing the disablement phase up at Yongbyon. That is moving forward and there is good progress on that.
So the opening North Korean bid for 2008 seems to be:
Half of Phase Two for half the 1,000,000 tons HFE.
Clearly, this part of the deal is doable. But the other half － the “complete and correct declaration” of the North Korean nuclear program － looks far more difficult. On that point, KCNA has, again according to the NYT article, the following:
The [North Korean Foreign Ministry’s] statement said that North Korea had already conducted “enough discussions” with the United States officials after they demanded more negotiations on its November draft declaration and that “[a]s far as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some quarters is concerned, the D.P.R.K. has done what it should do.”
This claim could have been interpreted to mean that North Korea would not give any more information on the uranium enrichment program that it had denied having once the Six-Party talks began, or on its plutonium stockpile and nuclear explosive devices. The State Department Spokesman chose to give it a positive spin, reminding us of the following:
[T]he fact is they haven't turned in a final declaration yet. They're going to turn that in to the Chinese as chair, conveners of the six-party meetings and we don't have that yet. We look forward to a full and complete declaration.
Further:
And part of the reasons why they are not right now is we are breaking new ground in terms of what we're doing, in terms of disabling Yongbyon and in terms of working with North Korea in the six-party talks to get a full, complete picture of their nuclear program, not something that has ever been done before***.
But even the amount of processed plutonium is in dispute, if the following excerpt from thisWaPo article is to be believed:
A Japanese newspaper quoted North Korean and U.S. officials as saying that the North has reported making about 66 pounds of plutonium, considerably less than U.S. estimates.
The article continues with the following riff on the state sponsors of terrorism list, injecting another element into speculation over North Korean motives:
In Pyongyang, there appears to be anger and frustration over the U.S. government's reluctance to remove North Korea from its list of states that sponsor terrorism.
The Bush administration suggested in October that it would pursue such a removal, but has since made clear that all promises regarding nuclear facilities and programs must first be met.
And there the article abruptly ends, without even a mention of a Japanese role in the alleged U.S. step-back. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the Bush administration standing up to Congress and large segments of the Republican constituency for a deal that takes North Korea off the list without a satisfactory and explainable rendering of its nuclear program. Japanese insistence on the abductees issue should cast a shadow there as well, particularly in light of the 2007 House of Representatives resolution on the comfort women.
As for the Six-Party talks as a whole, the State Department spokesman stated the following in his response to the question on the North Korean statement on the nuclear program:
The first thing I'll note about what they said is that they are committed to the six-party process. That is, I think, the kicker line in their statement and there is every evidence that they are still committed to the six-party process and are moving forward with the implementation of this phase of the agreement as was outlined back in October.
So it looks like the talks will continue, with North Korea extracting the maximum possible from the disablement process and prolonging the nuclear program declaration as long as they can.
It is barely conceivable that the lame-duck Bush administration could bring the North Koreans around to a deal on the declaration that it can defend against Congressional accusations of caving in. But that would require North Korea to make a couple of difficult decisions, at least one of which would completely strip North Korea of the strategic ambiguity that it currently enjoys.
First, the two sides must come up with a plausible explanation of the scope and extent of North Korea’s uranium program, or, much less likely, a convincing case that there is no such thing. This is possible if North Korea determines that its uranium enrichment program is so rudimentary and its lead time accordingly so long that its strategic value is small enough to trade it in for delisting and the rest of the 1,000,000 tons. Let me put it this way; I don’t have any information that shows that to be impossible. But second, the two sides must come up with a plausible explanation of the scope and extent of North Korea’s plutonium stockpile and nuclear arsenal, such as there is. This is far more problematic than the enrichment program. The power, real and imagined, of these two elements that comprise the bulk of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent and serve as the symbol of the conflict with the U.S. is substantially amplified by the opacity of North Korea’s nuclear program. The perception of vulnerability as the result of a defensibly (from the viewpoint of the Bush administration of course) transparent deal will have serious domestic implications for the North Korean regime. Frankly, I don’t see North Korea jumping this shark any time soon, though I hope to be wrong.
Beyond 2008, a Democratic administration could very well re-inject a human rights angle into the picture, adding further complications, even if the Chris-Hill approach survives regime change. Given that the perception of a U.S. threat and the resultant perpetual state of emergency are actually a stabilizing element for the authoritarian regime, and that South Korea and China appear willing to continue to buy off the North Korean regime indefinitely, my money is on phase two extending itself deep into the foreseeable future. And in the less probable case of a North Korean decision to effectively conclude phase two, North Korea will find reasons to perpetuate the Six-Party talks at the threshold of phase three.
The upside, if you can call it that, to these short- and long-term outcomes that I find likely is that they entrench the status quo. The nuclear threat lies dormant in a North Korea in near-institutional stasis, while everyone waits for Kim Jong Il to pass away. This is obviously not the worst case scenario for Japan. For the Fukuda administration, this situation allows it to table a decision on the abductees issue at least until after the next Lower House election, a decision that could open the Prime Minister’s flank to an attack from the LDP right wing.
* Official term.
** The “aid” refers to the 1,000,000 tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent.
*** Note that on this point, the NYT article erroneously links the two sides of the deal, saying, “The State Department’s spokesman, Sean McCormack, said that the United States and the other countries involved in the talks had not reacted more strongly to the missed deadline because foreign nuclear experts were continuing their work to dismantle the Yongbyon plant, hoping through that work to learn more about aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program.” Such discrepancies happen because the State Department correspondent cannot be expected to fully understand a press briefing that covers anything from North Korea’s nuclear program to Kenya’s presidential election. But someone should have checked it against the transcript.
Friday, January 04, 2008
A Few Thoughts on the Post-Lower House General Election
I just posted to the effect that the ruling coalition will win the next Lower House election, or rather, the DPJ will not win. But that does not mean that Prime Minister Fukuda will necessarily be out of the woods.
If the ruling coalition maintains a supermajority, Mr. Fukuda will have a renewed mandate. Heaven has spoken: the coalition will rightfully claim the right to exercise the override more freely, still with care, than in the upcoming regular Diet session. Moreover, even if the coalition loses the supermajority, I expect that Mr. Fukuda can stay on if he wishes as long as the LDP can maintain a symbolic one-party majority; Mr. Asō is not exactly the person you want to put forward as Prime Minister when seeking accommodation with micro-parties to exercise the override or, at worst, with the DPJ, in order to pass sorely-needed legislation. I will not guess at what may happens below that talismanic figure.
It appears that Mr. Fukuda has put a definitive lid on a Cabinet reshuffle. That means that he will keep that card to play for much later, after the Lower House election if it falls within the year. Fukushirō will not go unless the other shoe drops and he becomes yoked with Fumio Kyūma. I think that I should have given more thought to the possibility that a bored press corps travelling with Mr. Fukuda blew it up out of proportions.
If the ruling coalition maintains a supermajority, Mr. Fukuda will have a renewed mandate. Heaven has spoken: the coalition will rightfully claim the right to exercise the override more freely, still with care, than in the upcoming regular Diet session. Moreover, even if the coalition loses the supermajority, I expect that Mr. Fukuda can stay on if he wishes as long as the LDP can maintain a symbolic one-party majority; Mr. Asō is not exactly the person you want to put forward as Prime Minister when seeking accommodation with micro-parties to exercise the override or, at worst, with the DPJ, in order to pass sorely-needed legislation. I will not guess at what may happens below that talismanic figure.
It appears that Mr. Fukuda has put a definitive lid on a Cabinet reshuffle. That means that he will keep that card to play for much later, after the Lower House election if it falls within the year. Fukushirō will not go unless the other shoe drops and he becomes yoked with Fumio Kyūma. I think that I should have given more thought to the possibility that a bored press corps travelling with Mr. Fukuda blew it up out of proportions.
Mr. Ozawa’s New Year’s Day Party Shows a House Divided
Mr. Ozawa’s New Year’s Day Party Shows a House Divided
LDP faction leaders and other party worthies would routinely hold court during the new year’s holidays, while faction members and other Diet members, top bureaucrats, and other supplicants came to pay their respects. Ichirō Ozawa hews to that tradition, and all the dailies dutifully reported (the longest online article can be found here) his statements at his New Year’s Day party that “there will be [a Lower House] election this year, make no mistake about it. Unless we change the political trends, change regimes, the future of Japan is gloomy indeed. This is also the opportunity for the people to make the ultimate choice. We will win with all our might. We will achieve a majority in the Lower House.”
Brave words indeed, since even the somewhat less ambitious goal of denying a comfortable Lower House majority* to the ruling coalition will require at least a couple of more crises that are mishandled or are of such immense proportions that no amount of damage control will suffice. Perhaps he hopes that he can draw the reluctant DPJ into a Grand Coalition if he can deny the ruling coalition An L.H. supermajority. But that is not the point I want to make here.
According to the Asahi article, 50 Diet members, including Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama and Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, attended the party. Today’s (4 January) hardcopy Yomiuri says “over 50 Diet members belonging to the [DPJ] attended”, so let’s say that a little over fifty out of 211 Diet members, or roughly one-fourth of the total came. According to the Yomiuri, the people around Mr. Ozawa were proud of this display of power, claiming that “it was show of the depth of support for Mr. Ozawa”.
Now getting 50 Diet members to show up at your private residence on a day when you might prefer to make the rounds of your constituency or just for once sit around the TV and get gloriously drunk may be an impressive feat. However, you can be sure that if the two Co-Deputy Presidents Naoto Kan and Seiji Maehara, who outrank Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Yamaoka, were there, the media would have taken notice. As if to illustrate the point, the Yomiuri article has a chart of the seven major DPJ groups in order of size**, the Ozawa group (approximately 50), the Kan Group (a. 30), former Socialist Party (a. 30), Hatoyama Group (a. 30), Maehara Group (a. 30), (Yoshihiko) Noda (a. 25), and former Democratic Socialist Party*** members (a. 25). In other words, it is highly likely that almost all of the people who were there were members of Mr. Ozawa’s group and that others, including non-Ozawa-Group DPJ leaders, stayed away.
That is not all. The origins of the seven groups can each be traced back to the times before they came together over the years, ultimately ending up in the current version of the DPJ. The house, it seems, can still be divided, and Mr. Ozawa’s personality and old-school ways have little other to offer to party unity besides elective success.
What does this mean? If, as I have been saying time**** and time again, the Lower House election comes in late summer or beyond but, as Mr. Ozawa claims, within the year, it is more than likely that the snap election will have been called at Mr. Fukuda’s pleasure, diminishing even more the likelihood that the DPJ will be able to deny the ruling coalition at least a comfortable majority*****. In either case, Mr. Ozawa will hand in his pro forma resignation as party leader. But this time, his act worn thin, it is likely that the party faithful will let him ride off into the sunset. As the attendance at his New Year’s Day party shows, the love for Mr. Ozawa extends beyond the ballot box 50-deep, no more.
* I define a comfortable majority as one that will not be threatened by the loss of a few seats in by-elections due to disqualification (e.g. as the result of election law violations), resignation (e.g. to run for governor), and death.
** The rough total comes to 230, substantially more than the 211 DPJ Diet members. That is because there is some overlap, unlike the LDP factions.
*** Not to be confused with the Social Democrats, which is the current English name for the Socialist Party.
**** Note that I did get it spectacularly wrong on Tarō Asō’s prospects. But that was before Mr. Fukuda entered the picture.
***** The supermajority is another animal, and I don’t see a good reason for Mr. Fukuda wanting to call a snap election unless he believes that the ruling coalition has a better than even chance of retaining joint custody. But he must balance that against the possibility of prospects declining as the 2009 expiration date for the current crop of Upper House members approaches, narrowing his options. Thus, the timing is subject to circumstances that become murkier as we look deeper into the future.
LDP faction leaders and other party worthies would routinely hold court during the new year’s holidays, while faction members and other Diet members, top bureaucrats, and other supplicants came to pay their respects. Ichirō Ozawa hews to that tradition, and all the dailies dutifully reported (the longest online article can be found here) his statements at his New Year’s Day party that “there will be [a Lower House] election this year, make no mistake about it. Unless we change the political trends, change regimes, the future of Japan is gloomy indeed. This is also the opportunity for the people to make the ultimate choice. We will win with all our might. We will achieve a majority in the Lower House.”
Brave words indeed, since even the somewhat less ambitious goal of denying a comfortable Lower House majority* to the ruling coalition will require at least a couple of more crises that are mishandled or are of such immense proportions that no amount of damage control will suffice. Perhaps he hopes that he can draw the reluctant DPJ into a Grand Coalition if he can deny the ruling coalition An L.H. supermajority. But that is not the point I want to make here.
According to the Asahi article, 50 Diet members, including Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama and Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, attended the party. Today’s (4 January) hardcopy Yomiuri says “over 50 Diet members belonging to the [DPJ] attended”, so let’s say that a little over fifty out of 211 Diet members, or roughly one-fourth of the total came. According to the Yomiuri, the people around Mr. Ozawa were proud of this display of power, claiming that “it was show of the depth of support for Mr. Ozawa”.
Now getting 50 Diet members to show up at your private residence on a day when you might prefer to make the rounds of your constituency or just for once sit around the TV and get gloriously drunk may be an impressive feat. However, you can be sure that if the two Co-Deputy Presidents Naoto Kan and Seiji Maehara, who outrank Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Yamaoka, were there, the media would have taken notice. As if to illustrate the point, the Yomiuri article has a chart of the seven major DPJ groups in order of size**, the Ozawa group (approximately 50), the Kan Group (a. 30), former Socialist Party (a. 30), Hatoyama Group (a. 30), Maehara Group (a. 30), (Yoshihiko) Noda (a. 25), and former Democratic Socialist Party*** members (a. 25). In other words, it is highly likely that almost all of the people who were there were members of Mr. Ozawa’s group and that others, including non-Ozawa-Group DPJ leaders, stayed away.
That is not all. The origins of the seven groups can each be traced back to the times before they came together over the years, ultimately ending up in the current version of the DPJ. The house, it seems, can still be divided, and Mr. Ozawa’s personality and old-school ways have little other to offer to party unity besides elective success.
What does this mean? If, as I have been saying time**** and time again, the Lower House election comes in late summer or beyond but, as Mr. Ozawa claims, within the year, it is more than likely that the snap election will have been called at Mr. Fukuda’s pleasure, diminishing even more the likelihood that the DPJ will be able to deny the ruling coalition at least a comfortable majority*****. In either case, Mr. Ozawa will hand in his pro forma resignation as party leader. But this time, his act worn thin, it is likely that the party faithful will let him ride off into the sunset. As the attendance at his New Year’s Day party shows, the love for Mr. Ozawa extends beyond the ballot box 50-deep, no more.
* I define a comfortable majority as one that will not be threatened by the loss of a few seats in by-elections due to disqualification (e.g. as the result of election law violations), resignation (e.g. to run for governor), and death.
** The rough total comes to 230, substantially more than the 211 DPJ Diet members. That is because there is some overlap, unlike the LDP factions.
*** Not to be confused with the Social Democrats, which is the current English name for the Socialist Party.
**** Note that I did get it spectacularly wrong on Tarō Asō’s prospects. But that was before Mr. Fukuda entered the picture.
***** The supermajority is another animal, and I don’t see a good reason for Mr. Fukuda wanting to call a snap election unless he believes that the ruling coalition has a better than even chance of retaining joint custody. But he must balance that against the possibility of prospects declining as the 2009 expiration date for the current crop of Upper House members approaches, narrowing his options. Thus, the timing is subject to circumstances that become murkier as we look deeper into the future.
The Economist Does a (Relatively) Good Job on Salarymen
I found the article through the Shisaku blog, and couldn't resist commenting. As I finished writing, I saw that two new comments had popped up and, being the busybody that I am, commented on those as well. Since my comment in its entirety is fairly long, I'm going to claim it as my post of the day and sit around vegetating for the rest of the day.
Thursday, January 03, 2008
How Empires Deal with History: Rewrite It, Said Prime Minister Fukuda
In this English language version of his New Year's greetings (the long version), Prime Minister Fukuda says, “One hundred years ago, in nineteen-oh-eight, the Russo-Japan War ended, ushering in a period of respite for Japan…” Yet we have no plans to celebrate that great victory. And Mr. Fukuda calls it the Russo-Japan, not Japan-Russia, War. And is the Nippon Kaigi doing anything about this? The sissies!
A more accurate re-rendition of the Japanese original would be, “A hundred years ago, Japan had seen the end of the Russo-Japan War and was enjoying a period of respite...”
A more accurate re-rendition of the Japanese original would be, “A hundred years ago, Japan had seen the end of the Russo-Japan War and was enjoying a period of respite...”
Relive William Howard Taft’s Trip to the Far East
Here’s the NYT article. Go and see the exhibit if you can.
But “a pivotal time in America’s diplomatic past, a moment when the country was beginning to flex its imperialist muscles”? “Pivotal” I can understand, but hadn’t the U.S. mostly done its thing by then, with Spain, Mexico and the rest, including Hawaii? After that, I thought that it was mostly consolidation and defense, as the U.S. had now become a status quo power. Vaguely revisionist? It is the Arts & Design section.
But “a pivotal time in America’s diplomatic past, a moment when the country was beginning to flex its imperialist muscles”? “Pivotal” I can understand, but hadn’t the U.S. mostly done its thing by then, with Spain, Mexico and the rest, including Hawaii? After that, I thought that it was mostly consolidation and defense, as the U.S. had now become a status quo power. Vaguely revisionist? It is the Arts & Design section.
BBC Hearts Deepak Chopra? Me Salve Deus!
Faithful readers have been aware of my disenchantment with BBC as a credible news outlet. On 31 December, in a fawning, one-hour interview of Deepak Chopra, a BBC “Sorry I Don’t Do Hard Talk” host lobbed one softball question after another without even any follow-up questions. I looked through the BCC website, but could not find a trace. I hope that it was a bad dream.
In case you don’t know who Mr. Chopra is, he is a medical doctor by training who makes a lot of money by connecting sound medical facts to gooey New Age blather. Think, Hiroyuki Ehara with an M.D. …if I only knew how they did it…
Speaking of BBC, read this. To quote:
Since the landmark disarmament deal was agreed in February, North Korea has closed its main reactor at Yongbyon. Steps are currently underway to permanently disable it.
But the second stage of the process - a written declaration providing a complete account of all Pyongyang's nuclear activities - has proved more problematic.
In fact, this is not as ridiculous as it seems. U.S. authorities are letting it leak that North Korea missing the Yongbyon deadline (which the BCC unknowingly overlooks altogether) is a technical glitch, and will be rectified in a few months. We’ll see.
In case you don’t know who Mr. Chopra is, he is a medical doctor by training who makes a lot of money by connecting sound medical facts to gooey New Age blather. Think, Hiroyuki Ehara with an M.D. …if I only knew how they did it…
Speaking of BBC, read this. To quote:
Since the landmark disarmament deal was agreed in February, North Korea has closed its main reactor at Yongbyon. Steps are currently underway to permanently disable it.
But the second stage of the process - a written declaration providing a complete account of all Pyongyang's nuclear activities - has proved more problematic.
In fact, this is not as ridiculous as it seems. U.S. authorities are letting it leak that North Korea missing the Yongbyon deadline (which the BCC unknowingly overlooks altogether) is a technical glitch, and will be rectified in a few months. We’ll see.
Why Did the US Vote for Kibaki then Vote against Him?
In a move reminiscent of the premature endorsement of the unsuccessful attempt to unseat Hugo Chavez in 2002, the U.S. withdrew its initial congratulations to Kenyan incumbent and President-Elect Mwai Kibaki.
Why the flip-flop? First of all, Ms. Rice was never that good in the first place. Second, and this is more important, political appointees and career officials alike have been bailing out, and nobody who’s any good is going to climb on board for a one year ride on a sinking ship. There are simply not enough people to keep watch beyond the Middle East.
Playing short-handed has repercussions here in Northeast Asia as well, where the prospects of an uneasy stalemate that I first speculated on here has grown. The U.S. Congress is not going to let the Bush administration give Chris Hill his “deal at any price”, while North Korea appears to be willing to play the short game only. And I will be surprised if the U.S. Congress ratifies the FTA with South Korea, even though the climate should be improved under the new South Korean president.
Why the flip-flop? First of all, Ms. Rice was never that good in the first place. Second, and this is more important, political appointees and career officials alike have been bailing out, and nobody who’s any good is going to climb on board for a one year ride on a sinking ship. There are simply not enough people to keep watch beyond the Middle East.
Playing short-handed has repercussions here in Northeast Asia as well, where the prospects of an uneasy stalemate that I first speculated on here has grown. The U.S. Congress is not going to let the Bush administration give Chris Hill his “deal at any price”, while North Korea appears to be willing to play the short game only. And I will be surprised if the U.S. Congress ratifies the FTA with South Korea, even though the climate should be improved under the new South Korean president.
Wednesday, January 02, 2008
Most of You Have Not Heard of Nippon Kaigi
Nippon Kaigi, established in 1997, is widely regarded as Japan’s largest nationalist organization. According to its website, its basic tenets are the following:
－ We inherit the traditions and culture that have been nurtured by our timeless history, and aspire to the ascendance of a healthy national spirit.
－ We maintain the glory and the self-reliance and the independence of the nation, and seek the construction of a prosperous and orderly society where all members of the nation obtain their [rightful] places.
－ We strive for harmony between humanity and nature, and contribute to the realization of a world of mutual existence and co-prosperity where each culture is mutually respected.
More specifically, Nippon Kaigi believes that we, that is, yours truly and other Japanese, should return to the traditional sense of unity focused on the Imperial Household. It believes that we should adopt a new constitution that reflects our national ethos that has been nurtured throughout our history. It rejects the “apology” diplomacy that unilaterally condemns ourselves over the last world war and seeks to achieve a true conservative politics. In education, it seeks history education that transmits our proud history, tradition and culture and education of the sensibilities that enables the recovery of our pristine virtues. It seeks to improve national security and contribute to world peace by, among other things, nurturing the people’s sense of reverence towards those who died in the war. Finally, it seeks world friendship.
It is chaired by Tōru Miyoshi, an 80 year old former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It has seven, mostly even older, advisors (ninety and up; one of them is actually dead), four of who are Shintō priests and one the previous head of the powerful Tendai Buddhist Sect. The other two are ex-CEOs of Bridgestone Tires and Fujitsū. Its six vice chairmen are mostly secular (only one Shintō priest), and even includes one 90 year old women, a former politician and singer of mainly children’s songs. Its fifty-five representative committee members include younger names, some of which might be recognizable to casual observers of the Japanese scene, such as Shintarō Ishihara, Tokyo Governor and man who can say no, Hiroo Onoda, the former intelligence officer who held out in the Philippines jungles for 29 years after the war ended, and Kishō Kurokawa, the world-famous architect and urban planner (also dead). It has two auditors, a president, and two managing directors to actually run things, but they are of no interest to you.
What could be of interest to you is Nippon Kaigi’s sister organization, the Nippon Kaigi Giin Kondankai, the bipartisan (mainly LDP, but some DPJ as well) association of Diet members who support the goals of this organization. Its members numbered 235 as of 2005 July. It passed a resolution in 2005 November on the following points:
－ Imperial succession is an important matter of state, and should be subordinated to careful deliberation and acceptance by the people. (This point is a negative reaction to the recommendation in a report commissioned by Prime Minister Koizumi that females should also be allowed to succeed to the throne.)
－ We support the visit of the Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine and oppose the construction of a national facility for mourning. (No explanation needed here.)
－ We oppose the human rights protection bill that may invite oppression of speech and human rights. (This concern was heightened by the fact that non-Japanese citizens who may have “prejudiced tendencies” could be selected to serve as human rights protection committee members.)
The Giin Kondankai is headed by Takeo Hiranuma, the still highly influential Post Office privatization castoff, with Shōichi Nakagawa as his regent. (Fukushirō Nukaga is the deputy.) But it is in the list of members that you will find names that will make your eyes pop out. For, according to Wikipedia, among its members are:
Yasuo Fukuda, Sadakazu Tanigaki.
Every nation has its own narrative, and its denizens are entitled to seek to mold it to their liking. In this particular case, I see nothing in a nation that allows such political and social discourse to develop that is any more alarming than a nation that demands schoolchildren, citizen and non- alike, to pledge allegiance to a Republic under one God. Or a nation that has crossed arms in the last 60 years with most of its neighbors (Japan being one of the few exceptions). But feel free to disagree.
－ We inherit the traditions and culture that have been nurtured by our timeless history, and aspire to the ascendance of a healthy national spirit.
－ We maintain the glory and the self-reliance and the independence of the nation, and seek the construction of a prosperous and orderly society where all members of the nation obtain their [rightful] places.
－ We strive for harmony between humanity and nature, and contribute to the realization of a world of mutual existence and co-prosperity where each culture is mutually respected.
More specifically, Nippon Kaigi believes that we, that is, yours truly and other Japanese, should return to the traditional sense of unity focused on the Imperial Household. It believes that we should adopt a new constitution that reflects our national ethos that has been nurtured throughout our history. It rejects the “apology” diplomacy that unilaterally condemns ourselves over the last world war and seeks to achieve a true conservative politics. In education, it seeks history education that transmits our proud history, tradition and culture and education of the sensibilities that enables the recovery of our pristine virtues. It seeks to improve national security and contribute to world peace by, among other things, nurturing the people’s sense of reverence towards those who died in the war. Finally, it seeks world friendship.
It is chaired by Tōru Miyoshi, an 80 year old former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It has seven, mostly even older, advisors (ninety and up; one of them is actually dead), four of who are Shintō priests and one the previous head of the powerful Tendai Buddhist Sect. The other two are ex-CEOs of Bridgestone Tires and Fujitsū. Its six vice chairmen are mostly secular (only one Shintō priest), and even includes one 90 year old women, a former politician and singer of mainly children’s songs. Its fifty-five representative committee members include younger names, some of which might be recognizable to casual observers of the Japanese scene, such as Shintarō Ishihara, Tokyo Governor and man who can say no, Hiroo Onoda, the former intelligence officer who held out in the Philippines jungles for 29 years after the war ended, and Kishō Kurokawa, the world-famous architect and urban planner (also dead). It has two auditors, a president, and two managing directors to actually run things, but they are of no interest to you.
What could be of interest to you is Nippon Kaigi’s sister organization, the Nippon Kaigi Giin Kondankai, the bipartisan (mainly LDP, but some DPJ as well) association of Diet members who support the goals of this organization. Its members numbered 235 as of 2005 July. It passed a resolution in 2005 November on the following points:
－ Imperial succession is an important matter of state, and should be subordinated to careful deliberation and acceptance by the people. (This point is a negative reaction to the recommendation in a report commissioned by Prime Minister Koizumi that females should also be allowed to succeed to the throne.)
－ We support the visit of the Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine and oppose the construction of a national facility for mourning. (No explanation needed here.)
－ We oppose the human rights protection bill that may invite oppression of speech and human rights. (This concern was heightened by the fact that non-Japanese citizens who may have “prejudiced tendencies” could be selected to serve as human rights protection committee members.)
The Giin Kondankai is headed by Takeo Hiranuma, the still highly influential Post Office privatization castoff, with Shōichi Nakagawa as his regent. (Fukushirō Nukaga is the deputy.) But it is in the list of members that you will find names that will make your eyes pop out. For, according to Wikipedia, among its members are:
Yasuo Fukuda, Sadakazu Tanigaki.
Every nation has its own narrative, and its denizens are entitled to seek to mold it to their liking. In this particular case, I see nothing in a nation that allows such political and social discourse to develop that is any more alarming than a nation that demands schoolchildren, citizen and non- alike, to pledge allegiance to a Republic under one God. Or a nation that has crossed arms in the last 60 years with most of its neighbors (Japan being one of the few exceptions). But feel free to disagree.
Monday, December 31, 2007
Re: Is This Chinese Gamesmanship over Taiwan or What?
Having gone over the media references to Prime Minister Fukuda’s comments with regard to Taiwan, I find them less revealing than I had thought. However, I believe that they are still notable enough for a post of their own. Excerpts and their translations are given below.
I looked at the conservative Sankei’s take on the mistranslation of Prime Minister Fukuda’s carefully rendered comment on Taiwan independence. But how did the others treat it? The leftish Asahi just skipped the matter altogether and went straight to Prime Minister Wen’s reiteration of Prime Minister Fukuda’s “non-support” for the referendum. Usually slightly to Asahi’s right, Mainichi, in giving the story near-equal billing with the gas fields, also ignored Mr. Wen’s translation and noted Mr. Fukuda’s “non-support” for independence. The point of the story was that in Mainichi’s view, Mr. Fukuda had gone somewhat beyond the current Japanese position, if only in nuance. Mainichi also put a totally different spin in contrast to Sankei on the meaning of Mr. Fukuda’s cryptic comment to the effect that he “may have said more than what [he] was questioned by the reporters”. The nationalist but also very pro-China Yomiuri seems to have thought the matter unworthy of mention in its online summaries. (The mistranslation appears to have escaped its notice as well.)
The foreign media does not appear to have noticed their pulses quicken with regard to Japan-on-Taiwan, but the BBC predictably bit the Chinese line. Xinghua, the Chinese state newswire, appears to have gotten it right.
These are online versions of the news. In Japan at least, they are more often than not condensed from the hardcopy versions, and many hardcopy items are passed over altogether. That being said, the Japanese coverage of the incident does appear to reflect the policy preferences of the dailies with regard to China. Even Mr. Fukuda’s comments wound up being parsed in completely different directions, consonant, I add, with the inclinations of the respective journals.
If the mistranslation was intentional, it has served its purpose as far as BBC is concerned. The fact that Xinghua did not repeat the mistake does not sway the conclusion over Chinese intent one way or other; the Chinese authorities are not so stupid as to push their luck that far, after Mr. Fukuda had taken pains to reiterate the official position.
On other matters, the matter of Taiwan, which is scheduled to hold a referendum in March next year on the merits of joining the UN under the name of Taiwan, was taken up and, according to Prime Minister Wen, Prime Minister Fukuda demonstrated the position of not supporting the referendum. (このほか、来年３月に台湾名義での国連加盟の是非を問う住民投票を予定している台湾の問題も取り上げられ、温首相によると、福田首相は住民投票を支持しない立場を示したという。
from ”Quatum Leap in Mutual Relations” Next Year, Japan-China Summit, Gas Field Talks to Be Continued(来年は「関係飛躍」 日中首脳会談 ガス田は協議継続)”Asahi, 27 December 28.
”I may have said more than what I was questioned by the reporters”, Prime Minister Fukuda said at the joint press conference. It was after he had stated clearly that he did not support Taiwan independence and furthermore that he did “not want tension to increase between the two shores (of China and Taiwan) with regard to the referendum in Taiwan”. Prime Minister Wen, who was sitting beside him, nodded strongly and adopted a satisfied expression.
…
Concerning Prime Minister Fukuda’s words, Japanese diplomatic sources admitted, while stating that “the government’s fundamental position remained unchanged”, that they went a little deeper.
In a public forum, such being this [press] conference, Prime Minister Wen, while preceding his remarks with the words “I would like to supplement that on one point”, did not forget to introduce that fact that Prime Minister Fukuda also “expressed his position that he definitely did not support” the referendum during the Prime Ministers’ meeting.
…
China’s tactics are to tighten the “web” around Taiwanese supporters of independence by having the heads of major countries that have influence over Taiwan to express their opposition. Therefore, it is highly significant that it was able to draw out “non-support” from the Prime Minister of Japan, which independence supporters look to [for sustenance].
… 「記者さんから質問を受けた以上のことを申し上げたかもしれない」。福田首相は共同記者会見で述べた。台湾独立を支持しないと明言し、さらに「台湾の住民投票をめぐって、（中台）両岸に緊張が高まるようなことは望んでいない」と言い切った後のことだ。隣に座る温首相は深くうなずき、満足そうな表情 を浮かべた。
台湾の陳水扁政権は来年３月の総統選と同時に台湾の名称で国連加盟を問う住民投票を計画、中国はこれを強く警戒している。
日本外交筋は福田首相の発言について「政府の基本的立場は変わっていない」としながらも、やや踏み込んだものだったと認めた。
温首相は会見という公開の場で「私の方から１点補足したい」と前置きしたうえ、首相同士の会談でも、福田首相が住民投票に「厳正に支持しない立場を表明した」と紹介することも忘れなかった。
「来年は中日友好にとって極めて重要な年」（温首相）。北京五輪、日中平和友好条約締結３０周年を迎えることを指す。だが、これには独立志向の民進党政権が続くか、中台協調を説く国民党が政権を奪還するか、台湾の進路を決める上で大きな意味を持つ総統選も含まれる。
中国は台湾に影響力を持つ主要国首脳に住民投票反対を表明させ、台湾独立派への「包囲網」を狭めていく戦術を取る。それだけに独立派が頼みとする日本の首相から「不支持」を引き出した意味は極めて大きい。
from “Japan-China Summit: China Flexible Stance on Gas Fields; Non-Support for Taiwan Independence, Japan Firmly ‘Cooperative’ (日中首脳会談：中国「ガス田」柔軟姿勢 台湾独立不支持、日本「協調」強く)”Mainichi, 2007 December 29.
Taiwan does not come up in the Yomiuri online articles. It escaped my notice in the hardcopy version as well. Sankei, as I mentioned here, devoted an entire article and a commentary to the controversy. They are too long to translate here, but the basic message is that you can’t trust the Chinese.
Mr Fukuda also reiterated Japan's opposition to Taiwanese independence and voiced his opposition to Taiwan's plans to hold a referendum on UN membership.
from “China and Japan PMs hail progress”BBC, 2007 December 28
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said on Friday that Japan does not support Taiwan authorities' attempts to seek UN membership by "referendum" and moves that may change the status quo of the cross-Strait relationship.
Fukuda said that Japan would give no support to the claims of "one China, one Taiwan", "Taiwan independence" or Taiwan authorities' attempts to join the United Nations and to seek UN membership through a "referendum".
from ”Japan PM states four 'no's on Taiwan issue”, Xinghua by way of China Daily, 2007 December 29.
I looked at the conservative Sankei’s take on the mistranslation of Prime Minister Fukuda’s carefully rendered comment on Taiwan independence. But how did the others treat it? The leftish Asahi just skipped the matter altogether and went straight to Prime Minister Wen’s reiteration of Prime Minister Fukuda’s “non-support” for the referendum. Usually slightly to Asahi’s right, Mainichi, in giving the story near-equal billing with the gas fields, also ignored Mr. Wen’s translation and noted Mr. Fukuda’s “non-support” for independence. The point of the story was that in Mainichi’s view, Mr. Fukuda had gone somewhat beyond the current Japanese position, if only in nuance. Mainichi also put a totally different spin in contrast to Sankei on the meaning of Mr. Fukuda’s cryptic comment to the effect that he “may have said more than what [he] was questioned by the reporters”. The nationalist but also very pro-China Yomiuri seems to have thought the matter unworthy of mention in its online summaries. (The mistranslation appears to have escaped its notice as well.)
The foreign media does not appear to have noticed their pulses quicken with regard to Japan-on-Taiwan, but the BBC predictably bit the Chinese line. Xinghua, the Chinese state newswire, appears to have gotten it right.
These are online versions of the news. In Japan at least, they are more often than not condensed from the hardcopy versions, and many hardcopy items are passed over altogether. That being said, the Japanese coverage of the incident does appear to reflect the policy preferences of the dailies with regard to China. Even Mr. Fukuda’s comments wound up being parsed in completely different directions, consonant, I add, with the inclinations of the respective journals.
If the mistranslation was intentional, it has served its purpose as far as BBC is concerned. The fact that Xinghua did not repeat the mistake does not sway the conclusion over Chinese intent one way or other; the Chinese authorities are not so stupid as to push their luck that far, after Mr. Fukuda had taken pains to reiterate the official position.
On other matters, the matter of Taiwan, which is scheduled to hold a referendum in March next year on the merits of joining the UN under the name of Taiwan, was taken up and, according to Prime Minister Wen, Prime Minister Fukuda demonstrated the position of not supporting the referendum. (このほか、来年３月に台湾名義での国連加盟の是非を問う住民投票を予定している台湾の問題も取り上げられ、温首相によると、福田首相は住民投票を支持しない立場を示したという。
from ”Quatum Leap in Mutual Relations” Next Year, Japan-China Summit, Gas Field Talks to Be Continued(来年は「関係飛躍」 日中首脳会談 ガス田は協議継続)”Asahi, 27 December 28.
”I may have said more than what I was questioned by the reporters”, Prime Minister Fukuda said at the joint press conference. It was after he had stated clearly that he did not support Taiwan independence and furthermore that he did “not want tension to increase between the two shores (of China and Taiwan) with regard to the referendum in Taiwan”. Prime Minister Wen, who was sitting beside him, nodded strongly and adopted a satisfied expression.
…
Concerning Prime Minister Fukuda’s words, Japanese diplomatic sources admitted, while stating that “the government’s fundamental position remained unchanged”, that they went a little deeper.
In a public forum, such being this [press] conference, Prime Minister Wen, while preceding his remarks with the words “I would like to supplement that on one point”, did not forget to introduce that fact that Prime Minister Fukuda also “expressed his position that he definitely did not support” the referendum during the Prime Ministers’ meeting.
…
China’s tactics are to tighten the “web” around Taiwanese supporters of independence by having the heads of major countries that have influence over Taiwan to express their opposition. Therefore, it is highly significant that it was able to draw out “non-support” from the Prime Minister of Japan, which independence supporters look to [for sustenance].
… 「記者さんから質問を受けた以上のことを申し上げたかもしれない」。福田首相は共同記者会見で述べた。台湾独立を支持しないと明言し、さらに「台湾の住民投票をめぐって、（中台）両岸に緊張が高まるようなことは望んでいない」と言い切った後のことだ。隣に座る温首相は深くうなずき、満足そうな表情 を浮かべた。
台湾の陳水扁政権は来年３月の総統選と同時に台湾の名称で国連加盟を問う住民投票を計画、中国はこれを強く警戒している。
日本外交筋は福田首相の発言について「政府の基本的立場は変わっていない」としながらも、やや踏み込んだものだったと認めた。
温首相は会見という公開の場で「私の方から１点補足したい」と前置きしたうえ、首相同士の会談でも、福田首相が住民投票に「厳正に支持しない立場を表明した」と紹介することも忘れなかった。
「来年は中日友好にとって極めて重要な年」（温首相）。北京五輪、日中平和友好条約締結３０周年を迎えることを指す。だが、これには独立志向の民進党政権が続くか、中台協調を説く国民党が政権を奪還するか、台湾の進路を決める上で大きな意味を持つ総統選も含まれる。
中国は台湾に影響力を持つ主要国首脳に住民投票反対を表明させ、台湾独立派への「包囲網」を狭めていく戦術を取る。それだけに独立派が頼みとする日本の首相から「不支持」を引き出した意味は極めて大きい。
from “Japan-China Summit: China Flexible Stance on Gas Fields; Non-Support for Taiwan Independence, Japan Firmly ‘Cooperative’ (日中首脳会談：中国「ガス田」柔軟姿勢 台湾独立不支持、日本「協調」強く)”Mainichi, 2007 December 29.
Taiwan does not come up in the Yomiuri online articles. It escaped my notice in the hardcopy version as well. Sankei, as I mentioned here, devoted an entire article and a commentary to the controversy. They are too long to translate here, but the basic message is that you can’t trust the Chinese.
Mr Fukuda also reiterated Japan's opposition to Taiwanese independence and voiced his opposition to Taiwan's plans to hold a referendum on UN membership.
from “China and Japan PMs hail progress”BBC, 2007 December 28
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said on Friday that Japan does not support Taiwan authorities' attempts to seek UN membership by "referendum" and moves that may change the status quo of the cross-Strait relationship.
Fukuda said that Japan would give no support to the claims of "one China, one Taiwan", "Taiwan independence" or Taiwan authorities' attempts to join the United Nations and to seek UN membership through a "referendum".
from ”Japan PM states four 'no's on Taiwan issue”, Xinghua by way of China Daily, 2007 December 29.
Yoshirō Mori Prime Minister: Mission Incomplete
You’ve heard about these people at their children’s games, haven’t you, pleading with the coaches, haranguing the referees, fighting other parents, embarrassing themselves and their kids? And you’ve wondered, haven’t you: what makes them do that?
If news reports are to be believed, ex-Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori has been at it again, pushing a Cabinet remake. Most recently, he had served as the middleman for Tsuneo Watanabe’s efforts to craft a Grand Coalition by engineering a meeting between Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister, and Ichirō Ozawa, DPJ leader and political mastermind. A few months before that, he had made sure that LDP faction leaders, as well as his own faction, would be united behind Mr. Fukuda as successor to the failed Shinzō Abe. This in turn was redemption of a rain check of sorts, for he had failed to convince Mr. Abe, who went on to take the Premiership by near-acclaim, to bide his time and let Mr. Fukuda follow Junichirō Koizumi. These and other lesser things Mr. Mori has been able to do through as their big brother in the Seiwakai/Seiwa Seisaku Kenkai, the faction that he once headed and has produced the last four Prime Ministers, beginning with Mr. Mori himself.
Mr. Mori is a very successful man by most accounts. Inheriting his faction from Hiroshi Mitsuzuka (who stepped in as faction leader after the untimely death of Shintarō Abe (Shinzō’s dad), who had received the nod from Fukuda Takeo (Yasuo’s dad), who in turn… but you get the idea) in 1998, he became Prime Minister in 2000. Although his highly unpopular reign lasted little more than a year, he was followed by his faction surrogate Mr. Koizumi, who rode a successful grassroots campaign to an upset victory in 2001. He then retook control of the faction and successfully grew it, until it is now the largest in the LDP.
So here we have an ex-Prime Minister whose brief reign was cut short, not by death or illness or election disaster, but by sheer unpopularity, a miasma of a thousand gaffes and mishaps that seemed to settle on him whenever the media turned their eyes and ears on the bumbling public figure; a still healthy 70 year old, whose entire life had demonstrated a consumptive love of the political game that appeared to be matched only by his disinterest in, or inaptitude for, statecraft. It is no wonder, then, given the lack of finality to his own turn at the pinnacle and no longer allowed to play for himself, that he continues to seek to mold the game to his liking.
There is no way for an outsider to determine the extent of influence that Mr. Mori retains within his faction, but Mr. Koizumi has been enjoying his semiretirement, Mr. Abe is in no position to claim the faction for his own any time soon (it never was his), and the brief leadership of Nobutaka Machimura, seen by many as a stop-gap compromise choice, has been interrupted by his current tenure as Chief Cabinet Secretary. Thus, his power base secure for the foreseeable future, expect more of the same from Mr. Mori. So stay tuned.
If news reports are to be believed, ex-Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori has been at it again, pushing a Cabinet remake. Most recently, he had served as the middleman for Tsuneo Watanabe’s efforts to craft a Grand Coalition by engineering a meeting between Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister, and Ichirō Ozawa, DPJ leader and political mastermind. A few months before that, he had made sure that LDP faction leaders, as well as his own faction, would be united behind Mr. Fukuda as successor to the failed Shinzō Abe. This in turn was redemption of a rain check of sorts, for he had failed to convince Mr. Abe, who went on to take the Premiership by near-acclaim, to bide his time and let Mr. Fukuda follow Junichirō Koizumi. These and other lesser things Mr. Mori has been able to do through as their big brother in the Seiwakai/Seiwa Seisaku Kenkai, the faction that he once headed and has produced the last four Prime Ministers, beginning with Mr. Mori himself.
Mr. Mori is a very successful man by most accounts. Inheriting his faction from Hiroshi Mitsuzuka (who stepped in as faction leader after the untimely death of Shintarō Abe (Shinzō’s dad), who had received the nod from Fukuda Takeo (Yasuo’s dad), who in turn… but you get the idea) in 1998, he became Prime Minister in 2000. Although his highly unpopular reign lasted little more than a year, he was followed by his faction surrogate Mr. Koizumi, who rode a successful grassroots campaign to an upset victory in 2001. He then retook control of the faction and successfully grew it, until it is now the largest in the LDP.
So here we have an ex-Prime Minister whose brief reign was cut short, not by death or illness or election disaster, but by sheer unpopularity, a miasma of a thousand gaffes and mishaps that seemed to settle on him whenever the media turned their eyes and ears on the bumbling public figure; a still healthy 70 year old, whose entire life had demonstrated a consumptive love of the political game that appeared to be matched only by his disinterest in, or inaptitude for, statecraft. It is no wonder, then, given the lack of finality to his own turn at the pinnacle and no longer allowed to play for himself, that he continues to seek to mold the game to his liking.
There is no way for an outsider to determine the extent of influence that Mr. Mori retains within his faction, but Mr. Koizumi has been enjoying his semiretirement, Mr. Abe is in no position to claim the faction for his own any time soon (it never was his), and the brief leadership of Nobutaka Machimura, seen by many as a stop-gap compromise choice, has been interrupted by his current tenure as Chief Cabinet Secretary. Thus, his power base secure for the foreseeable future, expect more of the same from Mr. Mori. So stay tuned.
Sunday, December 30, 2007
You Are a Prime Minister, Mr. Fukuda (plus, Japanese politics intermezzo)
I posted on the joint conference of the two Prime Ministers with regard to Taiwan here. I should have done more of my Media Watch before I did so, because I’ve found some more fascinating stuff that is revealing of several aspects of the media. But I need time to write it up properly. In the meantime, a few words on the real implications of the meeting of the Prime Ministers:
The Taiwan mistranslation aside, the joint press conference with Prime Minister Wen came off swimmingly, concluding the substantive part of Prime Minister Fukuda’s visit. It is trivial that it showed that little if anything will come of Mr. Fukuda’s visit that cannot happen without it; it is the symbolism (or, to less kindly eyes, the photo-op) that counts. Mr. Fukuda is China’s favorite, and it was evident. There must be some grumbling back home (this Sankei commentary is a mere foreboding of things to come in the nationalist weeklies and monthlies), but the majority of the Japanese public should welcome this turn of events.
Mr. Fukuda is going to take the China visit and the settlement of the cirrhosis law suits as his otoshidama, enjoy the New Year’s Holidays, then do the refueling resumption bill override thing when the Diet resumes. He will, if the latest reports are to be believed*, use this momentum to revamp the Cabinet that he mostly inherited from Prime Minister Abe. The real purpose, in my view, will be to clear the Cabinet and the sub-Cabinet appointee list of Finance Minister Fukushirō Nukaga and any other suspects before the Yamada Yōkō slush fund scandal really blows up, if it does. Mr. Fukuda probably wants to rid himself of some loose cannons as well. A total makeover is the Japanese way, to do it without pointing fingers.
But going back to China, what did the Chinese get out of it all, aside from setting the table for President Hu Jintao’s visit? The hint lies in the game of catch that the two Prime Ministers played the day after.
I am surprised that people do not take note of the fact that China has two major pieces while Japan has only one**. Now the distinction between heads of government, e.g. our Prime Minister, and heads of state, e.g. a president, is usually trivial with no meaning beyond diplomatic protocol***. However, that protocol takes on great importance between states that share a complicated and ambiguous history that continues to cast a shadow on mutual relations and regional geopolitics, and on the respective domestic scenes as well. For the Chinese authorities in particular, the matter abuts on the very legitimacy on which they base their claims of the popular mandate. It is within this context, then, that the symbolism of Mr. Fukuda’s meeting and press conference with Mr. Wen (and not Mr. Hu) played out. Likewise, the game of catch.
Message? Mr. Fukuda, you are Mr. Wen’s counterpart.
Perhaps if the Prime Minister had tossed a rugby ball at the President during the banquet, Japanese nationalists at home would be happier now.
* It makes sense, and all the mainstream dailies are reporting it. The only caveat here is that 28 December-4 January (extending to 7 January this time) usually are very slow news days, particularly for reporters on the political beat. Mr. Fukuda may have just put up a trial balloon and as an added fillip did the reporters a favor by throwing some fresh meat to his media entourage that accompanied him to this photo-op during the year’s end holidays.
** I’m leaving the Emperor out of consideration because he is even more of a figurehead than any symbolic head of state.
*** Seating arrangements during G-B Summit photo-ops are one thing that immediate comes to mind.
The Taiwan mistranslation aside, the joint press conference with Prime Minister Wen came off swimmingly, concluding the substantive part of Prime Minister Fukuda’s visit. It is trivial that it showed that little if anything will come of Mr. Fukuda’s visit that cannot happen without it; it is the symbolism (or, to less kindly eyes, the photo-op) that counts. Mr. Fukuda is China’s favorite, and it was evident. There must be some grumbling back home (this Sankei commentary is a mere foreboding of things to come in the nationalist weeklies and monthlies), but the majority of the Japanese public should welcome this turn of events.
Mr. Fukuda is going to take the China visit and the settlement of the cirrhosis law suits as his otoshidama, enjoy the New Year’s Holidays, then do the refueling resumption bill override thing when the Diet resumes. He will, if the latest reports are to be believed*, use this momentum to revamp the Cabinet that he mostly inherited from Prime Minister Abe. The real purpose, in my view, will be to clear the Cabinet and the sub-Cabinet appointee list of Finance Minister Fukushirō Nukaga and any other suspects before the Yamada Yōkō slush fund scandal really blows up, if it does. Mr. Fukuda probably wants to rid himself of some loose cannons as well. A total makeover is the Japanese way, to do it without pointing fingers.
But going back to China, what did the Chinese get out of it all, aside from setting the table for President Hu Jintao’s visit? The hint lies in the game of catch that the two Prime Ministers played the day after.
I am surprised that people do not take note of the fact that China has two major pieces while Japan has only one**. Now the distinction between heads of government, e.g. our Prime Minister, and heads of state, e.g. a president, is usually trivial with no meaning beyond diplomatic protocol***. However, that protocol takes on great importance between states that share a complicated and ambiguous history that continues to cast a shadow on mutual relations and regional geopolitics, and on the respective domestic scenes as well. For the Chinese authorities in particular, the matter abuts on the very legitimacy on which they base their claims of the popular mandate. It is within this context, then, that the symbolism of Mr. Fukuda’s meeting and press conference with Mr. Wen (and not Mr. Hu) played out. Likewise, the game of catch.
Message? Mr. Fukuda, you are Mr. Wen’s counterpart.
Perhaps if the Prime Minister had tossed a rugby ball at the President during the banquet, Japanese nationalists at home would be happier now.
* It makes sense, and all the mainstream dailies are reporting it. The only caveat here is that 28 December-4 January (extending to 7 January this time) usually are very slow news days, particularly for reporters on the political beat. Mr. Fukuda may have just put up a trial balloon and as an added fillip did the reporters a favor by throwing some fresh meat to his media entourage that accompanied him to this photo-op during the year’s end holidays.
** I’m leaving the Emperor out of consideration because he is even more of a figurehead than any symbolic head of state.
*** Seating arrangements during G-B Summit photo-ops are one thing that immediate comes to mind.
Saturday, December 29, 2007
Is This Chinese Gamesmanship over Taiwan or What?
The Chinese will never stop pushing the envelope, even during the best of times. Their gamesmanship was evident as a Chinese submarine “accidentally” wandered into Japanese waters in 2004, when bilateral relations were approaching a nadir, and it surfaced again during the press conference following Prime Minister Fukuda’s talks with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
Sankei depicts Mr. Fukuda catching the Chinese interpreter trying a fast one here, as he translated Mr. Wen’s explanation of Mr. Fukuda’s reiteration of the Japanese policy to “not support Taiwan’s independence ” as “oppose Taiwan’s independence”. Mr. Fukuda’s years of service as aide to his Prime Minister father, Diet member in his own right, and Chief Cabinet Secretary surely stood him in good stead as he used the subsequent Q&A to reiterate the official Japanese position.
This is no trivial matter. As the status quo appears set to continue indefinitely, words gain ever more significance. Particularly for pro-China Mr. Fukuda, a misstep here could have incited a rebellion by LDP conservatives.
Anyone who thinks that this was merely a case of something getting lost in translation should recall this incident involving a few lines Mr. Wen skipped on a speech being broadcast live back to China.
I think that South Koreans are more in-your-face and will let you know in no uncertain terms when they want something from you. But I’m ready to be corrected.
Sankei depicts Mr. Fukuda catching the Chinese interpreter trying a fast one here, as he translated Mr. Wen’s explanation of Mr. Fukuda’s reiteration of the Japanese policy to “not support Taiwan’s independence ” as “oppose Taiwan’s independence”. Mr. Fukuda’s years of service as aide to his Prime Minister father, Diet member in his own right, and Chief Cabinet Secretary surely stood him in good stead as he used the subsequent Q&A to reiterate the official Japanese position.
This is no trivial matter. As the status quo appears set to continue indefinitely, words gain ever more significance. Particularly for pro-China Mr. Fukuda, a misstep here could have incited a rebellion by LDP conservatives.
Anyone who thinks that this was merely a case of something getting lost in translation should recall this incident involving a few lines Mr. Wen skipped on a speech being broadcast live back to China.
I think that South Koreans are more in-your-face and will let you know in no uncertain terms when they want something from you. But I’m ready to be corrected.
The Education Ministry Caves to Okinawa Pressure on Textbooks
Norimitsu Ohnishi lets the facts tell the story here, as Okinawa strips away the government’s stock response to complaints on Japanese textbooks. Luckily for the Fukuda administration, Chinese authorities are in no mood to press the point.
Mr. Ohnishi ends this piece with the following:
“The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, a group of nationalist scholars that, along with politicians like Mr. Abe, led a campaign to rid textbooks of references to wartime crimes committed by the Japanese military, condemned the ministry’s decision. On its Web site, the group said that the ministry “had succumbed to political pressure [emphasis mine] and approved one-sided historical descriptions.”
Mr. Ohnishi has wisely decided that the irony speaks for itself.
Mr. Ohnishi ends this piece with the following:
“The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, a group of nationalist scholars that, along with politicians like Mr. Abe, led a campaign to rid textbooks of references to wartime crimes committed by the Japanese military, condemned the ministry’s decision. On its Web site, the group said that the ministry “had succumbed to political pressure [emphasis mine] and approved one-sided historical descriptions.”
Mr. Ohnishi has wisely decided that the irony speaks for itself.
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