I wondered here what was up with Dear Leader. At first glance, North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il was still on top of his game. During the three day summit with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, he:
a) kept his intents unknown until he did show up after all, to greet a relieved Mr. Roh, at the reception ceremonies on the latter's arrival in Pyongyang;
b) absented himself - somewhat against speculation - from the Arirang Mass Games, and instead let Kim Young Nam, figurehead Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, host Mr. Roh as they joined the masses in the glorification of Dear Leader and his father in gaudy cutout displays;
c) joked during the second day meetings about the concerns (hopes?) that his behavior had caused in the West; and
d) declined Mr. Roh's invitation to visit him in Seoul – the time is not ripe – offering to send Kim Young Nam his stead
while Mr. Roh went out of his way to praise Mr. Kim and, more generally, the North Korean regime throughout his visit. All in all, Mr. Kim made lame-duck President Roh look decidedly the overeager-to-please junior partner – Mr. Kim is the older of the two, a not unimportant distinction in these Confucian societies – over the course of the proceedings.
And what did Mr. Roh get in return? Well, he got Mr. Kim to agree to include South Korea in the ultimate conversion of the long-standing truce in the Korean War to an agreement for everlasting peace between the "three states or four states". This is not insubstantial, since what Mr. Roh gave up (beyond what he and his predecessor have already done) amounted to face. (This assessment of course accepts the common view the "three states" excludes China, not South Korea, which had been the traditional posture of North Korea.) Still, given that the main stage for this is the U.S.-North Korean bilateral WP in the Six-Party Talks and it is inconceivable that the U.S. can agree to a deal on the Peninsula without South Korea signing on, the entire deal has little more impact in the real world than to reinforce the impression that South Korea, at least under President Roh, is in the North Korean camp when it comes to its views on North Korea as an enduring threat.
(note) The mercurial Syngman Rhee, South Korean President at the time of the Korean War, boycotted the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and the North Koreans have used that to shut South Korea out of its formal dealings with the U.S.
So, it can be reasonably argued that Kim Jong Il knew exactly what he was doing throughout, and had merely been throwing in his well-practiced bag of political illusion tricks.
And yet, I cannot shake the image of the disinterested, distracted Mr. Kim on the first day, nor, on the second day, of the way he leaned somewhat forward and looked sidewise and up at the one man sitting beside him, almost as if to seek his approval, as they sat at an inordinately wide table, facing Mr. Roh, sitting alone on the other side. Then there is the final, second day photo op after the signing of their joint declaration, where after Mr. Roh goes hand-in-hand with Mr. Kim and proudly raises them like two boxers after a hard-fought draw. When the hands are lowered, even as a still joyful Mr. Roh turns toward his counterpart, an expressionless, Mr. Kim casually turns the other way. Were these calculated put-downs of a junior counterpart, a presumed tributary, and/or displays of feigned weakness - alternating with an alert, at times even mildly jocose, persona – employed to put Mr. Roh and his handlers off-guard? Or the inevitable and frequent mood swings of a deteriorating mind? In this light, even his surprise, second-day invitation during the morning session to an extra day for informal discussions, only to be rescinded near the end of that session, leaves me to wonder, was it a gambit tossed out only to be casually declined, or the wandering thoughts of an old man.
And there is more than prurient, tabloid fascination – to which I admit freely – that draws me to this question. Totalitarian-authoritarian regimes are notoriously poor at handling succession. The problem is eased greatly when the sovereign enjoys a good measure of legitimacy and there is a determinate line of succession. In North Korea, the former is arguable, the latter dubious. If the Dear Leader's mind slips away before he is able to firmly install one of his sons to replace him when he departs for that Great Big Mt. Baekdu in the Sky, there is a good likelihood that succession will be messy and, until a successor is firmly entrenched, the North Korean leadership will become even more insular and unpredictable. And Japan, if anybody, is firmly in the sights of North Korean missiles and is the least illogical among potential targets under what must be North Korea's increasingly irrelevant WMD strategy.
Frankly, I am of three minds.
Commercial for Eurasia Group head Ian Bremmer: If you are interested in knowing more about authoritarian-totalitarian regimes and their inclinations, you can do worse than to read J-Curve. I'll be happy to lend you a copy if you know me personally.)
Friday, October 05, 2007
From Asahi, Peace Depot Update on JMSDF OEF-MIO? OIF? Refueling Activities
Today's Asahi brings us the news that Peace Depot, in the second installment of their investigations, which I previously chronicled here. Peace Depot has confirmed mainly through the log records of the Fleet Replenishment Oiler USNS Pecos, which had made the controversial 80,000 gallon retransfer to the USS Kitty Hawk, had subsequently refueled the Egis cruiser Coupens, then replenished locally and repeatedly refueled other US Marine and other vessels in the Persian Gulf. Peace Depot asserts that this deepens suspicions that the 800,000 gallon fuel oil in question, even if it had not been used to refuel the Kitty Hawk, was indeed used for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Asahi, perhaps weighted by its initial support of refueling activities back in the day, takes a We-Report, You-Decide approach to the latest revelations.
Asahi, perhaps weighted by its initial support of refueling activities back in the day, takes a We-Report, You-Decide approach to the latest revelations.
I Called It the Meta-habatsu Game, Grandmaster Koizumi Says It's Factions Writ Large
Here, I characterized the bi-party jockeying for supremacy between the two, broadly similar, main contestants, with smaller groups flitting around seeking to maximize their advantages, as a game of meta-habatsu (faction). Here, Asahi shows ex-Prime Minister Koizumi going one step further, with:
"DPJ Is Counter-mainstream LDP", Prime Minister Koizumi Urges Policy Dialogue
…
"We were the counter-mainstream [when Ichiro Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama belonged to the Takeshita faction], and Mr. Ozawa's group was the mainstream. … (The Machimura) faction has produced four Prime Ministers in a row and has become the mainstream. Wouldn't it be okay if we considered the DPJ as the counter-mainstream (LDP of today)?"
…
… Mr. Koizumi urged policy dialogue, saying, "There is an aspect of opposing though they have similar policies. We should think of them as a cooperative party when we debate policy in the Diet."
Of course this is yet another case of the soft-sell, respectful embrace that the LDP has been putting on around the Fukuda administration, and the DPJ knows better than to get on this boat made of mud.
(note) The factions aligned with the Prime Minister are called shuryu-ha=mainstream groups, while the factions that went for his opponents are called han-shuryu-ha=counter-mainstream groups. More neutral forces are considered to be hi-shuryu-ha=non-mainstream groups. These terms are fast becoming obsolete, as factional discipline withers.
"DPJ Is Counter-mainstream LDP", Prime Minister Koizumi Urges Policy Dialogue
…
"We were the counter-mainstream [when Ichiro Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama belonged to the Takeshita faction], and Mr. Ozawa's group was the mainstream. … (The Machimura) faction has produced four Prime Ministers in a row and has become the mainstream. Wouldn't it be okay if we considered the DPJ as the counter-mainstream (LDP of today)?"
…
… Mr. Koizumi urged policy dialogue, saying, "There is an aspect of opposing though they have similar policies. We should think of them as a cooperative party when we debate policy in the Diet."
Of course this is yet another case of the soft-sell, respectful embrace that the LDP has been putting on around the Fukuda administration, and the DPJ knows better than to get on this boat made of mud.
(note) The factions aligned with the Prime Minister are called shuryu-ha=mainstream groups, while the factions that went for his opponents are called han-shuryu-ha=counter-mainstream groups. More neutral forces are considered to be hi-shuryu-ha=non-mainstream groups. These terms are fast becoming obsolete, as factional discipline withers.
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Will the DPJ Push Mr. Ozawa's Legal Argument and Normal Country Inclinations to Their Ultimate Conclusion?
There is no difference of opinion between the LDP and the DPJ over the basic legal prerequisites for Japanese involvement in military operations in and around Afghanistan. Both parties believe that such operations must be authorized by UNSG resolutions. However, the two parties differ when it comes to the specific application of this legal principle. The LDP is of the view that both a) the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its activities and b) what the US named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; actually, OEF in Afghanistan in this post, as commonly accepted) and its participants have received such authorization, while the DPF asserts that only ISAF has done so. So, as far as the Constitution is concerned, the LDP position is that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces may engage in both activities, while the DPJ, with the victorious Ichiro Ozawa imposing his will on internal dissidents, allows to participation in ISAF only.
As a practical matter though, the LDP deems ISAF operations too dangerous and therefore has limited Japanese presence to OEF, where the JMSDF is undertaking the relatively safe, refueling operations on the open seas. On the other hand, the DPJ, prodded by Mr. Ozawa's openness to Japanese participation in ISAF - Mr. Ozawa has in the past shown a strong-pro US streak, and was the original proponent of "normal country" status for Japan, a concept that is more often associated with hawkish LDP politicians - is considering the matter, albeit with reluctance in many quarters. (Former party leader Seiji Maehara is one name that springs immediately to mind.) Thus, we have the intriguing situation where the LDP for practical reasons is limiting Japanese participation to modest proportions, while the DPJ is considering accepting the conclusions of its legal position (which has some force, if not quite a slam-dunk argument) and leapfrogging the LDP to the more dangerous phase of the operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. (There are reportedly DPJ voices calling for limiting participation to medical assistance and other civilian activities. It remains to be seen, though, if other nations with soldiers in Afghanistan will be willing, or even able, to baby-sit another gaggle of Japanese civilians and possibly lightly armed JSDF personnel.)
How will these legal and practical considerations play with the Japanese public?
OEF and the activities of ISAF in theory address different phases, or aspects of the war on terror; i.e. the former the continuing war against terror, and the latter the post-warfare stage "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment" UNSC Res.1386 (2001). But both activities are directed against Al Qaeda and its protectors the Taliban (if at least in the case of ISAF by no means exclusively so). Thus, for all practical purposes, they end up serving the same objective. In fact, until the whole controversy blew up over the extension of the anti-terrorism act, I confess that I was not aware of this distinction, and I hazard to guess that the Japanese public in general did not know much better either.
Remember that a plurality of the Japanese public has been coming around to an admittedly underwhelming support for the continuation of refueling activities. And it's the same theater against the same opponents; one operation is safe, the other is hazardous (and, by itself, might not even be welcomed).
I think that the practical consideration will prevail with the safety-first Japanese public. Unless the 800,000 gallon controversy spills over into operations beyond USS Kitty Hawk, or even the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I believe that the LDP position will prevail in the court of public opinion. A limited extension of two years for refueling operations only is definitely in the works, and, unless the potential budgetary repercussions of the ensuing delay of the next general Diet session become an overriding concern (I am now forced to add this caveat), will be passed within the year by a Lower House coalition supermajority revote. At least the Yomiuri editorial board seems to think so.
(Note) The Asahi editorial board is disappointed with Prime Minister Fukuda's answers in yesterday's Diet plenary, but officially remains agnostic. Mainichi is even more non-committal. The Sankei editorials no longer seem to be available after it replaced Mainichi as MSN's online news partner of choice. WTF?
Nikkei, Yomiuri and Asahi are collaborating on a joint website, joint distribution, and joint emergency production. Other newspapers are also welcome to join the party. At the same time, MSN has ditched Mainichi (or is it the other way around?) for Sankei. Whatever. Just give the world a deeper archive, so I won't have to keep copying the articles to my hard disk.
As a practical matter though, the LDP deems ISAF operations too dangerous and therefore has limited Japanese presence to OEF, where the JMSDF is undertaking the relatively safe, refueling operations on the open seas. On the other hand, the DPJ, prodded by Mr. Ozawa's openness to Japanese participation in ISAF - Mr. Ozawa has in the past shown a strong-pro US streak, and was the original proponent of "normal country" status for Japan, a concept that is more often associated with hawkish LDP politicians - is considering the matter, albeit with reluctance in many quarters. (Former party leader Seiji Maehara is one name that springs immediately to mind.) Thus, we have the intriguing situation where the LDP for practical reasons is limiting Japanese participation to modest proportions, while the DPJ is considering accepting the conclusions of its legal position (which has some force, if not quite a slam-dunk argument) and leapfrogging the LDP to the more dangerous phase of the operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. (There are reportedly DPJ voices calling for limiting participation to medical assistance and other civilian activities. It remains to be seen, though, if other nations with soldiers in Afghanistan will be willing, or even able, to baby-sit another gaggle of Japanese civilians and possibly lightly armed JSDF personnel.)
How will these legal and practical considerations play with the Japanese public?
OEF and the activities of ISAF in theory address different phases, or aspects of the war on terror; i.e. the former the continuing war against terror, and the latter the post-warfare stage "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment" UNSC Res.1386 (2001). But both activities are directed against Al Qaeda and its protectors the Taliban (if at least in the case of ISAF by no means exclusively so). Thus, for all practical purposes, they end up serving the same objective. In fact, until the whole controversy blew up over the extension of the anti-terrorism act, I confess that I was not aware of this distinction, and I hazard to guess that the Japanese public in general did not know much better either.
Remember that a plurality of the Japanese public has been coming around to an admittedly underwhelming support for the continuation of refueling activities. And it's the same theater against the same opponents; one operation is safe, the other is hazardous (and, by itself, might not even be welcomed).
I think that the practical consideration will prevail with the safety-first Japanese public. Unless the 800,000 gallon controversy spills over into operations beyond USS Kitty Hawk, or even the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I believe that the LDP position will prevail in the court of public opinion. A limited extension of two years for refueling operations only is definitely in the works, and, unless the potential budgetary repercussions of the ensuing delay of the next general Diet session become an overriding concern (I am now forced to add this caveat), will be passed within the year by a Lower House coalition supermajority revote. At least the Yomiuri editorial board seems to think so.
(Note) The Asahi editorial board is disappointed with Prime Minister Fukuda's answers in yesterday's Diet plenary, but officially remains agnostic. Mainichi is even more non-committal. The Sankei editorials no longer seem to be available after it replaced Mainichi as MSN's online news partner of choice. WTF?
Nikkei, Yomiuri and Asahi are collaborating on a joint website, joint distribution, and joint emergency production. Other newspapers are also welcome to join the party. At the same time, MSN has ditched Mainichi (or is it the other way around?) for Sankei. Whatever. Just give the world a deeper archive, so I won't have to keep copying the articles to my hard disk.
Wednesday, October 03, 2007
Oh No, Not Another South Korean Media Scoop Sourced from Japan Citing U.S. Sources! But Could the Kim Jong Il Dementia Allegations Have Legs?
I believe South Korean media scoops sourced from Japan citing U.S. sources about as much as, say, Japanese wires citing South Korean media exclusives about U.S.-North Korean negotiations. So usually, I enjoy stories like this with guilty pleasure and the usual dose of skepticism reserved for weekly tabloid headlines, then move on. But the reports of an expressionless, disinterested Kim Jong Il on the occasion of the visit of his South Korean counterpart caught my eye. True, the perfunctory handshake in the place of the comradely hug (that he gave to Kim Dae-jung what seems like an eternity ago) and the expressionless visage that he displays throughout what must be carefully controlled reporting seem to show a forlorn figure barely able to function publicly.
But then, Mr. Kim has never looked very comfortable appearing before crowds, a trait he shares with another second-generation head of state and nemesis.
Here's an unsatisfactorily incomplete video clip courtesy of BBC. Mr. Kim looks disengaged throughout, though he does clap when passing the cheering throng with South Korean President.
I link, you decide.
Does anyone know a good source for data on Kim Jong Il's state visits and visitors over the years? And number of public appearances? Ther must be many people keeping track of such stuff.
But then, Mr. Kim has never looked very comfortable appearing before crowds, a trait he shares with another second-generation head of state and nemesis.
Here's an unsatisfactorily incomplete video clip courtesy of BBC. Mr. Kim looks disengaged throughout, though he does clap when passing the cheering throng with South Korean President.
I link, you decide.
Does anyone know a good source for data on Kim Jong Il's state visits and visitors over the years? And number of public appearances? Ther must be many people keeping track of such stuff.
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
I Need a Life, But in the Meantime, Interesting Facts and Figures on the Refueling Issue
Shisaku points to some interesting numbers on the refueling issue. (So that's where the October 1 Yomiuri got those non-attributed numbers for its chart.)
Panel 10 shows that the amount of fuel oil that the JMSDF vessels provided dropped precipitously from 119,000 KL in FY 2001 and 175,000 KL in FY 2002 to 53,000 KL in FY 2003, and has stayed more or less in that ballpark (albeit with large fluctuations) since then. This, despite the fact that the number of refueling occasions leapt from 58 in FY 2001 to 130 in FY 2002, jumped further to 188 in FY 2003, and has also stayed in that neighborhood. Moreover, the number of U.S. and non-U.S. vessels were: 98 and 2 in FY 2001, 96 and 4 in FY 2002, and 56 and 44 in FY 2003 (and in that vicinity since then), respectively.
In other words, in FY 2001 and FY 2002, the JMSDF vessels for the most part serviced large U.S. vessels and, from FY 2003 on, have been provisioning smaller vessels of mixed origin (roughly half-U.S. and declining and half non-, of which Pakistani ships so far form a large plurality).
The Iraqi War officially began on March 20, 2003 (did they declare war before they attacked?) near the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2002 (April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003). Clearly, there are many dots to be connected here, helped along with a little bit of Diet investigation authority.
So, are you thinking what I'm thinking?
Yes, Ichiro Ozawa does owe Shisaku a nice lunch.
ADD:
The average amount of fuel provided per operation was highest in FY 2002, at 2,052 KL. The amount of fuel involved in the (mainly) U.S.S. Kitty Hawk discrepancy was 800,000 gallons, or, more accurately, 2,973 KL. The two KL figures are in the same ballpark.
I believe that the authorities will try to explain all this as merely topping up, as the ships arrived for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) surveillance and interception activities. But can they sort out the ships and operations dedicated to OEF and those to Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and match the right ones to JMSDF refueling activities? Will the numbers add up?
Panel 10 shows that the amount of fuel oil that the JMSDF vessels provided dropped precipitously from 119,000 KL in FY 2001 and 175,000 KL in FY 2002 to 53,000 KL in FY 2003, and has stayed more or less in that ballpark (albeit with large fluctuations) since then. This, despite the fact that the number of refueling occasions leapt from 58 in FY 2001 to 130 in FY 2002, jumped further to 188 in FY 2003, and has also stayed in that neighborhood. Moreover, the number of U.S. and non-U.S. vessels were: 98 and 2 in FY 2001, 96 and 4 in FY 2002, and 56 and 44 in FY 2003 (and in that vicinity since then), respectively.
In other words, in FY 2001 and FY 2002, the JMSDF vessels for the most part serviced large U.S. vessels and, from FY 2003 on, have been provisioning smaller vessels of mixed origin (roughly half-U.S. and declining and half non-, of which Pakistani ships so far form a large plurality).
The Iraqi War officially began on March 20, 2003 (did they declare war before they attacked?) near the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2002 (April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003). Clearly, there are many dots to be connected here, helped along with a little bit of Diet investigation authority.
So, are you thinking what I'm thinking?
Yes, Ichiro Ozawa does owe Shisaku a nice lunch.
ADD:
The average amount of fuel provided per operation was highest in FY 2002, at 2,052 KL. The amount of fuel involved in the (mainly) U.S.S. Kitty Hawk discrepancy was 800,000 gallons, or, more accurately, 2,973 KL. The two KL figures are in the same ballpark.
I believe that the authorities will try to explain all this as merely topping up, as the ships arrived for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) surveillance and interception activities. But can they sort out the ships and operations dedicated to OEF and those to Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and match the right ones to JMSDF refueling activities? Will the numbers add up?
Sunday, September 30, 2007
A Twofer Post: The Two Policy Research Council Chairmen Go Head to Head; Chief Cabinet Secretary Grilled on Diesel Fuel for USS Kitty Hawk
On Sunday Project - surely the TV program most often cited (if often not credited) by the national print media - it's Sadakazu Tanigaki batting for the LDP doing what he does best and likes most, which is talking about policy issues, and the need to raise taxes. Up against him is the new DPJ policy chief Masayuki Naoshima, an ex-salaryman with extensive labor union background, someone that I'm not sure even Tobias Harris has seen. At the end, I am left wondering, what the hell was Mr. Naoshima doing there? He clearly had read the DPJ policy manifest, but did he know anything beyond it? Did he even believe it?
Soichiro Tawara, the Tasmanian Devil of political journalism, pounds Mr. Naoshima mercilessly on public pension reform. And with good reason too, because Mr. Naoshima is maddeningly vague on the details, basically copping a plea, that they are working on a bill. Mr. Tanigaki is at his enthusiastic and congenial best as he brings his command of details as well as his understanding of the broader fiscal implications to talk rings around Mr. Naoshima. Significantly, he emphasizes the underlying commonalities between the two positions, and suggests that there is plenty of room for a dialogue here. Mr. Tanigaki, like the Prime Minister, is by temperament and talent supremely suited to the soft-sell approach, and it shows.
On the contrast between the existing government policy to favor consolidating agricultural acreage and the DPJ proposal to extend income supplements to all farmers, Mr. Tanigaki scores at least a debating point when he argues against the wisdom of giving money to aging part-time farmers, an allegation that Mr. Naoshima lets pass without denial or counterargument. Moreover, Mr. Tanigaki handles the issue within the metropolitan center-boondocks dichotomy context. He believes that the persistence of public works that the prefectures conduct with their own revenues (in contrast to the public works subsidized by revenue transfers or direct subsidies) indicates that there are better ways to boost local economies. Is this a pitch for raising the consumption tax rate? Of course. Is he hinting at a possible escape valve for local pressures against the annual 3% cut in the national public works budget allocations? Maybe. But Mr. Naoshima does next to nothing to hit back, or even to defend himself.
Before, the DPJ could cite a recalcitrant bureaucracy for the lack of detail to its proposals. But control of the Upper House has greatly augmented the opposition's Diet investigation authority (Constitution, Article 62), and the bureaucracy has stepped up its cooperation with the DPJ, no doubt with the blessing of the LDP-New Komeito coalition. Ignorance is no longer an excuse for the DPJ.
Actually, only a very small fraction of this will show up in the Monday morning editions of the major dailies. At least not in the way that I have described them. And the DPJ will surely knock Mr. Tanigaki for stating that, in order to achieve primary balance in FY2011, the consumption tax rate will have to be raised higher than the 8% that Heizo Takenaka has suggested, and it may well find sympathetic editorial writers and even LDP discontents. If Mr. Naoshima clearly lost a round, he did it on a TV program that is only about as popular as a Sunday morning talk show on politics and the economy can be. Still, if this is any indication of how the policy debate is going to unfold, the DPJ will run the risk of being labeled not ready for primetime.
The LDP is clearly out to treat the relationship between consenting adults and to do its best to make a show of wooing the DPJ, and this actually comes naturally to Mr. Tanigaki. Ichiro Ozawa clearly wants to make war, not love. But the message does not seem to have reached his party policy chief.
Nobutaka Machimura, Chief Cabinet Secretary, also appeared on the program and was grilled at length about the controversy over the alleged diversion of JMSDF diesel fuel from counter-terrorism surveillance activities to the Iraqi War. Mr. Machimura basically kept repeating that such diversion, if true, was a serious matter and that they were talking to the U.S. side to find out the truth. Mr. Tawara pushed hard to make him say that an extension would be taken off the table if it turned out to be a lie, and Mr. Machimura showed himself at his firm, confident, and congenial, stonewalling best.
I've written quite often on and around this matter, but this is the most useful post because it points to great investigative work by Peace Depot. I think that the U.S. is going to explain the 800,000 gallons as a regrettable but honest logistics and communications mix-up in the accelerated and incredibly complicated lead-up to the Iraqi War and admonish Centcom or some other part of the U.S. forces for the error. No, it will not show up in the service records of individual military officers. The explanation and the accompanying show of contrition will be accepted by the Fukuda administration, Asahi will make some noises, and a new, refueling-only law will be passed by a supermajority override, sometime late this year.
Two caveats:
One, the Fukuda administration will have to come up with a plausible explanation for the 200,000-800,000 discrepancy. My sixth sense says that this is the easy one.
Two, it better be just the 800,000 gallons. If systemic diversion beyond that intial phase of the Iraq War is uncovered, then all bets are off on the extension, and Mr. Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, will have some very serious atonement on his agenda.
Soichiro Tawara, the Tasmanian Devil of political journalism, pounds Mr. Naoshima mercilessly on public pension reform. And with good reason too, because Mr. Naoshima is maddeningly vague on the details, basically copping a plea, that they are working on a bill. Mr. Tanigaki is at his enthusiastic and congenial best as he brings his command of details as well as his understanding of the broader fiscal implications to talk rings around Mr. Naoshima. Significantly, he emphasizes the underlying commonalities between the two positions, and suggests that there is plenty of room for a dialogue here. Mr. Tanigaki, like the Prime Minister, is by temperament and talent supremely suited to the soft-sell approach, and it shows.
On the contrast between the existing government policy to favor consolidating agricultural acreage and the DPJ proposal to extend income supplements to all farmers, Mr. Tanigaki scores at least a debating point when he argues against the wisdom of giving money to aging part-time farmers, an allegation that Mr. Naoshima lets pass without denial or counterargument. Moreover, Mr. Tanigaki handles the issue within the metropolitan center-boondocks dichotomy context. He believes that the persistence of public works that the prefectures conduct with their own revenues (in contrast to the public works subsidized by revenue transfers or direct subsidies) indicates that there are better ways to boost local economies. Is this a pitch for raising the consumption tax rate? Of course. Is he hinting at a possible escape valve for local pressures against the annual 3% cut in the national public works budget allocations? Maybe. But Mr. Naoshima does next to nothing to hit back, or even to defend himself.
Before, the DPJ could cite a recalcitrant bureaucracy for the lack of detail to its proposals. But control of the Upper House has greatly augmented the opposition's Diet investigation authority (Constitution, Article 62), and the bureaucracy has stepped up its cooperation with the DPJ, no doubt with the blessing of the LDP-New Komeito coalition. Ignorance is no longer an excuse for the DPJ.
Actually, only a very small fraction of this will show up in the Monday morning editions of the major dailies. At least not in the way that I have described them. And the DPJ will surely knock Mr. Tanigaki for stating that, in order to achieve primary balance in FY2011, the consumption tax rate will have to be raised higher than the 8% that Heizo Takenaka has suggested, and it may well find sympathetic editorial writers and even LDP discontents. If Mr. Naoshima clearly lost a round, he did it on a TV program that is only about as popular as a Sunday morning talk show on politics and the economy can be. Still, if this is any indication of how the policy debate is going to unfold, the DPJ will run the risk of being labeled not ready for primetime.
The LDP is clearly out to treat the relationship between consenting adults and to do its best to make a show of wooing the DPJ, and this actually comes naturally to Mr. Tanigaki. Ichiro Ozawa clearly wants to make war, not love. But the message does not seem to have reached his party policy chief.
Nobutaka Machimura, Chief Cabinet Secretary, also appeared on the program and was grilled at length about the controversy over the alleged diversion of JMSDF diesel fuel from counter-terrorism surveillance activities to the Iraqi War. Mr. Machimura basically kept repeating that such diversion, if true, was a serious matter and that they were talking to the U.S. side to find out the truth. Mr. Tawara pushed hard to make him say that an extension would be taken off the table if it turned out to be a lie, and Mr. Machimura showed himself at his firm, confident, and congenial, stonewalling best.
I've written quite often on and around this matter, but this is the most useful post because it points to great investigative work by Peace Depot. I think that the U.S. is going to explain the 800,000 gallons as a regrettable but honest logistics and communications mix-up in the accelerated and incredibly complicated lead-up to the Iraqi War and admonish Centcom or some other part of the U.S. forces for the error. No, it will not show up in the service records of individual military officers. The explanation and the accompanying show of contrition will be accepted by the Fukuda administration, Asahi will make some noises, and a new, refueling-only law will be passed by a supermajority override, sometime late this year.
Two caveats:
One, the Fukuda administration will have to come up with a plausible explanation for the 200,000-800,000 discrepancy. My sixth sense says that this is the easy one.
Two, it better be just the 800,000 gallons. If systemic diversion beyond that intial phase of the Iraq War is uncovered, then all bets are off on the extension, and Mr. Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, will have some very serious atonement on his agenda.
Kenji Nagai Is One of Many Murdered in Rangoon and It's Been Raining in Tokyo
The U.S. press statement on September 24 calls on the Burmese government to exercise restraint and engage in dialogue with its people for transition to a civilian, democratic government. By the 26th, things had taken an ominous turn in Burma with the security forces firing on the demonstrators. The joint U.S.-EU press statement on that day adds threats of sanctions against the Burma/Myanmar government. (The EU, unlike the US or the equally decisive Japan (see below), cannot make up its collective mind on what to call the mafia state.) On the 27th, President Bush has even harsher words for the "brutal military regime" and calls on "all nations that have influence with the regime to join us in supporting the aspirations of the Burmese people and to tell the Burmese Junta to cease using force on its own people." On the same day, the U.S. Treasury broadens sanctions on certain Burmese individuals. The following day, the State Department follows suit with more visa restrictions. Mr. Bush's wife issues a statement similar to her husband, but somewhat longer and even more harshly worded. The White House Press Secretary also let's us know that EU is also considering sanctions. Meanwhile, in Japan…
The Japanese press statement on the 25th basically makes the same points with the Myanmar government as the 24 September State Department statement did, in the typically mild-mannered Japanese way. On the 26th, his views on sanctions on Myanmar is the first question put to new Foreign Minister Komura in his first regular press briefing. He sidesteps the issue, and repeats the call for restraint on the part of the Myanmar government and says that he will be watching the situation carefully. Senior Vice Minister Onodera gives a longer regular briefing saying essentially the same things. On the 27th, Japanese freelance cameraman Kenji Nagai is murdered, shot in the back pointblank, by a Myanmar government soldier. By the 28th, Mr. Komura is in New York for the US General Assembly Plenary, and holds a talk with his Myanmar counterpart. In a press briefing there - no official records; this is as unofficial as the burasagaris, which became a bone of contention between Prime Minister Abe and the media - he reveals that he reiterated Japanese calls for restraint and dialogue and told his counterpart that the Japanese government "strongly seeks the revelation of the truth" with regard to Mr. Nagai's shooting. He remains noncommittal on sanctions.
You can see the differences in words and deeds, small and large, and imagine the time and effort that the bureaucracies expended in putting them together. And more sanctions may still be on their way - who knows, from Japan? Yet these are of little to no significance to an authoritarian natural-resource state. It's always the same: stop the cash flow; or the security forces refuse to fire on civilians, which also will be a long time in coming, if ever.
A certain Ibrahim Gambali visited Naypyidaw on the 29th, no doubt to be told that all is in order, there's nothing to see, please keep moving. You know, he should - to Thailand, and, even more important, China. Don't bother going to India, India will stay away if China does; and Russia is only following the money. As for Japan, Mr. Gambali may come, if he wishes, to express his condolences.
The Japanese press statement on the 25th basically makes the same points with the Myanmar government as the 24 September State Department statement did, in the typically mild-mannered Japanese way. On the 26th, his views on sanctions on Myanmar is the first question put to new Foreign Minister Komura in his first regular press briefing. He sidesteps the issue, and repeats the call for restraint on the part of the Myanmar government and says that he will be watching the situation carefully. Senior Vice Minister Onodera gives a longer regular briefing saying essentially the same things. On the 27th, Japanese freelance cameraman Kenji Nagai is murdered, shot in the back pointblank, by a Myanmar government soldier. By the 28th, Mr. Komura is in New York for the US General Assembly Plenary, and holds a talk with his Myanmar counterpart. In a press briefing there - no official records; this is as unofficial as the burasagaris, which became a bone of contention between Prime Minister Abe and the media - he reveals that he reiterated Japanese calls for restraint and dialogue and told his counterpart that the Japanese government "strongly seeks the revelation of the truth" with regard to Mr. Nagai's shooting. He remains noncommittal on sanctions.
You can see the differences in words and deeds, small and large, and imagine the time and effort that the bureaucracies expended in putting them together. And more sanctions may still be on their way - who knows, from Japan? Yet these are of little to no significance to an authoritarian natural-resource state. It's always the same: stop the cash flow; or the security forces refuse to fire on civilians, which also will be a long time in coming, if ever.
A certain Ibrahim Gambali visited Naypyidaw on the 29th, no doubt to be told that all is in order, there's nothing to see, please keep moving. You know, he should - to Thailand, and, even more important, China. Don't bother going to India, India will stay away if China does; and Russia is only following the money. As for Japan, Mr. Gambali may come, if he wishes, to express his condolences.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Why Hereditary Diet Members Prevail
Looking at Japanese-language blogs, you would think that hereditary Diet members are on a par with the Devil's spawn. Of course if the blogosphere were the sole basis of democracy, Ron Paul could be the Republican candidate. And the media is somewhat kinder, but they are still generally unfavorable. In fact, despite such public outcry against nepotism, about a third of the LDP Lower House members are sons (and in rare cases daughters), sons-in-law, and a few brothers, nephews, and grandnephews of former (usually Lower House) Diet members. This is somewhat lower than before the 2005 general election, no doubt because of the expulsion of the Post Office rebels (many of whom did not even make it back to the Diet) and the huge influx of their assassins and other non-pedigreed rookies as the result of the Koizumi landslide victory. The DPJ is not blameless; likely one-fifth or thereabouts of their Lower House members also guard their family heirlooms, including a few from old Socialist Party lineages.
(Oddly, all the convenient online data bases seem to cover the 2003 general election; the only comprehensive post-2005 data base available online is on Wikipedia, which may or may not cover the Upper House as well, and it is too time-consuming for this blogger to confirm it one way or the other.)
Lower House members toil long and hard to cultivate their local constituency. During this process, they build up powerful electoral/political machines around local notables and worthies and just plain enthusiastic people. Of these, the prefectural and municipal assemblymen are of particular importance because of the grass-roots support that they can muster. In fact, they appear to form the nucleus of many, perhaps most, of the prefectural party apparatuses and can on occasion overrule nationally prominent Diet members with impunity. They by no means hold absolute sway over the choice of Lower House candidates, but it is mighty hard to become the next Sultan without the support, or at least acquiescence, of the Janissary.
Over time, I am sure that the relationship can become intensely personal, and thus the electoral/political machine may find it difficult to refuse the last wish of the retiring politician to bequeath his seat to his beloved son or son-in-law (who in most though not all cases will have gone through the name-changing legal adoption process). And the son would more likely than not have served the incumbent father as a political secretary, thus easing the transition. But what of the frantic recruitment of the reluctant offspring or even more distant relative – in the case of sudden intestate, as it were, departure? Is personal loyalty so fungible as to be transferred to persons whose local ties and/or political inclinations are tenuous at best? Why don't the local politicians see this as a chance to stand for themselves?
In fact, I assume that, in many cases, that is exactly what they do. However, it is quite likely that there is no unity within the electoral/political machines behind a single candidate. A battle would disrupt the equilibrium, which, even if restored, would be drastically altered. There will be one mighty winner and his minions on the one side, and there will be losers, large and small. And this would be the case even if there had been a primus inter pares among the politicos to begin with. This looks like a risky proposal for all the members of the machine, not just the main contestants. So here is a powerful incentive to maintain the equilibrium at all reasonable costs. A hereditary successor usually meets this very important, though not essential, condition.
(That same desire, I believe, is the main reason why so many members of the much-maligned central bureaucracy manage to continue to parachute in to run, more often than not successfully, for the governor's office – in some cases whose only link with the prefecture would be a typically two-year term on secondment as a deputy governor (not an electoral office in Japan). The powers-that-be desire to maintain equilibrium; who better to do so than a (hopefully) neutral outsider? Why, then, I ask myself so inconveniently, are there few if any hereditary governors? I suspect that it has to do with the fact that you actually have to govern. Running a prefectural government is not a task for the fainthearted. But I'm going to continue thinking about this.)
I have no way of knowing, or even guessing, whether such a process is good or bad, or that it can be substantially altered. Humans like stability, and there are some very good reasons for it. However, whether those reasons are good for the nation as a whole in the case of political succession in the specific case of the Lower House, I have no idea.
Here, I note that conventional wisdom apparently decries the lack of political vision and reformatory zeal in politics and places at least some of the blame on the preponderance of hereditary politicians. But second-generation Ryutaro Hashimoto matched Yasuhiro Nakasone's scope and depth, if not success, as a reformist Prime Minister. And the man who beat him the second time around, Junichiro Koizumi - so fresh in your memories - is a third-generation Diet member. Second-generation Keizo Obuchi may not exactly have been a reformist, but he succeeded beyond all expectations (actually, there was little, so the bar had been set low, but still…) in steering his administration through the most difficult of economic and political times. The case for the conventional wisdom looks inconclusive.
So I have written all this when I don't even know if it's a good thing or a bad one. But I do believe that I have found a way to look at a very important determinant of the makeup of a very important element of the Japanese political landscape. I also believe that looking at such structural elements is essential, whether your intent is to describe, or to prescribe any aspect of Japanese politics. For example, I intuitively feel that the very size of the DPJ has made a significant realignment of the political parties along ideologically more consistent lines very difficult, and believe that this can be demonstrated by examining both DPJ and LDP within the current electoral rules. I have something like a combination of the thinking in this post and this examination of the New Komeito in mind.
Of course, I may be totally wrong about all this, or, worse, have reinvented yet another wheel, that is, pointed to something that has been obvious to everyone but me or worked over to death by real political scientists. I welcome your suggestions and other comments. If anybody wants to work with me on this in more detail, let me know.
My thanks to Mentor. I now realize that his answer, some time back, to my question was somewhere in the back of my head when I dreamed up this argument.
(Oddly, all the convenient online data bases seem to cover the 2003 general election; the only comprehensive post-2005 data base available online is on Wikipedia, which may or may not cover the Upper House as well, and it is too time-consuming for this blogger to confirm it one way or the other.)
Lower House members toil long and hard to cultivate their local constituency. During this process, they build up powerful electoral/political machines around local notables and worthies and just plain enthusiastic people. Of these, the prefectural and municipal assemblymen are of particular importance because of the grass-roots support that they can muster. In fact, they appear to form the nucleus of many, perhaps most, of the prefectural party apparatuses and can on occasion overrule nationally prominent Diet members with impunity. They by no means hold absolute sway over the choice of Lower House candidates, but it is mighty hard to become the next Sultan without the support, or at least acquiescence, of the Janissary.
Over time, I am sure that the relationship can become intensely personal, and thus the electoral/political machine may find it difficult to refuse the last wish of the retiring politician to bequeath his seat to his beloved son or son-in-law (who in most though not all cases will have gone through the name-changing legal adoption process). And the son would more likely than not have served the incumbent father as a political secretary, thus easing the transition. But what of the frantic recruitment of the reluctant offspring or even more distant relative – in the case of sudden intestate, as it were, departure? Is personal loyalty so fungible as to be transferred to persons whose local ties and/or political inclinations are tenuous at best? Why don't the local politicians see this as a chance to stand for themselves?
In fact, I assume that, in many cases, that is exactly what they do. However, it is quite likely that there is no unity within the electoral/political machines behind a single candidate. A battle would disrupt the equilibrium, which, even if restored, would be drastically altered. There will be one mighty winner and his minions on the one side, and there will be losers, large and small. And this would be the case even if there had been a primus inter pares among the politicos to begin with. This looks like a risky proposal for all the members of the machine, not just the main contestants. So here is a powerful incentive to maintain the equilibrium at all reasonable costs. A hereditary successor usually meets this very important, though not essential, condition.
(That same desire, I believe, is the main reason why so many members of the much-maligned central bureaucracy manage to continue to parachute in to run, more often than not successfully, for the governor's office – in some cases whose only link with the prefecture would be a typically two-year term on secondment as a deputy governor (not an electoral office in Japan). The powers-that-be desire to maintain equilibrium; who better to do so than a (hopefully) neutral outsider? Why, then, I ask myself so inconveniently, are there few if any hereditary governors? I suspect that it has to do with the fact that you actually have to govern. Running a prefectural government is not a task for the fainthearted. But I'm going to continue thinking about this.)
I have no way of knowing, or even guessing, whether such a process is good or bad, or that it can be substantially altered. Humans like stability, and there are some very good reasons for it. However, whether those reasons are good for the nation as a whole in the case of political succession in the specific case of the Lower House, I have no idea.
Here, I note that conventional wisdom apparently decries the lack of political vision and reformatory zeal in politics and places at least some of the blame on the preponderance of hereditary politicians. But second-generation Ryutaro Hashimoto matched Yasuhiro Nakasone's scope and depth, if not success, as a reformist Prime Minister. And the man who beat him the second time around, Junichiro Koizumi - so fresh in your memories - is a third-generation Diet member. Second-generation Keizo Obuchi may not exactly have been a reformist, but he succeeded beyond all expectations (actually, there was little, so the bar had been set low, but still…) in steering his administration through the most difficult of economic and political times. The case for the conventional wisdom looks inconclusive.
So I have written all this when I don't even know if it's a good thing or a bad one. But I do believe that I have found a way to look at a very important determinant of the makeup of a very important element of the Japanese political landscape. I also believe that looking at such structural elements is essential, whether your intent is to describe, or to prescribe any aspect of Japanese politics. For example, I intuitively feel that the very size of the DPJ has made a significant realignment of the political parties along ideologically more consistent lines very difficult, and believe that this can be demonstrated by examining both DPJ and LDP within the current electoral rules. I have something like a combination of the thinking in this post and this examination of the New Komeito in mind.
Of course, I may be totally wrong about all this, or, worse, have reinvented yet another wheel, that is, pointed to something that has been obvious to everyone but me or worked over to death by real political scientists. I welcome your suggestions and other comments. If anybody wants to work with me on this in more detail, let me know.
My thanks to Mentor. I now realize that his answer, some time back, to my question was somewhere in the back of my head when I dreamed up this argument.
Thursday, September 27, 2007
Asahi Polls Give the Fukuda Administration Good Numbers Too
The Asahi poll gives 53% to the Fukuda administration. That's only a 4.5% spread under Yomiuri's 57.5%. Mainichi has 57%, so they're in the right order. Still, the spread is nearer the short end of variations. I credit this to what looks in hindsight like a uniformly favorable – albeit uniformly cautious and caveat-filled - press coverage. Let's see how Mr. Fukuda's media-friendly, soft-sell personality and tactics work in advancing statecraft, most immediately when he fills out his policy laundry list when the Diet recommences in full. Then, with the fight over the extension of the JMSDF refueling operations and the expected flurry of DPJ sponsored-bills, it's open season on the Fukuda Cabinet.
TIME Did It Again, This Time on the LDP Election
"Abe's failure to address [many important issues, including the handling of over 50 million lost pension records, rural economic stagnation and tax reforms] cost his party control of Japan's upper house, and yet like their fallen predecessor, both Fukuda and Aso preferred to highlight their foreign policy differences — Fukuda called for open talks with Japan's neighbors, while the hawkish Aso took a conservative stance on the Yasukuni war shrine, a sore point in Asian relations. Both favored postponing a general election until next spring; both have also inherited Abe's insistence on continuing Japan's support of coalition forces in Afghanistan through its refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.
[…]
[W]ith Fukuda still unclear on how he intends to solve Japan's domestic economic issues, the LDP has until next spring's general elections to prove it can answer to the country's needs."
"
- TIME, 23 September 2007/09/27
I had started writing a post about how bad the article was, ran out of time, and left it in my draft file. Somehow, news on the Fukuda administration's poll numbers reminded me of it, so I dug it out. It would be a waste of time; it would be too long. So above you see what I think is the most egregious stretch of bad journalism.
If the correspondent had bothered to read the policy manifests of the two candidates, she would have known that that ["preferred to highlight their foreign policy differences note: later added for clarity while excising repeated sentence in the excerpt"] was the farthest thing from the truth. Then why did it appear as if they were talking about those subjects? Because those were the things the media chose to ask the candidates and highlight. Blame your Japanese colleagues. It's like Al Gore inventing the Internet.
As a matter of fact, in Mr. Aso's case, this point in the article has more than an echo of Al Gore's misfortune. If the correspondent had bothered to read this and this, she would have known that Mr. Aso has a very different view of what we should do about Yasukuni from, say Shoichi Nakagawa, and is, among other things, quite open to the idea of taking out the Class A War Criminals.
In passing, I'll mention that the general election is scheduled for September 2009. It's actually quite significant, at least to me, because Mr. Fukuda has never said that he will call an election in spring. He's been coy, if you listen to him carefully. I think that it will be later, and in any case when he thinks it's the right time to go to the public.
As you can see, there was nothing really wrong with the ending (except the writer's presumption that Mr. Fukuda must call an election in spring). But you don't need a whole error-filled article to say it.
As you can see, there was nothing really wrong with the ending (except the writer's presumption that Mr. Fukuda must call an election in spring). But you don't need a whole error-filled article to say it.
[…]
[W]ith Fukuda still unclear on how he intends to solve Japan's domestic economic issues, the LDP has until next spring's general elections to prove it can answer to the country's needs."
"
- TIME, 23 September 2007/09/27
I had started writing a post about how bad the article was, ran out of time, and left it in my draft file. Somehow, news on the Fukuda administration's poll numbers reminded me of it, so I dug it out. It would be a waste of time; it would be too long. So above you see what I think is the most egregious stretch of bad journalism.
If the correspondent had bothered to read the policy manifests of the two candidates, she would have known that that ["preferred to highlight their foreign policy differences note: later added for clarity while excising repeated sentence in the excerpt"] was the farthest thing from the truth. Then why did it appear as if they were talking about those subjects? Because those were the things the media chose to ask the candidates and highlight. Blame your Japanese colleagues. It's like Al Gore inventing the Internet.
As a matter of fact, in Mr. Aso's case, this point in the article has more than an echo of Al Gore's misfortune. If the correspondent had bothered to read this and this, she would have known that Mr. Aso has a very different view of what we should do about Yasukuni from, say Shoichi Nakagawa, and is, among other things, quite open to the idea of taking out the Class A War Criminals.
In passing, I'll mention that the general election is scheduled for September 2009. It's actually quite significant, at least to me, because Mr. Fukuda has never said that he will call an election in spring. He's been coy, if you listen to him carefully. I think that it will be later, and in any case when he thinks it's the right time to go to the public.
As you can see, there was nothing really wrong with the ending (except the writer's presumption that Mr. Fukuda must call an election in spring). But you don't need a whole error-filled article to say it.
As you can see, there was nothing really wrong with the ending (except the writer's presumption that Mr. Fukuda must call an election in spring). But you don't need a whole error-filled article to say it.
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
It's a Yomiuri Poll So Asahi Readers Get up to a 10 Percentage-Point Discount
In a show of how quickly the tide can turn (and turn again), the latest Yomiuri poll gives the Fukuda Cabinet 57.5% support against 27.3% opposed. 47% favor the extension of JMSFD refueling activities in the Indian Ocean while 40% oppose it.
Asahi should have its own numbers in tomorrow's morning edition, and early polls - likewise the JMSM – always go easy on the newbie. Still, it's something to think about for Ichiro Ozawa.
Asahi should have its own numbers in tomorrow's morning edition, and early polls - likewise the JMSM – always go easy on the newbie. Still, it's something to think about for Ichiro Ozawa.
The Prime Minister Sets Out to Charm the Press. Hey, It worked for President Bush…
"It's also fun to meet young people like this, right? For now..."
- Yasuo Fukuda, Asahi, 26 September 2007
The Prime Minister agreed to return to the traditional twice-a-day, burasagari, ask-the-PM-on-the-move format that Shinzo Abe had tried so hard to cut in half, and threw a kiss at the media butt for good measure, finishing it off with a dash of that (Fukuda-family) rarity among other Japanese politicians - irony. You could just see the reporters lapping it up.
All will not always be well. But when things go bad, the good-will cultivated with the media could spell the difference between victory and defeat. Just ask George Bush and Al Gore.
There's nothing wrong with that. In fact, it is the measure of a true leader of The Third Chimp. Mr. Fukuda is showing us how he had charmed the entire Kantei press into longing for his triumphant return.
Klieglight-shy, humorless Ichiro Ozawa needs to understand that he's up against a Chance the Gardener with some brains.
- Yasuo Fukuda, Asahi, 26 September 2007
The Prime Minister agreed to return to the traditional twice-a-day, burasagari, ask-the-PM-on-the-move format that Shinzo Abe had tried so hard to cut in half, and threw a kiss at the media butt for good measure, finishing it off with a dash of that (Fukuda-family) rarity among other Japanese politicians - irony. You could just see the reporters lapping it up.
All will not always be well. But when things go bad, the good-will cultivated with the media could spell the difference between victory and defeat. Just ask George Bush and Al Gore.
There's nothing wrong with that. In fact, it is the measure of a true leader of The Third Chimp. Mr. Fukuda is showing us how he had charmed the entire Kantei press into longing for his triumphant return.
Klieglight-shy, humorless Ichiro Ozawa needs to understand that he's up against a Chance the Gardener with some brains.
Random Firings of the Synapses on the New Fukuda Cabinet, Factions, Reformist Prime Ministers and Stuff
Got a long email from Mentor, gave a shorter response. Lightly edited and excised of personal stuff, here it is:
- Yasuo Fukuda takes over from Shinzo Abe, and there's only one new face in the cabinet. Is there anything that better symbolizes the LDP? Shoichi Nakagawa could take over one year from now and, if he could stay away from the Yasukuni Shrine, I don't think we'd notice the difference.
- habatsu; or, faction: a Japanese sport, played mainly by LDP men. Most cognoscenti of the sport consider the heydays of the SanKakuDaiFuku League the Golden Age of competitive, full-contact habatsu, when the weakest teams usually had at least one superstar and a legitimate chance to win it all.
Contemporary habatsu is an intramural-recreation game. After the game is over, all the players on all the teams get together and throw a big karaoke party. What can I say, it serves a useful objective. If nothing else, it proves that man is a social animal.
The DPJ plays a more primitive, freestyle game, but the objectives seem to be converging. The DPJ players want a big fat karaoke party of their own, and are beginning to smell the fried chicken and beer.
The problem is, there's only one karaoke set, and the LDP and DPJ are now too big to fit into the one karaoke room at the same time. This, I think, is a variety of the two-party political system that allows small floaters to play both sides of the game. Let's call it, meta-habatsu.
Sorry, that's about all I can say now on habatsu. I'll see if I can come up with some meaningful thoughts on dissenters and discontents, and their effect on team cohesion.
- I've long believed that Ryutaro Hashimoto has been underrated. In terms of potential, I rank him up there with Yasuhiro Nakasone. And I'm not saying that because he came to love METI. But that's what happens when you lose. Twice. People think of Noboru Takeshita as a pol of pols. But he got the consumption tax done. Gave me hope for the entire LDP with that too.
A true reformer would have to overhaul the entire FILP from head to tail, and that means that he has to redo the Post Office thing. As for the highways – Junichiro Koizumi really botched that one; maybe he was no better than that – Mr. Fukuda has said stuff that suggests, hints, that he'll backtrack on that. Politically, it would make at least as much sense as throwing money at 90-year old small-plot farmers; as statecraft, it would leave something to be desired. But let's keep hoping.
- Yasuo Fukuda takes over from Shinzo Abe, and there's only one new face in the cabinet. Is there anything that better symbolizes the LDP? Shoichi Nakagawa could take over one year from now and, if he could stay away from the Yasukuni Shrine, I don't think we'd notice the difference.
- habatsu; or, faction: a Japanese sport, played mainly by LDP men. Most cognoscenti of the sport consider the heydays of the SanKakuDaiFuku League the Golden Age of competitive, full-contact habatsu, when the weakest teams usually had at least one superstar and a legitimate chance to win it all.
Contemporary habatsu is an intramural-recreation game. After the game is over, all the players on all the teams get together and throw a big karaoke party. What can I say, it serves a useful objective. If nothing else, it proves that man is a social animal.
The DPJ plays a more primitive, freestyle game, but the objectives seem to be converging. The DPJ players want a big fat karaoke party of their own, and are beginning to smell the fried chicken and beer.
The problem is, there's only one karaoke set, and the LDP and DPJ are now too big to fit into the one karaoke room at the same time. This, I think, is a variety of the two-party political system that allows small floaters to play both sides of the game. Let's call it, meta-habatsu.
Sorry, that's about all I can say now on habatsu. I'll see if I can come up with some meaningful thoughts on dissenters and discontents, and their effect on team cohesion.
- I've long believed that Ryutaro Hashimoto has been underrated. In terms of potential, I rank him up there with Yasuhiro Nakasone. And I'm not saying that because he came to love METI. But that's what happens when you lose. Twice. People think of Noboru Takeshita as a pol of pols. But he got the consumption tax done. Gave me hope for the entire LDP with that too.
A true reformer would have to overhaul the entire FILP from head to tail, and that means that he has to redo the Post Office thing. As for the highways – Junichiro Koizumi really botched that one; maybe he was no better than that – Mr. Fukuda has said stuff that suggests, hints, that he'll backtrack on that. Politically, it would make at least as much sense as throwing money at 90-year old small-plot farmers; as statecraft, it would leave something to be desired. But let's keep hoping.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
070925What the State Department Thinks of North Korea as a Sponsor of Terrorism
Ever wondered what the bureaucrat-vetted version of U.S. policy concerning North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism looked like? I thought so.
Well, I'm going to force you to read them anyway, with excerpts of the introduction to the chapter on State Sponsors of Terror Overview and the section on North Korea. For both 2005 and 2006!
They were both published in April of the subsequent year. Two major differences:
The introduction in the 2006 Report has dropped reference to North Korea altogether. This is no oversight. The 2006 introduction is much longer, 280 words to 2005's 127.
The 2006 section on North Korea has also been truncated. Moreover, it includes the ominous statement:
In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."
What of the abductees? The 2005 Report says:
Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War.
But the 2006 Report says:
The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002.
What at the end of 2005 remained a contentious issue was now merely a continuing demand from the Japanese government for a full accounting. All reference to other abductees, including South Koreans, had been removed. Moreover, there was no evident link between the Japanese demands and North Korean de-listing.
What happened in between was, of course, the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement.
It had become something of a ritual, where Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Hill would intimate de-listing without regard to the Japanese abductees, then the Japanese powers-that-be would claim that they had talked to President Bush, or Condoleezza Rice, and received reassurances that such was not the case. Now, the latest report from Washington says that Secretary Rice has also defected to the other side. I should not have been surprised, since, on September 16, I had already watched then LDP Secretary-General Nobuteru Ishihara kiss off the Six-Party Talks in a fit of anger at the U.S. "change of heart".
In turn, though, I wonder how Mr. Ishihara could have held it in so long, since February 13? And if he had needed any further confirmation to have the message sink in, surely he should have read the writing on the cyberwall when he saw the April 30 Report.
Or maybe, just maybe, these people had known what was going on all along?
Consider this post complementary to this.
Country Report on Terrorism (2005)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 28, 2006
Chapter 6 -- State Sponsors of Terror Overview
Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.
State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.
North Korea
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.
Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.
Country Report on Terrorism (2006)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 30, 2007
Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other destabilizing technologies that could get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.
As a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsors of terrorism on June 30. Since pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States and the international community on counterterrorism efforts.
Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the War on Terror. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.
Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as "not fully cooperating" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The designation, included in Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, was based on a review of Venezuela's overall efforts to fight terrorism. Effective October 1, the decision imposed sanctions on all commercial arms sales and transfers. It remains in effect until September 30, 2007, when it may be renewed by a determination by the Secretary. (Venezuela is the only nation certified as "not fully cooperating" that is not a state sponsor of terrorism.)
North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."
Well, I'm going to force you to read them anyway, with excerpts of the introduction to the chapter on State Sponsors of Terror Overview and the section on North Korea. For both 2005 and 2006!
They were both published in April of the subsequent year. Two major differences:
The introduction in the 2006 Report has dropped reference to North Korea altogether. This is no oversight. The 2006 introduction is much longer, 280 words to 2005's 127.
The 2006 section on North Korea has also been truncated. Moreover, it includes the ominous statement:
In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."
What of the abductees? The 2005 Report says:
Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War.
But the 2006 Report says:
The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002.
What at the end of 2005 remained a contentious issue was now merely a continuing demand from the Japanese government for a full accounting. All reference to other abductees, including South Koreans, had been removed. Moreover, there was no evident link between the Japanese demands and North Korean de-listing.
What happened in between was, of course, the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement.
It had become something of a ritual, where Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Hill would intimate de-listing without regard to the Japanese abductees, then the Japanese powers-that-be would claim that they had talked to President Bush, or Condoleezza Rice, and received reassurances that such was not the case. Now, the latest report from Washington says that Secretary Rice has also defected to the other side. I should not have been surprised, since, on September 16, I had already watched then LDP Secretary-General Nobuteru Ishihara kiss off the Six-Party Talks in a fit of anger at the U.S. "change of heart".
In turn, though, I wonder how Mr. Ishihara could have held it in so long, since February 13? And if he had needed any further confirmation to have the message sink in, surely he should have read the writing on the cyberwall when he saw the April 30 Report.
Or maybe, just maybe, these people had known what was going on all along?
Consider this post complementary to this.
Country Report on Terrorism (2005)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 28, 2006
Chapter 6 -- State Sponsors of Terror Overview
Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.
State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.
North Korea
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.
Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.
Country Report on Terrorism (2006)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 30, 2007
Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other destabilizing technologies that could get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.
As a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsors of terrorism on June 30. Since pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States and the international community on counterterrorism efforts.
Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the War on Terror. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.
Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as "not fully cooperating" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The designation, included in Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, was based on a review of Venezuela's overall efforts to fight terrorism. Effective October 1, the decision imposed sanctions on all commercial arms sales and transfers. It remains in effect until September 30, 2007, when it may be renewed by a determination by the Secretary. (Venezuela is the only nation certified as "not fully cooperating" that is not a state sponsor of terrorism.)
North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."
And the Winner Is… Makoto Koga? and Other Post-LDP Election Trivia
"…When I requested a meeting with Ichiro Ozawa, head of the DPJ, I had decided to resign, in view of my health. On that basis, I had intended to ask him to build a relationship of trust."
- Shinzo Abe, Sept. 24 press conference
At first, I am thinking, is he nuts? Did he really think giving himself up would convince Mr. Ozawa to stop trying to knock the LDP out of power? Then I realize that Mr. Abe is channeling those medieval warlords and - dare I say it? - our previous Emperor, who offered their lives in order to save their people. Still, this is odd; The LDP may have lost the battle, but, with an overwhelming majority in the decisive Lower House, it certainly hasn't lost the war. President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor seeking truce with Japan by offering to commit seppuku? Hmm, still doesn't quite work.
As new election czar, Makoto "I Am Prettier than Tamisuke Watanuki but Not as Cute as Shizuka Kamei" Koga wrests substantial power out of the hands of the Secretary-General, effectively making the LDP party leadership The Big Four instead of The Big Three. Post-Upper House election reports said that Mr. Koga had refused Prime Minister Abe's request to be the General Council Chairman, the least powerful among The Big Three. Asked by Yasuo Fukuda, he refused again, instead, asking for and getting the election portfolio.
Let's see: Secretary-General, Bunmei Ibuki, 69; Toshihiro Nikai, General Council Chairman, 62; Sadakazu Tanigaki, 62; Makoto Koga, 67. Well, at least they're all younger than the Prime Minister…
The LDP and the New Komeito leadership meet and agree to require receipts for all expenditures regardless of amount (there is currently a \50,000 floor for declaring individual expenditures). Prime Minister Abe had pushed the idea before the election, but had let it slip as his power continued to deteriorate. I thought that would be disastrous, tantamount to sticking out your neck, then giving Mr. Ozawa a sledgehammer. This is a smart, if obvious, move.
The Foreign Ministry looked like the only plausible place to put Taro Aso. Now it is opening up, as current Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura is switching to Chief Cabinet Secretary. True, there are philosophical differences between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Aso, but exogenous constraints (make nice with China, make nice with the US, keep hands and eyes on abductees issue, etc.) will confine any dissonance to symbolic, not substantive, quarters. Besides, what did Lyndon B. Johnson say about Edger J. Hoover? Long-time readers of my blog know, of course, that my predictive powers are on a par with Sylvia Brown and Uri Geller…
ADD. You know, Tobias Harris makes a good point about Mr. Aso here. No, I mean here. Actually, I thought that there would be a very high likelihood that Mr. Fukuda would offer the post, but it appears from the Sankei link that Mr. Aso is saying that if offered, he will not serve We'll know soon.
- Shinzo Abe, Sept. 24 press conference
At first, I am thinking, is he nuts? Did he really think giving himself up would convince Mr. Ozawa to stop trying to knock the LDP out of power? Then I realize that Mr. Abe is channeling those medieval warlords and - dare I say it? - our previous Emperor, who offered their lives in order to save their people. Still, this is odd; The LDP may have lost the battle, but, with an overwhelming majority in the decisive Lower House, it certainly hasn't lost the war. President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor seeking truce with Japan by offering to commit seppuku? Hmm, still doesn't quite work.
As new election czar, Makoto "I Am Prettier than Tamisuke Watanuki but Not as Cute as Shizuka Kamei" Koga wrests substantial power out of the hands of the Secretary-General, effectively making the LDP party leadership The Big Four instead of The Big Three. Post-Upper House election reports said that Mr. Koga had refused Prime Minister Abe's request to be the General Council Chairman, the least powerful among The Big Three. Asked by Yasuo Fukuda, he refused again, instead, asking for and getting the election portfolio.
Let's see: Secretary-General, Bunmei Ibuki, 69; Toshihiro Nikai, General Council Chairman, 62; Sadakazu Tanigaki, 62; Makoto Koga, 67. Well, at least they're all younger than the Prime Minister…
The LDP and the New Komeito leadership meet and agree to require receipts for all expenditures regardless of amount (there is currently a \50,000 floor for declaring individual expenditures). Prime Minister Abe had pushed the idea before the election, but had let it slip as his power continued to deteriorate. I thought that would be disastrous, tantamount to sticking out your neck, then giving Mr. Ozawa a sledgehammer. This is a smart, if obvious, move.
The Foreign Ministry looked like the only plausible place to put Taro Aso. Now it is opening up, as current Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura is switching to Chief Cabinet Secretary. True, there are philosophical differences between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Aso, but exogenous constraints (make nice with China, make nice with the US, keep hands and eyes on abductees issue, etc.) will confine any dissonance to symbolic, not substantive, quarters. Besides, what did Lyndon B. Johnson say about Edger J. Hoover? Long-time readers of my blog know, of course, that my predictive powers are on a par with Sylvia Brown and Uri Geller…
ADD. You know, Tobias Harris makes a good point about Mr. Aso here. No, I mean here. Actually, I thought that there would be a very high likelihood that Mr. Fukuda would offer the post, but it appears from the Sankei link that Mr. Aso is saying that if offered, he will not serve We'll know soon.
Monday, September 24, 2007
If You Want to Know Who's Afraid of Japan, Take a Look at the Three Nations Survey
Yomiuri has released the results of this year's joint three-nation opinion poll (Japan: Yomiuri; China: 瞭望東方週刊 Liaowang Dongfeng Zhoukan? (Shinghwa Agency) ; South Korea: 韓国日報社 Hanguk Ilbo) taken between August 21 and September 9. Yomiuri on-line has articles centering on environmental concerns and mutual sentiment. The hard copy version has the full results with plenty of commentary in a two-page spread. I don't have the time to give it justice - in a nutshell, it's better all around than last year (July 2006), mainly due to Prime Minister Abe staying away (we think) from the Yasukuni Shrine and Chinese authorities engaging in heavy-duty public communications at home - but one data set not taken up in the articles that made it online struck me as singularly illuminating.
Question: The countries and regions that you think will be a military threat to your nation (multiple answers allowed)
Answer:
Japan: 1. North Korea (73.6%); 2. China (46.1%); 3. Russia (24.3%)
China: 1. Japan (78.2%); 2. U.S. (75.2%); 3. Taiwan (36.6%)
South Korea: 1. North Korea (71.0%); 2. China (46.6%); 3. Japan (37.5%)
Should 1.3 billion Chinese fear us more than twice as much as 46 million South Koreans do? Amazing what purposeful education and other state propaganda can do over the decades, isn't it?
Question: The countries and regions that you think will be a military threat to your nation (multiple answers allowed)
Answer:
Japan: 1. North Korea (73.6%); 2. China (46.1%); 3. Russia (24.3%)
China: 1. Japan (78.2%); 2. U.S. (75.2%); 3. Taiwan (36.6%)
South Korea: 1. North Korea (71.0%); 2. China (46.6%); 3. Japan (37.5%)
Should 1.3 billion Chinese fear us more than twice as much as 46 million South Koreans do? Amazing what purposeful education and other state propaganda can do over the decades, isn't it?
Sunday, September 23, 2007
Mr. Fukuda Is the Next Prime Minister
Just before the vote, the newscaster divulges the outcome of the Prefectural chapter votes; Yasuo Fukuda has a comfortable though not overwhelming 76 to 65 edge. So there goes the last vestige of what little suspense remained, and you have what must be the most boring secret vote in TV history, if you want to watch.
Yes, secret vote. Imagine; the LDP Diet members, mostly men, grown ups all (there's you-know-who, but otherwise), are afraid to stand up and be counted.
Final tally: Fukuda 330, Aso 197 (one vote is void). So the Diet members went: Fukuda 254, Aso 132.
note: For what it's worth, the Yomiuri survey of the Diet members had given Mr. Fukuda 263 votes as of yesterday.
Mr. Aso must be feeling wistful; at 67, this is very likely his last hurrah, unless Mr. Fukuda fails badly and the LDP needs a caretaker Prime Minister for an early general election. Still, in an uphill battle against most of the leadership in the factions, he has fought a good fight, made a very respectable showing, yet has not quite embarrassed Mr. Fukuda either. This makes it easier for everybody to kiss and make up; in fact, they'll have to.
Mr. Fukuda delivers a brief speech, appropriately humble, thankful, determined. He tells the audience… Wait, are they… Yes, those are Diet members, arms extended, snapping I-Was-There pictures on their cell phones… The new LDP President tells the audience that he wants to revive an LDP in deep difficulties with everybody's help and recover public confidence in it. Later, Mr. Aso joins him on stage; the two greet each other warmly, they all do the customary three banzais for Mr. Fukuda, and suddenly, it's all over.
So, restructuring continues, with a human face. Achieving primary balance by FY 2011 is still in, and expanding public works is still out. Combine this with his dovish outlook, and we have a Koga-Tanigaki-Yamazaki-Koizumi-(yes, Koizumi)-friendly Prime Minister on deck. Mr. Fukuda will fill out his statecraft package when he delivers his first policy statement address; after he is elected Prime Minister by the Diet and anointed by the Emperor, and assembles his Cabinet. (He is expected to maintain all or most of the main players there; which is unlikely for the party leadership, beginning with Mr. Aso, the Secretary-General.) I only wish that I'll have something interesting to say when he does that.
The first item on the Prime Minister to-do list is, of course, pushing a counter-terrorism extension bill. Mr. Fukuda has steadfastly refused to say that he'll resort to the supermajority override. I firmly believe that this is merely part of the LDP charm offensive, beginning right after the Upper House election, when Nobutaka Machimura and other party worthies talked up the DPJ and even hinted at a Grand Coalition. This has continued with Mr. Fukuda's repeated talk of a negotiated Lower House dissolution (hanashiai kaisan)and general election, depending on prevailing sentiment after the FY 2008 budget is passed. (I still believe that it won't happen until well into the summer, and possibly later.) When the moment comes, however, he will, reluctantly and with no ill will of course, pull the trigger.
ADD. Mr. Fukuda has been elected to complete Mr. Abe's term as LDP President, which ends on 30 September 2009. According to party rules, he can (theoretically) serve two full three-year terms after that.
Yes, secret vote. Imagine; the LDP Diet members, mostly men, grown ups all (there's you-know-who, but otherwise), are afraid to stand up and be counted.
Final tally: Fukuda 330, Aso 197 (one vote is void). So the Diet members went: Fukuda 254, Aso 132.
note: For what it's worth, the Yomiuri survey of the Diet members had given Mr. Fukuda 263 votes as of yesterday.
Mr. Aso must be feeling wistful; at 67, this is very likely his last hurrah, unless Mr. Fukuda fails badly and the LDP needs a caretaker Prime Minister for an early general election. Still, in an uphill battle against most of the leadership in the factions, he has fought a good fight, made a very respectable showing, yet has not quite embarrassed Mr. Fukuda either. This makes it easier for everybody to kiss and make up; in fact, they'll have to.
Mr. Fukuda delivers a brief speech, appropriately humble, thankful, determined. He tells the audience… Wait, are they… Yes, those are Diet members, arms extended, snapping I-Was-There pictures on their cell phones… The new LDP President tells the audience that he wants to revive an LDP in deep difficulties with everybody's help and recover public confidence in it. Later, Mr. Aso joins him on stage; the two greet each other warmly, they all do the customary three banzais for Mr. Fukuda, and suddenly, it's all over.
So, restructuring continues, with a human face. Achieving primary balance by FY 2011 is still in, and expanding public works is still out. Combine this with his dovish outlook, and we have a Koga-Tanigaki-Yamazaki-Koizumi-(yes, Koizumi)-friendly Prime Minister on deck. Mr. Fukuda will fill out his statecraft package when he delivers his first policy statement address; after he is elected Prime Minister by the Diet and anointed by the Emperor, and assembles his Cabinet. (He is expected to maintain all or most of the main players there; which is unlikely for the party leadership, beginning with Mr. Aso, the Secretary-General.) I only wish that I'll have something interesting to say when he does that.
The first item on the Prime Minister to-do list is, of course, pushing a counter-terrorism extension bill. Mr. Fukuda has steadfastly refused to say that he'll resort to the supermajority override. I firmly believe that this is merely part of the LDP charm offensive, beginning right after the Upper House election, when Nobutaka Machimura and other party worthies talked up the DPJ and even hinted at a Grand Coalition. This has continued with Mr. Fukuda's repeated talk of a negotiated Lower House dissolution (hanashiai kaisan)and general election, depending on prevailing sentiment after the FY 2008 budget is passed. (I still believe that it won't happen until well into the summer, and possibly later.) When the moment comes, however, he will, reluctantly and with no ill will of course, pull the trigger.
ADD. Mr. Fukuda has been elected to complete Mr. Abe's term as LDP President, which ends on 30 September 2009. According to party rules, he can (theoretically) serve two full three-year terms after that.
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