The Relationship between TPP and the US Response to China’s New Air Defense Identification Zone

Just in case there’s any misunderstanding, I do not believe that the US response to China’s new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) will directly impact the Japan-US bilateral part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Once the Abe administration committed to the TTP process, there was no way that it could entrench itself in a position that would wind up putting the blame on Japan in the event that negotiations ultimately failed. The Abe administration will make the necessary domestic adjustments—essentially using fiscal means to buy off vested agricultural interests—regardless of what goes on in the East China Sea.

However, there has been much to worry about the Obama administration’s Asia Pivot from the Japanese perspective as John Kerry has supplanted Hilary Clinton in the State Department and focused most of his attention on the Middle East. It is conceivable, plausible, that China looked at what it considers a distracted Obama administration and timed its move accordingly. In a sense, the US commitment to the Japan-US security relationship is being tested. A muscular US response on this front should serve as confirmation of this commitment, in turn replenishing confidence in the Obama administration’s commitment to the Asian Pivot. Japanese concessions at the negotiating table are unlikely to be materially affected by this, but they will easier to sell within the domestic political process because of it.

Of course the Obama administration has its own domestic selling process to worry about. Specifically, it faces considerable political opposition in securing fast-track authority, without which the TPP process may collapse. Good friend and former Fulbright scholar Paul Sracic, who will be in Tokyo again for a few weeks, has been looking in on this issue for some time and should have interesting things to say. Media folks in Tokyo who are interested in talking to him can get in touch with him through his public email account on his bio page

At Least WaPo Is Showing Some Sympathy for China on the ADIZ Controversy

I’ve mostly stopped critiquing media reports but I couldn’t help it this time, and since it comes within the flow of my latest stream...

The title of the WaPo piece says “China's move to establish air defense zone appears to backfire”, but what’s not to like for the Chinese authorities about a report that begins with the sentence “It was designed as a forceful response to Japanese assertiveness, and a robust declaration of China’s maritime claims”, and later offers these stories?

“Japan, like numerous other countries, already has its own air defense identification zone. The country increasingly has used the zone as an excuse to warn or intercept Chinese planes in the area, according to military experts in Beijing. In September, Japan threatened to shoot down Chinese drones flying over the disputed islands; China warned that downing the drones would constitute an act of war” (never mind that a routine fact check would have shown that the Japanese authorities carefully avoided any such commitment on the Senkakus or anywhere).

 “’Japan has been acting more and more confrontational with regards to the Diaoyu islands, so China had to roll out its own measures to balance it out,’ said Zhou Yongsheng of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of International Relations in Beijing. ‘Whenever Chinese aircraft entered Japan’s zone, they would dispatch fighter jets to intercept us, which put us in a very passive position.’”

China is portrayed as the passive party, reacting to Japanese “assertiveness,” a trope helped by a factual error, omission of the sovereign overreach in the Chinese claim that is at the core of the complaints, and the overall lack of Japanese voices.

“David Nakamura in Washington, Chico Harlan in Seoul and Liu Liu, Li Qi and Guo Chen in Beijing contributed to this report.”

Oh. Ooohh…

So I guess my question is: Do the Chinese even need pictures?

So What Was the Reason for the Massive Chinese Overreach on Its ADIZ?

So I guess my question is, why did the Chinese authorities do something so out of the norm? Surely they were aware of their massive overreach?

A Southeast Asian diplomat that I talked to has more or less the following to say: The Chinese believe that the United States is in decline, so it did what it did to demonstrate that it would be willing to throw its weight around going forward.

I'm not 100% convinced that this is the case, but I can't think of a better explanation myself.

Why Everybody Is Furious at China for Establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone

The United States has one, Japan has one; so why is everyone so angry that China decided to have one its own? And why are its overseas supporters quiet for once? Simple. China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is a one-of-a-kind device that extends sovereign authority over international airspace.

Specifically, the Chinese authorities are demanding that all aircraft that passes through its ADIZ must provide flight plan identification, radio identification, transponder identification, and logo identification to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Civil Aviation Administration. Moreover, such aircraft “should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.”

This is quite different from procedures adopted by the United States, which only “apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace.” Sounds reasonable, doesn’t it? The United States accordingly “does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace.” Also reasonable. Ergo the flyover by a pair of B-52 bombers, just to make the point. (The relevant paragraph is reproduced below.)

The Japanese ADIZ appears to amount to the same thing. Aircraft intending to enter Japan’s national airspace must report flight plans to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (the civil aviation authorities), which is transmitted in real time to the Air Defense Force. Otherwise, the Japanese authorities impose no reporting requirements on aircraft passing through its ADIZ.

“2.7.2.3 Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace

"International law does not prohibit nations from establishing air defense identification zones (ADIZ) in the international airspace adjacent to their territorial airspace. The legal basis for ADIZ regulations is the right of a nation to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory. Accordingly, an aircraft approaching national airspace can be required to identify itself while in international airspace as a condition of entry approval. ADIZ regulations promulgated by the United States apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace and require the filing of flight plans and periodic position reports. The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so."

No the Japanese Authorities Did Not Quite Threaten to Shoot Down Drones in the Air Defense Identification Zone around the Senkaku Islands

There’s apparently some misunderstanding out there that the Japanese government warned that it would shoot down drones in the air Japanese defense identification zone around the Senkaku Islands. Since the new Chinese ADIZ raises the chances of some incident blowing up into a more serious clash, the following memo may be of some interest to anyone who chances upon this blog.

First, the Japanese authorities were referring to territorial air space, not just any "air defense [identification] zone(s)." In fact, the western part of Yonakuni Island, an undisputed (and well-inhabited) part of Okinawa had not been included in any Japanese ADIZ until the latter was expanded during the very recent DPJ administration. Most of the Japanese and Chinese ADIZs cover non-territorial air space, where aircraft are in principle free to traverse. On the other hand, all international air flight requires reporting to the proper international authorities. I do not know the details of this requirement, but sovereign states have access to this flight information, which means that all normal civilian flights in the new ADIZ (or any non-territorial airspace in any ADIZs for that matter) will continue unmolested by the Japanese or Chinese military. Of course any unreported aircraft--which likely will include most Japanese and Chinese aircraft in the area--will be subjected to proper scrutiny, i.e. demand for self-identification, warnings and the like, and ultimately attacked in self-defense in the case where there is an clear and present danger--a decision that may be made with regard to the non-territorial airspace within the ADIZ. It is unlikely that a JSDAF fighter will shoot down a Chinese drone/aircraft in the ADIZ or even in Senkaku Islands airspace just because the latter is recalcitrant or unable to identify itself. A Chinese PLA aircraft may be more gung-ho, though, and may decide to attack a JSDAF or Japanese Coast Guard aircraft that happens to fly over the new Chinese ADIZ, territorial air space in particular. (The Japanese authorities do not, to the best of my knowledge, have drones in operation in that neighborhood.) Far more likely, though, is that a Chinese pilot might close in on a JSDAF or JCG aircraft as a form of warning (or just to put a scare into the Japanese) and cause an accident. (Remember the Hainan Island Incident.)

My second caveat is that the Japanese authorities did not explicitly state that they would use weapons. It was in response to a hypothetical that the Chinese authorities directly and somewhat belligerently addressed the matter. The relevant comments from Japanese defense minister at the Sept. 10 press conference, when he addressed the matter in response to questions from the media, follow:

" Question:

Based on the current Self Defense Forces Act, my understanding is that necessary measures can be taken in order to make aircraft invading Japan's territorial airspace withdraw. However, in the theoretical case in which an unmanned aircraft invades Japan's territorial airspace and it is left alone, the situation may threaten the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and assets of Japanese people. Under such circumstances, do you think shooting the aircraft down can be an option as a last resort?

"Minister:

In any case, we will take necessary actions in order to defend Japan's territorial land, sea and airspace as well as protecting lives and assets of the people."

and

"Question:

Concerning countermeasures against invasion of Japan's territorial airspace, not only by an unmanned aircraft but in any form, I presume that necessary countermeasures exclude the use of weapons that can harm the invaders, unless they are used for emergency evacuation or self-defense based on the conventional interpretation. When you said earlier, "We will take necessary actions," did you mean that the use of weapons that are harmful to the invaders is one of the options, too?

"Minister:

I will refrain from answering about each specific countermeasure, since doing so may reveal Japan's strategies. In any case, we will take necessary measures."

Some Thoughts around the 2020 Tokyo Olympics

The tangible impact on the Japanese economy will be limited. The Japanese economy is much larger and more developed than it was in 1964, when the first Tokyo Olympics was held. There is no bullet train to be commissioned in time for the opening ceremonies. There is no post-WW II Tokyo waiting to be terraformed. But there are intangible, if also limited, benefits. Animal spirits will quicken, helping to stoke the Abenomics fire. In this regard, it’s significant that it’s Tokyo—not Nagoya (candidate 1988) or Osaka (2008)—it maximizes the socio-cultural impact.

Prime Minister Abe is a lucky man—who guessed a year ago that Prime Minister Erdegan would blow up Istanbul’s chances in the face of a heavily European IOC?—but he helps to make his own luck. This is not the first time that I’ve said that, but again he put some political capital on the line, and again it paid off; his presence and presentation were, by all accounts, a definite positive. Think about it. Can you imagine Prime Minister Kan having carried it off? Or even thinking about it? With Governor Ishihara? Again, the effect will be limited in political terms; it’s not about him, he surely understands that, and he’ll wisely downplay his role in having made it happen.

And speaking of Abe’s presence, does anything say G-Zero more than leaving the G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg to show up at an NGO—after all, that’s what the International Olympics Committee is, isn’t it?—plenary in Buenos Aires to make a pitch to host a sports event?

Given the timing of all this, some people will be wondering what the impact will be on the looming decision on the consumption tax hike. I’ve been moving back over the last couple of weeks to the view that the FY 2014 hike will indeed be implemented as scheduled (with a significant FY2013 supplemental budget to tide the Japanese economy over the bump) and I’m tempted to interpret all this as a positive in this respect. More importantly, though, it makes any decision of his easier for the Japanese public to accept, and the consumption tax question is no exception. In other words, it increases his room for maneuver.

Finally, it’s useful to remember that the likes of NYT and “outcast of Asia” chatter aside, Japan is quite popular worldwide, regularly placing near the top—it would be the top if not for the Chinese and South Korean respondents—in the annual Pew survey. That surely helped to offset headlines around the latest Fukushima leakage.

Now, I have work to do.

I Now Believe that Abe Will Not Do the Full 3% Consumption Tax Hike in April

Prime Minister Abe has been persuaded by two economic advisors, Professor Koichi Hamada and former non-mainstream MOF bureaucrat Etsuro Honda, to adopt a gradual five-year phase-in instead of the two-installment plan that is currently in place. It could be jiggered, but the idea is to more away from the three-party deal. That, or Honda is a complete flake, which I do not believe he is. MOF will not like it, but it will go along. Likewise, BOJ.

I can’t take any meaningful bets since I live in Japan (and I’m not so confident that I’m willing to bet the house), but I’m sure that the authorities won’t chase me down if I make a friendly wager to all and sundry for an up to-2,000 yen lunch. Let’s put it this way: If the consumption tax goes up 3% on April 1, you win; if it doesn’t, I do. Wait, I’ll give you the full FY2013 for the Abe administration to do so. Any takers please contact my Gmail account, which is easily found around my blog.

Are We Japanese Ultranationalists?

According to this joint Japan-China survey, 46.0% of the Japanese responders were okay with the prime minister paying his respects at the Yasukuni Shrine and 27.5% were okay if he did it in his capacity as a private citizen while only 9.9% were unconditionally opposed. There’s two ways to understand this: a) 46.6% of the Japanese electorate is ultra-nationalist; or b) you antis out there totally miss what Yasukuni is all about. I might go over this (and the meaning of the 27.5%) in more detail tomorrow—August 15—if I can take time out of some pressing work. And I might work the Arlington National Cemetery into it. Then again, I think that there’s a narrative there waiting to be exposed to a braoder audience. I’ll sleep on it.

Underwear Will Out: The Short Shorts Meditations

Is it my imagination or have my observation skills taken a jump this summer? There seem to be a noticeably higher number of women, mostly young—but then, at my age, what woman isn’t?—hitting the streets of Tokyo in short shorts (SSs). Now most SSs surely have their origins in the short pants outerwear that once only boys wore, but some of them are made from flimsy cloth and trimmed with lace, making them look, with perhaps with added gloss and froufrou, like something out of a Victoria’s Secret catalog (or so I guess, based purely on what I’ve heard from my friends). And some of the similarly constructed dresses could be mistaken for chemises. And on the other side of the gender divide, the suteteko, baggy underpants created to wear under kimono, is making a comeback among the young as casual outerwear.

This reminds me of my Osaka childhood, the hottest days of summer saw women walking around the neighborhood in their chemises and men hanging out in suteteko. But these were the doings of older generations (though for someone my age, anyone above high-school age was old); a couple of events stand out in my memory, the high-school age sister of a friend walking around the house in her chemise and a grade seven classmate stripping down to her chemise to change into gym wear, for their unusualness.

This is not without precedent. The kimono as we know it today evolved from the kosode, which had its origins as underwear for the nobles in the Heian era that spread to the samurai and later to the lower classes. The more casual yukata began life as a bathing suit-and-bath towel, an origin that is reflected in the protocol now largely honored in the breach (or so I hear) that says you’re not supposed to wear any underwear with it.

Summers are hot here, we wanna take our clothes off, and between global warming and the heat island effect, here we go again, by Nelly, led by the young, as usual. And next up for promotion? The thong. I may not be around to see this prediction vindicated, though. Sad, isn’t it?

Sidebar: More women are covering their arms in dark sleeve-like gloves and long plastic faceguards, a look that I first saw maybe just a couple of years ago, when I wondered if the woman was hypersensitive to sunlight. But this Dr. Moreau-meets-the Invisible Man and Darth Vader look is sported by women typically more advanced in years, indicating a rearguard action against the ravages of time.

Aso and the Nazis: Some Thoughts on What to Expect Going Forward

Here’s my weekend memo on Aso channeling the Nazis, edited to avoid any duplication with other stuff out there. Someone whose judgment I respect suggests that I’m being a little too harsh on Aso. I suspect he’s right, and I don’t think that Aso can bring the Aso administration down all by himself. Nevertheless, he is revealing the significant potential as a target for the opposition that I mentioned at the beginning of the Abe administration, a target that can be very useful when the Abe administration is more vulnerable.

Last week, the media swarmed all over Aso regarding an occasion where he allegedly suggested that Japan should learn from the Nazis in how they quietly (stealthily?) changed the German constitution. There’s a case to be made that Aso was mistreated. After all, he first mentioned the rise of the Nazis under the Weimar Constitution in what appears to be a warning that even a perfectly respectable constitution could lead to a disastrous political outcome. However, he later indeed talked about the Nazi experience as something to possibly learn from. True, most likely from a purely tactical point of view, but he broke an unwritten rule of the West: Never say anything remotely positive about the Nazis. Ever. That said, it’ll blow over.

First, the international impact. China and South Korea are jumping on Aso (and the Abe administration by implication), and the story certainly ties into the tide of ill will that has been developing and will impede nascent efforts on all sides to contain the negativity and hopefully improve the situation. That said, the impact of Aso’s latest gaffe will be limited by the fact that Nazism is not a significant element in the history issues that plague Japan’s relationship with its neighbors. It does not resonate in the way that disputing the testimonies of comfort women does for South Korea and the Nanjing Massacre for China. (But hey, if you’ve been telling your clients or bosses that Prime Minister Abe will go to Yasukuni on August 15, this is a useful excuse to stop tooting that horn.) It does resonate, though, in Europe and the United States, which is where the bulk of the public communications damage is being done. Even there, it will not do lasting structural damage to Japan’s all-important relationship with the United States (or the less important one with Europe), but it does make every desirably outcome that much harder to achieve.

Second, the domestic. The Abe administration is on a roll; it is strong enough to weather opposition attacks and media ridicule—which is the problem. Aso has stepped in it before, on issues from women, to the elderly, to nationalism and just about everything else(or so it seems)...and so at this point, the press are just waiting for him to produce provide the next headline, making him a perfect target for opposition attacks that could, cumulatively, weaken the Abe administration with a decidedly negative impact on governance during the three-year, election pressure-free (theoretically) window that Abe has to create a legacy as a transformative prime minister. And much of the media will be happy to build on any negative narratives emerging after the honeymoon with the Abe administration.

Clearly, the best outcome for the Abe administration is to have Aso do the honorable thing and fall on his sword. The problem is, Aso appears to be temperamentally disinclined to take a hint. When he became prime minister in 2008, he refused to honor his predecessor Yasuo Fukuda’s wishes and call a snap election while the electoral honeymoon lasted and instead made a year-long effort to create a legacy for himself. (And we know how that story turned out.)

So that’s the problem that Abe has as prime minister. He has a finance minister who has jurisdiction over the fiscal elements of Abenomics, a finance minister who, he knows with a high degree of certainty, will serve as a high-yield point of attack for the opposition. It’s the best gives hope (other than a significant economic downturn) for to the divided and demoralized opposition and potentially the worst as a potential political nightmare for an administration that wants to use the rare three-year window between national elections for extensive structural reform.

TPP: Any Buyer’s Remorse from Japanese Diet Possible?

Not after the Japanese government signs on.

I just finished talking to an analyst who wanted to know if there would be any potential road bumps when the eventual TPP bills go to the Japanese Diet. (He’s an American, so go figure.) I told him not to worry, since the LDP-New Komeito coalition exercise tight discipline on its Diet members, who would place their political careers at dire risk if the voted against the party line. The only other country that I could come up with that might have US-like problems was South Korea—which, as my interlocutor was quick to remind me, is not party to the negotiations (KORUS FTA is already in place so there’s less urgency)—which also happens to have a presidential system.

I did this as a matter of professional courtesy, so I thought I’d share this point with you as well.

There Are Gaffes; Then There Are Gaffes

Deputy Prime Minister (and Finance Minister) Taro Aso has turned Godwin’s Law on its head with his latest gaffe about Nazis (Nazis?!?) generating widespread incredulity and opprobrium in equal parts. I have some thoughts on that and its implications, but I’m keeping them under wraps since I’m currently using them in my professional capacity. I’ll know if I can post them here in a few days. In the meantime, let me cover an angle that is for the most part being missed in the debate: Both Aso and Prime Minister Abe are known for making statements around history issues (Nazis?!?) that they must later take back; is there a difference?

Yes, there is.

Abe’s comments typically come as part of a dialogue, sometimes friendly but more often not, when he is drawn into a discussion over the finer points of a given issue, exerts himself in trying to explain himself, and winds up tripping a land mine. (Prime Minister Junichiro Kozumi avoided this largely by barking out the same stock answer no matter how hard the interrogator tried to bait him.) Aso, by contrast, appears to have a demon in his head who whispers things—like, oh, “Nazis”, say it again, “Nazis”, once more, the crowd’ll love it, NOW—whispers that only Aso can hear, whispers that Aso…cannot resist. I can’t think of another explanation; his comments, as rambling and disjointed as they were on that occasion, had been conveying the twofold message that discussions around constitutional amendment should be conducted calmly and deliberately (there’s a legitimate argument against this but let’s leave it out for the time being) and that bad regimes could emerge even under the best of constitutions if we’re not careful (Weimar and Nazis?...now that’s a reasonable argument), when, after meandering around some generational babble and talking about Yasukuni and working himself up again about the need for calm and deliberation, he suddenly re-injected the Nazis into his argument (this time, like a bad Hitler joke, as a counter-historical example to emulate).

One, with clear forewarnings that the recipient can apply to good use with discipline and practice; the other, unforeseen brainfarts that can only be eliminated by way of a vow of total silence.

Some Thoughts around the Looming Cabinet Legislation Bureau Makeover

I thought that I’d post something that complemented, rather than overlapped with, media reports and also avoided grappling with the polemics that are sure to emerge. I also reserve the right to alter my thoughts on a later, more public occasion since this post represents some of my initial impressions and is largely unedited.

The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) and the New Komeito are regarded as the two most significant obstacles to a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution that would allow Japan to engage in collective self-defense. The Abe Cabinet is about to a) eliminate the first problem while b) keeping bureaucratic dissatisfaction to a minimum by appointing a diplomat who strongly favors reinterpretation as secretary-general of the CLB and nominating the current secretary-general, a former METI official, as the replacement for a Supreme Court justice, a former diplomat, who had retired on July 20 after reaching the constitutional age limit (70).

With regard to the “first problem”, some people have wondered why the Prime Minister (or the Cabinet) can’t simply order the CLB to change its interpretation. After all, the CLB is an agency established within the Cabinet, isn’t it? The answer is twofold. He can’t, and he doesn’t have to. The relevant task of the CLB according to its charter law is to “give opinions concerning legal issues to the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of each Ministry.” It would be an absurdity to seek an opinion and to simultaneously dictate what that opinion should be; indeed the law does not give the Cabinet or the Prime Minister the power to do so. Of course it is just an opinion; the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of each Ministry are free to ignore the opinions of the CLB and do as they please, and take their chances in the courts if necessary. Then why don’t they do so with regard to collective self-defense?

I believe that there is a historical explanation. It must be hard to imagine these days, when you will have difficulty finding any LDP Diet members who oppose reinterpretation, that the early LDP largely took a minimalist approach to self-defense, many not necessarily for tactical purposes—let’s first concentrate on building up the Japanese economy—but from a genuinely pacifist perspective. Some of them had defied the Japanese military and suffered during the long wars, while others had submitted and come to grief. For these otherwise conservative politicians, the CLB’s interpretation must have been exactly what they wanted, while those who opposed it did not have the power to mount a challenge to the leadership around the issue. The LDP has a whole has turned more sanguine in recent decades as the result of the generational shift that has diminished visceral aversion to all matters military and the increasing sense of insecurity over threats emanating from China and North Korea. Thus, the coalition that emerged in the late 1990s with the pacifist Komeito remains as the only structural impediment to the reinterpretation of the Constitution.

This will not be the end of legal hurdles to reinterpretation. With the passing of the years, during which successive cabinets have explicitly or implicitly endorsed this interpretation, significant legitimacy has accreted, precedent that needs to be handled with great care if it is to be breached without serious harm to the rule of law. Still, the institutional obstacle is being removed; the sticks are moving downfield for sure.

The remainder of this post is for people who like inside baseball stuff.

The secretary-general “supervises the activities” of the CLB, which means among other things having final say on opinions regarding the constitution. The position is rotated between officials seconded from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the former Ministry of Home Affairs, now part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, who fulfill several key assignments before they are elevated in their turn to the top post. Of course the other ministries as well as the judiciary and the Public Prosecutors Office also second officials to the CLB and most of the MOF, METI, and (now) MIC officials never make it to secretary-general. But only an official from the three ministries does. Until now, apparently.

The replacement of the secretary-general, however, requires handling with care. First, interpreting the constitution is but a small part of the CLB’s legislation-related work (unless it decides to seriously consider changing its mind on the substantive focus of this post), in which the secretary-general is very much involved. Competence and familiarity with the interpretation process is highly desirable. Moreover, the secretary-general is also the authoritative voice of the CLB, nay, the Cabinet, in Diet sessions and committees on legal matters. It is very different, say, from picking Koichi Hamada as your economic guru, influential, true, but still one of many voices that have a say in making economic policy. An ill-advised choice could spell political disaster.

Second, a Prime Minister does not want to unduly alienate the bureaucracy, and the Abe administration appears to have taken the political and policy outcomes of the DPJ’s experiences in conflicts overt and clandestine with the bureaucracy to heart. However urgent the Abe administration’s desire might be to take the CLB in a new direction might be, taking away the CLB post without compensation could not only be a cause of alienation with the METI bureaucracy—political assignments, which have so far favored METI, are fine but METI should be around after Mr. Abe leaves the political scene—but also send a chill throughout the rest of the bureaucracy. Yet in another case of good fortune for Mr. Abe, a position has just opened up in the Supreme Court, a position reserved for all practical purposes traditionally filled by MOFA, the very ministry that is professionally inclined to favor reinterpretation on collective self-defense and, unlike academics, comes with significant practical experience around the legislative process, if not nearly the equivalent of that of the other ministries on the domestic process. It is hard to gauge the relative value of the two assignments. A Supreme Court justice carries significant constitutional prestige; the CLB secretary-general far less so. But the SCJ is merely one among fifteen, while the CLB secretary-general is the undisputed leader of a major institution. Perhaps the difficulty (at least for me) is its own answer and the trade is about as close to a wash as can be engineered. All this is not to imply that METI would not meekly submit if the matter were put to it without compensation. But friction is being been minimized, and that’s not a small matter to a prime minister whose personal proclivities already lean towards comity.

Oh, and make no mistake, this cannot have been a decision made up on the spur of the moment. The Supreme Court vacancy was a certainty from the very moment of the appointment, a fact that Mr. Abe’s political team could not have missed.

In Praise of Concrete

It is common practice among the metropolitan city folk to lament the despoilment of Japanese coastlines and riverbanks by thick slabs of pork-sodden concrete; I myself have done so on occasion. But have we ever bothered to ask the locals? In the 1940s and 1950s, fourteen typhoons that hit Japan, seven in each decade, each caused 100 or more deaths. A couple of them killed more than 1,000 people. In the 1990s, no typhoon caused more than a few dozen deaths and many claimed single-digit casualties. Now, imagine how many more people could have died in the Great East Japan Earthquake if there had been none of this concrete. In fact, that’s when I first got to thinking about this.

The concrete serves another purpose. They often provide the foundations for the roads and railways that connect the coastland communities with each other and the hinterlands. That cannot always be said for the riverbanks, particularly as they leave the hills and approach the estuaries, but some of that is counterbalanced by the greater benefits to life and property afforded through protection from alluvial cataclysm.

Is there inefficiency? Is there pork? Sure. Of course. I’m sure there’s lots and lots, indeed enough lard to deep-fry all the pigs in Canada for all I know. And plans with round numbers followed by lots and lots of zeros certainly should be eyed with skepticism. But keep in mind that there’s another side to the balance sheet that may not be obvious to the casual tourist aesthete.

Three Things that Will Not Happen

The following comments have been significantly aided by a conversation with John Campbell.

Prime Minister Abe will not go to Yasukuni on August 15. To be more precise, he will not be seen going to Yasukuni. In fact, I am quite confident of this with regard to his entire term. I keep running into people who think that he will, typically people who hate the idea of a Japanese politician going to Yasukuni but hate Abe even more. Well, Mr. Abe could turn out to be the political moron of their dreams. But I don’t think so. You only have to remember that he recently reiterated the strategic ambiguity from his first term regarding this point to see that.

The DPJ will not break up any time soon. Yes, the media loves to speculate about realignment. But if you’re looking to realign, you want to bargain from a position of strength. You still have the Diet member numbers and you poll better than the other two potential partners. Why weaken your bargaining position before you negotiate? And let’s face it, Yoshimi Watanabe, Toru Hashimoto, and Shintaro Ishihara are not good team players. Three Alan Iversons do not a backcourt make, and they’re not even that good. Much could change by the time that the next election looms, and a waiting game is more likely to serve the interests of the DPJ incumbents.

The FY2014 consumption tax hike will not be postponed or altered. Professor Koichi Hamada can say all he wants, but the MOF minister and the LDP tax committee chairman surely carry more weight? Barring horrendous July-September numbers, surely Mr. Abe cannot be seen to be spooked by a single quarter of an economic lull, assuming it is even that.

Goshi Hosono is not going to be prime minister. Ever. Oops, that makes it four. Forget I said this.

A Totally Impractical Epiphany about Resolving the Vote Disparity Issu

So we’re a small group of political junkies, and John Campbell reminds us that to settle the vote disparity issue for good like the Supreme Court wants the Diet to do, prefectural borders would have to be disregarded in redesigning the districts. (Assume for the sake of argument that switching to a proportional system is not a viable option.) I note that one way to get around this problem would be to expand the size of the Diet houses indefinitely in order to accommodate the constitutional need for equal representation. John’s reminded me that public opinion and political discourse were running in the other direction.

It was then that I had my epiphany: Give each prefecture a number of seats positively correlated with its population. Fix that as it currently is, for that matter. Next, give each prefecture voting rights in proportion to its population. Finally, divide those voting rights equally between the Diet members of that prefecture. This means that some Diet members, specifically from the currently underrepresented metropolitan prefectures, will be more equal, proportionately, than their peers from the boondocks. And of course no one is going to lose his/her seat through redistricting. And at the end of the day, isn’t the most important thing at stake for these solons?

I know, I know, this will never happen. But if you’re thinking of setting up a new sovereign state, adopting it would remove a potential source of much conflict.

The Upper House Election: Representing on China Radio International

Here I am on China Radio International

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I got a message from a political scientist, who will go unnamed for now since he is at a crossroads in his career with regard to China and I don’t want to spook his chances. To quote:

“It seemed to go well. I was surprised that the Chinese analyst agreed with you so often, particularly on the idea of Japan's right to have a conventional military.”

To the point, as ever, this guy. My response, edited slightly:

“There was nowhere near enough time at the event…to cover all the points, of course, but even so, I felt that between the time that the coordinator dashed off the questions and sent them to us and the event, the minders of the show decided to tone down the hostile elements. I told a government contact about my impression, but was informed that the Chinese authorities have actually been giving Japanese counterparts the cold shoulder lately because they felt that the Abe government had been unre[s]ponsive to (what were in their view) Chinese concessions on the Senkaku Islands. I think there are a couple of ways to explain what seems at first glance to be a contradiction.”

That exchange ended there. I’ll be happy to give anyone my explanations, but there’s a price. In the meantime, the questions, and my answers, in preparation for the event below. Is it my imagination, or was there a significant change between the preparation and the event? And why, if so?

PART 1 (10:05-10:20)- The Political Forces of Japan

OVERVIEW (Brief Opening Thoughts)

How do you see the senate election result? Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has won control of both houses of parliament, giving his Liberal Democratic Party-led coalition the strongest grip on power since 2007. So what does it mean for Japan? Does it mean the LDP or Abe can do what he wants without any worries from party politics?

It means that Prime Minister Abe has a three-year window in which he can be pretty much sure that he can secure any legislation short of constitutional amendments that are necessary for any policy measures that have the support of the ruling coalition parties. Party politics and Komeito remain as constraints, but Mr. Abe’s hand has been strengthened.

How do you evaluate different political forces, the DPJ, LDP and New Komeito’s performance during the senate election?

The DPJ did about as well or as poorly as could be expected, given the circumstances. Three years, three prime ministers, a divided party leadership, plus the fallout from the Fukushima disaster. It did not have a coherent leadership and a coherent policy platform, which probably hurt. The LDP ran a conservative campaign, avoided overreach. It didn’t try to win too many seats, and did everything it could to keep Komeito onside. On policy, it did its best to avoid commitments that could alienate significant constituents.

Why did the DPJ and New Komeito get much more support now?

To quote Yoshihide Suga, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, in anticipation of the election, “the economy, economy, economy, economy.” The stock market, export value, consumption, summer bonuses, GDP: visible economic improvements, and they are connected in the public mind with Abenomics. This is reflected and magnified by the media, and the voters were responding.

What is the turnout?

-Low = voter apathy. Does that single endorsement and still give Abe a clear mandate to pursue his pet interests and agenda?

It was low, but the LDP received a much bigger number of votes than it did in the 2010 upper house election, when the turnout was much higher. So yes, I think that Mr. Abe’s claim to a popular mandate is justified. But it is still constrained by the presence of the New Komeito, vested interests, and is subject to the effect of major changes in the economic circumstances.

Some have described this as a mandate on Abe and a chance for redemption, having led them to defeat at the 2009 vote. How is he regarded as a personality and as a politician by the voters?

Mr. Abe is still something of a cypher to the general public. He’s not a particularly effective public speaker and rarely says anything memorable. But his mistakes are few and he’s quick to backtrack when he makes them. And nothing succeeds like success. 2007 is forgiven—forgotten, even. If the Japanese economy stays on track over the next three years, he’ll gain more confidence, loosen up a little, and the public will come to better appreciate his fundamentally decent if unspectacular personality.

The LDP was pushed from power just three years ago, what’s its political influence now and how did it regain power and then enhance it in such a spectacular way? Is there something different about LDP policies this time around or are they basically the same party?

The LDP didn’t regain power, it had power dropped into its laps. Remember, in last year’s lower house landslide victory, the LDP’s share of the proportional vote, when it couldn’t rely on the Sokagakkai vote, was almost as low as it was when it was absolutely slaughtered by the DPJ in the 2009 election. I don’t think that the LDP has changed that much. Familiar faces, familiar factions, familiar stakeholders. On policy, take away the monetary policy, which has been highly effective so far, and look beyond the tree to the forest and there’s not much that we didn’t see before the last time around. And Mr. Abe owns that monetary policy, not the LDP. I do hope that the LDP—Mr. Abe too for that matter—will surprise me and push a truly transformative agenda for the Abe administration’s third arrow.

How did the opposition Democratic Party of Japan get ousted from power so easily in the 2012 elections after a landslide victory in 2009?

-the result of introducing the consumption tax to repay the Japan public debt, the DPJ lost around 75% of its pre-election seats

The DPJ did not have a coherent, consistent, and executable policy agenda. It did not have a coherent, consistent, and executable policy making process. Over time, it may have been able to bring the neoliberals, big-government welfare-state proponents, labor-unions, and old-school special-interest politicos together as an effective ruling party. But the first prime minister frittered away most of his political capital on a policy non-starter, the second one failed to come across as leader in Japan’s biggest post-WW II crisis, and schism took out a sizeable chunk of bedrock support. Remember, the consumption tax hike was more LDP than anything else.

The LDP may be commanding a healthy majority in both Houses of Parliament but is it fair to say that they, too, have been shedding voters since the 1990s, whilst DPJ have only momentarily offered voters an alternative on an irregular basis？

That’s not unique to Japan if you look at the European democracies. But take away the Communist and Social Democrat vote and the rest of the political parties are essentially fighting over more or less the same set of voters. And the New Komeito is always going to take its cut, 11 percentage points and up. Now, the LDP doesn’t look so bad as the numbers initially suggested.

NEW KOMEITO

The New Keomeito party is the coalition partner to the LDP with over seats, what does this represent to the voters?

It is widely believed that more or less the same set of people votes for the New Komeito year in, year out, and the cohabitation has been in place since 1999 and withstood the test of three years in opposition. That is all there is to it. Now a few people may be voting for New Komeito for its moderating effect on the LDP, but their numbers are surely very small.

PART 2 (10:20-10:32)- the Message of the Election

MESSAGE OF THE ELECTION

What is the central message of this election?  Are the voters most concerned about economics, territorial tensions, or else?

The economy. Not nuclear power plants, certainly not territorial issues. And with Abenomics maintaining momentum through election day, the politically divided opposition parties didn’t have a chance.

Abenomics

ABENOMICS

Abe says he aims to lift the economy out of recession. He says he will do this through hyper easing policy and increased government spending.  Generally how would you describe Abenomics and can work?

If there’s are economists on the panel, I’ll be happy to defer to them. That said, the first arrow was a huge political bet that an inflation target backed by strong quantitative easing by the central bank would change inflationary expectations, setting a virtuous circle in motion. So far, it has worked. The biggest know uncertainty is the 2014 consumption tax hike. If that takes the wind out of the economic sails, then Abenomics will be in trouble. The second arrow is a flexible fiscal policy. Frankly, I’m skeptical about this one. Spending 200 trillion yen over ten years to make Japan more disaster resistant? Any 10-year spending plan with lots and lots of zeros behind a round number even before we’ve figured out what the real needs makes no sense to me. I’d be much happier if they replaced this with a 10-year fiscal plan for achieving primary balance. The third arrow is essentially structural reform. But will the Abe administration commit itself to serious agrarian reform? Labor and social safety net? Corporate taxation? Education? Frankly, I’ll be happy if we get even half a loaf. But maybe my standards are unrealistic from a political of view. I’ll be more than happy if the Abe administration proves me wrong.

The LDP leader Shinzo Abe favors forcing the central bank to do whatever it takes to meet an inflation target of 3 percent. He is calling for “hyper easing”, strong intervention in the currency market and increased spending on public works, is this the right economic plan for Japan?

The risks of hyperinflation from quantitative coupled with an inflation target, are very low, economists tell me, while the potential payoff appears to be pretty big. Currently, it seems to be working. And some of its critics are moving the goalpost. But remember, the Abe administration is not intervening in the currency market at all. Intervention is what South Korea did to keep the Won down, which in turn was nothing compared to the near-total control that the Chinese authorities have over the Renminbi rate. As for public works, Spending 200 trillion yen over ten years to make Japan more disaster resistant? Any 10-year spending plan with lots and lots of zeros behind a round number even before we’ve figured out what the real needs makes no sense to me. I’d be much happier if they replaced this with a 10-year fiscal plan for achieving primary balance.

Will the rest of the world standby while Japan actively weakens its currency?

When you run a clean float like Japan, or the United States, an easy-money monetary policy will push the value of that currency down, other things being equal. The yen appears to have stabilized around the 100 mark; the rest of the world appears willing, or at least resign, to live with that. The idea, I suppose, is that a robust Japanese economy makes up for whatever negative effects there are on their respective national economies. Besides, right now, it appears to be the Fed pulling back from its QE that’s spooking the emerging economies.

How significant is it that when Abe came into office at the end of 2012, the Nikkei index averaged 10 230 but in recent months, it’s come gone to an average of around 14 000. The B

It’s a measure of the confidence that market players have in the near-future prospects of the Japanese economy and more specifically Japanese businesses. But it does have a real effect on the economy, since it appears to be connected to a rise in consumption and housing sales and it does make it easier to raise money through the equity market.

-The Bank of Japan’s Regional Economic Report for 4th July upgraded its economic assessment for 8 of the country’s 9 prefectures.

It’s good to hear that the brighter outlook is increasingly shared in the provinces.

What about unemployment and wages – have they changed greatly since Abe returned to power? Likewise, interest rates on home loan have risen

That’s a good question. Unemployment figures are improving, but that has been going on fairly consistently since 2009. Wage are not going up yet, but summer bonuses are. So it remains to be seen whether the virtuous circle: consumption-investment-hiring… is really under way.

THE ECONOMY

Abe says the economy is his top priority yet some of the economic harm has come from a trade dispute with china amidst territorial disputes, and the nuclear power energy is causing many problems in getting the nation’s power needs sorted out.  Can he just focus on economics or will he have to solve these other problems first?

First, the Senkaku issue certainly does have a negative effect on the China business of Japanese retailers and conspicuous brand-name manufacturers. But the impact on the Japanese economy is limited to the extent that these businesses source within China. There appear to be other inconveniences, but they rarely appear to be something that businesses can’t handle on their own. Second, the nuclear power plant stoppage is in essence a roughly 0.7% tax on GDP, or tribute if you will, paid to natural gas exporting countries. As for the matter of electricity supply, each regional monopoly greeted the summer months with a margin of capacity over expected peak demand. So it’s not as acute a problem as you might imagine. We would be more worried if we growing at a 7.5% clip like the Chinese economy.

Japan has the largest debt of any sovereign nation, can it really afford to spend its way out of the current crisis?

Easy-money monetary policy is not about “spending its way out of [any] current crisis.” It’s about kicking the Japanese economy out of a chronic deflationary equilibrium. But I am skeptical about fiscal policy, if that’s what you’re talking about. Spending 200 trillion yen over ten years to make Japan more disaster resistant? Any 10-year spending plan with lots and lots of zeros behind a round number even before we’ve figured out what the real needs makes no sense to me. I’d be much happier if they replaced this with a 10-year fiscal plan for achieving primary balance.

HYPER-EASING

injecting money into the economy by printing money instead of borrowing it.  Can this policy truly inject stimulus into the economy?

Hyper-easing is not about injecting stimulus. To the extent that it lowers the effective interest rate, it makes it easier for the government to borrow too, but that’s not the point.

Abe’s goal is to fight deflation, has this been a serious issue for the nation? Will this finally turn that problem around?

Deflation has essentially put a zero-nominal interest floor under the real interest rate. Most mainstream economists believe that this affects the real economy negatively and who am I to argue with them? Will the inflation target be achieved on a sustainable basis? I don’t do economic forecasts and real economists are divided on that question.

THE YEN

Is the Hyper easing policy about injecting money into the Japanese economy or boosting exports by devaluing the Yen?

It’s about achieving an inflation target. A weaker yen is the low-hanging fruit, the immediate benefit accruing to exporting businesses. Mr. Abe was obviously aware of this when he launched his Abenomics program.

Abe has promised bold stimulus to restart growth and curb deflation. He has also called for a weaker yen to bolster exports. Since these calls the yen has fallen by 16% against the dollar and 19% against the euro over the past 4 months. Does this mean his policies are working? Are his policies overly focused on currency weakening rather than actual stimulus?

It’s about achieving an inflation target. A weaker yen is the low-hanging fruit, the immediate benefit accruing to exporting businesses. Mr. Abe was obviously aware of this when he launched his Abenomics program. But it’s not something that you mention in polite company , and he rarely if ever has alluded to the effect since he was criticized for doing so early on.

STIMULUS

The Japanese cabinet has approved a stimulus package of more than 20 trillion yen. 10 trillion is earmarked for infrastructure spending over the next 15 months, what type of infrastructure does Japan need at the moment?

I should look into this issue more closely, but I haven’t, so I’ll refrain from passing judgment. However, there is a genuine, massive backload of aging infrastructure built in the go-go years that require repair or replacement. But some of them may no longer been socioeconomically viable. I’d like to see them sorted out for prioritization before putting numbers on the price tags.

Abe’s party has a long history of pork barrel and wasteful infrastructure spending, is he promising more of the same or will it be different? Past efforts to pour millions into concrete and steel have had limited impact, will this new spending go to other places?

I should look into this issue more closely, but I haven’t, so I’ll refrain from passing judgment.

Half of the infrastructure spending will come from national debt, can the country truly afford to borrow more?

I am not a fiscal expert. So far, so good. But yes, there must be a limit as a matter of logic. In the long run, we do have to more or less balance revenue and expenditures and we do have an unfavorable demographics.

GLOBAL IMPACTS

Will Japan’s easing lead to foreign capital flood into the emerging markets like Brazil? If so, how should emerging markets avoid inflation caused by it? Limited capital controls may be a sensible short-term defense against destabilizing inflows of hot money, should it be implemented by emerging countries?

I’m not so sure, but isn’t that what countries like Brazil and India want, now that the US Fed talk about moving away from QE is drawing money out of those emerging economies?

CHINA IMPACT

Should China have such concern? How will a weaker yen affect China? Will it lead to escalated trade frictions and increase China's inflationary pressure? Can China take any counter measures?

Why should China worry? Our businesses don’t compete much in third countries, and Chinese exports to Japan are still significantly cheaper than Japanese products in broadly similar product categories.

How will Japan’s devaluation of yen impact China’s exports and imports? It seems to hurt Germany since they have the same products mix for exports, but does China have the same export products with Japan?

China shouldn’t worry. Japanese businesses don’t compete much in third countries, and Chinese exports to Japan are still significantly cheaper than Japanese products in broadly similar product categories.

Does this affect the free trade talks either individually with both China and South Korea, as well as the three-way trade agreement that China craves but not Japan or South Korea?

Not at all. China has a firm grip on its currency that no country on a float has. As for the trilateral FTA, I think both Japan and China want this to happen. The South Korea government should be a little more ambivalent, since it has to get it ratified by its parliament. Also, South Korea sees Japan as a competitor.

Will the devaluation of yen lead to the relative appreciation of Chinese currency RMB? Will the Chinese government allow the RMB to appreciate in response?

Yes, by definition, in terms of the effective exchange rate. But the Chinese authorities measures the exchange rate against a currency basket, of which the yen is a significant but by no means dominant part, no?

Part 3 Right-wing orientation

How much has Abe’s personal views on Japanese history and past actions been a factor in being overwhelmingly endorsed by voters in both last year’s general election as well as the Upper House election?

It has had little effect on voter behavior. It didn’t help him in 2007 and it didn’t hurt him in 2013.

In Japan, fresh calls for constitutional amendment from various political parties have got louder. Is it easy now for him to start procedure of constitutional amendment?

-Abe has described his lifework to be revising Art 9.

-Article 9 of the Constitution renounces war and prohibits the possession of military forces.

-Abe first made the argument to amend it back in 2006-07 when he was Prime Minister.

-Abe wants to revise Art. 9 to allow Japan to possess a military that can defend itself as well as participating in the defense of its allies.

-He is proposing to revise Art 96 first which sets the provisions for constitutional amendments, that is to lower the threshold needed in the Diet in order to get the bill passed in order to amend Art 9. A referendum will then follow.

-Abe has been careful in not pursuing this too aggressively.

It has become somewhat easier, to the extent that parties that want to amend Article 9 in a way that gives the government more leeway in using the military for collective defense

How enthusiastic were voters about the Constitutional amendment in casting their votes at the ballot box?

-A vast majority of voters favour the pacifist Art. 9 for its principles and ideals but do agree that a self-defense force as a necessary option.

It was not a significant issue in this election—any election in living memory, actually—since the Communists and the Social Democrats are the only political parties that take up the other side of the argument but their political presence has been marginal for quite some time. The New Komeito would probably favor keeping Article 9 as is, but should go along with recognition of the Self-Defense Force’s military status.

How true is it that many voters plumped for the LDP not because of their stance on revising the Constitution but more on economics and a lack of political alternatives?

100% true. I’m pretty sure that few people voted for the LDP because of its constitutional views.

Does the LDP’s solid majority mean the amendment to Art 96 mean a change to Art 9 looks more likely？

(If the JRP, YP and New Komeito give pro-amendment forces a 2/3 majority) Its chances have improved. It still needs to bring the JRP, YP, and New Komeito along but the DPJ by itself can no longer stop the issue from going to a national referendum.

((If the JRP, YP and New Komeito do not give pro-amendment forces a 2/3 majority) No. It still needs to carry some DPJ votes, and the DPJ is sure to use this leverage to the best of its political advantage.

How does affect the opposition DPJ? Commentators say this is likely to split the already-weakened party down the middle?

I don’t agree. At the end of the day, the DPJ leadership can allow its Diet members to vote their conscience on the matter and call on all the other parties to do likewise.

How dangerous will it be for regional countries both China and South Korea? Earlier this year, Japanese officials made irresponsible remarks about the comfort women or rather sexual slavery issue, which arouse drastic response from South Korea and China.

-South Korean president Park Guen-Hye has called on Japan to follow her vision for the region on a ‘correct understanding of history’, a clear reference to Japanese past aggression and atrocities.

No need for China or South Korea to worry at all unless it decides to launch a cruise missile at a US vessel during a Japan-US joint military exercise. The mayor of Osaka made some ill-advised comments about sex, the military, and women, comments that were almost uniformly condemned by the Japanese media. He seemed to forget that there was a very large number of Japanese comfort women as well. But that, of course, has nothing to do about slf-defense.

Does Abe risk anatagonising its nearest neighbours – both with new leadership in place – so early in their time in office? And how significant is it that President Park chose China as her second official stop ahead of Japan when in the past, it would’ve been the other way round?

By seeking to amend the Constitution? Risk what? And President Park has her own political needs and wants, and it should have some economic benefits, as an amenable South Korea will make the Chinese public that much more receptive to South Korean goods and services. But it will not bring North-South unification any closer, if that’s South Korea’s ultimate objective.

Japan may also further its military buildup and will probably go beyond the exclusively defense-oriented strategy. Will Japan’s self-defense force be transferred to a normal military? How will this impact the regional stability? How will China and South Korea respond to it?

The exclusively defense-oriented strategy will be breached only, if ever, as part of UN-sanctioned operations. China has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, so China doesn’t have to worry about that. South Korea is a formal US ally, so it’s protected as well. Note also that the Japanese budgetary constraints precludes the kind of the buildup that China has been engaging in for many, many years.

Media reports say Japan may nationalise any unclaimed remote islands in its waters in a bid to bolster its territorial claims. How far will Japan go on this road? Can the neighbouring countries accept its move like this?

You’ve got this completely wrong. You’re confusing sovereignty with ownership, which is understandable from an authoritarian, socialist perspective. Any islands in Japan’s territorial waters are Japanese territory and vice versa; there’s no question about that. The problem is that many of those islands may have no owners. In that case, the state has ownership by default. The government is going to confirm the ownership, and assume control where it finds that it does have ownership. I don’t see why that could alarm anyone.

In recent years, Japan has become more assertive in dealing territorial disputes with its neighbors. Will it continue on this path?

No it hasn’t. The Japanese government has not taken the case against South Korea or Russia to the International Court of Justice. It tried to maintain the status quo on the Senkaku Islands and all it got for its troubles was a ferocious, totally unexpected backlash from the Chinese authorities, with Chinese government ships continuing to dip in and out of the Senkaku waters. It also knows happened in the South China Sea to the Philippines and Vietnam. Maybe China sees its actions as just one step in its manifest destiny. But I do think that the Chinese should be aware of how it’s projecting itself with regard to its neighbors.

Japan is aiming at a leading role in East Asia affairs. If it continues to be more right-wing, will it disturb the regional stability?

I would argue that it is China’s actions, if anyone’s that is disturbing regional stability. China is no longer acting as a status quo power. Ask the Vietnamese. Ask the Filipinos. And China’s relationship with India remains ambiguous, never mind the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

What’s the US stance on the Japan’s continuously right-wing orientation? Will it have to rein in Japanese rhetoric?

What right-wing orientation? The US will surely be happy with the kind of constitutional amendment that the LDP, New Komeito and the able and will among the opposition parties. They cannot, need not, “rein in Japanese rhetoric” because Japan is a democracy and any truly off-the-wall rhetoric—as opposed to statements that are merely not to the liking of the Chinese or South Korean authorities—is quickly reeled back by the rhetorician or the rhetorician is the one to suffer the consequences.

PART 4 (10:32-10:47)- Challenges

NUCLEAR ENERGY

The Nuclear energy issue has been highly contentious with many critical of the outgoing DPJ for its relationship with the industry.  The LDP is a well known advocate for nuclear energy, are people really ready to turn the reactors back on? Do they feel comfortable with the decision?

-Abe has made clear that he intends to turn the reactors back on.

-50% of those polled say they are against nuclear energy

-30% favour nuclear energy.

-Opposition parties generally against nuclear energy.

Given how toxic an issue nuclear energy has been, in the long run, the LDP or any political party has to move away from Japan’s dependence upon nuclear power?

That’s not the way to talk about the issue. Instead, ask

1)    Will the reactors that pass the safety test be restarted? The answer is yes.

2)    Will the reactors that do not pass the safety test be restarted? The answer is no.

3)    Will the reactors that are currently under construction and meet safety standards be commissioned? The answer is very likely yes.

4)    Will any more new reactors be built? Possibly, as old reactors are decommissioned. But don’t bet on it. Electric utilities may think that it’s not worth the trouble.

Japan has put the Japan Restoration party third in polls, will they stand by if the LDP considers negotiating or changing its stance on the Islands in dispute with China?

The JRP has appeared amenable to admitting the existence of a territorial dispute. But a doubt that any Japanese political party will make such a concession unless the Chinese authorities agree to call off the government ships from the Senkaku Islands and keep Chinese fishing boats away from the neighborhood.

Can Japan afford not to put relations back together with China considering the economic harm of the last few month stemming from their trade and regional disputes?

Can Japan afford to? After all, it tried to contain the situation and all it got for its troubles was a ferocious response from the Chinese government and the Chinese public.

US RELATIONS

Abe says strengthening the US relationship is important, will he reverse decisions about the military base on Okinawa?  What other areas will he change to improve the relationship with the US?

The Abe administration has

How do Japanese voters see closer China-US?

They will not worry as long as the Japan-US mutual security treaty is in place. On the economic front, the Japanese voters, to the extent that they think about the matter, should be happy with a closer US-China relationship. And nothing would make me happy than China seeking membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership with the US in the lead.

TPP

Will Japan join the TPP?  Will that improve relations with the US?

Both of the main parties are for the TPP. Japan depends on trade so voters approves of this EXCEPT for farmers who might lose out to a lack of trade barriers.

The answer is yes. But only marginally, since the relationship is already an excellent one.

REGIONAL TIES

Japan’s presence in the region’s key multilateral institutions such as APEC, ASEAN and the East Asia Summit is another vehicle that should continue to drive Tokyo’s foreign policy. But besides trade, Will Japan enhance its political and security relationships with natural allies in the region such as India, Australia, Mongolia, Thailand?

That certainly is the idea. Japan shares, to varying degrees, values and economic and security intrests with these countries. But remember, these countries have their own national interests in mind, and many of those interest are enhanced by a healthy and constructive relationship with China. Come to think of it, the same thing can be said for Japan.

The Philippines has signaled support for a stronger Japanese military. Will Abe focus on building a stronger military?  Will China stand by if this happens?

Yes, but let’s put this into some perspective. The Chinese military budget has been growing for several decades, while the Abe administration’s first defense budget grew 1% this year. What does that tell you? Frankly, I don’t think that the PLA worries nearly as much about Japan’s self-defense forces as it worries about the US military’s presence in the neighborhood.