Just in case there’s any misunderstanding, I do not
believe that the US response to China’s new Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) will directly impact the Japan-US bilateral part of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership negotiations. Once the Abe administration committed to the TTP process,
there was no way that it could entrench itself in a position that would wind up
putting the blame on Japan in the event that negotiations ultimately failed. The
Abe administration will make the necessary domestic adjustments—essentially using
fiscal means to buy off vested agricultural interests—regardless of what goes
on in the East China Sea.
However, there has been much to worry about the
Obama administration’s Asia Pivot from the Japanese perspective as John Kerry
has supplanted Hilary Clinton in the State Department and focused most of his
attention on the Middle East. It is conceivable, plausible, that China looked
at what it considers a distracted Obama administration and timed its move
accordingly. In a sense, the US commitment to the Japan-US security relationship
is being tested. A muscular US response on this front should serve as
confirmation of this commitment, in turn replenishing confidence in the Obama
administration’s commitment to the Asian Pivot. Japanese concessions at the negotiating
table are unlikely to be materially affected by this, but they will easier to
sell within the domestic political process because of it.
1 comment:
WTO is meeting in Bali in December and the world does not seem to care, yet the rules apply. Will WTO fail? Will TPP and other "partnership" agreements fill the gap? I doubt it.
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