Off-the-Cuff Assessments

…in response to an inquiry from a fixed-income investment advisor. A week has gone by and my comments were given free of charge so here they are for what they’re worth.

CLB: Ichiro Komatsu

The CLB matters with regard to collective defense because of its longstanding opinion against its constitutionality. Otherwise, it does not stand in the way of any other significant policy initiatives, including relaxation of the ban on arms exports.

On collective defense, Abe must swing the Komeito his way. Achieve that and the CLB bureaucracy will follow in due time. The print media will be divided between Yomiuri and Sankei on one hand and Asahi and Mainichi on the other while the audiovisual media will feature voices on both sides of the debate. In any case, the CLB will be a minor player.

BOJ: Kuroda.

Kuroda has long held firm views on monetary policy, views that Abe has set in motion by appointing him BOJ governor. This is the one appointment (and policy decision) that Abe cannot undo.

NSC: Shotaro Yachi

Yachi is the architect of the freedom and democracy concept—containing China, actually; Russia, whatever its authoritarian leanings, is not in the Japanese sights. The Abe administration’s foreign policy has for the most part performed admirably in that respect.

Personal Secretary: Isao Iijima

Iijima favored rapprochement with North Korea; Abe did not. But that was in 2002. His 2013 Pyongyang visit can only be interpreted as Abe’s attempt to gain leverage against South Korea and to a lesser extent China. The overall role that he is playing is a mystery to me, though. (Public communications, political strategy...too vague.) He is keeping his counsel, that’s for sure.

GPIF:

I have nothing to say about him except that he is a holdover from the DPJ administration

Post: Taizo Nishimura chairman and Yoshiyuki Izawa

Izawa is a Hatoyama cabinet appointment; four-years-and-out in December would makes sense. He was downgraded in the Japan Post parent company when Nishimura took over in June. Nishimuro (not Nishimura) is the elder statesman of the business establishment and go-to guy for the political class. More consolidator than initiator, he gets things done with minimum friction. No enemies, no criticism as far as I’m aware. He surely favors privatization but will move no more quickly or extensively than the Abe administration wants.

ClicheWatch: Go as Metaphor

“China is playing the classic game of weiqi, wherein it slowly expands influence through steps that are not a threshold to violence and do not trigger a forcible response,” Paal said, referring to the strategic board game known as Go in English.

Douglas Paal, quoted in “China Adopts Board-Game Strategy to Blunt U.S. Pivot to Asia”

By Bloomberg News  Dec 10, 2013 3:42 PM GMT+0900

It’s easy to tell that Paal has never played weiqi/Go. Go, in fact, is like war in all its permutations. An entire game can be played with little overt conflict, capped by a long and arduous stretch in which the two players meticulously settle borders to the last point.  Then again, an early skirmish can blow up into a relentless battle encompassing the entire board that only ends with one player falling in utter defeat. And everything in between.

Have I Become China Radio International’s Alan Colmes to Its Collective Sean Hannity in Discussing the Chinese Aid Difense Identification Zone?

Yesterday, I appeared on China Radio International’s 10-11AM (Beijing Time) panel discussion by landline telephone, this time supposedly to discuss China’s new air defense identification zone (ADIZ).  If you listen to the podcast, you will, in my defense, think that it was not my finest hour. In my defense, nnnn points: First, I was outnumbered three to one by the Chinese panelists. (One was based in Hong Kong but was curiously the most belligerently pro-China of the three.) There is typically another guest from Western nations on a panel of four, and the Japanese government was certainly not the only one complaining.  Second, the moderator—also Chinese—always gave the last word to a Chinese panelist. No one interrupts on the program; this is not an American talk show. If there’s a better way to make the Chinese arguments look good, ever there was a good way to make China look good, I’d like to know. Third, the moderator steered the show midway away from the talking points into a totally unscripted attack against Japan on history issues. You can see that from the talking points and the answers that I’d prepared, which I’ve pasted below. Now my basic take on the history issues is complicated and takes plenty of time to explain, as an American political scientist discovered the other day (that’s you, PS), which made it even more difficult to fight the three-on-one battle that ensued.

Actually, that was not all. After the opening question and my response, second in line—I thought I got the better of that exchange, but then, who am I to judge?—the director cut in on my line, told me that my line had gone dead. How she knew when I was no longer talking and I could still hear the broadcast though the phone line, I have no idea. Anyway, the line went completely dead after that, broadcast and all. When the line was restored, after maybe a minute or so had passed, another Chinese panelist was responding to the same question (I think). Now this is the second time that something like this had happened, and both times, the moderator went off the script. On the other occasion, the other “Western” panelist turned out to be quite critical of China. Would you believe me if I told you that my line failed and the moderator later decided to go off-script on a whim? On two occasions?

I’ve made it a point to appear on this program as often as I can because of two reasons:  One, China is putting a lot of resources into CRI to push its take on Asia through its news programs, largely in developing countries. I think that it’s useful to have what usually turns out to be a voice of dissent against the mainland Chinese perspective on geopolitical issues. Second, CRI has been generally tolerant of my decidedly non-Chinese voice, the moderation relatively fair, even if the questions can be obviously biased. (For better or worse, again, this is not an American talk show.) But I’m beginning to have serious doubts. Am I increasingly being reduced to enhancing the legitimacy of the Chinese worldview under the Xi Jinping regime?

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PART I - The current dispute

Is the current crisis in East China Sea inevitable and long overdue?

Inevitable? No and yes. No, because China could have informed its neighbors that it would set up its own air defense identification zone and that all aircraft entering the ADIZ with the intent to enter Chinese airspace would be requested to inform the Chinese civil aviation authorities of their flight plans and the like. But yes, because China appears to have been aware that its maximalist demands went well beyond what other countries were doing with their ADIZs. On the second count, no, if it means that China only now has sufficient air power to effectively administer its ADIZ.

Should China have notified its neighbours and airlines beforehand rather than just set it upon unilaterally? Has China violated international laws?

Yes. But I am not aware of any violation of international laws, although the threat of possible extreme consequences on non-complying aircraft, could, if carried out, be one. 

 What do you make of the timing of the air-defence identification zone? Has China’s unilateral declaration unwittingly helped Japan to gain international attention and ‘sympathy’ for its stance?

I’m not so sure about the timing. It could mean that China only now has sufficient air power to effectively administer its ADIZ. It could mean that it’s the latest step in changing the status quo around the Senkaku Islands. But no, I don’t think it made Japan look any better in the eyes of third parties, but it certainly made China look worse.

Japan is preparing for a National Security Strategy Document due out at the end of December as well as a draft proposal in which it describes the Chinese as ‘changing the status quo by force’ and that ‘Japan will respond calmly and firmly’ to such attempts. (Bloomberg reports). Likewise, it’s proposing to revise Article 9 which would allow the country to resort to conflicts in order to solve international disputes. What could the Abe administration try next – is there appetite in escalating this dispute?

There is no interest in escalating the dispute but there certainly is plenty of interest in maintaining the status quo, which is administrative control of the Senkaku Islands. China is entering the territorial waters and airspace around Senkaku with regularity. More generally, China is increasing its presence in the East China Sea. I would say that most observers in Japan agree with the Abe administration that China is indeed changing the status quo. As for Article 9, Abe does want to revise it but will not be able to do so in the foreseeable future because coalition partner New Komeito will not let him.

Did Japan miscalculate China?

China certainly caught Japan by surprise. But if anyone miscalculated, it was China—unless it had anticipated the international response and went ahead anyway.

 How has the Japanese public reacted to this zone?

Dismay, generally speaking, although there is no sense that the threat to Japanese aircraft is imminent.

Japan, US and South Korea all have an ADIZ whilst China didn’t until the previous weekend. Why the outrage? Is this double-standard?

There is no double standard. The overall outrage is due to the lack of consultation and the excessive demands made on aircraft merely passing through international airspace and the implied threat to those who do not comply. Japan is also worried about the extension of the Chinese ADIZ to Senkaku airspace, but that’s not a major concern of third parties.

What political thinking went into establishing the zone now and Diaoyu Island/Sendaku dispute?

I can only guess. China’s foreign ministry spokesperson has stated that the ADIZ has nothing to do with territorial issues. I’ll be happy to take her word for it if China pulls back on its demands on aircraft in transit.

What long-term impact is there for China in setting up this ADIZ in securing its national sovereignty?

None, if China’s foreign ministry spokesperson is to be believed.

Since its creation, USAF B-52 bombers, Japanese fighters, surveillance and AWACS aircraft, and South Korean P3-C Orion maritime have all deliberately gone into the zone without notifying the Chinese – should Beijing be concerned by this?

I assume that this happens all the time. Remember, this is international airspace, and you can’t expect military aircraft to yield to Chinese demands there. Note also that the US announced that the B-52s were unarmed. So, no, China should not be concerned.

This is one of the most heavily-congested airspace for commercial flights in the whole world – could passengers end up being caught up in the dispute?

No. Exactly because this is congested airspace. The Chinese military will do everything to avoid doing anything that the global community might consider an actual threat to civil aviation.

 Why did China wait so long to establish its own ADIZ – does it now feel militarily capable to fend off hostile forces that it’s finally ready to flex its muscle?

I assume that China is doing it now because it can, after decades of double-digit defense budget hikes. It would have be embarrassing if China had established an ADIZ without the means to administer it.

Which side do you blame for escalating the crisis?

Obviously China’s maximalist demands on aircraft in transit and the relatively explicit threat. The lack of prior consultations is another, but this one is merely procedural.

PART II – The ADIZ

What is an air-defense identification zone, and how important were they during the Cold War?

-an act of formalizing claims to national security interests

No. In principle, it is a piece of military protocol designed to balance national security concerns with freedom of international airspace.  

-ADIZ is created by GPS coordinates

Defined, not created, to be precise.

-ADIZ is considered international airspace so no planes can be shot down but all much identify themselves to the jurisdiction

Well, no one has jurisdiction over international airspace, right? Actually, if a supersonic aircraft makes a straight beam for Beijing and refuses to identify itself, I think that the PLA Air Force would be justified in intercepting it and shooting it down even before it enters Chinese airspace, ADIZ or no ADIZ. The US practice is that only aircraft that intends to enter US airspace is required to identify itself, and that kind of measure should be sufficient to separate legitimate fly-through aircraft from any hypothetical rogue aircraft.

China’s ADIZ requires commercial aircraft flying through air defence zone to provide advance warning even when their final destination is another country. In contrast, commercial aircrafts flying through the US ADIZ are only required to provide advance flight details when they are destined to land in the US. What does this tell you China’s thinking behind this?

We must assume that the Chinese authorities knew exactly what they were doing, so I suspect that the advance warning requirement was instituted to give it an air of sovereign authority, particularly over the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson has essentially denied this, though, so this point is now moot. Also, the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that China fears its defense system is not sophisticated enough to weed out potential interlopers from normal civilian traffic.

A number of air defence zones overlap in this instance – how, in theory – can the various powers resolve this? Is negotiation the only way forward? China proposed to sit down with the Japanese to negotiate about this – will the Japanese take up the offer?

China proposed to sit down with the Japanese to negotiate about this? About what, actually? If it involves any talks over the status of the Senkakus, then it’s obviously a no-starter. Anyway, it’s natural that the zones overlap. But yes, there should be talks. But will China be willing to revise its aggressive protocol? Otherwise, talks don’t make sense.

A number of airlines are obeying the identification rule – notably Hong Kong’s, Taiwan’s, Qantas, Singapore Airlines and US carriers though not ANA of Japan Airlines due to pressure from Tokyo. Do these zones put airlines in a difficult position?

Does it make the Chinese authorities happy that the airlines are complying? Well, they shouldn’t, since they are gaining nothing in terms of China’s sovereignty claims while they have managed to anger not only Japan but also the United States, Australia, South Korea, and even the UK. But to answer your question, no, since the airlines are merely bystanders who do not face any imminent physical threat.

PART III - China-Japan-US ties

Was US Vice-president’s tour of the region to do with fence-mending between the neighbours or a show of solidarity with Japan? Is America neutral in this dispute?

East Asia is a priority area for the United States, Asia Pivot or no Asia Pivot, and President failed to show in Bali. The Obama administration needed to do something to reaffirm its commitment without Obama’s physical presence. Vice-President Biden is the US Plan B. But no, the US is not a neutral party; it is directly affected by China’s ADIZ. Don’t the Chinese authorities realize that US military aircraft are directly threatened by the new Chinese edict since they will never reveal their flight plans to them?

-US Vice President said that China’s growing economic and military strength means that it should “bear increasing responsibility to contribute positively to peace and security…by taking steps to reduce the risks of accidental conflict and miscalculation”. -

Yes, China could begin to do that by scaling back its demands on aircraft in transit.

How tricky a task is this for the State Department in DC having to smooth relations between two of your most important partners while standing up for your historic allies against your biggest economic trading partner?

The United States is standing up for its own security interests first and those of its allies a close second. That’s all there is to it.

Is there much in a way of trust between US and China, and US/Japan vs China? Is this a matter of trust?

It’s a matter of doing something about measures that include threats on aircraft transiting through international airspace. The issue will fester until China rectifies it.

Have US-Japan ties also been hurt by this dispute? Would Abe have consulted with the US over their decision to ignore Beijing and ordered commercial airlines to ignore likewise?

No. And no.

Does Japan have a Plan-B if this dispute lingers on?

I don’t think that there is a need for a Plan B. Why would Japan have any use for one?

How would China view America’s stance on the ADIZ – does this chime in with Beijing’s suspicion over America’s pivot to Asia and the western Pacific?

I don’t know, but I think that China should understand that it has overreached on this matter and should take steps to scale back its demands on the aircraft flying through what is, after all, international airspace.

Should US and China develop stronger military-to-military cooperation to build trust?

Of course. We all should.

How do you square US airlines adhering to the rules of the zone with identification and yet, two of its warships have been sent to the area amidst all the rhetoric supporting Japan’s (and South Korea) stance?

Warships? I thought that it was two bombers? There is no US government authority to demand US-based airlines from doing what they consider prudent, but the US military is a totally different animal. This appears to be difficult to understand from a Chinese perspective, where the state essentially can bend the private sector to its will.

With Shinzo Abe in command of a healthy majority in both the lower and upper houses, could this escalate further as his government maintains its position on the islands?

No. Why would the Japanese government want to do anything more than it is doing? It is only trying to maintain the status quo.

PART IV – South Korea

How unenviable a position is South Korea in?

I’m not conversant enough in South Korea’s domestic politics, but I am sure that it is a manageable issue for them. South Korea will expand its ADIZ, and that will be it for the time being.

-The South Korean president and her top defence officials were hosting the Chinese trade counsellor just 3 weeks ago to talk trade.

The British prime minister is in a similar situation. Likewise, the Australian foreign minister. But it’s not their problem. Look, when you’ve alienated so many people who are eager to do business with you, you have to understand that you’ve done something very, very wrong.

Are they torn between their political and strategic loyalty – let alone the presence of US troops on the ground – to America whilst hoping to not offend their biggest economic partner and neighbour, China? What do you expect President Park to do?

Stand firm, but do no more. And that will be fine for South Korea.

Do you believe that China and South Korea can work out these differences behind closed doors and with ease?

No, because China has a problem with everybody because of this, while President Park cannot be seen to back down. Maybe China did do it mainly with the Senkaku Islands in mind. But everyone has been affected.

The two countries’ contention over the submerged reef is the main source of focus – why do you think the South Korean defence zone finishes just north of Ieodo (Korean) and Suyan Rock (China)?

-There’s a South Korean research station and heliport there.

Historical. The ADIZs appear to be the heritage of the 1950s, established by the US military.

Does this dispute with South Korea also put China in an awkward position?

Not by itself. Other than the ADIZ, it’s business as usual.

How intertwined are South Korea and the US especially in defence and strategic matters? Does Seoul have a say in how it wants to deal with the dispute?

Every country appears to have a problem with the Chinese ADIZ as currently construed. The next move is up to China, not South Korea.

Does this represent a setback in China’s effort to wean South Korea off US influence?

Yes. Of course.

Would a peaceful resolution with South Korea represent a diplomatic coup for Beijing? If so, what would that signal to Japan and Washington?

No. China cannot resolve the broader issue of the ADIZ bilaterally.

Can China and South Korea’s shared mistrust of Japan and anger towards its refusal to apologise for past crimes help resolve the bilateral problems more easily?

No. China cannot resolve the broader issue bilaterally.

Conversely, could China’s action encourage a rapprochement between South Korea and Japan whose new leaders are yet to meet in person? What role could America play to foster that?

I doubt it. For essentially the same reason. Countries are responding differently because of their differentiated relationships with China. But the underlying cause is China’s overreach. China must rectify it. Otherwise, the problem will not go away.

Vice President Biden’s Contentious Courtesy Visit to China

I had my latest five minutes of fame on the Channel News Asia network at 8:30PM Tokyo Time this evening (an hour earlier than I had expected, which forced me to suspend cooking my dinner). I’d been prepped earlier in the day but had to do some adlibbing since the host of the news show went off script. Still, I did manage to air that “contentious courtesy visit” line, so mission accomplished. If I catch some flak from my Japanese former colleagues and some of my American friends, well, c’est la vie.

I will also be showing up next Monday at 11:30AM Tokyo Time on China Radio International for a panel discussion on, yes, “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone.” I’m not exactly the merchant of death but it’s rarely a good sign for Japan when I show up in the media.

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Q. South Korea has declared its intention to expand its ADIZ. Does this complicate the situation in the region?

 A. Not much more than it already has been. The new Chinese ADIZ has more to do with geopolitics than national security, and South Korea will expand its own ADIZ to cover airspace over the submerged rock and the surrounding EEZ, but it does not alter the status quo at sea level and below.

Q. Will there be any direct effect of South Korea's ADIZ expansion on Japan?

A. No. Japan does not have a conflicting sovereignty claim on the sea area being contested there.

Some people do wonder if it will draw the two countries closer in opposition to China’s latest move. The United States would like to see that happen, no doubt about it. Highly unlikely, though.  The territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea is significantly more contentious from the South Korean perspective, since it is intimately connected with the so-called history issues.

Q. How are Vice President Biden's visits to the region being viewed so far?

A. About as seriously as an American vice president’s visit will ever be taken, as far as I can see from where I am in Japan. The three heads of state and government engage him in dialogue. After all, he is the vice president of the United States. However, Japan did not make any new concessions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and the Chinese authorities did not agree to roll back the ADIZ or the reporting requirements levied on aircraft merely passing through the ADIZ.

So it’s really more symbolic than substantial. But domestic troubles in America and the conundrum that is the Middle East are casting doubt on the seriousness of the Obama administration’s commitment to the “Pivot to Asia.” Vice President Biden’s visit helps to somewhat alleviate such concerns.

I can only guess at what the Chinese are thinking. My guess is that it’s being treated as not much more than a somewhat contentious courtesy visit.

The Relationship between TPP and the US Response to China’s New Air Defense Identification Zone

Just in case there’s any misunderstanding, I do not believe that the US response to China’s new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) will directly impact the Japan-US bilateral part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Once the Abe administration committed to the TTP process, there was no way that it could entrench itself in a position that would wind up putting the blame on Japan in the event that negotiations ultimately failed. The Abe administration will make the necessary domestic adjustments—essentially using fiscal means to buy off vested agricultural interests—regardless of what goes on in the East China Sea.

However, there has been much to worry about the Obama administration’s Asia Pivot from the Japanese perspective as John Kerry has supplanted Hilary Clinton in the State Department and focused most of his attention on the Middle East. It is conceivable, plausible, that China looked at what it considers a distracted Obama administration and timed its move accordingly. In a sense, the US commitment to the Japan-US security relationship is being tested. A muscular US response on this front should serve as confirmation of this commitment, in turn replenishing confidence in the Obama administration’s commitment to the Asian Pivot. Japanese concessions at the negotiating table are unlikely to be materially affected by this, but they will easier to sell within the domestic political process because of it.

Of course the Obama administration has its own domestic selling process to worry about. Specifically, it faces considerable political opposition in securing fast-track authority, without which the TPP process may collapse. Good friend and former Fulbright scholar Paul Sracic, who will be in Tokyo again for a few weeks, has been looking in on this issue for some time and should have interesting things to say. Media folks in Tokyo who are interested in talking to him can get in touch with him through his public email account on his bio page

At Least WaPo Is Showing Some Sympathy for China on the ADIZ Controversy

I’ve mostly stopped critiquing media reports but I couldn’t help it this time, and since it comes within the flow of my latest stream...

The title of the WaPo piece says “China's move to establish air defense zone appears to backfire”, but what’s not to like for the Chinese authorities about a report that begins with the sentence “It was designed as a forceful response to Japanese assertiveness, and a robust declaration of China’s maritime claims”, and later offers these stories?

“Japan, like numerous other countries, already has its own air defense identification zone. The country increasingly has used the zone as an excuse to warn or intercept Chinese planes in the area, according to military experts in Beijing. In September, Japan threatened to shoot down Chinese drones flying over the disputed islands; China warned that downing the drones would constitute an act of war” (never mind that a routine fact check would have shown that the Japanese authorities carefully avoided any such commitment on the Senkakus or anywhere).

 “’Japan has been acting more and more confrontational with regards to the Diaoyu islands, so China had to roll out its own measures to balance it out,’ said Zhou Yongsheng of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of International Relations in Beijing. ‘Whenever Chinese aircraft entered Japan’s zone, they would dispatch fighter jets to intercept us, which put us in a very passive position.’”

China is portrayed as the passive party, reacting to Japanese “assertiveness,” a trope helped by a factual error, omission of the sovereign overreach in the Chinese claim that is at the core of the complaints, and the overall lack of Japanese voices.

“David Nakamura in Washington, Chico Harlan in Seoul and Liu Liu, Li Qi and Guo Chen in Beijing contributed to this report.”

Oh. Ooohh…

So I guess my question is: Do the Chinese even need pictures?

So What Was the Reason for the Massive Chinese Overreach on Its ADIZ?

So I guess my question is, why did the Chinese authorities do something so out of the norm? Surely they were aware of their massive overreach?

A Southeast Asian diplomat that I talked to has more or less the following to say: The Chinese believe that the United States is in decline, so it did what it did to demonstrate that it would be willing to throw its weight around going forward.

I'm not 100% convinced that this is the case, but I can't think of a better explanation myself.

Why Everybody Is Furious at China for Establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone

The United States has one, Japan has one; so why is everyone so angry that China decided to have one its own? And why are its overseas supporters quiet for once? Simple. China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is a one-of-a-kind device that extends sovereign authority over international airspace.

Specifically, the Chinese authorities are demanding that all aircraft that passes through its ADIZ must provide flight plan identification, radio identification, transponder identification, and logo identification to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Civil Aviation Administration. Moreover, such aircraft “should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.”

This is quite different from procedures adopted by the United States, which only “apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace.” Sounds reasonable, doesn’t it? The United States accordingly “does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace.” Also reasonable. Ergo the flyover by a pair of B-52 bombers, just to make the point. (The relevant paragraph is reproduced below.)

The Japanese ADIZ appears to amount to the same thing. Aircraft intending to enter Japan’s national airspace must report flight plans to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (the civil aviation authorities), which is transmitted in real time to the Air Defense Force. Otherwise, the Japanese authorities impose no reporting requirements on aircraft passing through its ADIZ.

“2.7.2.3 Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace

"International law does not prohibit nations from establishing air defense identification zones (ADIZ) in the international airspace adjacent to their territorial airspace. The legal basis for ADIZ regulations is the right of a nation to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory. Accordingly, an aircraft approaching national airspace can be required to identify itself while in international airspace as a condition of entry approval. ADIZ regulations promulgated by the United States apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace and require the filing of flight plans and periodic position reports. The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so."

No the Japanese Authorities Did Not Quite Threaten to Shoot Down Drones in the Air Defense Identification Zone around the Senkaku Islands

There’s apparently some misunderstanding out there that the Japanese government warned that it would shoot down drones in the air Japanese defense identification zone around the Senkaku Islands. Since the new Chinese ADIZ raises the chances of some incident blowing up into a more serious clash, the following memo may be of some interest to anyone who chances upon this blog.

First, the Japanese authorities were referring to territorial air space, not just any "air defense [identification] zone(s)." In fact, the western part of Yonakuni Island, an undisputed (and well-inhabited) part of Okinawa had not been included in any Japanese ADIZ until the latter was expanded during the very recent DPJ administration. Most of the Japanese and Chinese ADIZs cover non-territorial air space, where aircraft are in principle free to traverse. On the other hand, all international air flight requires reporting to the proper international authorities. I do not know the details of this requirement, but sovereign states have access to this flight information, which means that all normal civilian flights in the new ADIZ (or any non-territorial airspace in any ADIZs for that matter) will continue unmolested by the Japanese or Chinese military. Of course any unreported aircraft--which likely will include most Japanese and Chinese aircraft in the area--will be subjected to proper scrutiny, i.e. demand for self-identification, warnings and the like, and ultimately attacked in self-defense in the case where there is an clear and present danger--a decision that may be made with regard to the non-territorial airspace within the ADIZ. It is unlikely that a JSDAF fighter will shoot down a Chinese drone/aircraft in the ADIZ or even in Senkaku Islands airspace just because the latter is recalcitrant or unable to identify itself. A Chinese PLA aircraft may be more gung-ho, though, and may decide to attack a JSDAF or Japanese Coast Guard aircraft that happens to fly over the new Chinese ADIZ, territorial air space in particular. (The Japanese authorities do not, to the best of my knowledge, have drones in operation in that neighborhood.) Far more likely, though, is that a Chinese pilot might close in on a JSDAF or JCG aircraft as a form of warning (or just to put a scare into the Japanese) and cause an accident. (Remember the Hainan Island Incident.)

My second caveat is that the Japanese authorities did not explicitly state that they would use weapons. It was in response to a hypothetical that the Chinese authorities directly and somewhat belligerently addressed the matter. The relevant comments from Japanese defense minister at the Sept. 10 press conference, when he addressed the matter in response to questions from the media, follow:

" Question:

Based on the current Self Defense Forces Act, my understanding is that necessary measures can be taken in order to make aircraft invading Japan's territorial airspace withdraw. However, in the theoretical case in which an unmanned aircraft invades Japan's territorial airspace and it is left alone, the situation may threaten the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and assets of Japanese people. Under such circumstances, do you think shooting the aircraft down can be an option as a last resort?

"Minister:

In any case, we will take necessary actions in order to defend Japan's territorial land, sea and airspace as well as protecting lives and assets of the people."

and

"Question:

Concerning countermeasures against invasion of Japan's territorial airspace, not only by an unmanned aircraft but in any form, I presume that necessary countermeasures exclude the use of weapons that can harm the invaders, unless they are used for emergency evacuation or self-defense based on the conventional interpretation. When you said earlier, "We will take necessary actions," did you mean that the use of weapons that are harmful to the invaders is one of the options, too?

"Minister:

I will refrain from answering about each specific countermeasure, since doing so may reveal Japan's strategies. In any case, we will take necessary measures."

Some Thoughts around the 2020 Tokyo Olympics

The tangible impact on the Japanese economy will be limited. The Japanese economy is much larger and more developed than it was in 1964, when the first Tokyo Olympics was held. There is no bullet train to be commissioned in time for the opening ceremonies. There is no post-WW II Tokyo waiting to be terraformed. But there are intangible, if also limited, benefits. Animal spirits will quicken, helping to stoke the Abenomics fire. In this regard, it’s significant that it’s Tokyo—not Nagoya (candidate 1988) or Osaka (2008)—it maximizes the socio-cultural impact.

Prime Minister Abe is a lucky man—who guessed a year ago that Prime Minister Erdegan would blow up Istanbul’s chances in the face of a heavily European IOC?—but he helps to make his own luck. This is not the first time that I’ve said that, but again he put some political capital on the line, and again it paid off; his presence and presentation were, by all accounts, a definite positive. Think about it. Can you imagine Prime Minister Kan having carried it off? Or even thinking about it? With Governor Ishihara? Again, the effect will be limited in political terms; it’s not about him, he surely understands that, and he’ll wisely downplay his role in having made it happen.

And speaking of Abe’s presence, does anything say G-Zero more than leaving the G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg to show up at an NGO—after all, that’s what the International Olympics Committee is, isn’t it?—plenary in Buenos Aires to make a pitch to host a sports event?

Given the timing of all this, some people will be wondering what the impact will be on the looming decision on the consumption tax hike. I’ve been moving back over the last couple of weeks to the view that the FY 2014 hike will indeed be implemented as scheduled (with a significant FY2013 supplemental budget to tide the Japanese economy over the bump) and I’m tempted to interpret all this as a positive in this respect. More importantly, though, it makes any decision of his easier for the Japanese public to accept, and the consumption tax question is no exception. In other words, it increases his room for maneuver.

Finally, it’s useful to remember that the likes of NYT and “outcast of Asia” chatter aside, Japan is quite popular worldwide, regularly placing near the top—it would be the top if not for the Chinese and South Korean respondents—in the annual Pew survey. That surely helped to offset headlines around the latest Fukushima leakage.

Now, I have work to do.

I Now Believe that Abe Will Not Do the Full 3% Consumption Tax Hike in April

Prime Minister Abe has been persuaded by two economic advisors, Professor Koichi Hamada and former non-mainstream MOF bureaucrat Etsuro Honda, to adopt a gradual five-year phase-in instead of the two-installment plan that is currently in place. It could be jiggered, but the idea is to more away from the three-party deal. That, or Honda is a complete flake, which I do not believe he is. MOF will not like it, but it will go along. Likewise, BOJ.

I can’t take any meaningful bets since I live in Japan (and I’m not so confident that I’m willing to bet the house), but I’m sure that the authorities won’t chase me down if I make a friendly wager to all and sundry for an up to-2,000 yen lunch. Let’s put it this way: If the consumption tax goes up 3% on April 1, you win; if it doesn’t, I do. Wait, I’ll give you the full FY2013 for the Abe administration to do so. Any takers please contact my Gmail account, which is easily found around my blog.

Are We Japanese Ultranationalists?

According to this joint Japan-China survey, 46.0% of the Japanese responders were okay with the prime minister paying his respects at the Yasukuni Shrine and 27.5% were okay if he did it in his capacity as a private citizen while only 9.9% were unconditionally opposed. There’s two ways to understand this: a) 46.6% of the Japanese electorate is ultra-nationalist; or b) you antis out there totally miss what Yasukuni is all about. I might go over this (and the meaning of the 27.5%) in more detail tomorrow—August 15—if I can take time out of some pressing work. And I might work the Arlington National Cemetery into it. Then again, I think that there’s a narrative there waiting to be exposed to a braoder audience. I’ll sleep on it.

Underwear Will Out: The Short Shorts Meditations

Is it my imagination or have my observation skills taken a jump this summer? There seem to be a noticeably higher number of women, mostly young—but then, at my age, what woman isn’t?—hitting the streets of Tokyo in short shorts (SSs). Now most SSs surely have their origins in the short pants outerwear that once only boys wore, but some of them are made from flimsy cloth and trimmed with lace, making them look, with perhaps with added gloss and froufrou, like something out of a Victoria’s Secret catalog (or so I guess, based purely on what I’ve heard from my friends). And some of the similarly constructed dresses could be mistaken for chemises. And on the other side of the gender divide, the suteteko, baggy underpants created to wear under kimono, is making a comeback among the young as casual outerwear.

This reminds me of my Osaka childhood, the hottest days of summer saw women walking around the neighborhood in their chemises and men hanging out in suteteko. But these were the doings of older generations (though for someone my age, anyone above high-school age was old); a couple of events stand out in my memory, the high-school age sister of a friend walking around the house in her chemise and a grade seven classmate stripping down to her chemise to change into gym wear, for their unusualness.

This is not without precedent. The kimono as we know it today evolved from the kosode, which had its origins as underwear for the nobles in the Heian era that spread to the samurai and later to the lower classes. The more casual yukata began life as a bathing suit-and-bath towel, an origin that is reflected in the protocol now largely honored in the breach (or so I hear) that says you’re not supposed to wear any underwear with it.

Summers are hot here, we wanna take our clothes off, and between global warming and the heat island effect, here we go again, by Nelly, led by the young, as usual. And next up for promotion? The thong. I may not be around to see this prediction vindicated, though. Sad, isn’t it?

Sidebar: More women are covering their arms in dark sleeve-like gloves and long plastic faceguards, a look that I first saw maybe just a couple of years ago, when I wondered if the woman was hypersensitive to sunlight. But this Dr. Moreau-meets-the Invisible Man and Darth Vader look is sported by women typically more advanced in years, indicating a rearguard action against the ravages of time.

Aso and the Nazis: Some Thoughts on What to Expect Going Forward

Here’s my weekend memo on Aso channeling the Nazis, edited to avoid any duplication with other stuff out there. Someone whose judgment I respect suggests that I’m being a little too harsh on Aso. I suspect he’s right, and I don’t think that Aso can bring the Aso administration down all by himself. Nevertheless, he is revealing the significant potential as a target for the opposition that I mentioned at the beginning of the Abe administration, a target that can be very useful when the Abe administration is more vulnerable.

Last week, the media swarmed all over Aso regarding an occasion where he allegedly suggested that Japan should learn from the Nazis in how they quietly (stealthily?) changed the German constitution. There’s a case to be made that Aso was mistreated. After all, he first mentioned the rise of the Nazis under the Weimar Constitution in what appears to be a warning that even a perfectly respectable constitution could lead to a disastrous political outcome. However, he later indeed talked about the Nazi experience as something to possibly learn from. True, most likely from a purely tactical point of view, but he broke an unwritten rule of the West: Never say anything remotely positive about the Nazis. Ever. That said, it’ll blow over.

First, the international impact. China and South Korea are jumping on Aso (and the Abe administration by implication), and the story certainly ties into the tide of ill will that has been developing and will impede nascent efforts on all sides to contain the negativity and hopefully improve the situation. That said, the impact of Aso’s latest gaffe will be limited by the fact that Nazism is not a significant element in the history issues that plague Japan’s relationship with its neighbors. It does not resonate in the way that disputing the testimonies of comfort women does for South Korea and the Nanjing Massacre for China. (But hey, if you’ve been telling your clients or bosses that Prime Minister Abe will go to Yasukuni on August 15, this is a useful excuse to stop tooting that horn.) It does resonate, though, in Europe and the United States, which is where the bulk of the public communications damage is being done. Even there, it will not do lasting structural damage to Japan’s all-important relationship with the United States (or the less important one with Europe), but it does make every desirably outcome that much harder to achieve.

Second, the domestic. The Abe administration is on a roll; it is strong enough to weather opposition attacks and media ridicule—which is the problem. Aso has stepped in it before, on issues from women, to the elderly, to nationalism and just about everything else(or so it seems)...and so at this point, the press are just waiting for him to produce provide the next headline, making him a perfect target for opposition attacks that could, cumulatively, weaken the Abe administration with a decidedly negative impact on governance during the three-year, election pressure-free (theoretically) window that Abe has to create a legacy as a transformative prime minister. And much of the media will be happy to build on any negative narratives emerging after the honeymoon with the Abe administration.

Clearly, the best outcome for the Abe administration is to have Aso do the honorable thing and fall on his sword. The problem is, Aso appears to be temperamentally disinclined to take a hint. When he became prime minister in 2008, he refused to honor his predecessor Yasuo Fukuda’s wishes and call a snap election while the electoral honeymoon lasted and instead made a year-long effort to create a legacy for himself. (And we know how that story turned out.)

So that’s the problem that Abe has as prime minister. He has a finance minister who has jurisdiction over the fiscal elements of Abenomics, a finance minister who, he knows with a high degree of certainty, will serve as a high-yield point of attack for the opposition. It’s the best gives hope (other than a significant economic downturn) for to the divided and demoralized opposition and potentially the worst as a potential political nightmare for an administration that wants to use the rare three-year window between national elections for extensive structural reform.

TPP: Any Buyer’s Remorse from Japanese Diet Possible?

Not after the Japanese government signs on.

I just finished talking to an analyst who wanted to know if there would be any potential road bumps when the eventual TPP bills go to the Japanese Diet. (He’s an American, so go figure.) I told him not to worry, since the LDP-New Komeito coalition exercise tight discipline on its Diet members, who would place their political careers at dire risk if the voted against the party line. The only other country that I could come up with that might have US-like problems was South Korea—which, as my interlocutor was quick to remind me, is not party to the negotiations (KORUS FTA is already in place so there’s less urgency)—which also happens to have a presidential system.

I did this as a matter of professional courtesy, so I thought I’d share this point with you as well.

There Are Gaffes; Then There Are Gaffes

Deputy Prime Minister (and Finance Minister) Taro Aso has turned Godwin’s Law on its head with his latest gaffe about Nazis (Nazis?!?) generating widespread incredulity and opprobrium in equal parts. I have some thoughts on that and its implications, but I’m keeping them under wraps since I’m currently using them in my professional capacity. I’ll know if I can post them here in a few days. In the meantime, let me cover an angle that is for the most part being missed in the debate: Both Aso and Prime Minister Abe are known for making statements around history issues (Nazis?!?) that they must later take back; is there a difference?

Yes, there is.

Abe’s comments typically come as part of a dialogue, sometimes friendly but more often not, when he is drawn into a discussion over the finer points of a given issue, exerts himself in trying to explain himself, and winds up tripping a land mine. (Prime Minister Junichiro Kozumi avoided this largely by barking out the same stock answer no matter how hard the interrogator tried to bait him.) Aso, by contrast, appears to have a demon in his head who whispers things—like, oh, “Nazis”, say it again, “Nazis”, once more, the crowd’ll love it, NOW—whispers that only Aso can hear, whispers that Aso…cannot resist. I can’t think of another explanation; his comments, as rambling and disjointed as they were on that occasion, had been conveying the twofold message that discussions around constitutional amendment should be conducted calmly and deliberately (there’s a legitimate argument against this but let’s leave it out for the time being) and that bad regimes could emerge even under the best of constitutions if we’re not careful (Weimar and Nazis?...now that’s a reasonable argument), when, after meandering around some generational babble and talking about Yasukuni and working himself up again about the need for calm and deliberation, he suddenly re-injected the Nazis into his argument (this time, like a bad Hitler joke, as a counter-historical example to emulate).

One, with clear forewarnings that the recipient can apply to good use with discipline and practice; the other, unforeseen brainfarts that can only be eliminated by way of a vow of total silence.

Some Thoughts around the Looming Cabinet Legislation Bureau Makeover

I thought that I’d post something that complemented, rather than overlapped with, media reports and also avoided grappling with the polemics that are sure to emerge. I also reserve the right to alter my thoughts on a later, more public occasion since this post represents some of my initial impressions and is largely unedited.

The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) and the New Komeito are regarded as the two most significant obstacles to a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution that would allow Japan to engage in collective self-defense. The Abe Cabinet is about to a) eliminate the first problem while b) keeping bureaucratic dissatisfaction to a minimum by appointing a diplomat who strongly favors reinterpretation as secretary-general of the CLB and nominating the current secretary-general, a former METI official, as the replacement for a Supreme Court justice, a former diplomat, who had retired on July 20 after reaching the constitutional age limit (70).

With regard to the “first problem”, some people have wondered why the Prime Minister (or the Cabinet) can’t simply order the CLB to change its interpretation. After all, the CLB is an agency established within the Cabinet, isn’t it? The answer is twofold. He can’t, and he doesn’t have to. The relevant task of the CLB according to its charter law is to “give opinions concerning legal issues to the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of each Ministry.” It would be an absurdity to seek an opinion and to simultaneously dictate what that opinion should be; indeed the law does not give the Cabinet or the Prime Minister the power to do so. Of course it is just an opinion; the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of each Ministry are free to ignore the opinions of the CLB and do as they please, and take their chances in the courts if necessary. Then why don’t they do so with regard to collective self-defense?

I believe that there is a historical explanation. It must be hard to imagine these days, when you will have difficulty finding any LDP Diet members who oppose reinterpretation, that the early LDP largely took a minimalist approach to self-defense, many not necessarily for tactical purposes—let’s first concentrate on building up the Japanese economy—but from a genuinely pacifist perspective. Some of them had defied the Japanese military and suffered during the long wars, while others had submitted and come to grief. For these otherwise conservative politicians, the CLB’s interpretation must have been exactly what they wanted, while those who opposed it did not have the power to mount a challenge to the leadership around the issue. The LDP has a whole has turned more sanguine in recent decades as the result of the generational shift that has diminished visceral aversion to all matters military and the increasing sense of insecurity over threats emanating from China and North Korea. Thus, the coalition that emerged in the late 1990s with the pacifist Komeito remains as the only structural impediment to the reinterpretation of the Constitution.

This will not be the end of legal hurdles to reinterpretation. With the passing of the years, during which successive cabinets have explicitly or implicitly endorsed this interpretation, significant legitimacy has accreted, precedent that needs to be handled with great care if it is to be breached without serious harm to the rule of law. Still, the institutional obstacle is being removed; the sticks are moving downfield for sure.

The remainder of this post is for people who like inside baseball stuff.

The secretary-general “supervises the activities” of the CLB, which means among other things having final say on opinions regarding the constitution. The position is rotated between officials seconded from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the former Ministry of Home Affairs, now part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, who fulfill several key assignments before they are elevated in their turn to the top post. Of course the other ministries as well as the judiciary and the Public Prosecutors Office also second officials to the CLB and most of the MOF, METI, and (now) MIC officials never make it to secretary-general. But only an official from the three ministries does. Until now, apparently.

The replacement of the secretary-general, however, requires handling with care. First, interpreting the constitution is but a small part of the CLB’s legislation-related work (unless it decides to seriously consider changing its mind on the substantive focus of this post), in which the secretary-general is very much involved. Competence and familiarity with the interpretation process is highly desirable. Moreover, the secretary-general is also the authoritative voice of the CLB, nay, the Cabinet, in Diet sessions and committees on legal matters. It is very different, say, from picking Koichi Hamada as your economic guru, influential, true, but still one of many voices that have a say in making economic policy. An ill-advised choice could spell political disaster.

Second, a Prime Minister does not want to unduly alienate the bureaucracy, and the Abe administration appears to have taken the political and policy outcomes of the DPJ’s experiences in conflicts overt and clandestine with the bureaucracy to heart. However urgent the Abe administration’s desire might be to take the CLB in a new direction might be, taking away the CLB post without compensation could not only be a cause of alienation with the METI bureaucracy—political assignments, which have so far favored METI, are fine but METI should be around after Mr. Abe leaves the political scene—but also send a chill throughout the rest of the bureaucracy. Yet in another case of good fortune for Mr. Abe, a position has just opened up in the Supreme Court, a position reserved for all practical purposes traditionally filled by MOFA, the very ministry that is professionally inclined to favor reinterpretation on collective self-defense and, unlike academics, comes with significant practical experience around the legislative process, if not nearly the equivalent of that of the other ministries on the domestic process. It is hard to gauge the relative value of the two assignments. A Supreme Court justice carries significant constitutional prestige; the CLB secretary-general far less so. But the SCJ is merely one among fifteen, while the CLB secretary-general is the undisputed leader of a major institution. Perhaps the difficulty (at least for me) is its own answer and the trade is about as close to a wash as can be engineered. All this is not to imply that METI would not meekly submit if the matter were put to it without compensation. But friction is being been minimized, and that’s not a small matter to a prime minister whose personal proclivities already lean towards comity.

Oh, and make no mistake, this cannot have been a decision made up on the spur of the moment. The Supreme Court vacancy was a certainty from the very moment of the appointment, a fact that Mr. Abe’s political team could not have missed.