Let’s Hope No One Draws Parallels between the Abductees and the Two American Journalists…

Joe’s comment here gives me good chance to unleash yet again a couple of my pet peeves—regarding the abductees and Prime Minister Koizumi. No, those canards do not come up in Joe’s comment, but it’s clear that they lurk behind the media reports that go into forming the background of his take.

There are good reasons why nothing has been achieved with regard to the following Japanese demands:

1) Give a full and credible accounting of the fate of the remaining abductees;
2) Return remaining survivors; and
3) Punish the people responsible for the operation.

The North Korean authorities claim that they have already accounted for the remainder—they deny some of the Japanese claims—and that there are no more survivors. They also claim that the people responsible for the operation were punished. There is a gap here. No, there is nothing short of regime change that can bring the North Koreans to satisfy Japanese demands. I think that this is hard not to see. But then, why does MOFA persist in making these demands?

One line of persistent popular among Western liberals is that this is the result of a successful rightwing campaign, who use this issue for some inchoate but undoubtedly nefarious purposes. Not so. This, as I have never tired of explaining, is a misunderstanding, a misunderstanding based on a few undeniable facts regarding Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. To wit, Koizumi:

1) paid his respects at Yasukuni Shrine (to fulfill a campaign promise);
2) dispatched troop to Iraq (after the war was over); and
2) was succeeded by Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister.

In fact, the Japanese demands are supported in public by most politicians across the entire political spectrum from the nationalist-nativists to JCP spokesmen as well as just about every editorial writer in the mainstream media from Sankei to Asahi. The key phrase here is “in public.” For it is the Japanese public that was the driving force behind these demands; Koizumi would have lost his job if he had stayed the course after his first trip to Pyongyang, and Abe was the grateful recipient, not the instigator, of the popular outcry over the North Korean revelations that helped propel him into the Prime Minister’s office. Public sentiment regarding the issue has very much cooled, but no one in any position of responsibility is willing yet to touch this political third rail. And that’s things stand today. If you doubt me, read the election manifestos.

If you want to know more about thoughts regarding Koizumi and how he fits into the big picture on this, you are free to search my blog or, better, pay me to write an essay on this subject. If you don’t have the time or money to do so, then you’ll just have to take my word for it.

Some Implications of South Korea’s Help on Japan’s Abduction Issue

I’ll have to issue a corrective regarding my previous post on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit regarding a possible meeting with family members of abductees. I’d overlooked the change in South Korea’s policy regarding its own abductees under the Lee Myung-bak administration and more broadly the impact of an overall shift away from the ten-year-old Sunshine policy. This point was driven home for me when South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-Hwan announced that he was helping to arrange a meeting between Kim Hyun Hui, one of the North Korean agents responsible for the 1987 Korean Air Flight 858 bombing and now living in South Korea in relative seclusion, and family members of Japanese abductee Taeko Yaguchi, who had been tasked with teaching Kim the Japanese language and Japanese customs.

I can’t imagine the Lee administration following Japan’s lead in asking Clinton for a face-to-face with South Korea’s own abduction constituency—it makes South Korea look weak and reliant on the United States, always bad politics over there, and it’s not going to help right things anyway—but the South Korean gesture has raised the media’s attention. I believe that this slightly raises the stakes for both Clinton and North Korea with regard to her response to the Japanese request. Moreover, it’s one thing for the United States to indulge Japan as an act of diplomatic courtesy; it’s another for the three parties to act in consonance, if not in unison. The North Korean response will be that much harsher. The Kim Jong Il regime is playing its latest Taepodon caper for much larger stakes in its bid for face and more fungible goodies, but it may nevertheless see such a gesture as an indication of a harder line from the Obama administration than the late-Bush administration’s sliced-salami concession tactics.

A Few Thoughts on Hillary Clinton’s Upcoming Visit

I thought that the AP wire that I linked to in this previous post implicitly said everything that absolutely needed to be said about Secretary of State Clinton’s East/Southeast Asia trip, and I still do. But there are a couple of bits of trivia in the Japanese media about which I have a few thoughts that might be of use to you. By that, I mean a) the U.S. attempt to set up a meeting with Ichiro Ozawa and b) the Japanese attempt to set up a meeting with the family members of the abductees.

The DPJ’s attempt to bask in the afterglow of its U.S. namesake’s across-the-board victory in the November elections notwithstanding, I will be pleasantly surprised if the Ozawa-Clinton meeting happens. The DPJ does not want to have its differences with Japan’s most important military ally (the only other one being Australia) and within its own party ranks regarding a) the U.S. military presence in Japan and b) the Japanese role regarding operations in and around Afghanistan and off the coasts of Somalia aired in public. It would be unsettling. Ozawa would be particularly problematic as the DPJ interlocutor, since he has been personally responsible for the policy positions that have led to the bilateral discord regarding the overseas projection of the Japanese military. Add to that, Ozawa… being Ozawa…

Incidentally, there’s nothing odd about a State Secretary meeting the head of the DPJ. After all, the DPJ is the leading opposition party. I wonder how it works the other way around though. What if Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone tries to do the same if and when he visits the United States? Nothing wrong with meeting the head of the Republican Party, but Michael Steele, the Chairman? Please. Not John McCain either, he only came close; now, he’s just a senator. George W. Bush? Maybe, but only as a courtesy call, which leaves the question open. There’s something to be said for the parliamentary system where official visits are concerned.

The other meeting, the one with family members of the abductees, is clearly not a top priority item for the Clinton side, if claims of her scheduling difficulties mean anything. The fact that the story of the logistical problem is emanating from Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary* indicates that the Aso administration is either not pushing too hard, which would mean that it is unlikely to happen; or lowering expectations to get the most out of a, say, ten-minute interlude in an Aso-Clinton meeting during which a few family members are shuffled in and out of the Prime Minister’s office. If I absolutely had to make a call, it would be the latter—it would be so easy to engineer—but either way, the consequences would be trivial. Some people in Japan will like Clinton (and the Obama administration) less if she doesn’t meet them. But Japan’s stance with regard to North Korea and more broadly the bilateral alliance including U.S. troop realignment will remain unchanged. Clinton-family facetime will earn some credits with the nationalist crowd, but that’s not where the real public and LDP opposition to Aso is coming from. Remember, this episode is playing out against a backdrop of increasing “abduction fatigue”. Wounds may never heal, but we at least learn to live with the pain; the media’s diminishing treatment of the issue reflects this fact of life. Moreover, a meeting may only exacerbate the sense of futility, which would be a negative for the Aso administration.

All this, of course, is predicated on the assumption that the regional problems of major concern for the bilateral alliance are chronic, not acute, in nature and require careful management, not dramatic initiatives. That includes North Korea, despite its most recent Taepodon threat. The short-term course for the overseas projection of the Japanese military is also set for the moment. The results of the upcoming Lower House election can change this, as well as the Japanese stance on U.S. troops realignment, but there’s little short of throttling Ozawa that Clinton can do to affect the outcome. Hey, maybe that’s why Ozawa…

The report is available from this short-lived Mainichi link. Oddly, the full reports of the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s press briefings for that day (available on the Sankei website) do not include this point. Perhaps the Mainichi chased him down after the press briefing. Takeo Kawamura, the current CCS, is regarded as a lightweight, but to his credit appears to be uncommonly accommodating with the press. He held two press briefings on Sunday.

North Korea Delisted; Life Goes on

Last January, I made the following speculation on what it would take to move beyond phase two:

It is barely conceivable that the lame-duck Bush administration could bring the North Koreans around to a deal on the declaration that it can defend against Congressional accusations of caving in. But that would require North Korea to make a couple of difficult decisions, at least one of which would completely strip North Korea of the strategic ambiguity that it currently enjoys.

First, the two sides must come up with a plausible explanation of the scope and extent of North Korea’s uranium program, or, much less likely, a convincing case that there is no such thing… [S]econd, the two sides must come up with a plausible explanation of the scope and extent of North Korea’s plutonium stockpile and nuclear arsenal, such as there is.

I was highly skeptical about this. In any case, the United States delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism somewhat short of my guesses. So much for my powers of prediction. I’m not sure that the Six-Party process has moved beyond phase two though. It seems more like the twilight zone dada-dada, dada-dada… between phases two and three… which looks a lot like what I most recently talked about here:

I still think that by far the most likely better-case scenario for the foreseeable future is North Korea disabling its three facilities but holding onto its current nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles system at their current levels, enough to allow China and South Korea to keep sustaining the current North Korean regime without incurring US disfavor, but well short of normalization of the US-DPRK relations.

As for the abduction issue, I’ve long believed that nothing of note will happen without regime change in Pyongyang. The Fukuda regime sought to push the process forward with the agreement on a new survey on the fate of the rest of the abductees—which would have led to ultimate disappointment. With the U.S. delisting in the bag, my money is on an indefinite delay on the part of the North Korean authorities until they feel the desire for another political fix, likely when (not if) North Korea-U.S. relations comes to an impasse again.

New Deal on Abduction Issue: The Japanese Version and Other Things

This is the summer holiday season, when the regular Tuesday Cabinet sessions and the subsequent press briefings customarily held by attending Cabinet ministers are canceled*, so it may be just an accident that the August 12 bilateral deal on a new North Korean survey on the abduction issue that would lead to the lifting of some Japanese sanctions passed unacknowledged (as far as I am aware; I stand ready to be corrected) by the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Minister, and the newly-minted Minister of State for (among other things) the Abduction Issue Kyoko Nakayama. Indeed the only official sign of recognition of the event to date has been a perfunctory document on the MOFA website entitled Outline of the Japan-North Korea Working-level Consultations held on August 11-12.

Still, this silence on the part of the political leadership is odd given the extraordinary revelations in the MOFA document. Let me translate for you the actions to be taken by the North Korean side:

(1) The survey to be conducted by North Korea shall be an across-the-board survey regarding abduction victims whose objective is to take substantive action directed towards the resolution of the abduction issue, in other words to find survivors and have them return to Japan.

(2) The subject of the survey includes victims recognized by the government and other missing people, etc. who have been put forward; in other words, all abduction victims shall be included.

(3) The survey shall be conducted with alacrity by a North Korean survey committee, and as far as possible shall be completed in autumn.

(4) The North Korean side shall inform the Japanese side as required and consult. If survivors are found in the process of the survey, the Japanese side shall be notified and the procedures after that shall be consulted with the Japanese side and agreed.

(5) The North Korean side shall cooperate so that the Japanese side can directly confirm the results of the survey through such means as face-to-face interviews of relevant people, joint possession of relevant documents, and visits to relevant sites.

(6) Consultations shall be continued on other matters related to the survey.**

In other words, the North Korean side is going to conduct a survey “to find survivors”, whose existence it has steadfastly refused to recognize “and have them return to Japan”. Moreover, the subject of the survey includes not only the ones that the North Korean side admits to have abducted but “all abduction victims” including “victims recognized by the [Japanese, one presumes] government and other missing people, etc.”, yet another seemingly extraordinary concession.

In exchange for this, the Japanese side:

Is prepared to implement the 1) lifting of restrictions on movement of personnel and 2) lifting of restrictions on charter flights [between Japan and North Korea] at the same time that the North Korean side begins said survey.***

The “agreement” left the return of the Yodogo airliner highjackers and permission of North Korean flagships to berth at Japanese ports to load humanitarian goods—agreed to in the June Working-Level Consultations****—to future consultations.

Given the eye-opening nature of the new North Korean survey and the immediate parallel lifting of some Japanese sanctions on this most high-profile of foreign policy (and national security) issues, it is odd at first sight that the matter is being downplayed to such an extent. But first sights can be deceiving, and this one is no exception. Let me explain.

First of all, there is no signed agreement, joint statement or anything else that records a common understanding that either side can refer to in the event of a disagreement. Indeed, since North Korea has not issued any sort of public record or statement of its own, we only have MOFA’s word that there really is an agreement, let alone its contents. North Korea may decide at any time to deny any part of MOFA’s version of the “agreement” when it suits their purposes, and will do so without hesitation if past behavior is any indication.

Second, the meeting was scheduled at the behest of the North Korean side, no doubt to have it begin on the date of the “initial window opening” for taking North Korea off the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Growing domestic dissatisfaction and the exigencies of John McCain’s presidential campaign with regard to the substance of the deal and subsequent foot-dragging by North Korea led the Bush administration to let August 11 pass without action on delisting. North Korea does not look likely to be satisfactorily forthcoming on the plutonium cache, the uranium enrichment program or proliferation activities any time soon.

Third, North Korea has always played Japan and the United States (and South Korea for that matter) off against each other. When one relationship sours, North Korea attempts to coax out tactical gains from the other. Remember that Prime Minister Koizumi’s November 2002 visit to North Korea (and not Shinzo Abe’s hard-line position) elicited Kim Jong Il’s extraordinary admission and the return of five abductees (and ultimately their families) during the nadir of North Korea’s relationship with the Bush administration. Note also that North Korea’s relations with South Korea, already on the rocks after conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak took office in February, has soured dramatically since its clumsy efforts to put the shooting of a South Korean tourist behind backfired.

Take these three points as a whole and North Korea’s intent and the motives thereof become clear. Seeing little prospect for improvements on the US and South Korean fronts in the near future, it decided to help the Japanese authorities release themselves from between a rock (Japanese public sentiment) and a hard place (the near-impossibility of substantive progress on the fate of the other abductees) by going easy on the August 11-12 Working-level Consultations and not disputing the Japanese MOFA version of the events that transpired. It is highly likely that the North Korean side will begin the survey and cash in on its immediate profits. As long as there are no substantial improvements on the US or South Korean fronts, it will try to extend the survey indefinitely—until such time as the situation improves sufficiently to allow it to end or (merely) suspend the survey, claiming completion or Japanese malfeasance.

Not only skeptics but also the families of the abductees well understand, if not the entire illusory background, the tenuous nature of the “agreement”, and are accordingly in no mood to embrace it wholeheartedly—all the more reason for political leaders to downplay the event and distance themselves from it*****.

* The regular Friday Cabinet sessions are held year-round.

** The Japanese originals of the six points are reproduced below. Incidentally, as official documents go, it is poorly drafted. That is what happens when an ambassador is obliged to work into the wee hours of the night, then produce a document for public consumption.

（1）北朝鮮が行う調査は、拉致問題の解決に向けた具体的行動をとるため、すなわち生存者を発見し帰国させるための、拉致被害者に関する全面的な調査となること。
（2）調査の対象には、政府が認定した被害者やその他に提起された行方不明者等が含まれ、すなわち、すべての拉致被害者が[調査の]対象となること。
（3）調査は、権限が与えられた北朝鮮の調査委員会によって迅速に行われ、可能な限り秋には終了すること。
（4）北朝鮮側は、調査の進捗過程について日本側に随時通報し、協議を行うこと。調査の過程で生存者が発見される場合には、日本側に伝達され、その後の段取りについては、日本側と協議し、合意されること。
（5）北朝鮮側は、日本側が関係者との面談、関係資料の共有、関係場所への訪問などを通じて調査結果を直接確認できるよう協力すること。
（6）調査に関連するその他の事項については、引き続き協議すること。

*** Original:

北朝鮮側が、今後、上記2．の調査を開始することと同時に、日本側も、1）人的往来の規制解除及び 2）航空チャーター便の規制解除を実施する用意がある旨表明した。なお、双方が措置をとる具体的タイミングについては、今後、日朝間で調整していくこととなった。

**** Here, the two parties are identified as “our side (我が方)” and “the other side (先方)”, thus accentuating the purely unilateral nature of the document. The August document reflects an awareness of this point, calling them the “Japanese side (日本側)” and “North Korean side (北朝鮮側)”.

***** It is telling that Mizuho Fukushima, head of the Socialist Party, is the only party leader anywhere to speak up—in favor in her case—of the understanding. Watch next week’s Japanese tabloids descend on her in a reminder of the Socialist blunder born of supreme indifference that reportedly led to the execution of one of the abductees.

Danzig-Nye Essay on “Obama’s Thinking”

Richard Danzig and Joseph Nye, two foreign policy establishment figures who have signed on to the Obama campaign, have co-produced an Asahi op-ed (English, Japanese) that gives, in the words of one of the authors quoted by Asahi's Washington bureau chief, “Obama's thinking about Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.” Someone wondered why Mr. Obama didn’t put his name on it. Actually, it’s simple; unlike John McCain, he hasn’t really focused on the bilateral relationship. He doesn't have anything that he's comfortable putting his name to. Short-term, it’s clearly a secondary consideration in a low-priority region, notwithstanding North Korea’s nuclear program*. I do not think that this relative lack of interest is a bad thing, though, as I have argued, sort of, before.

In fact, when Mr. Danzig and Mr. Nye turn their attention to Japan, the outcome is very much like the line that the Bush administration has been pushing. In a nutshell, they want to continue to transform the military alliance along the revised guidelines. This is no surprise, when you recall that Mr. Nye is the co-author, with Republican Richard Armitage, of the bipartisan 2000 report that laid out the framework for the Bush administration’s Japan policy.

Beyond the bilateral security relationship, the essay talks about their hopes for close cooperation on what they call “the world's most pressing challenges—halting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening the global economy, tackling climate change, responding to global pandemics”. But that’s all really not much more than boilerplate stuff, the kind that can be tossed at any self-respecting member of the OECD. It is what the pair says on the Six-Party Talks that an uncomfortable truth for the Japanese authorities emerges. To quote:

Japan now plays a critical diplomatic and political role in the region. In the six-party talks, Tokyo supports efforts to persuade North Korea to fully and transparently abandon its nuclear weapons program and return to the Nonproliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards. It is pressing North Korea to resolve outstanding questions about the fate of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean regime. And it is trying to convince North Korea to engage in a larger regional peace regime.

Our mutual efforts to use the six- party vehicle to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue have been harmed by erratic U.S. policies toward the North that have allowed it to accumulate a stockpile of plutonium sufficient to build nuclear weapons, to test a nuclear device and to resume testing of missiles.

We need closer consultations between the United States and Japan, the right mix of pressures and inducements, and direct tough-minded dialogue with North Korea to resolve all the issues included in the six-party process and to prevent the slide since 2001 from continuing.

Did you notice that working on North Korea’s nuclear program is referred to as a collective effort, while the abductees issue is tacked on as the subject of Japanese efforts? The McCain-Lieberman op-ed appears to pay a little more attention to the uniquely Japanese concerns, but, in all fairness to the Obama’s-thinking duo, Mr. McCain also sees the abductees as a secondary issue, as I have pointed out before**.

Finally, China does not figure in the Danzig-Nye essay the way that it casts a shadow on McCain’s views of the bilateral alliance, but other than that, there’s remarkably little distance between Mr. McCain and Mr. Obama’s campaign on Japan, for better or worse. It’s on the global level that differences arise, and affect the bilateral relationship, which would make a neat summary of what I was getting at in my Glocom talk.

* Not that that’s anything new. If North Korea’s nuclear program was such an important issue, why did the Bush administration put a mere assistant secretary, a career diplomat albeit one with an excellent resume, in charge? China got the Secretary of Treasury, the Middle East not only got the President, but the Secretary of State as well. And everybody else, not that that helped.

** Especially footnote **.

(sidebar) The McCain-Lieberman op-ed came out in the Yomiuri, the Danzig-Nye essay appeared in the Asahi. Coincidence? I think not. So who gets Ron Paul? Remember, he’s still in the Republican race. And Ralph Nader? Sankei and Mainichi?

The Fix Is in on Delisting North Korea as State Sponsor of Terrorism

Yesterday, the Chief Cabinet Secretary made the announcement, later confirmed by the Foreign Minister, that the North Korean authorities has agreed to reopen investigations regarding abductees and repatriate the remaining four of the nine Japanese radicals who highjacked a plane to North Korea in 1970 and received asylum there and two Japanese wives of theirs, who, together with the highjackers, are accused of playing key roles in the abductions. In return, the Japanese government will be lifting all sanctions on movement of personnel, and will also allow North Korean ships to enter Japanese ports to load humanitarian aid cargo. However, all sanctions on trade—including a total ban on imports from North Korea—as well as the less significant financial sanctions will remain.

To repeat: There is no reasonable scenario short of regime change in North Korea that will close the case. It is highly likely that the remaining eight of the thirteen abductees that the North Korean authorities have confessed to are dead, and just as unlikely that North Korea will be forthcoming even if any of them are alive.* There is also little chance that the North Korean authorities will fess up to the other four abductees that the Japanese government has recognized but the North Korean authorities have denied. On the other hand, it is near impossible for the North Korean authorities to prove that they are telling the truth.

Thus, I do not see the reinvestigation producing anything conclusive in any way. It is no wonder that the families of the remaining abductees show no optimism with regard to the latest turn of events. That lack of enthusiasm is likely to boil over into open displeasure as the process peters out with little to show for it. In terms of domestic politics, there is little to gain for the Fukuda administration, though the negatives down the road will be tempered by waning public interest with the passage of time since the 2002 revelations.

Then why do it? Actually, the Fukuda administration had little choice. The Bush administration is poised to cut a deal with the North Korean authorities that will freeze North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for among other things dropping it from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. The bus will be leaving, with or without Japan on board, so Mr. Fukuda had to take what he could get. Besides, the main target of the sanctions are programs relating to weapons of mass destruction; it was only in 2006 October, after Shinzo Abe succeeded Junichiro Koizumi as Prime Minister, that the Japanese government added the abductees issue to the justifications.

Some people here will trace this change in tack to the very beginning of the Fukuda administration, when Mr. Fukuda indicated that he would be taking a more conciliatory approach to the issue. Indeed, the Fukuda administration indicated through the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Foreign Minister that it would ease sanctions commensurate with progress on the abductees issue. It is also true that Mr. Fukuda represents a less hawkish worldview than Mr. Abe, his predecessor as Prime Minister. Moreover, Mr. Fukuda has far less political capital invested in the issue than Mr. Abe, who basically rode that one-trick pony as an obscure sub-cabinet Deputy to Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda to the Prime Minister’s office in just four years’ time.

Thus, the more nationalistic/hawkish elements of the media will blast Mr. Fukuda for making the deal—Sankei has already come out strongly against easing the sanctions. But there was no viable alternative. There is no way that an LDP Prime Minister, whatever his personal inclinations may be, could hope to stand in the way of a nuclear programs deal that the U.S. government is determined to push through without losing face, or worse, just possibly throw the whole process off track by giving a somewhat implausible Congressional coalition of human rights advocates and national security hawks ammunition to cut down the main track agreement on North Korea’s nuclear program. The abductees issue has existed only between the lines in the agreement under the Six-Party Talks. There is no way that the Bush administration, or any U.S. administration for that matter, would allow it to take a front seat to the main issue.**

So the fix is in. Barring deal-breaking snags in the negotiations between the Bush administration and the North Korean authorities—and the devil is truly in the details when it comes to dealing with North Korea—the Fukuda administration will have to live with the political consequences of an unsatisfactory but unavoidable deal.

* It is notable that three of the nine highjack perpetrators reportedly died in North Korea of natural (illness and accident) when they were 35, 42, and 52 years of age respectively. This unusually high mortality rate mirrors that of the deceased abductees. The North Korean authorities claim that eight out of the thirteen that they have admitted to—five were repatriated alive, while the Japanese government recognizes four more missing people as abductees, bringing the total of officially confirmed victims to seventeen—also died of illness and accidents (and natural disasters), all in their twenties, thirties or forties.

** Note that John McCain, who is seen as deeply sympathetic to the plight of the abductees and their families, always makes a clear distinction between the nuclear weapons program and the abductees issue, which he always places in the category of “future talks”. See, for example, the following excerpt from his Foreign Affairs essay.

It is unclear today whether North Korea is truly committed to verifiable denuclearization and a full accounting of all its nuclear materials and facilities, two steps that are necessary before any lasting diplomatic agreement can be reached. Future talks must take into account North Korea's ballistic missile programs, its abduction of Japanese citizens, and its support for terrorism and proliferation.

The Japanese Government Needs Better Public Communications on the Need for Movement on the Remaining Abductees

Once every five years, the Japanese government conducts a public opinion poll on the protection of human rights, and one of the things it tries to find out is what human rights issues the public is interested in. This year, they included the "victims of abduction by North Korea, etc." for the first time. The issue/category came in fifth at 31.5%, behind "the handicapped (44.1%)", "the old (40.5%)", "children (35.0%)", and "human rights abuses using the Internet (32.7%)", but ahead of such issues/categories as "women (25.0%)", "victims of crime, etc. (24.1%)", and "HIV carriers, etc. (18.9%)".

This and other information on the abductees issue is available on this web page that came with the Headquarters for the Abductee Issue that the Abe administration established in September 2006. The web page is full of information on the abductees issue, with new material being added every month. Some of it is intriguing, such as this document, which lays out the Japanese case for all the discrepancies, irregularities, and lack of cooperation on the part of the North Koreans. As I read it, I realize that they must be the unanswered questions that are keeping Japan from pitching in with the fuel oil shipments and acquiescing to the US delisting of North Korea as a terrorist sponsor.

Unfortunately for all you monolingual gaijins, until recently, all this information was available only in Japanese. Somehow, the people who were responsible for this forgot that it was the other parties to the Six-Party Talks who were wondering when Japan would come around to helping out with the quid pro quo for the North Korean nuclear program, and that the Japanese government needed to work on public opinion beyond Japanese borders as well as the Japanese public. Somebody in the Fukuda administration must have notice the omission, and there is now an English-language page as well.

But there are problems. The English page is merely a digest version of the Japanese page. This means that the document I linked to in the second paragraph that argues the Japanese case becomes more of an English-language talking points memo. Perhaps more seriously, the page is poorly designed and lacks a sense of mission and purpose. There is little effort to draw attention to the salient points, to make your case leap out at you even before you start clicking on the links. Technically, intellectually, emotionally, it's a job done on the cheap.

If the objective of this and other PR campaign efforts (among other things, the web site links to Paul Stookey's Song for Megumi) is to show that "the government cares", then this state of affairs is fine. If the intent is to make sure that "the Japanese people care", then the fifth-place finish might be a cause for mild concern. But either way, the government needn't have bothered with the English-language digest version at all. But if it wants to win the hearts and minds of the public beyond its borders and convince them of the need for answers before it moves on, then it has a long way to go in public communications, starting here.

If Anyone Can Prolong the Honeymoon with the Media, It's Prime Minister Fukuda

I did not make it up when I wrote that "[Mr. Fukuda] had charmed the entire Kantei press into longing for his triumphant return." In fact, a member of the Asahi board of editorial writers said it on Sunday Project. So I am not surprised to see that the Prime Minister's multiple political financing embarrassments are not causing him much trouble. Likewise, the financial irregularities in, for example, Environment Minister Kamoshita's books provided a few headlines, but nothing more. Think of it, if Mr. Fukuda had been an Abe clone, he would have been inundated with "more-of-the-same" invectives by now, and never mind the legal distinctions between the intentional and the negligent. Of course the media would be obliged to maintain balance with these and other Ozawa money stories (it could be just a coincidence that this story does not appear on the Asahi website), and it remains to be seen if they are just sick and tired of flogging this same horse over and over again.

In any case, Mr. Fukuda is liked - by the media and the public alike - and likeable, so this may be as good a time as any for the media, as they do here and here, to let the Japanese people know something that they've been aware of for a long, long time: that is, short of regime change, North Korea is not going to give Japan any more meaningful information on the abductees issue, let alone 1) let all abductees come home; 2) give a full, satisfactory accounting of the abductees issue (for example, how did they die, if they did), and 3) hand over the culprits; and have the Fukuda administration deal with the consequences.

Now imagine the embarrassment if the Abe administration had to deal with the revelation, and the only answer it had was that it had not heard such a thing directly from the North Koreans. Wouldn't the media be saying that Mr. Abe should ask Mr. Roh what Mr. Kim actually said? But I'll be mildly surprised if the mainstream media put that same question to Mr. Fukuda.

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I found this while I was looking for my posts on the relationship between the media and Prime Ministers. I think that it has stood the test of time pretty well, including the time horizon for Mr. Abe.

Full Text of Joint Document of the Second Session of the Sixth Round Six-Party Talks

Here.

070925What the State Department Thinks of North Korea as a Sponsor of Terrorism

Ever wondered what the bureaucrat-vetted version of U.S. policy concerning North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism looked like? I thought so.

Well, I'm going to force you to read them anyway, with excerpts of the introduction to the chapter on State Sponsors of Terror Overview and the section on North Korea. For both 2005 and 2006!

They were both published in April of the subsequent year. Two major differences:

The introduction in the 2006 Report has dropped reference to North Korea altogether. This is no oversight. The 2006 introduction is much longer, 280 words to 2005's 127.

The 2006 section on North Korea has also been truncated. Moreover, it includes the ominous statement:

In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."

What of the abductees? The 2005 Report says:

Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War.

But the 2006 Report says:

The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002.

What at the end of 2005 remained a contentious issue was now merely a continuing demand from the Japanese government for a full accounting. All reference to other abductees, including South Koreans, had been removed. Moreover, there was no evident link between the Japanese demands and North Korean de-listing.

What happened in between was, of course, the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement.

It had become something of a ritual, where Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Hill would intimate de-listing without regard to the Japanese abductees, then the Japanese powers-that-be would claim that they had talked to President Bush, or Condoleezza Rice, and received reassurances that such was not the case. Now, the latest report from Washington says that Secretary Rice has also defected to the other side. I should not have been surprised, since, on September 16, I had already watched then LDP Secretary-General Nobuteru Ishihara kiss off the Six-Party Talks in a fit of anger at the U.S. "change of heart".

In turn, though, I wonder how Mr. Ishihara could have held it in so long, since February 13? And if he had needed any further confirmation to have the message sink in, surely he should have read the writing on the cyberwall when he saw the April 30 Report.

Or maybe, just maybe, these people had known what was going on all along?

Consider this post complementary to this.

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Country Report on Terrorism (2005)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 28, 2006

Chapter 6 -- State Sponsors of Terror Overview

Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.

North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

Country Report on Terrorism (2006)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 30, 2007


Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other destabilizing technologies that could get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.

As a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsors of terrorism on June 30. Since pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States and the international community on counterterrorism efforts.

Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the War on Terror. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.

Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as "not fully cooperating" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The designation, included in Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, was based on a review of Venezuela's overall efforts to fight terrorism. Effective October 1, the decision imposed sanctions on all commercial arms sales and transfers. It remains in effect until September 30, 2007, when it may be renewed by a determination by the Secretary. (Venezuela is the only nation certified as "not fully cooperating" that is not a state sponsor of terrorism.)

North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."

The Candidates Talk the Talk Differently; Will They Walk the Walk Differently Too?

The two candidates are seen as ideological opposites, but their differences seem more style than substance, if their appearance on today's Sunday Project is any indication.

On the domestic front, they both favor reform, duly corrected to take account of those left behind, particularly in the less populated areas beyond hailing distance from major urban centers. (Does anyone have a good translation for 地方(chihou)? Does anyone even know what地方(chihou) means?) But neither wants to throw more money at them by way of more public works. They want to be more selective, is want they want. And the details that they gave were too spotty and anecdotal to come to any kind of conclusions.

They both favor a 1% consumption tax hike in order to cover shortfalls in the public pension system. Their differences there seem to be more of an accounting issue than anything else.

At first glance, they appear to be miles apart on the abductees issue. Nobuteru Ishihara, the LDP Secretary General, who came on at the beginning of the program, clearly believes that the US is abandoning the abductees issue. He looked about as furious as he is capable of, and all but came out and advocated pulling out from the Six-Party Talks. When the question is later put to the candidates, though, Mr. Fukuda - as with everything and everyone else, you sometimes feel - advocates dialogue, with the North Koreans here of course. Mr. Aso, alarmingly, appears to endorse Mr. Ishihara's views. But then, he leans forward and, with a cagey grin, tells Soichiro Tawara, the septuagenarian host of the long-running program, that the Six-Party Talks are about North Korea's nuclear program and the abductees issue; so guess who has the most to gain? In one fell swoop of illogic, he has bridged the gap between Mr. Ishihara's anger and Japan’s need to keep talking..

They are not that far apart on Yasukuni either, at least where its international implications ar concerned. Mr. Fukuda advocates a secular, national memorial, while Mr. Aso favors secularizing Yasukuni itself. Both believe that the WW II leaders executed as Class A War Criminals do not belong there. Of course, Mr. Aso explicitly supports Yushukan, the war museum with its singular take on history issues, which would require substantial reworking before it becomes acceptable to our neighbors. But neither plan is much more than a gleam in the eyes of the beholder, and even a Prime Minister Aso can be expected to stay away from Yasukuni for the time being, which is what counts.

As for the more pressing extension of the counter-terrorism act (or, increasingly more appropriately, continuation of the refueling activities), Mr. Fukuda, unlike Mr. Aso, refuses to a priori accept the hypothetical resort to a revote, and predictably repeats his dialogue mantra. But, like Mr. Aso, he does say that he would put the national interest above public opinion, after Mr. Tawara prods him mercilessly like a stray doggie.

Of course, Mr. Aso advocates The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, which explicitly excludes China. (I've always failed to see the point of this concept, but maybe that's just me. Or it makes me a Panda hugger. Whatever. But I digress.) But he also went to great pains to stress that he was all for a prosperous China. Mr. Fukuda confined himself to stating his opposition to exclusionary undertakings. On the other hand, both candidates expressed concern at the Chinese military build-up.

If this face-off is any indication, style aside, there will be no major break from the Koizumi/Abe years, no matter which one wins. It is yet another demonstration of how the LDP, whatever its leaders desire individually, cannot go beyond the policy constraints that Japan faces without precipitous consequences. And that goes for the two candidates.

It could be worse.

Where Did the Abductees Issue Become Part of the Response to the WMDs?

The Japanese Government issues an annual report titled: Report on the Government's Undertaking Concerning the Tackling of the Abductees Issue and Other Issues of Human Rights Violations by the North Korean Authorities
The report states its purpose at the very beginning:

"This document reports on the Government's undertaking concerning the tackling of the abductees issue and other issues of human rights violations by the North Korean authorities pursuant to the provision of The Act Concerning the Tackling of the Abductees Issue and Other Issues of Human Rights Violations by the North Korean Authorities (Act No. 96, 2006 Jun. 23)."

The first section of: Part 2. Abductees Chapter 1, Section 1. Domestic Undertakings; in its entirety:

(1) Measures Implemented against North Korea

In light of the launching of a ballistic missile by North Korea on July 5, 2006, the Government announced a set of measures such as forbidding the Mangyongbong 92, a North Korean cargo-passenger ship to entering [Japanese] ports, and tightening examinations on entries from North Korea. Moreover, when North Korea announced on October 9 the implementation of a nuclear test, [the Government] decided to forbid all North Korea-registered ships from entering [Japanese] ports, and decided the implementation of measures including a ban on the import of all categories of products from North Korea. These measures decided by comprehensively considering the various aspects of the situation including the fact that North Korea is not showing any sincere response to the abductees issue.

The text leaves the impression that the Government took the abductees issue into consideration on both occasions in determining the measures to be taken. In fact, there is no other reasonable interpretation. However, according to the 2006.07.05 press announcement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Shinzo Abe):

The launching of the ballistic missile or flying object [I like that; launching of a flying object] by North Korea directly concerns our country's security and is to be greatly alarmed about. Moreover, this case violates the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration and is incompatible with the Joint Declaration at the Six-Party talks, and is to be greatly regretted as well from the viewpoint of peace and safety of the international society and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. From this point of view, it is necessary to give a steadfast, severe response to North Korea and we have decided to take the following substantive measures".

On July 5, there was no mention of the abductees issue. For that, we must turn to the next set of sanctions, three months later, the occasion of the nuclear test. On October 11, the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Yasuhisa Shiozaki) gave a danwa, or "talk". Here's the text in its entirety:

The National Security Council was held from 21 hours for approximately 20 minutes. As the result, I would like to allowed to announce our country's response for the time being pertaining to the nuclear test by North Korea.

Concerning the nuclear test by North Korea, we already clarified the position of our country by a declaration by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the 9th.

Subsequently, the Government had considered our country's response; and, comprehensively taking into consideration the various elements of the situation including the fact that the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves different from the shapes of waves from a normal natural earthquake, that it is recognized that, in conjunction with the development of missiles by North Korea, that the threat to our country's security has doubled, North Korea has not shown any sincere response to the abductees issue, and that talks are being conducted in the UN Security Council with a view to making a severe response by the international society as a whole; and based on the opinions of the relevant Cabinet members and on orders from the Prime Minister, we have decided to take the following severe measures against North Korea and to expeditiously take the measures necessary for their implementation, and to decide them at the Cabinet session on the 13th.

In other words, the abductees issue was inserted on the second occasion as one of the factors that determined the Japanese response to the nuclear test, and the 2006 report (issued in 2007) retroactively stamped the July measures with the abductees issue seal. Since the only significant change between July and October other than the nuclear test is that Shinzo Abe had replaced Junichiro Koizumi as Prime Minister, the logical conclusion is that the addition was made at the order of Prime Minister Abe or someone who understood his desires. (The text itself bears the marks of careful calibration by the bureaucracy, but the thought is clearly of political origin.)

I had – mistakenly, it turns out – assumed that the sanctions had been in response to the WMD and missile delivery system issues, But it turns out that, because of the decision to insert the abductees issues on the occasion of the response to the nuclear tests, if and when (a very, very big "if and when") the Six-Party talks move forward and lifting/easing sanctions becomes a prerequisite, the Abe administration (another, growing, "if") will have to openly admit - it has no choice - that the abductees issue must be subsumed to the greater good of national security.

North Korea: The Abduction Saga Continues with an Arrest Warrant. So Who Wants to Know?

Unless you are nuts about Japan (which you must be, if you're reading this blog, c'mon), you have missed the biggest long-running JMSM story over the last couple of months, which is the revelation of a probable double murder of a Japanese-North Korean couple, and the abduction of their two small children by North Korean agents headquartered in Tokyo, which has culminated in an arrest warrant for a prime suspect, likely living in North Korea.

Now, I know from my experience in New York in 2001 that the response from across the pond will be: What about the nuclear issue/(and now) the comfort women? And indeed I myself have had such thoughts. But, as hard as it is for some (including yours truly) to believe, I am Japanese. And from that perspective, I realize that the abductee issue does not matter to you because it's about us, not you. It's the same story with Iraq; for you, it's about your soldiers dying, not the Iraqi civilian casualties. It's Us, and The Others, as far back in history as you can see. Empathy, like the weak force, diminishes greatly with distance.

So, with that note, Happy Golden Week!

Something the foreign MSM will focus on, if they ever get around to it, is something I too cannot understand. It's the timing of the reinvigorated investigation, as well as the way information has been strung out week after week. After all, it's been more than thirty years since it happened. Conspiracy theorists will undoubtedly have a ball speculating over the political motives that may have gone into this renewed interest. But that is one of the least of my concern these days.