I’d been telling everyone who would listen that Noda would take Japan into the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA negotiations if only because there was no way that he could back down without becoming the third lame-duck prime minister in the first three years of the Democratic Party of Japan’s hold on power. He made me a little nervous with his one-day delay of the announcement, but he did came through and the threat of secession from DPJ dissidents proved to be a bluff…for now. The TPP negotiations should take another year or more, which means that Noda does not have any related legislative action to worry about during the 2012 regular Diet session. However, the opposition will have a couple of matters with which it will test the prime minister to see if they can erode public trust in his governance. And his DPJ opponents will not be happy about them either.
First, he reportedly gave favorable notice regarding Japanese import restrictions on U.S. beef. Actually I’ve been bewildered by recent talk regarding the Noda administration’s willingness to revisit this issue, specifically to raise the import eligibility of U.C. cattle from 20 months old to 30. Leaving aside my personal views on the issue itself, it seemed odd to me that the Noda administration would make a valuable concession even before the TPP negotiations had started. I can think of no other explanation than that it was an “omiyage,” a present, to make the Noda-Obama go smoothly. Maybe it helped, maybe it didn’t, who knows. I’ve always believed that this tactic, long favored by the Japanese authorities, is demeaning and serves mainly to keep the Japanese political masters happy—whee, I got a lot of applause when I addressed the plenary!, President So-and-So shook my hand! that kind of thing—but that’s beside the point. The problem here is that the Noda administration has so far given no official indication that the beef issue is in play. In fact, the news that Noda notified Obama took the Japanese media by surprise. There’s a good political, if unscientific, reason that Japan is one of the few countries to maintain a 30-month age limit on properly processed U.S. beef. The Japanese public was scared out of its wits by the mad cow disease breakout and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had to go well beyond what the science around the issue required. (In our defense, we are no more (or less) irrational than our American/British/Chinese/…Luxembourgian/…/South Korean/…/Zimbabwean friends. It’s just that we each care insanely about different things. Okay, maybe Luxembourgers don’t, though who knows…) This will cause problems. After all, this is a food safety issue. It has obvious international ramifications, but first and foremost, it’s a matter of domestic regulation. I think that Noda got it ass backwards, and the media, the opposition and his DPJ opponents are going to (rightfully in my opinion) take him to task for it.
Second, the White House announced that President Obama “welcomed Prime Minister Noda's statement that he would put all goods, as well as services, on the negotiating table for trade liberalization.” Now this may seem to you mere recognition of reality. After all, if Noda had said that agriculture, or anything else for that matter, was off the table, his bid to take Japan into the TPP negotiations would have collapsed on the dry dock. However, lobbies and Congress feed off trade issues, so the White House in its press secretary readout obviously did what it could to ensure smooth sailings as far as officially accepting Japan as a TPP negotiating member with as few domestic strings as possible. (A negotiator always looks to expand his/her mandate.) The Japanese side, incredibly, not only failed to anticipate the White House spin but did not put out any statement regarding the bilateral meeting except a bland, all-points-covered summary from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The prime minister’s team—Kantei?—missing in action. (See if you can find anything at the Kantei website.) It wound up issuing a denial that Noda had said any such thing. Bad for relations with the White House, and fodder for opposition guns when the Diet resumes operations on the Prime Minister’s return from Honolulu.
Showing posts with label Japanese foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japanese foreign policy. Show all posts
Sunday, November 13, 2011
Monday, May 16, 2011
Are Japan’s Days of Overseas Adventures Over?
The following is my email response to an inquiry from a friend in the academia, verbatim but with personal details edited out.
[F]:
Foreign relations in the abstract are of little concern to most voters. Instead, they respond to specific issues such as the North Korean abductions or a mad cow disease breakout in a beef exporting country. Politicians as well as the MSM are inclined to think differently, since statecraft is a far more amusing endeavor than making sure that the private sector keeps the trains running on time, i.e. leaving them alone as much as possible. Still, in a democracy, it is a luxury to be indulged in at one’s peril unless one has dotted and crossed all the more significant I’s and T’s at home. Specifically in Japan’s case, it does not have geopolitical interests that diverge significantly from those of the United States (and to a lesser extent the EU). This means that Japan can largely free-ride on global public goods (and to a lesser extent regional public goods) that the United provides for the rest of the world (including China, though the Chinese authorities would be loathe to admit it).
Much attention was given in the mid-90 and early 2000s to the LDP regime’s interest in permanent UNSC membership and a larger international profile for the Japanese military, propelled in the latter case by the perception of humiliation on the occasion of the Gulf War. However, the first floundered because of the lack of support from non-permanent members that were not part of the push for inclusion in the Council and ill-concealed antipathy from China; the second was always destined to be limited because of fiscal constraints. Meanwhile, on the economic front, the Doha Round is now in its death throes while post-Kyoto Protocol climate change talks are going nowhere fast, leaving little room—or need—for Japanese authorities to spend whatever political capital it has on the issues. The triple disaster has certainly forced the Kan administration to take its eyes off the rest of the world, but, as you say, it only accelerated, albeit dramatically, a trend that had already been in the making.
What will happen when the Japanese economy recovers from the disasters? First of all, the fiscal circumstances will continue to demand the attention of the Japanese government and its constituencies. That means that there will be little political room for expensive overseas adventures excepting FTAs and other economically advantageous undertakings. (Prime Minister Kan gave lip service to foreign ambassadors in Tokyo by promising that the 100 billion yen cut that Japanese ODA took to finance the relief and recovery efforts would be restored many times over. But that’s a canard, really, since the cuts will last only a couple of years—fingers crossed—while Japanese ODA will last many decades beyond that, if significant numbers of developing countries remain just that: developing.) And that leads to my second point: Japan needs socioeconomic reform. This will demand most of the Japanese government’s attention, as well as the expenditure of considerable political capital for more sweeping FTAs with Japan’s major trading partners. Any efforts outside of support for socioeconomic reform will be largely reactive, responding to events and circumstances as they unfold. (A violent endgame on the Korean Peninsula would be a good example.) Third and finally, Japan will emerge out of the disasters’ aftermath older and, in relative terms, economically diminished if BRICS and other developing countries maintain their most recent historical growth trends. This will diminish further the Japanese government’s ability to act proactively on the regional and global theater and the willingness of the Japanese public to support any such adventures.
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the younger post-online generation has a different outlook on the rest of the world, domestic and overseas, than their elders. The drift away from hardcopy print media to the less judgmental visual media and the vastly more fragmented online sources of information and public (for want of a better word) discourse could be a contributory cause. The consequences of a post-industrial society—the difficulties that the less skilled have in finding secure, well-paid jobs; complacency settling in with general affluence; aging demographics creating a societal background that discourages risk-taking across the board—could also be behind what I suspect is a more global phenomenon. 35 would be as good a point as any to find an Internet-driven divergence if there is one. But all this is speculation on my part and is not based on personal observation. The Japanese under 35 generally do not speak to me.
I hope that helps. And congratulations on your [book] contract. I understand that any academic career will be well-served by that hardcopy publication.
Jun
PS: The following are fragments of an earlier attempt at responding. They don’t quite fit into the main narrative, but I include them here since they might add more substance to my arguments there.
“The last point is true of all democratic nations (and, over the long run, in all others as well) but particularly so in Japan. I see two reasons for this. First, Japan is not one of the main protagonists in any regional issue that has existential consequences. This means that regional issues will only be in the forefront of voters’ minds in the case of an acute incident—which will be of electoral consequence only if it changes voters’ perception of the administration’s competence. Second, Japan’s interests regarding global issues are mostly consonant with the countries in that of the United States, ROK, and to a somewhat lesser extent with the EU. This creates massive incentives for any conventional administration to ride the US hegemony’s wake to the maximum possible, i.e. do the moistest with the leastest. You have heard of the Yoshida Doctrine?
“So unless there are specific issues that demand political attention—to give two examples, 1) DPRK developing nuclear weapons and firing ballistic missiles in our direction and 2) the US pushing us to do more to provide regional and/or global public goods—an administration is well advised to…”
[F]:
Foreign relations in the abstract are of little concern to most voters. Instead, they respond to specific issues such as the North Korean abductions or a mad cow disease breakout in a beef exporting country. Politicians as well as the MSM are inclined to think differently, since statecraft is a far more amusing endeavor than making sure that the private sector keeps the trains running on time, i.e. leaving them alone as much as possible. Still, in a democracy, it is a luxury to be indulged in at one’s peril unless one has dotted and crossed all the more significant I’s and T’s at home. Specifically in Japan’s case, it does not have geopolitical interests that diverge significantly from those of the United States (and to a lesser extent the EU). This means that Japan can largely free-ride on global public goods (and to a lesser extent regional public goods) that the United provides for the rest of the world (including China, though the Chinese authorities would be loathe to admit it).
Much attention was given in the mid-90 and early 2000s to the LDP regime’s interest in permanent UNSC membership and a larger international profile for the Japanese military, propelled in the latter case by the perception of humiliation on the occasion of the Gulf War. However, the first floundered because of the lack of support from non-permanent members that were not part of the push for inclusion in the Council and ill-concealed antipathy from China; the second was always destined to be limited because of fiscal constraints. Meanwhile, on the economic front, the Doha Round is now in its death throes while post-Kyoto Protocol climate change talks are going nowhere fast, leaving little room—or need—for Japanese authorities to spend whatever political capital it has on the issues. The triple disaster has certainly forced the Kan administration to take its eyes off the rest of the world, but, as you say, it only accelerated, albeit dramatically, a trend that had already been in the making.
What will happen when the Japanese economy recovers from the disasters? First of all, the fiscal circumstances will continue to demand the attention of the Japanese government and its constituencies. That means that there will be little political room for expensive overseas adventures excepting FTAs and other economically advantageous undertakings. (Prime Minister Kan gave lip service to foreign ambassadors in Tokyo by promising that the 100 billion yen cut that Japanese ODA took to finance the relief and recovery efforts would be restored many times over. But that’s a canard, really, since the cuts will last only a couple of years—fingers crossed—while Japanese ODA will last many decades beyond that, if significant numbers of developing countries remain just that: developing.) And that leads to my second point: Japan needs socioeconomic reform. This will demand most of the Japanese government’s attention, as well as the expenditure of considerable political capital for more sweeping FTAs with Japan’s major trading partners. Any efforts outside of support for socioeconomic reform will be largely reactive, responding to events and circumstances as they unfold. (A violent endgame on the Korean Peninsula would be a good example.) Third and finally, Japan will emerge out of the disasters’ aftermath older and, in relative terms, economically diminished if BRICS and other developing countries maintain their most recent historical growth trends. This will diminish further the Japanese government’s ability to act proactively on the regional and global theater and the willingness of the Japanese public to support any such adventures.
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the younger post-online generation has a different outlook on the rest of the world, domestic and overseas, than their elders. The drift away from hardcopy print media to the less judgmental visual media and the vastly more fragmented online sources of information and public (for want of a better word) discourse could be a contributory cause. The consequences of a post-industrial society—the difficulties that the less skilled have in finding secure, well-paid jobs; complacency settling in with general affluence; aging demographics creating a societal background that discourages risk-taking across the board—could also be behind what I suspect is a more global phenomenon. 35 would be as good a point as any to find an Internet-driven divergence if there is one. But all this is speculation on my part and is not based on personal observation. The Japanese under 35 generally do not speak to me.
I hope that helps. And congratulations on your [book] contract. I understand that any academic career will be well-served by that hardcopy publication.
Jun
PS: The following are fragments of an earlier attempt at responding. They don’t quite fit into the main narrative, but I include them here since they might add more substance to my arguments there.
“The last point is true of all democratic nations (and, over the long run, in all others as well) but particularly so in Japan. I see two reasons for this. First, Japan is not one of the main protagonists in any regional issue that has existential consequences. This means that regional issues will only be in the forefront of voters’ minds in the case of an acute incident—which will be of electoral consequence only if it changes voters’ perception of the administration’s competence. Second, Japan’s interests regarding global issues are mostly consonant with the countries in that of the United States, ROK, and to a somewhat lesser extent with the EU. This creates massive incentives for any conventional administration to ride the US hegemony’s wake to the maximum possible, i.e. do the moistest with the leastest. You have heard of the Yoshida Doctrine?
“So unless there are specific issues that demand political attention—to give two examples, 1) DPRK developing nuclear weapons and firing ballistic missiles in our direction and 2) the US pushing us to do more to provide regional and/or global public goods—an administration is well advised to…”
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Would It Make More Sense to Translate It as “Conventional State”?
You know, that “normal country” thing. I do believe that post-WW II Japan has been an “unconventional state,” constitutionally speaking. And it worked. But “abnormal country”? I think not.
No time for anything else today. Tomorrow for sure.
No time for anything else today. Tomorrow for sure.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Open-Source Appeal on “New US President and Next Leader in Japanese Politics” Seminar
Those of you who can read Japanese, I request your help. Any comments, hopefully constructive, in Japanese, English, or Portuguese, on the following answers are welcome. I will be joining the panel at this GLOCOM-TUJ event. I’ve been working out my comments in advance since I’m not a good extemporaneous speaker. Each panelist has five minutes for the answers to questions 1) and 4) and ten minutes for 2) and 3). For 1) and 2), I’m up to about five-six minutes depending on how quickly I speak 1). I hardly have anything on 3) and 4). I’ll be adding to and otherwise editing them as I go along; for now, I’m signing off. I thank you for your cooperation.
Please write to okumurajun@gmail.com.
Or if you prefer, you are welcome to post them as comments.
１）次期米国のオバマ政権はどのような政権になるか。
一言で言うと、これは、たぶん Robert Dujarricが最初に言ったのではないかと思いますが、Commander-in-ChiefでなくJanitor-in-Chiefだ、つまり、少なくとも一期目は、「後始末政権」であって、経済の立て直しを図りながら、イラクからの撤収とアフガニスタンへの増派を進めるというのが、圧倒的に最優先課題だと思います。それ以外の点については、閣僚等の政治任命も含め、ブッシュ政権と違い、イデオロギー色をできるだけ薄めながら、比較的慎重にことを進めていくだろうと予想します。というわけで、内外で絶大な期待を寄せられていることが―CNNの最新の国内世論調査では、オバマへの支持率が７５％、チェンジに期待できるとする回答が２/３近く、4年後には米国の状況が良くなっているとする回答が７６％です－それが現実との落差拡大という形でかえって重荷になる危険もあるわけです。
経済の立て直しについては、金融パニックは、今の７０００億ドルの救済パッケージでとりあえず小康を得ているので、それをブッシュ政権から引き継ぎながら、並行して、相当規模の景気・経済対策を民主党が多数を占める議会と一緒に組み立て、実行していくということになります。その中で、1）オバマ流のユニバーサル・ヘルスケア実現への手掛かりを作り、2）教育改革にも手をつけようとするものと予想します。それに、ちょっとミスリーディングな表現でありますが、3）所得減税もやるでしょう。さらに、4）エネルギー・環境対策も重視していて、自動車業界救済策も、その枠組みの中に位置付けられていくでしょう。この４点というか、それらがオバマのチェンジの中身の核になるでしょう。それで２年後の中間選挙を経て、どこかの国は、全治４年だそうですが、その４年後までに景気回復が進んでいれば、オバマの再選がきわめて有力になってくる、というシナリオを想定して見守っていくことにしています。
イラク、アフガニスタンについては、それぞれ情勢次第ですが、いずれも大変難題で、しかも、不確実性に満ちています。イラクは、治安、経済ともに改善されつつあるが、宗派間、民族間、党派間の安定的均衡を可能にする政治的条件が整う見通しが立ちません。ただ、イラクの国内事情もあり、遅かれ早かれ米軍が主役の座を降りることは、マケインの場合でも大差なかったでしょう。アフガニスタンは、治安が徐々にではあるが着実に悪化しており、出口が見えません。ただ、これまたテロとの戦いの主戦場で状況が対応を形作っていくことに変わりありません。
外交面のほかの大所では、パレスチナ問題、イランの核開発計画をはじめとする中東問題、北朝鮮の大量破壊兵器・弾道ミサイル開発問題については、いずれも、ブッシュ政権後期の対話路線を続けていくでしょう。オバマは、パレスチナ問題を解決に向けて大きく進めるだけの国内政治上のレバレッジを持っていません。イランの核開発計画については、経済制裁（特に投資規制が効いている）に原油価格の低下が当分続けば、多少希望が持てるでしょう。ただし、米政権交代の合間を縫ってイスラエルが核施設攻撃を行う可能性が若干あることに留意すべきでしょう。北朝鮮については、金正日政権としては、とりあえず取るものは取ったので、核兵器（？）、貯蔵プルトニウムの提出といった、対米国交正常化につながっていくような措置に進むことは、当面考えられないと思います。そのほか私が気になってしょうがなかったのが、対ロシア関係です。実は、私は、マケインのロシアに対する敵対的姿勢について大きな懸念を持っていて、これが両候補の対外政策上の最大の違いだと思っていました。オバマの下で、とりあえずミニ冷戦は回避できたのかなと思っています。
なお、経済、外交の双方にまたがるものとしてFTAの見直しがありますが、これは、実質的な影響があまりないと予想していますのが、話が長くなるので、とりあえず省略します。
他に米国内で重要なのは、連邦裁判官の指名権です。今、最高裁がリベラル派、保守派それぞれ４名ずつに中道派が１名、という構成になっていて、向こう４年の間、つまり新大統領の任期中にリベラル派裁判官が２名退任するものと予想されています。民主党議会の承認が必要だといっても、大統領の意向に対する抵抗には一定の限界があります。また、最高裁が取り上げる事件数に限りがあるので、広く連邦下級法廷の裁判官の指名権があることも、とても大事です。
こうしてみると、後期ブッシュと比べてたいして変わり映えしない、どこにチェンジがあるのだ、とおっしゃるかもしれません。確かにそうですが、もともとオバマの「チェンジ」は、政治、社会のプロセスそのものを変えて国民の統合を深めていこう、というところに重点があって、その結果、具体的な措置そのものは、必然的に現実的、プラグマティックなものになっていくのです。しかも、内外情勢が極めて厳しく、独自の工夫を凝らす余地が乏しくなっている、誰がやっても同じようなことになっている、ブッシュ大統領の変身がその何よりの証拠だ、というわけです。
ただ、オバマにあってマケインにも米国のほかのどの主立った政治家にもないものがあります。つまり、世界中から圧倒的な好意で迎えられていることが、とても大きなポリティカル・キャピタル、国際的グッドウィル、オバマの持ち札になっているわけです。というわけで、期待値が高いのは大変だが、限界的なところでは、これが確実に効いてくるし、より一般的には、米国に対する好意へとつながっていくことも大事でしょう。
２）民主党政権になるとアジア政策（特に対日と対中）がどう変わるか。
アジアは、北東はロシアから南西はイエメンまで続いているので、「アジア」について議論をする人は、その都度、国、地域、そして課題をはっきりさせる義務があると思っています。という前置きで、対日本、対中国に絞ってお話しします。オバマ政権になったから変わるということは、基本的にはないと思います。変わることがあるとすれば、それは、米国の政権交代の結果ではなく、状況の変化の結果としてのことです。具体的な問題に沿ってご説明しましょう。
対日関係のほうがわかりやすい。
日本の政財官のリーダーたちの間では、マケインのほうがいい、というのが圧倒的な声だったように思います。それは、ひとつには、共和党が自由貿易主義、民主党が保護主義という印象、イメージが強いこと、それに加えて、共和党の両ブッシュ大統領の日本に対する気配りが手厚かったのに対して、民主党のクリントン大統領の下で、経済摩擦の激化に加えて、中国優先のジャパンパッシングがあった、という印象が強いことが背景になっています。さらに、マケインがアジア・太平洋地域において、同盟国としての日本を最も重視する考えをはっきりと打ち出したことが、好感を呼んだようです。
だが、まず、安全保障問題について言うと、安全保障条約の下での日米同盟のあり方ないし米軍再編についての米国の方針が変わることがありうると感じさせるものは、オバマの場合にもありません。北朝鮮については、すでに述べたとおりですが、拉致問題についても、オバマ政権だからと言って特に期待できると思わせられる動きが一切なく、また、期待する理由もありません。マケインのほうがより気配りをしてくれることになったかもしれませんが、いずれにしても、テロ支援国家の再指定があるとすれば、それは大量破壊兵器がらみであって、拉致問題の成り行きによって左右されるものでありません。
経済問題について言うと、レーガンからブッシュ・シニアの時代にも、貿易摩擦がありました。ただ、クリントン大統領が就任したのは、米国経済が悪化したのを受けてブッシュ大統領の再選を阻止したうえでのことであり、時あたかも日本の経済バブルが頂点に達しようとしていました。いわば状況が経済摩擦の激化を招いたのであって、その大きな原因が民主、共和の違いにあったと断定するのにはかなり無理があります。また、ここだけのことで言えば、ブッシュ・ジュニアの時代にも、ドーハ・ラウンドを中心に、ロバート・ゼリックのジャパン・パッシングも相当なものだったように思います。いずれにせよ、二国間で言えば、ブッシュ時代と同様、単発的事件を除けば、比較的無風状態が続くのだと思います。それがジャパン・パッシング、ジャパン・ナッシングだと言うのなら、それも悪くありません。
中国については、断言できるほど自分で考えていませんが、基本的は変わらないだろうと見ています。外交・安全保障では、引き続き協力できるところは協力していくだろうし、特に北朝鮮の核問題が暴発しないようにするためには、中国の協力が最も大切です。アフリカその他の地域では、できるだけ責任ある対応を求めており、中国当局も、米国政府の不満が爆発しないよう引き続きそこそこな手を打っていくでしょう。民主党およびその支持者の間で、チベットをはじめとする人権問題について強硬姿勢を求める向きも多いでしょうが、オバマ政権下での人権問題の実質的な優先度は、意外に低いでしょう。ブッシュ政権が１１月１１日にビルマ特使として毎度おなじみマイケル・グリーンを任命したが、これが仮にオバマ陣営の了解を得たうえでのことでなかったとしても、オバマ政権でも、人権問題については、手をつけやすいところから手をつけていく、ということでしょう。エネルギー・環境問題については、気候変動条約の枠組みに戻り―ただし、京都プロトコールに調印するとは、私の知る限り言っていない―京都プロトコール後の体制に取り組みたいと言っているので、一国家としては温室効果ガスの最大排出源である中国に対する働きかけも活発化していくということはあるでしょう。
経済問題については、ポールソン財務長官主導の「経済戦略対話」がそろそろ息が切れ始めていたので、金融危機への対応策、そして景気対策が一段落したところで仕切り直す、ちょうどいい区切りができたのだろうと思います。といっても、対中要求事項は、知的所有権の保護、外資いじめの阻止、そしてマクロ的には人民元の切り上げを含め経済成長における内需の役割拡大などと、ブッシュ時代とあまり変わり映えがしないでしょう。その際念頭に置いておくべきことは、単純化していえば、日本の場合、日本企業が主として米国企業と競合する製品を輸出したのに対し、中国の場合、完全子会社から委託生産まで形態はまちまちだが、米国企業のサプライ・チェーンの中に組み込まれた製品が輸出されているという違いも、当面変わりないだろうということでしょう。
最後に一言、米国における対日関係の優先度は、低いのだが、それを不幸中の幸いと受け止めるべきです。北東アジアは、平和である。中国、韓国は、ともにステータス・クオ・パワー、現状維持勢力、北朝鮮も別の意味でそう、そして、ロシアも、極東では差し迫った脅威になっていない。
３）オバマ政権とうまく協力していくために日本は何をすべきか。
できたらいいなあと思うことはいろいろあるのですが、できるかもしれないと思うことに絞ってお話しましょう。また、国内の景気回復および経済化改革の推進は、当たり前のこととして省略します。そこで、日本がすべきことは、端的に言うと、グローバル・インフラの維持・強化の国際的肩代わりが進んでいくだろう中で出来るだけ大きな役割をはたすようにしていくことです。米国の相対的国力の低下は、歴史的な趨勢です。それは、ブッシュ政権後期のありかたにも反映されていますが、オバマ政権こそは、国際協調、国際協力をはっきりと前面に押し出していくことになります。その中で、日本は、市場経済および自由主義を基本とする民主国家です。また、資源ネット輸入国でもあります。グローバル・インフラについての利害関係について、従ってその将来の方向性についても、基本的に一致しているはずです。
４）日本を正しい方向に導く次期政治リーダーは誰か。
米国との関係だけで言えば、極端なことを言えば、誰でもいいのです。もっと言えば、アジア・太平洋における米国の兵力の前方展開のプラットフォームとしての役割を果たし続けることに反対するような政治リーダーがいないのだから、後は、日本の都合ですべて決めてもさしたる不具合がない、ということです。というわけで、この先は、床屋政談だと思って聞いてください。
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１）次期米国のオバマ政権はどのような政権になるか。
一言で言うと、これは、たぶん Robert Dujarricが最初に言ったのではないかと思いますが、Commander-in-ChiefでなくJanitor-in-Chiefだ、つまり、少なくとも一期目は、「後始末政権」であって、経済の立て直しを図りながら、イラクからの撤収とアフガニスタンへの増派を進めるというのが、圧倒的に最優先課題だと思います。それ以外の点については、閣僚等の政治任命も含め、ブッシュ政権と違い、イデオロギー色をできるだけ薄めながら、比較的慎重にことを進めていくだろうと予想します。というわけで、内外で絶大な期待を寄せられていることが―CNNの最新の国内世論調査では、オバマへの支持率が７５％、チェンジに期待できるとする回答が２/３近く、4年後には米国の状況が良くなっているとする回答が７６％です－それが現実との落差拡大という形でかえって重荷になる危険もあるわけです。
経済の立て直しについては、金融パニックは、今の７０００億ドルの救済パッケージでとりあえず小康を得ているので、それをブッシュ政権から引き継ぎながら、並行して、相当規模の景気・経済対策を民主党が多数を占める議会と一緒に組み立て、実行していくということになります。その中で、1）オバマ流のユニバーサル・ヘルスケア実現への手掛かりを作り、2）教育改革にも手をつけようとするものと予想します。それに、ちょっとミスリーディングな表現でありますが、3）所得減税もやるでしょう。さらに、4）エネルギー・環境対策も重視していて、自動車業界救済策も、その枠組みの中に位置付けられていくでしょう。この４点というか、それらがオバマのチェンジの中身の核になるでしょう。それで２年後の中間選挙を経て、どこかの国は、全治４年だそうですが、その４年後までに景気回復が進んでいれば、オバマの再選がきわめて有力になってくる、というシナリオを想定して見守っていくことにしています。
イラク、アフガニスタンについては、それぞれ情勢次第ですが、いずれも大変難題で、しかも、不確実性に満ちています。イラクは、治安、経済ともに改善されつつあるが、宗派間、民族間、党派間の安定的均衡を可能にする政治的条件が整う見通しが立ちません。ただ、イラクの国内事情もあり、遅かれ早かれ米軍が主役の座を降りることは、マケインの場合でも大差なかったでしょう。アフガニスタンは、治安が徐々にではあるが着実に悪化しており、出口が見えません。ただ、これまたテロとの戦いの主戦場で状況が対応を形作っていくことに変わりありません。
外交面のほかの大所では、パレスチナ問題、イランの核開発計画をはじめとする中東問題、北朝鮮の大量破壊兵器・弾道ミサイル開発問題については、いずれも、ブッシュ政権後期の対話路線を続けていくでしょう。オバマは、パレスチナ問題を解決に向けて大きく進めるだけの国内政治上のレバレッジを持っていません。イランの核開発計画については、経済制裁（特に投資規制が効いている）に原油価格の低下が当分続けば、多少希望が持てるでしょう。ただし、米政権交代の合間を縫ってイスラエルが核施設攻撃を行う可能性が若干あることに留意すべきでしょう。北朝鮮については、金正日政権としては、とりあえず取るものは取ったので、核兵器（？）、貯蔵プルトニウムの提出といった、対米国交正常化につながっていくような措置に進むことは、当面考えられないと思います。そのほか私が気になってしょうがなかったのが、対ロシア関係です。実は、私は、マケインのロシアに対する敵対的姿勢について大きな懸念を持っていて、これが両候補の対外政策上の最大の違いだと思っていました。オバマの下で、とりあえずミニ冷戦は回避できたのかなと思っています。
なお、経済、外交の双方にまたがるものとしてFTAの見直しがありますが、これは、実質的な影響があまりないと予想していますのが、話が長くなるので、とりあえず省略します。
他に米国内で重要なのは、連邦裁判官の指名権です。今、最高裁がリベラル派、保守派それぞれ４名ずつに中道派が１名、という構成になっていて、向こう４年の間、つまり新大統領の任期中にリベラル派裁判官が２名退任するものと予想されています。民主党議会の承認が必要だといっても、大統領の意向に対する抵抗には一定の限界があります。また、最高裁が取り上げる事件数に限りがあるので、広く連邦下級法廷の裁判官の指名権があることも、とても大事です。
こうしてみると、後期ブッシュと比べてたいして変わり映えしない、どこにチェンジがあるのだ、とおっしゃるかもしれません。確かにそうですが、もともとオバマの「チェンジ」は、政治、社会のプロセスそのものを変えて国民の統合を深めていこう、というところに重点があって、その結果、具体的な措置そのものは、必然的に現実的、プラグマティックなものになっていくのです。しかも、内外情勢が極めて厳しく、独自の工夫を凝らす余地が乏しくなっている、誰がやっても同じようなことになっている、ブッシュ大統領の変身がその何よりの証拠だ、というわけです。
ただ、オバマにあってマケインにも米国のほかのどの主立った政治家にもないものがあります。つまり、世界中から圧倒的な好意で迎えられていることが、とても大きなポリティカル・キャピタル、国際的グッドウィル、オバマの持ち札になっているわけです。というわけで、期待値が高いのは大変だが、限界的なところでは、これが確実に効いてくるし、より一般的には、米国に対する好意へとつながっていくことも大事でしょう。
２）民主党政権になるとアジア政策（特に対日と対中）がどう変わるか。
アジアは、北東はロシアから南西はイエメンまで続いているので、「アジア」について議論をする人は、その都度、国、地域、そして課題をはっきりさせる義務があると思っています。という前置きで、対日本、対中国に絞ってお話しします。オバマ政権になったから変わるということは、基本的にはないと思います。変わることがあるとすれば、それは、米国の政権交代の結果ではなく、状況の変化の結果としてのことです。具体的な問題に沿ってご説明しましょう。
対日関係のほうがわかりやすい。
日本の政財官のリーダーたちの間では、マケインのほうがいい、というのが圧倒的な声だったように思います。それは、ひとつには、共和党が自由貿易主義、民主党が保護主義という印象、イメージが強いこと、それに加えて、共和党の両ブッシュ大統領の日本に対する気配りが手厚かったのに対して、民主党のクリントン大統領の下で、経済摩擦の激化に加えて、中国優先のジャパンパッシングがあった、という印象が強いことが背景になっています。さらに、マケインがアジア・太平洋地域において、同盟国としての日本を最も重視する考えをはっきりと打ち出したことが、好感を呼んだようです。
だが、まず、安全保障問題について言うと、安全保障条約の下での日米同盟のあり方ないし米軍再編についての米国の方針が変わることがありうると感じさせるものは、オバマの場合にもありません。北朝鮮については、すでに述べたとおりですが、拉致問題についても、オバマ政権だからと言って特に期待できると思わせられる動きが一切なく、また、期待する理由もありません。マケインのほうがより気配りをしてくれることになったかもしれませんが、いずれにしても、テロ支援国家の再指定があるとすれば、それは大量破壊兵器がらみであって、拉致問題の成り行きによって左右されるものでありません。
経済問題について言うと、レーガンからブッシュ・シニアの時代にも、貿易摩擦がありました。ただ、クリントン大統領が就任したのは、米国経済が悪化したのを受けてブッシュ大統領の再選を阻止したうえでのことであり、時あたかも日本の経済バブルが頂点に達しようとしていました。いわば状況が経済摩擦の激化を招いたのであって、その大きな原因が民主、共和の違いにあったと断定するのにはかなり無理があります。また、ここだけのことで言えば、ブッシュ・ジュニアの時代にも、ドーハ・ラウンドを中心に、ロバート・ゼリックのジャパン・パッシングも相当なものだったように思います。いずれにせよ、二国間で言えば、ブッシュ時代と同様、単発的事件を除けば、比較的無風状態が続くのだと思います。それがジャパン・パッシング、ジャパン・ナッシングだと言うのなら、それも悪くありません。
中国については、断言できるほど自分で考えていませんが、基本的は変わらないだろうと見ています。外交・安全保障では、引き続き協力できるところは協力していくだろうし、特に北朝鮮の核問題が暴発しないようにするためには、中国の協力が最も大切です。アフリカその他の地域では、できるだけ責任ある対応を求めており、中国当局も、米国政府の不満が爆発しないよう引き続きそこそこな手を打っていくでしょう。民主党およびその支持者の間で、チベットをはじめとする人権問題について強硬姿勢を求める向きも多いでしょうが、オバマ政権下での人権問題の実質的な優先度は、意外に低いでしょう。ブッシュ政権が１１月１１日にビルマ特使として毎度おなじみマイケル・グリーンを任命したが、これが仮にオバマ陣営の了解を得たうえでのことでなかったとしても、オバマ政権でも、人権問題については、手をつけやすいところから手をつけていく、ということでしょう。エネルギー・環境問題については、気候変動条約の枠組みに戻り―ただし、京都プロトコールに調印するとは、私の知る限り言っていない―京都プロトコール後の体制に取り組みたいと言っているので、一国家としては温室効果ガスの最大排出源である中国に対する働きかけも活発化していくということはあるでしょう。
経済問題については、ポールソン財務長官主導の「経済戦略対話」がそろそろ息が切れ始めていたので、金融危機への対応策、そして景気対策が一段落したところで仕切り直す、ちょうどいい区切りができたのだろうと思います。といっても、対中要求事項は、知的所有権の保護、外資いじめの阻止、そしてマクロ的には人民元の切り上げを含め経済成長における内需の役割拡大などと、ブッシュ時代とあまり変わり映えがしないでしょう。その際念頭に置いておくべきことは、単純化していえば、日本の場合、日本企業が主として米国企業と競合する製品を輸出したのに対し、中国の場合、完全子会社から委託生産まで形態はまちまちだが、米国企業のサプライ・チェーンの中に組み込まれた製品が輸出されているという違いも、当面変わりないだろうということでしょう。
最後に一言、米国における対日関係の優先度は、低いのだが、それを不幸中の幸いと受け止めるべきです。北東アジアは、平和である。中国、韓国は、ともにステータス・クオ・パワー、現状維持勢力、北朝鮮も別の意味でそう、そして、ロシアも、極東では差し迫った脅威になっていない。
３）オバマ政権とうまく協力していくために日本は何をすべきか。
できたらいいなあと思うことはいろいろあるのですが、できるかもしれないと思うことに絞ってお話しましょう。また、国内の景気回復および経済化改革の推進は、当たり前のこととして省略します。そこで、日本がすべきことは、端的に言うと、グローバル・インフラの維持・強化の国際的肩代わりが進んでいくだろう中で出来るだけ大きな役割をはたすようにしていくことです。米国の相対的国力の低下は、歴史的な趨勢です。それは、ブッシュ政権後期のありかたにも反映されていますが、オバマ政権こそは、国際協調、国際協力をはっきりと前面に押し出していくことになります。その中で、日本は、市場経済および自由主義を基本とする民主国家です。また、資源ネット輸入国でもあります。グローバル・インフラについての利害関係について、従ってその将来の方向性についても、基本的に一致しているはずです。
４）日本を正しい方向に導く次期政治リーダーは誰か。
米国との関係だけで言えば、極端なことを言えば、誰でもいいのです。もっと言えば、アジア・太平洋における米国の兵力の前方展開のプラットフォームとしての役割を果たし続けることに反対するような政治リーダーがいないのだから、後は、日本の都合ですべて決めてもさしたる不具合がない、ということです。というわけで、この先は、床屋政談だと思って聞いてください。
Monday, September 29, 2008
What Prime Minister Aso Really Meant by an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”
Anyone who has read Taro Aso’s speech as Foreign Minister will realize that it is very far from the confrontational “League of Democracies” that John McCain has been pushing. In March, I issued a warning of sorts. Now, Prime Minister Aso’s inaugural speech reinforces my point. Here’s a translation of the salient points:
To create stability and prosperity in our region and grow together with our neighbors China, South Korea and Russia, as well as the nations of Asia and the Pacific—this is point two.The McCain administration, I’m sure, will be disappointed to hear all this, Can’t you guys see Russia on a clear day too? And I’m not talking about your … “Northern Territories”?
…
We shall not spare our assistance, so that the irreplaceable values that we believe in will take root in youthful democracies.
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Would Yasuo Fukuda Envy Gordon Brown, or Does He Even Think about Things Like That?
Here, you may think that Prime Minister Brown is merely hitching Britain’s wagon to the US Hummer. But that’s what you do, unless you’re the big dog in the junk yard. It’s Churchilesque, actually.
Short of giving up the national language, there’s no way that we can emulate the Brits, but that’s all the more reason to rethink the ways that we engage the world. We don’t have that safety blanket. At the end of the day, America will not save the last dance for us.
There must be many people here who find the political divide between the superpower fantasists and the head-in-the-sand minimalists utterly unproductive. There must be many people here who believe that there’s something wrong with a nation that has so many self-imposed taboos on the debate over national security and diplomacy.
We’ve had a good sixty-years-and-counting run outsourcing all that mess. (Watchdog-sama? Honestly…) But I have a hunch things are changing and we’re not paying attention.
Short of giving up the national language, there’s no way that we can emulate the Brits, but that’s all the more reason to rethink the ways that we engage the world. We don’t have that safety blanket. At the end of the day, America will not save the last dance for us.
There must be many people here who find the political divide between the superpower fantasists and the head-in-the-sand minimalists utterly unproductive. There must be many people here who believe that there’s something wrong with a nation that has so many self-imposed taboos on the debate over national security and diplomacy.
We’ve had a good sixty-years-and-counting run outsourcing all that mess. (Watchdog-sama? Honestly…) But I have a hunch things are changing and we’re not paying attention.
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Kosovo Redux
Here’s the substance of the answer, slightly edited, to a question that I received from an analyst. It’s for anyone else who found my previous post on this issue to be of any interest.
I would not say that Japan is taking an “overly”-cautious attitude toward the Kosovo question. After all, the overall direction is clear. We will in principle recognize Kosovo, and that should please the US and the Islam Nation (not that the Islamic states notice, though I'm sure that they would if we said no to an independent Kosovo). However, there are no public discussions of the real reasons for our tag-along approach; it's not a compelling issue for us. So I’m really guessing here. Having said that...
China surely has Taiwan in mind in its opposition to Kosovo independence, but I don't think that the matter is important enough to China that Japan would feel compelled to defer to its wishes if they are to maintain the current amicable relationship. The China-Taiwan relationship is overwhelmingly determined by local factors and is not going to be materially affected by the eventual fate of Kosovo. Russia, in contrast, is the state that has the geopolitical interest in Kosovo and the broader counter-status quo posture that make this a compelling issue for it. To put it another way, it is my view that Japan would take the same approach if Russia were the only permanent UNSC member opposing Kosovo independence, while Japan would afford more immediate recognition if China were the only one doing so. Of course China would have to accept it if Russia decided to drop its veto on UN accession for Kosovo, so the last scenario would never happen.
The one possibility that I did not consider in my previous post is the possibility that Greece and other EU member countries withholding recognition (but, crucially, not opposing EU takeover from KFORS) willone day reconsider. What will Japan do then? But that will be some time in coming, certainly not in time for Japan to have to face the question before Medvedev comes to the Hokkaido Summit. I don't call the shots here, so don't blame me if the authorities say, hell with Putin, to hell with Medvedev, let's recognize Kosovo ASAP. But I would definitely bet against it.
In the meantime, Japan should be providing humanitarian and other forms of assistance that will not offend the Russians.
I would not say that Japan is taking an “overly”-cautious attitude toward the Kosovo question. After all, the overall direction is clear. We will in principle recognize Kosovo, and that should please the US and the Islam Nation (not that the Islamic states notice, though I'm sure that they would if we said no to an independent Kosovo). However, there are no public discussions of the real reasons for our tag-along approach; it's not a compelling issue for us. So I’m really guessing here. Having said that...
China surely has Taiwan in mind in its opposition to Kosovo independence, but I don't think that the matter is important enough to China that Japan would feel compelled to defer to its wishes if they are to maintain the current amicable relationship. The China-Taiwan relationship is overwhelmingly determined by local factors and is not going to be materially affected by the eventual fate of Kosovo. Russia, in contrast, is the state that has the geopolitical interest in Kosovo and the broader counter-status quo posture that make this a compelling issue for it. To put it another way, it is my view that Japan would take the same approach if Russia were the only permanent UNSC member opposing Kosovo independence, while Japan would afford more immediate recognition if China were the only one doing so. Of course China would have to accept it if Russia decided to drop its veto on UN accession for Kosovo, so the last scenario would never happen.
The one possibility that I did not consider in my previous post is the possibility that Greece and other EU member countries withholding recognition (but, crucially, not opposing EU takeover from KFORS) will
In the meantime, Japan should be providing humanitarian and other forms of assistance that will not offend the Russians.
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Japan Consistently Bucks US on the Palestinian Question. Will It Distance Itself Elsewhere in the Middle East and Beyond?
The Jewish Virtual Library provides a list of US vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel between 1972-2006. According to this list, the US has always been alone in casting vetoes*. Although from time to time, other UNSC members have abstained, Japan, in all but one case, voted for the resolutions. Japan has been an elected UNSC member in 71- 72, 75-76, 81-82, 87-88, 92-93, 97-98 and 2005-06. In1983-present, the years for which the list gives the names of the abstaining members for each resolution, the US did receive some support of sorts between 1984-88 and 2001-2006, when an assortment of mainly Western European nations** would abstain when the US exercised its veto. However, Japan abstained only once, in 2006, on a draft resolution calling for Israel to halt its Gaza operations, where it joined three other abstaining UNSC members***.
Much of this Japanese accommodation of the Arab position on the Palestinian Question is surely attributable to its heavy reliance on Middle East oil. But there is also our history, or lack of it to consider. Japan’s involvement in the politics of the Middle East is quite recent, since its imperialist ambitions never extended to the Middle East. In fact, as the enemy of Russia and later the West European empires, Japan appears to have enjoyed a favorable, if somewhat vaguely informed, reputation with the Moslem nations in the Middle East. True, imperial Japan was one of the four powers in the 1920 San Remo Conference that, among other things, gave the UK the Mandate for Palestine and reaffirmed the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which stated that the UK government viewed “with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and that it would “use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object”. In any case, post-WW II Japan was obviously not in a position to take a stand in the 1947 UN partition of Palestine. Shielded by the Yoshida Doctrine and the Peace Constitution, Japan has been at most a passive actor in the geopolitics of the region.
So far, the Japanese stand on the Palestinian Question has had little by way of consequences. Domestically, the issue rarely registers on the political scene. The US has never made an issue of it as far as I am aware, and neither has Israel, with which Japan also has a sound, if somewhat distant, relationship. More importantly, this particular US-Japan rift has never spread to other issues in the Middle East. Most recently, Japan has docilely followed the US lead there in putting boots and boats in Iraq and Afghanistan and, far more painful with regard to national security, forfeited most of its exploration rights to the Azadegan oil fields in Iran in keeping with the wishes of the US.
We have already seen the DPJ intransigence on the Japanese presence on the Iraqi and terrorism fronts. DPJ leaders have also been taking a hard line on the US military presence on Japanese territory. This maneuvering is in part the consequence of the political game being played between the DPJ and the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition. As such, it faces dissent within the DPJ itself. But even mere political posturing can interact with the underlying situation to create a momentum of its own, and national security should be no exception. I suspect that the broader debate will become a feature of the Japanese political scene sooner rather than later. In a thoroughgoing review of Japan’s national security, the Middle East would surely come right after the near abroad.
The dissonance within the DPJ (and to a lesser extent the LDP as well, if you listen carefully) with regard to national security is but one of the many fault lines within the two major parties (and between the LDP and New Kōmeitō. Other contentious examples are: the history issues, imperial succession, gasoline taxes (and road-related expenditures) and human rights protection legislation. These and other contradictions, to resuscitate stock Marxist terminology, have led many observers and some participants themselves to expect/hope for a major realignment of the political parties along ideologically more coherent lines. I have been moving away from that line of thinking. The fault lines are too many to allow political actors to coalesce around two to three distinct groups sharing an across-the-board policy manifest without serious reserves. Instead, I think that some relaxation of the party-line voting will become visible along the line as the Diet works its way through possibly two more Upper House elections before the Upper House/Lower House split is resolved****.
* I assume that no other UNSC permanent member has cast a veto during this period.
** The return of UK abstention precedes 9.11 and coincides with Tony Blair’s appointment as Prime Minister.
*** It replaced Peru, which was the fourth abstaining member in an earlier draft resolution.
**** I think that it is telling that Naoto Kan only demanded that the proportional-district Diet members give up their seats if they were going to vote in favor of the extension of the gasoline tax surcharge.
Much of this Japanese accommodation of the Arab position on the Palestinian Question is surely attributable to its heavy reliance on Middle East oil. But there is also our history, or lack of it to consider. Japan’s involvement in the politics of the Middle East is quite recent, since its imperialist ambitions never extended to the Middle East. In fact, as the enemy of Russia and later the West European empires, Japan appears to have enjoyed a favorable, if somewhat vaguely informed, reputation with the Moslem nations in the Middle East. True, imperial Japan was one of the four powers in the 1920 San Remo Conference that, among other things, gave the UK the Mandate for Palestine and reaffirmed the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which stated that the UK government viewed “with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and that it would “use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object”. In any case, post-WW II Japan was obviously not in a position to take a stand in the 1947 UN partition of Palestine. Shielded by the Yoshida Doctrine and the Peace Constitution, Japan has been at most a passive actor in the geopolitics of the region.
So far, the Japanese stand on the Palestinian Question has had little by way of consequences. Domestically, the issue rarely registers on the political scene. The US has never made an issue of it as far as I am aware, and neither has Israel, with which Japan also has a sound, if somewhat distant, relationship. More importantly, this particular US-Japan rift has never spread to other issues in the Middle East. Most recently, Japan has docilely followed the US lead there in putting boots and boats in Iraq and Afghanistan and, far more painful with regard to national security, forfeited most of its exploration rights to the Azadegan oil fields in Iran in keeping with the wishes of the US.
We have already seen the DPJ intransigence on the Japanese presence on the Iraqi and terrorism fronts. DPJ leaders have also been taking a hard line on the US military presence on Japanese territory. This maneuvering is in part the consequence of the political game being played between the DPJ and the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition. As such, it faces dissent within the DPJ itself. But even mere political posturing can interact with the underlying situation to create a momentum of its own, and national security should be no exception. I suspect that the broader debate will become a feature of the Japanese political scene sooner rather than later. In a thoroughgoing review of Japan’s national security, the Middle East would surely come right after the near abroad.
The dissonance within the DPJ (and to a lesser extent the LDP as well, if you listen carefully) with regard to national security is but one of the many fault lines within the two major parties (and between the LDP and New Kōmeitō. Other contentious examples are: the history issues, imperial succession, gasoline taxes (and road-related expenditures) and human rights protection legislation. These and other contradictions, to resuscitate stock Marxist terminology, have led many observers and some participants themselves to expect/hope for a major realignment of the political parties along ideologically more coherent lines. I have been moving away from that line of thinking. The fault lines are too many to allow political actors to coalesce around two to three distinct groups sharing an across-the-board policy manifest without serious reserves. Instead, I think that some relaxation of the party-line voting will become visible along the line as the Diet works its way through possibly two more Upper House elections before the Upper House/Lower House split is resolved****.
* I assume that no other UNSC permanent member has cast a veto during this period.
** The return of UK abstention precedes 9.11 and coincides with Tony Blair’s appointment as Prime Minister.
*** It replaced Peru, which was the fourth abstaining member in an earlier draft resolution.
**** I think that it is telling that Naoto Kan only demanded that the proportional-district Diet members give up their seats if they were going to vote in favor of the extension of the gasoline tax surcharge.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Now that the Other Presidential Candidates Are Going, Going, (Mostly) Gone
The Democrats are down to the two I already did. Now let’s take a look at the two Republicans remaining with a chance to win to see how they see Japan.
Mitt Romney’s Foreign Affairs essay is an easy one. Japan is missing, except as, together with Germany, as a country that the US defeated. In fact, most of the known world has been left off his roadmap. Instead his entire focus is on national security, and the Middle East is the only place and Muslims － the bad ones only, mind you － are the only place and people outside of the US that matters*. Even free trade agreements are invoked to solve the Middle East problem. Near the beginning of his essay he does tell you that “…[t]he economic rise of China and other countries across Asia poses a different type of challenge. It is easy to understand why Americans -- and many others around the world -- feel so much unease and uncertainty.” But this thread is never picked up. He is playing to national security conservative Republicans. Nothing else matters on foreign policy until he wins the nomination.
John McCain’s essay is another thing altogether. Now his Middle East policy is basically Bush on steroids － altius, citius, fortius. He sees Japan and Asia from a similar perspective, and is effusive in his praise of Japan, whether it is for “serving alongside” the United States as a “democratic all[y]” in Afghanistan as part of Mr. McCain’s grand strategy of “Uniting the World’s Democracies”, or exerting “international leadership and emerg[ing] as a global power” as part of Mr. McCain’s grand design for “Shaping the Asia-Pacific Century”. It is no surprise then, that a President McCain will “encourage its admirable ‘values-based diplomacy,’ and support its bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council,” while speaking favorably of the "'arc of freedom and prosperity' stretching across Asia."
As for North Korea, future talks with it “must take into account [it]s ballistic missile programs, its abduction of Japanese citizens (my italics), and its support for terrorism and proliferation.” China is given even more attention, but not necessarily in ways that the Chinese authorities will appreciate, his conclusion being: “until China moves toward political liberalization, our relationship will be based on periodically shared interests rather than the bedrock of shared values.”
John McCain, a President that the Prime Minister can only love. Prime Minister Abe, that is. And therein lies the… I can’t quite find the right word, but you know what I mean…
Actually, there’s little about Mr. McCain’s thoughts about Japan that goes against official policy here. Yet I cannot escape the feeling that Mr. Fukuda must be hoping that Mr. McCain’s bark is worse than his bite.
* In fact, Mr. Romney’s limitless capacity to live in the moment is one of the secrets to his past successes. It is essential to his ability to slip seemingly effortlessly into any role that he chooses to take on. The downside of all this: The simultaneous, granular attention that a presidential campaign casts brings to all his characters and lines reminds me of that Martian shapeshifter who has a meltdown in a Ray Bradbury story whose name escapes me.
(UPDATE) The Martian, from The Martian Chronicles. Thanks, MTC
Mitt Romney’s Foreign Affairs essay is an easy one. Japan is missing, except as, together with Germany, as a country that the US defeated. In fact, most of the known world has been left off his roadmap. Instead his entire focus is on national security, and the Middle East is the only place and Muslims － the bad ones only, mind you － are the only place and people outside of the US that matters*. Even free trade agreements are invoked to solve the Middle East problem. Near the beginning of his essay he does tell you that “…[t]he economic rise of China and other countries across Asia poses a different type of challenge. It is easy to understand why Americans -- and many others around the world -- feel so much unease and uncertainty.” But this thread is never picked up. He is playing to national security conservative Republicans. Nothing else matters on foreign policy until he wins the nomination.
John McCain’s essay is another thing altogether. Now his Middle East policy is basically Bush on steroids － altius, citius, fortius. He sees Japan and Asia from a similar perspective, and is effusive in his praise of Japan, whether it is for “serving alongside” the United States as a “democratic all[y]” in Afghanistan as part of Mr. McCain’s grand strategy of “Uniting the World’s Democracies”, or exerting “international leadership and emerg[ing] as a global power” as part of Mr. McCain’s grand design for “Shaping the Asia-Pacific Century”. It is no surprise then, that a President McCain will “encourage its admirable ‘values-based diplomacy,’ and support its bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council,” while speaking favorably of the "'arc of freedom and prosperity' stretching across Asia."
As for North Korea, future talks with it “must take into account [it]s ballistic missile programs, its abduction of Japanese citizens (my italics), and its support for terrorism and proliferation.” China is given even more attention, but not necessarily in ways that the Chinese authorities will appreciate, his conclusion being: “until China moves toward political liberalization, our relationship will be based on periodically shared interests rather than the bedrock of shared values.”
John McCain, a President that the Prime Minister can only love. Prime Minister Abe, that is. And therein lies the… I can’t quite find the right word, but you know what I mean…
Actually, there’s little about Mr. McCain’s thoughts about Japan that goes against official policy here. Yet I cannot escape the feeling that Mr. Fukuda must be hoping that Mr. McCain’s bark is worse than his bite.
* In fact, Mr. Romney’s limitless capacity to live in the moment is one of the secrets to his past successes. It is essential to his ability to slip seemingly effortlessly into any role that he chooses to take on. The downside of all this: The simultaneous, granular attention that a presidential campaign casts brings to all his characters and lines reminds me of that Martian shapeshifter who has a meltdown in a Ray Bradbury story whose name escapes me.
(UPDATE) The Martian, from The Martian Chronicles. Thanks, MTC
Monday, January 28, 2008
Time to See What Mr. Obama Has to Say about Japan
A long time ago, I promised I’d look at Barack Obama’s Foreign Affairs essay and what it had to say on Japan. Since he’s been surging with the south Carolina blowout and endorsements from Democrat heavyweights (Ted (and Caroline) Kennedy, Kathleen Sibelius), this is a good time to make good on it. However, I wound up with so little to say － not entirely my fault － that I expanded a footnote and made this a two-part post.
Members of the Japanese establishment who seek a more aggressive national security and foreign policy stance must be disappointed to find that “Japan” is mentioned only once in Mr. Obama’s Foreign Affairs (2007 July/August) essay. No, not because China is mentioned five times. After all, the European Union appears only once as well, and none of the West European nations are mentioned by name. By contrast, Iraq comes up no less than 15 times. Chances are, if he mentions you, you are part of the problem or, in terms that the amiable presidential candidate prefers, a challenge. To quote:
As China rises and Japan and South Korea assert themselves, I will work to forge a more effective framework in Asia that goes beyond bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad hoc arrangements, such as the six-party talks on North Korea. We need an inclusive infrastructure with the countries in East Asia that can promote stability and prosperity and help confront transnational threats, from terrorist cells in the Philippines to avian flu in Indonesia.
Here, it is notable that Mr. Obama sees Japan on the same plane as South Korea and, to some extent, China. This must reflect the views of his foreign policy advisors on the Japanese government’s not-quite-forthcoming approach to North Korea. The European Union does not appear in flattering circumstances either. In fact, it comes up in a most embarrassing manner as he covers climate change. Namely, in a list of “those that pollute the most: the United States, China, India, the European Union, and Russia.”
As for his take on China:
I will also encourage China to play a responsible role as a growing power － to help lead in addressing the common problems of the twenty-first century. We will compete with China in some areas and cooperate in others. Our essential challenge is to build a relationship that broadens cooperation while strengthening our ability to compete.
Relationship, not partnership; a challenge, in his own words.
Onside nations are for the most part anonymous counterparts in “alliances” and “partnerships” and “institutions”. And speaking of institutions, there is one that is mentioned by name, and six times at that － NATO. Mr. Obama wants “NATO allies to contribute more troops to collective security operations and to invest more in reconstruction and stabilization capabilities.” In Afghanistan, he wants “to remove the limitations placed by some NATO allies on their forces.” You wonder, does he realize that Japan is missing from this picture? Does he even mind? Japan may not be part of the problem, but, outside East Asia, it is not part of the solution either. So much for aspirations to be a normal “normal” country.
The essay, of course, addresses the US public first and foremost. Moreover, it was written before the US surge in Iraq had begun to show much effect and subprime lending problem had not yet reached crisis proportions. Thus, economic and financial issues per se are ignored other than as a Third World issue. For instance, there is barely a hint, a fleeting shadow of FTAs, and the Doha Round is not mentioned at all. To quote:
As president, I will double our annual investment in meeting these challenges to $50 billion by 2012 and ensure that those new resources are directed toward worthwhile goals. For the last 20 years, U.S. foreign assistance funding has done little more than keep pace with inflation. It is in our national security interest to do better. But if America is going to help others build more just and secure societies, our trade deals, debt relief, and foreign aid must not come as blank checks. I will couple our support with an insistent call for reform, to combat the corruption that rots societies and governments from within. I will do so not in the spirit of a patron but in the spirit of a partner -- a partner mindful of his own imperfections.
Note that “trade deals” are mentioned in the context of foreign aid and come with strings attached. But where Hillary Clinton would “enforce labor standards” (albeit through the ILO), Mr. Obama does not use these labor-union-friendly code words here and focuses on “corruption”.
Members of the Japanese establishment who seek a more aggressive national security and foreign policy stance must be disappointed to find that “Japan” is mentioned only once in Mr. Obama’s Foreign Affairs (2007 July/August) essay. No, not because China is mentioned five times. After all, the European Union appears only once as well, and none of the West European nations are mentioned by name. By contrast, Iraq comes up no less than 15 times. Chances are, if he mentions you, you are part of the problem or, in terms that the amiable presidential candidate prefers, a challenge. To quote:
As China rises and Japan and South Korea assert themselves, I will work to forge a more effective framework in Asia that goes beyond bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad hoc arrangements, such as the six-party talks on North Korea. We need an inclusive infrastructure with the countries in East Asia that can promote stability and prosperity and help confront transnational threats, from terrorist cells in the Philippines to avian flu in Indonesia.
Here, it is notable that Mr. Obama sees Japan on the same plane as South Korea and, to some extent, China. This must reflect the views of his foreign policy advisors on the Japanese government’s not-quite-forthcoming approach to North Korea. The European Union does not appear in flattering circumstances either. In fact, it comes up in a most embarrassing manner as he covers climate change. Namely, in a list of “those that pollute the most: the United States, China, India, the European Union, and Russia.”
As for his take on China:
I will also encourage China to play a responsible role as a growing power － to help lead in addressing the common problems of the twenty-first century. We will compete with China in some areas and cooperate in others. Our essential challenge is to build a relationship that broadens cooperation while strengthening our ability to compete.
Relationship, not partnership; a challenge, in his own words.
Onside nations are for the most part anonymous counterparts in “alliances” and “partnerships” and “institutions”. And speaking of institutions, there is one that is mentioned by name, and six times at that － NATO. Mr. Obama wants “NATO allies to contribute more troops to collective security operations and to invest more in reconstruction and stabilization capabilities.” In Afghanistan, he wants “to remove the limitations placed by some NATO allies on their forces.” You wonder, does he realize that Japan is missing from this picture? Does he even mind? Japan may not be part of the problem, but, outside East Asia, it is not part of the solution either. So much for aspirations to be a normal “normal” country.
The essay, of course, addresses the US public first and foremost. Moreover, it was written before the US surge in Iraq had begun to show much effect and subprime lending problem had not yet reached crisis proportions. Thus, economic and financial issues per se are ignored other than as a Third World issue. For instance, there is barely a hint, a fleeting shadow of FTAs, and the Doha Round is not mentioned at all. To quote:
As president, I will double our annual investment in meeting these challenges to $50 billion by 2012 and ensure that those new resources are directed toward worthwhile goals. For the last 20 years, U.S. foreign assistance funding has done little more than keep pace with inflation. It is in our national security interest to do better. But if America is going to help others build more just and secure societies, our trade deals, debt relief, and foreign aid must not come as blank checks. I will couple our support with an insistent call for reform, to combat the corruption that rots societies and governments from within. I will do so not in the spirit of a patron but in the spirit of a partner -- a partner mindful of his own imperfections.
Note that “trade deals” are mentioned in the context of foreign aid and come with strings attached. But where Hillary Clinton would “enforce labor standards” (albeit through the ILO), Mr. Obama does not use these labor-union-friendly code words here and focuses on “corruption”.
Friday, January 11, 2008
日本は、クリントン先生のクラスの、あのおとなしくて行儀のいい男の子なのです
(translation of the previous post)
ヒラリー・クリントンが民主党の大統領予備選の本命に戻ったところで、“Foreign Affairs”の記事を読み返してみるのもいいのではないかと思いました。
ヒラリー・クリントンがForeign Affairsの「私が大統領に選ばれれば」シリーズに寄稿したエッセーは、日本の政官界のリーダーシップの間でかなりの動揺を引き起こしました。というのも、彼女が「我々と中国との関係は、今世紀で最も重要な二国間関係になる」と述べて、日本についてはほんのついでにしか言及しなかったからです。この動揺は、一つには、この人々の間で、一般的に言って共和党政権のときのほうがうまくいくと広く信じられている*ことに根ざしています。もっと具体的に言うと、かつてのクリントン政権のときは、中国に対しては全面的な友好外交を展開したのに、日米関係は通商問題をめぐる異例のとげとげしさの中で停滞しました。
では、これは、単に悪い連想が働いているだけなのでしょうか。いや、そんなことはありません。対外関係に関するクリントン氏のトップ・アドバイザーであるマデリン・オルブライト元国務長官、リチャード・ホルブルック元国連大使を始めその他クリントン・チームの面々の多くがクリントン政権（ややこしい）のときも枢要な役割を果たしていたのです。しかも、クリントン氏は、ファースト・レディー時代の8年間を自分の経験として援用しているのです。
だが・・・
第一に、対外関係で大きく取り上げられることは、いいことずくめというわけにはいきません。というのも、中国は、「21世紀に直面する国家、政府でない当事者、そして自然そのものからの脅威という、かつてない多種多様な挑戦的課題」のリストの中でまず登場するのです。「二つの戦争、グローバルなテロのネットワークに対する長期の戦い、そして、核兵器を取得しようとするイランとの緊張の高まり、成り行きが不明なままに再生を遂げるロシア、急速に成長する中国の国際システムへの統合、イスラエルを脅かすとともに石油供給の中断によって世界経済を崩壊させかねない中東の予測不可能かつ危険な状況、そして、気候変動及び世界規模の疫病の新たな波という長期的な脅威」といっしょくたにして言及されることには、いくらあまのじゃくでも喜びを感じることができないでしょう。第一、以前に本気でアメリカに挑戦状をたたきつけた時どうなったか、ご存知でしょう。
クリントン氏は、これら挑戦のそれぞれについて、自分の立場を説明していますが、「最も重要な二国間関係」というのも、こうした文脈で理解する必要があります。実際、クリントン氏は、日本は問題解決のほうから、ここで初めて言及して、「米国は、新しくクリーンなエネルギー源を開発し、より高い水準の省エネルギーを奨励し、気候変動と戦うために中国及び日本と共同プログラムに取り組むべきである」と書いています。
「同盟関係の強化」－ これは明らかにブッシュ大統領のユニラテラリズムと彼女が描き出しているものと対照をなしている － は、こうした挑戦に取り組むための彼女の戦略の礎石の一つですが、これには、それなりにもっと心配すべき理由があります。昔からの三極のもう一つの極であるヨーロッパは、「同盟関係の強化」に関してはトップを占め、また、アジアでは、日本をインドと豪州と一緒くたにして「オーストラリア、インド、日本、そして米国が効力してテロとの戦い、気候変動を制限するための協力、グローバルなエネルギー供給の保全、経済発展の深化を含め、共通の関心事項について協力するすべを今以上に追求する必要がある」と述べています。彼女はさらに「欧米が協力すればグローバルな諸目標も実現可能になる」と述べていますが、結構なことで。また、アジアのスターはインドであって、「新興経済国として、また、世界でもっとも人口の多い民主主義国として特別の意義を持っている。上院のインド関係議員連盟の共同代表として、インドの勃興が与えてくれる素晴らしい機会、そして国連等の国際、地域諸機関でもっとインドの発言力を強化することの必要性を理解する」とも述べています。
だが、この、一見して目に付く不均衡には、意味を込めすぎないように気を付ける必要があります。というのも、ヨーロッパは、「同盟諸国を安心させること」が必要だという文脈の中で登場するからです。具体的には「安心と信頼というヨーロッパとの間の伝統的な関係を再構築しなければいけない」というわけです。インドはと言えば、「途方もない」とは言うものの、あくまでも「機会」なのです。というわけで、次のように考えることができるのではないでしょうか。つまり、クリントン上院議員の立場に立って考えると、日本との関係は（インドとは対照的に）成熟した安定的な関係であって、（ヨーロッパとは対照的に）癒しを必要としていないのです。別の言い方をすると、私たちは、昔、どのクラスにもいた、宿題をいつもきちんとやって、それ以外にも先生方に迷惑をかけることのなかった、あの目立たず、地味な男の子なのです。
で、それがそんなにまずいことなのでしょうか。国民の大部分がそれ以上のことを望んでもいないというのに。
* 1・2月号には、ビル・リチャードソン州知事がマイケル・ハッカビー元州知事とともにＦＡの紙面を飾っています。クリス・ドッド、ジョー・バイデン両上院議員は、掲載の機会を得る前に脱落しました。フレッド・トムソンは、もし残っていれば掲載されるでしょう。だが、ロン・ポール上院議員やデニス・クシニッチ下院議員まで載せてくれるでしょうか。
** セオドア・ルーズベルトは共和党、フランクリン・デラノ・ルーズベルトは民主党でした。
*** 注**をご参照のこと。
ヒラリー・クリントンが民主党の大統領予備選の本命に戻ったところで、“Foreign Affairs”の記事を読み返してみるのもいいのではないかと思いました。
ヒラリー・クリントンがForeign Affairsの「私が大統領に選ばれれば」シリーズに寄稿したエッセーは、日本の政官界のリーダーシップの間でかなりの動揺を引き起こしました。というのも、彼女が「我々と中国との関係は、今世紀で最も重要な二国間関係になる」と述べて、日本についてはほんのついでにしか言及しなかったからです。この動揺は、一つには、この人々の間で、一般的に言って共和党政権のときのほうがうまくいくと広く信じられている*ことに根ざしています。もっと具体的に言うと、かつてのクリントン政権のときは、中国に対しては全面的な友好外交を展開したのに、日米関係は通商問題をめぐる異例のとげとげしさの中で停滞しました。
では、これは、単に悪い連想が働いているだけなのでしょうか。いや、そんなことはありません。対外関係に関するクリントン氏のトップ・アドバイザーであるマデリン・オルブライト元国務長官、リチャード・ホルブルック元国連大使を始めその他クリントン・チームの面々の多くがクリントン政権（ややこしい）のときも枢要な役割を果たしていたのです。しかも、クリントン氏は、ファースト・レディー時代の8年間を自分の経験として援用しているのです。
だが・・・
第一に、対外関係で大きく取り上げられることは、いいことずくめというわけにはいきません。というのも、中国は、「21世紀に直面する国家、政府でない当事者、そして自然そのものからの脅威という、かつてない多種多様な挑戦的課題」のリストの中でまず登場するのです。「二つの戦争、グローバルなテロのネットワークに対する長期の戦い、そして、核兵器を取得しようとするイランとの緊張の高まり、成り行きが不明なままに再生を遂げるロシア、急速に成長する中国の国際システムへの統合、イスラエルを脅かすとともに石油供給の中断によって世界経済を崩壊させかねない中東の予測不可能かつ危険な状況、そして、気候変動及び世界規模の疫病の新たな波という長期的な脅威」といっしょくたにして言及されることには、いくらあまのじゃくでも喜びを感じることができないでしょう。第一、以前に本気でアメリカに挑戦状をたたきつけた時どうなったか、ご存知でしょう。
クリントン氏は、これら挑戦のそれぞれについて、自分の立場を説明していますが、「最も重要な二国間関係」というのも、こうした文脈で理解する必要があります。実際、クリントン氏は、日本は問題解決のほうから、ここで初めて言及して、「米国は、新しくクリーンなエネルギー源を開発し、より高い水準の省エネルギーを奨励し、気候変動と戦うために中国及び日本と共同プログラムに取り組むべきである」と書いています。
「同盟関係の強化」－ これは明らかにブッシュ大統領のユニラテラリズムと彼女が描き出しているものと対照をなしている － は、こうした挑戦に取り組むための彼女の戦略の礎石の一つですが、これには、それなりにもっと心配すべき理由があります。昔からの三極のもう一つの極であるヨーロッパは、「同盟関係の強化」に関してはトップを占め、また、アジアでは、日本をインドと豪州と一緒くたにして「オーストラリア、インド、日本、そして米国が効力してテロとの戦い、気候変動を制限するための協力、グローバルなエネルギー供給の保全、経済発展の深化を含め、共通の関心事項について協力するすべを今以上に追求する必要がある」と述べています。彼女はさらに「欧米が協力すればグローバルな諸目標も実現可能になる」と述べていますが、結構なことで。また、アジアのスターはインドであって、「新興経済国として、また、世界でもっとも人口の多い民主主義国として特別の意義を持っている。上院のインド関係議員連盟の共同代表として、インドの勃興が与えてくれる素晴らしい機会、そして国連等の国際、地域諸機関でもっとインドの発言力を強化することの必要性を理解する」とも述べています。
だが、この、一見して目に付く不均衡には、意味を込めすぎないように気を付ける必要があります。というのも、ヨーロッパは、「同盟諸国を安心させること」が必要だという文脈の中で登場するからです。具体的には「安心と信頼というヨーロッパとの間の伝統的な関係を再構築しなければいけない」というわけです。インドはと言えば、「途方もない」とは言うものの、あくまでも「機会」なのです。というわけで、次のように考えることができるのではないでしょうか。つまり、クリントン上院議員の立場に立って考えると、日本との関係は（インドとは対照的に）成熟した安定的な関係であって、（ヨーロッパとは対照的に）癒しを必要としていないのです。別の言い方をすると、私たちは、昔、どのクラスにもいた、宿題をいつもきちんとやって、それ以外にも先生方に迷惑をかけることのなかった、あの目立たず、地味な男の子なのです。
で、それがそんなにまずいことなのでしょうか。国民の大部分がそれ以上のことを望んでもいないというのに。
* 1・2月号には、ビル・リチャードソン州知事がマイケル・ハッカビー元州知事とともにＦＡの紙面を飾っています。クリス・ドッド、ジョー・バイデン両上院議員は、掲載の機会を得る前に脱落しました。フレッド・トムソンは、もし残っていれば掲載されるでしょう。だが、ロン・ポール上院議員やデニス・クシニッチ下院議員まで載せてくれるでしょうか。
** セオドア・ルーズベルトは共和党、フランクリン・デラノ・ルーズベルトは民主党でした。
*** 注**をご参照のこと。
Japan Is the Quiet Little Boy in Mrs. Clinton’s Class
Now that Hillary Clinton is back as the frontrunner, I thought that it would be worth my while to reread her Foreign Affairs article.
Hillary Clinton’s contribution in the Foreign Affairs series of “If elected I would” essays by the presidential candidates* caused considerable distress within the Japanese establishment because it said that “[o]ur relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century”, while mentioning Japan only in passing. Part of the dismay is rooted in the widely held belief among these people that, generally speaking, the alliance has gone smoother when Republicans have been in charge**. More specifically, the Clinton administration put on a full-court charm offensive on China, while Japan-U.S. relations languished under an uncommon level of animosity over trade issues.
So is this guilt by association? No. Not when Mrs. Clinton’s top foreign policy advisors, Madeline K. Albright and Richard Holbrooke, as well as much of the rest of her team also figured prominently in the Clinton administration. No. Not when she lists her eight years in the White House on her résumé under Experience. But…
First of all, in foreign affairs, top billing is often a mixed blessing, or worse. For China’s name first comes up in the list of “unprecedented array of challenges in the twenty-first century, threats from states, nonstate actors, and nature itself”. It would be hard to derive even a twisted sense of satisfaction from being mentioned in the same breath as “two wars, a long-term campaign against global terrorist networks, and growing tension with Iran as it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons[;] … a resurgent Russia whose future orientation is uncertain[;]… a rapidly growing China that must be integrated into the international system (my italics)[;]… an unpredictable and dangerous situation in the Middle East that threatens Israel and could potentially bring down the global economy by disrupting oil supplies[;]… and the looming long-term threats of climate change and a new wave of global health epidemics.” And you know what happened the last time we really challenged the United States***.
Mrs. Clinton goes on to explain her position on these challenges one-by-one, and it is in this context that “the most important bilateral relationship” must be understood. Indeed, Japan is first mentioned here as part of the solution, as she writes, “The United States should undertake a joint program with China and Japan to develop new clean-energy sources, promote greater energy efficiency, and combat climate change.”
“Strengthening Alliances” － in an obvious contrast to her protrayal of the Bush administration’s unilateralism － is a cornerstone of her strategy in meeting such challenges. Here, there is somewhat more reason for concern. The other corner of the old Trilateral, Europe, is given top billing where “Strengthening Alliances” is concerned, while in Asia, Japan is lumped together with India and Australia, as she says that “[w]e must find additional ways for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including combating terrorism, cooperating on global climate control, protecting global energy supplies, and deepening global economic development.” She claims, “When America and Europe work together, global objectives are within our means”, uplifting thoughts indeed. And the star of Asia is India, which “has a special significance both as an emerging power and as the world's most populous democracy. As co-chair of the Senate India Caucus, I recognize the tremendous opportunity presented by India's rise and the need to give the country an augmented voice in regional and international institutions, such as the UN.”
But we must be careful not to read too much into this seeming imbalance. Europe comes up in the context of the need “to reassure our allies.” Specifically, she says, “We must reestablish our traditional relationship of confidence and trust with Europe.” And India remains an “opportunity”, albeit “tremendous”. So you can look at it this way: From Senator Clinton’s point of view, its relationship with Japan is a mature, stable relationship (contrast India) that requires no healing (contrast Europe). To put it another way, we’re that quiet boy who used to be in your class, the kid who always did his homework and otherwise never made any trouble for the teachers.
Now is that such a bad thing to be? Especially since the Japanese public is not looking for more?
* Bill Richardson shares the Jan/Feb edition with Michael D. Huckabee, while Chris Dodd and Joe Biden dropped out before they got the chance. Fed Thompson will surely have his day if he stays in, but you wonder if FA will ever let Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich have their say.
** Teddy Roosevelt was a Republican; Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Democrat. Case closed. Kidding.
*** See footnote **
Hillary Clinton’s contribution in the Foreign Affairs series of “If elected I would” essays by the presidential candidates* caused considerable distress within the Japanese establishment because it said that “[o]ur relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century”, while mentioning Japan only in passing. Part of the dismay is rooted in the widely held belief among these people that, generally speaking, the alliance has gone smoother when Republicans have been in charge**. More specifically, the Clinton administration put on a full-court charm offensive on China, while Japan-U.S. relations languished under an uncommon level of animosity over trade issues.
So is this guilt by association? No. Not when Mrs. Clinton’s top foreign policy advisors, Madeline K. Albright and Richard Holbrooke, as well as much of the rest of her team also figured prominently in the Clinton administration. No. Not when she lists her eight years in the White House on her résumé under Experience. But…
First of all, in foreign affairs, top billing is often a mixed blessing, or worse. For China’s name first comes up in the list of “unprecedented array of challenges in the twenty-first century, threats from states, nonstate actors, and nature itself”. It would be hard to derive even a twisted sense of satisfaction from being mentioned in the same breath as “two wars, a long-term campaign against global terrorist networks, and growing tension with Iran as it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons[;] … a resurgent Russia whose future orientation is uncertain[;]… a rapidly growing China that must be integrated into the international system (my italics)[;]… an unpredictable and dangerous situation in the Middle East that threatens Israel and could potentially bring down the global economy by disrupting oil supplies[;]… and the looming long-term threats of climate change and a new wave of global health epidemics.” And you know what happened the last time we really challenged the United States***.
Mrs. Clinton goes on to explain her position on these challenges one-by-one, and it is in this context that “the most important bilateral relationship” must be understood. Indeed, Japan is first mentioned here as part of the solution, as she writes, “The United States should undertake a joint program with China and Japan to develop new clean-energy sources, promote greater energy efficiency, and combat climate change.”
“Strengthening Alliances” － in an obvious contrast to her protrayal of the Bush administration’s unilateralism － is a cornerstone of her strategy in meeting such challenges. Here, there is somewhat more reason for concern. The other corner of the old Trilateral, Europe, is given top billing where “Strengthening Alliances” is concerned, while in Asia, Japan is lumped together with India and Australia, as she says that “[w]e must find additional ways for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including combating terrorism, cooperating on global climate control, protecting global energy supplies, and deepening global economic development.” She claims, “When America and Europe work together, global objectives are within our means”, uplifting thoughts indeed. And the star of Asia is India, which “has a special significance both as an emerging power and as the world's most populous democracy. As co-chair of the Senate India Caucus, I recognize the tremendous opportunity presented by India's rise and the need to give the country an augmented voice in regional and international institutions, such as the UN.”
But we must be careful not to read too much into this seeming imbalance. Europe comes up in the context of the need “to reassure our allies.” Specifically, she says, “We must reestablish our traditional relationship of confidence and trust with Europe.” And India remains an “opportunity”, albeit “tremendous”. So you can look at it this way: From Senator Clinton’s point of view, its relationship with Japan is a mature, stable relationship (contrast India) that requires no healing (contrast Europe). To put it another way, we’re that quiet boy who used to be in your class, the kid who always did his homework and otherwise never made any trouble for the teachers.
Now is that such a bad thing to be? Especially since the Japanese public is not looking for more?
* Bill Richardson shares the Jan/Feb edition with Michael D. Huckabee, while Chris Dodd and Joe Biden dropped out before they got the chance. Fed Thompson will surely have his day if he stays in, but you wonder if FA will ever let Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich have their say.
** Teddy Roosevelt was a Republican; Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Democrat. Case closed. Kidding.
*** See footnote **
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
The Future of Japan's Relations with the US and China Et Cetera Et Cetera… Glad You Asked…
LH is teaching a class on East Asia in the US. She has asked these questions of several people here, but I know of at least two people beyond her list who actually read this blog whose knowledge and understanding of these issues are far superior to mine, and several others whom I consider to be, at a minimum, my peers. And of course there must be others who I am not aware of. So I decided to post this draft on my blog, since I am sure that LH will very much appreciate any comments you may have.
LH asks: What you think about the future of Japan's relations with the US and China. Do you see a rivalry developing between China and Japan? What kind of foreign policy do you see developing with the new PM?
Me: I know all the answers to your questions. Unfortunately, God has told me that if I tell anyone, He will immediately strike me down with one of his trademark lightning bolts. And He told me in no uncertain terms where I would find myself when I came to. So I'll stay away from the crystal ball and confine myself to talking around the matter by outlining what I think are some (hopefully a very large proportion) of the most salient conditions that should be the basis of scenarios for the future.
First of all, I often hear questions similar to these about Japan and its relations with its two largest neighbors. I believe that this is mainly because of China's recent and remarkable economic, military and diplomatic ascendancy. Moreover, though an increasingly influential civil society has grown up within the confines of one-party rule, there are still enough political legacies in the Chinese regime from a more totalitarian era to cause people to see China in an inherently ominous light. Add to all this the impact from the sheer size of China in every dimension, and no wonder there is talk of the Chinese threat. But I have never seen things that way since I began thinking about this matter and I still do not.
The starting point of my argument is that the current regimes in Japan, the US and China share a fundamental interest in sustaining and enhancing a market-oriented global system. In the world we now live in, this makes Japan, the US and China status quo states with a strong interest in global and regional stability. The enormous geopolitical footprints of the US and China in East Asia, the asymmetries in their bilateral economic relationship, and fundamental differences in their approaches to governance, as well as Japanese fears of the Chinese ascendancy sometimes obscure this reality, but the issues speak for themselves.
Let's look at the main regional issues:
The Korean Peninsula. None of the regimes in the three states want North Korea to have a nuclear weapons program. The reasons for that are not necessarily consonant. That is, for the main part, the Japan regime does not want North Korea to have it because it is the most natural target for the nuclear weapons, the US regime because it fears nuclear proliferation, and the Chinese regime because of the arms race that a successful North Korean program might touch off. Thus, there are inevitable differences in the scope and extent of measures each state is willing to resort to in order to contain and roll back the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Still, the three states have enough in common that they can cooperate within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Also significant is the fact that, because of economic and security concerns, none of the three regimes seek a precipitous regime change there but would prefer a more graduated process of integration into the regional and global economic and security systems. This also happens to coincide with the interest of the South Korean regime.
Taiwan. Here again, the desires of the three regimes roughly coincide. All three regimes accept Chinese claims of sovereignty over the island but want the future course of the course of action to be determined peacefully. The US position is somewhat constrained by the Taiwan Relations Act, but, if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence, China will challenge this by force, and it is doubtful that the US would come to its rescue barring catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Japan has a role of sorts by way of the US military presence on its territory and the strategic ambiguity maintained over "areas surrounding Japan", but it is a subsidiary and passive one. In any case, the common interest of the three regimes lies in maintaining the status quo.
Looking beyond the regional stage, the most compelling issue is energy. Here again, the three regimes share a common objective that is often obscured by arguments about competition for oil and gas, as well as over human rights concerns in resource-rich states with poor and worse governance. China is sometimes accused, mainly by the US regime (most prominently by powerful members of the legislative wing) of propping up undesirable regimes - some of them downright repugnant - in order to obtain access to their energy (and other) resources, most evident in Sudan and Myanmar (or Burma, if you will). In fact, we are all net importer heavyweights and, as such, need to keep global supply steadily expanding and easily accessible. From an energy security perspective, any investment that increases supply is welcome. Besides, leaving aside for now the broader question of who is doing what business that enables which undesirable regimes to maintain itself by collecting and distributing economic rent on which scarce natural resources, China satisfies most of its oil and gas requirements the old fashioned way, that is, by paying what the market demands. This will be even more so, as they come to rely more and more on foreign sources to satiate an ever-expanding domestic demand. Some people in Japan and elsewhere see this as a threat in itself. But all sources of demand, not just the increments, for oil and gas compete against each other. The growth of Chinese (as well as Indian) demand is certainly an important factor to enter in our calculations, but to call it a threat merely obscures the way to the proper response, which is conserving energy and bringing additional and new energy sources to the market.
note: I am ignoring climate change as an issue here in great part because I am of two minds on that and consequently do not have a good idea on how to treat that matter within this context. More generally, it is difficult to talk about global externalities in bilateral and plurilateral contexts.
There is potential for real conflict in international trade. Such conflicts are not due to an inherent conflict between states under the WTO, free-trade regime, but are caused by domestic conflicts between the larger but diffused gains as the whole and the cumulatively smaller but individually more painful losses to specific interests. But understanding by policymakers of the common interest is keeping states from spinning into the damaging realms of extensive protectionism that swept the world in the inter-War years in the 20th Century. That is true of all three states concerned here.
note: An increasingly likely failure of the Doha Round does not mean that international trade will collapse. It merely signals that the free-trade system remains where it stands for the time being. All things considered, that is not such a bad place to be.
Having said all this, it is in the nature of the beast to compete. That is why we root for the home team, haggle over seating arrangements, and what have you. Politicians and pundits will pay heed to how the two states match up as measured by the nebulous concept of 'influence' over, say, ASEAN; and the Japanese authorities will chafe as their Chinese counterparts conspire to deny Japan a permanent seat at the UN Security Council's table. However, unless Japan is willing to surrender its sovereignty to the UN (and in effect to the Security Council), this disparity is almost as trivial to the Japanese national well being as the relative performance of our respective national teams at the next FIFA World Cup. The public, of course, understands this. That is why such matters never become the focus of our national debate come election time.
As for what the Fukuda administration will do by way of foreign policy, I can be brief. In a nutshell: continuity. This is not a prophecy; it is an observation. For it is remarkable the extent to which the need for popular consent ultimately winds up confining every Japanese administration within the perimeters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Now let's stretch it out a little.
Note that Prime Minister Abe's already modest ambitions for constitutional reform was drastically scaled down by the time the Diet got around to passing the procedural act (neglected for 60 years!). And his predecessor Prime Minister Koizumi was often mistakenly portrayed as a conservative revisionist or worse because of a misunderstanding over his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. But virtually all Japanese administrations since the Nakasone administration have continued efforts to find more uses for our military in a multilateral context; and enhance, where possible, mutual defense relationships of a modest nature. And, in more recent years, without increasing military budget expenditures. There is no reason to believe that the Fukuda administration will waver.
On international trade, Japan has been reduced (with an inaudible sigh of relief) to the sidelines of the Doha Round as the negotiations have apparently reached an insurmountable impasse mainly over agricultural products. In the meantime, Japan, like so many other states, seek to cultivate bilateral agreements - some erroneously assume in competition with China - with its Asia-Pacific neighbors and further abroad. There is no reason to believe that this situation will change either.
note: Popular consent also drives our policy on abductees, as well as the reshaping of the contours of US Forces in Japan. Here also can be seen how the need for popular consent enforces a form of continuity.
All this makes the Fukuda administration, indeed any Japanese administration, decidedly unthreatening to China, and at a minimum not seriously detrimental to US interests. Thus, the future of the relationships… but I fear that I am already inviting the wrath of the Almighty.
(Sidebar)
I notice that I have written mainly about China. Is this a sign of personal complacency over our relationship with the US?
It is important to note that China will be facing demographic pressures similar to Japan's in a couple of decades. Can China grow quickly enough to become rich before it becomes poor?
Japan is blessed with plenty of fresh clean water and fertile volcanic and sedimentary soil. Its archipelagic geography stretching from the subtropics to the northern edge of the temperate zone endow it with an outsized exclusive economic zone. China is less well-endowed; it is less resilient in the face of environmental challenges.
LH asks: What you think about the future of Japan's relations with the US and China. Do you see a rivalry developing between China and Japan? What kind of foreign policy do you see developing with the new PM?
Me: I know all the answers to your questions. Unfortunately, God has told me that if I tell anyone, He will immediately strike me down with one of his trademark lightning bolts. And He told me in no uncertain terms where I would find myself when I came to. So I'll stay away from the crystal ball and confine myself to talking around the matter by outlining what I think are some (hopefully a very large proportion) of the most salient conditions that should be the basis of scenarios for the future.
First of all, I often hear questions similar to these about Japan and its relations with its two largest neighbors. I believe that this is mainly because of China's recent and remarkable economic, military and diplomatic ascendancy. Moreover, though an increasingly influential civil society has grown up within the confines of one-party rule, there are still enough political legacies in the Chinese regime from a more totalitarian era to cause people to see China in an inherently ominous light. Add to all this the impact from the sheer size of China in every dimension, and no wonder there is talk of the Chinese threat. But I have never seen things that way since I began thinking about this matter and I still do not.
The starting point of my argument is that the current regimes in Japan, the US and China share a fundamental interest in sustaining and enhancing a market-oriented global system. In the world we now live in, this makes Japan, the US and China status quo states with a strong interest in global and regional stability. The enormous geopolitical footprints of the US and China in East Asia, the asymmetries in their bilateral economic relationship, and fundamental differences in their approaches to governance, as well as Japanese fears of the Chinese ascendancy sometimes obscure this reality, but the issues speak for themselves.
Let's look at the main regional issues:
The Korean Peninsula. None of the regimes in the three states want North Korea to have a nuclear weapons program. The reasons for that are not necessarily consonant. That is, for the main part, the Japan regime does not want North Korea to have it because it is the most natural target for the nuclear weapons, the US regime because it fears nuclear proliferation, and the Chinese regime because of the arms race that a successful North Korean program might touch off. Thus, there are inevitable differences in the scope and extent of measures each state is willing to resort to in order to contain and roll back the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Still, the three states have enough in common that they can cooperate within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Also significant is the fact that, because of economic and security concerns, none of the three regimes seek a precipitous regime change there but would prefer a more graduated process of integration into the regional and global economic and security systems. This also happens to coincide with the interest of the South Korean regime.
Taiwan. Here again, the desires of the three regimes roughly coincide. All three regimes accept Chinese claims of sovereignty over the island but want the future course of the course of action to be determined peacefully. The US position is somewhat constrained by the Taiwan Relations Act, but, if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence, China will challenge this by force, and it is doubtful that the US would come to its rescue barring catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Japan has a role of sorts by way of the US military presence on its territory and the strategic ambiguity maintained over "areas surrounding Japan", but it is a subsidiary and passive one. In any case, the common interest of the three regimes lies in maintaining the status quo.
Looking beyond the regional stage, the most compelling issue is energy. Here again, the three regimes share a common objective that is often obscured by arguments about competition for oil and gas, as well as over human rights concerns in resource-rich states with poor and worse governance. China is sometimes accused, mainly by the US regime (most prominently by powerful members of the legislative wing) of propping up undesirable regimes - some of them downright repugnant - in order to obtain access to their energy (and other) resources, most evident in Sudan and Myanmar (or Burma, if you will). In fact, we are all net importer heavyweights and, as such, need to keep global supply steadily expanding and easily accessible. From an energy security perspective, any investment that increases supply is welcome. Besides, leaving aside for now the broader question of who is doing what business that enables which undesirable regimes to maintain itself by collecting and distributing economic rent on which scarce natural resources, China satisfies most of its oil and gas requirements the old fashioned way, that is, by paying what the market demands. This will be even more so, as they come to rely more and more on foreign sources to satiate an ever-expanding domestic demand. Some people in Japan and elsewhere see this as a threat in itself. But all sources of demand, not just the increments, for oil and gas compete against each other. The growth of Chinese (as well as Indian) demand is certainly an important factor to enter in our calculations, but to call it a threat merely obscures the way to the proper response, which is conserving energy and bringing additional and new energy sources to the market.
note: I am ignoring climate change as an issue here in great part because I am of two minds on that and consequently do not have a good idea on how to treat that matter within this context. More generally, it is difficult to talk about global externalities in bilateral and plurilateral contexts.
There is potential for real conflict in international trade. Such conflicts are not due to an inherent conflict between states under the WTO, free-trade regime, but are caused by domestic conflicts between the larger but diffused gains as the whole and the cumulatively smaller but individually more painful losses to specific interests. But understanding by policymakers of the common interest is keeping states from spinning into the damaging realms of extensive protectionism that swept the world in the inter-War years in the 20th Century. That is true of all three states concerned here.
note: An increasingly likely failure of the Doha Round does not mean that international trade will collapse. It merely signals that the free-trade system remains where it stands for the time being. All things considered, that is not such a bad place to be.
Having said all this, it is in the nature of the beast to compete. That is why we root for the home team, haggle over seating arrangements, and what have you. Politicians and pundits will pay heed to how the two states match up as measured by the nebulous concept of 'influence' over, say, ASEAN; and the Japanese authorities will chafe as their Chinese counterparts conspire to deny Japan a permanent seat at the UN Security Council's table. However, unless Japan is willing to surrender its sovereignty to the UN (and in effect to the Security Council), this disparity is almost as trivial to the Japanese national well being as the relative performance of our respective national teams at the next FIFA World Cup. The public, of course, understands this. That is why such matters never become the focus of our national debate come election time.
As for what the Fukuda administration will do by way of foreign policy, I can be brief. In a nutshell: continuity. This is not a prophecy; it is an observation. For it is remarkable the extent to which the need for popular consent ultimately winds up confining every Japanese administration within the perimeters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Now let's stretch it out a little.
Note that Prime Minister Abe's already modest ambitions for constitutional reform was drastically scaled down by the time the Diet got around to passing the procedural act (neglected for 60 years!). And his predecessor Prime Minister Koizumi was often mistakenly portrayed as a conservative revisionist or worse because of a misunderstanding over his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. But virtually all Japanese administrations since the Nakasone administration have continued efforts to find more uses for our military in a multilateral context; and enhance, where possible, mutual defense relationships of a modest nature. And, in more recent years, without increasing military budget expenditures. There is no reason to believe that the Fukuda administration will waver.
On international trade, Japan has been reduced (with an inaudible sigh of relief) to the sidelines of the Doha Round as the negotiations have apparently reached an insurmountable impasse mainly over agricultural products. In the meantime, Japan, like so many other states, seek to cultivate bilateral agreements - some erroneously assume in competition with China - with its Asia-Pacific neighbors and further abroad. There is no reason to believe that this situation will change either.
note: Popular consent also drives our policy on abductees, as well as the reshaping of the contours of US Forces in Japan. Here also can be seen how the need for popular consent enforces a form of continuity.
All this makes the Fukuda administration, indeed any Japanese administration, decidedly unthreatening to China, and at a minimum not seriously detrimental to US interests. Thus, the future of the relationships… but I fear that I am already inviting the wrath of the Almighty.
(Sidebar)
I notice that I have written mainly about China. Is this a sign of personal complacency over our relationship with the US?
It is important to note that China will be facing demographic pressures similar to Japan's in a couple of decades. Can China grow quickly enough to become rich before it becomes poor?
Japan is blessed with plenty of fresh clean water and fertile volcanic and sedimentary soil. Its archipelagic geography stretching from the subtropics to the northern edge of the temperate zone endow it with an outsized exclusive economic zone. China is less well-endowed; it is less resilient in the face of environmental challenges.
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