I’ve believed, like many people here, that if only Prime Minister firmed up and took the heat for sticking with the 2006 agreement to move the U.S. Marine helicopters on Futenma Base to a base to be built offshore of Camp Schwab on the coral seas of the remotest part of Nago City, everyone except the pacifist SDP would fall into line, the bulk of the Marine forces at Futenma could be relocated to Guam, and Futenma would revert to Japan to be used for non-military purposes. After all, the DPJ manifesto and the subsequent DPJ-SDP-PNP policy pact had only carried a vague reference to revisiting the U.S. troop realignment, and even the reprisal in the policy pact—hammered out on the DPJ side by Katsuya Okada—had been a grudging concession to the SDP. The DPJ would—did—have more than enough on the domestic agenda without U.S. relations becoming an unwelcome distraction. The projected landfill might be something of an eyesore, but few people would notice, as Henoko, the part of Nago where Camp Schwab now resides, is one of the most sparsely populated areas in all of Okinawa. More significantly, the helicopter base would bring welcome Tokyo money. Perhaps that is why Nago has elected three pro-base mayors—albeit professing great reluctance and a powerful sense of public duty—in a row. Thus, I had believed Foreign Minister Okada’s most recent brainstorm to relocate the helicopters to Kadena Air Base to be no more than a strawman, to be knocked down by the U.S. side—which the Obama administration promptly proceeded to do at all levels from the Defense Secretary on down—and by the Okinawans themselves—which the good assemblymen of the Kadena township immediately proceeded to do, in a unanimous vote that rejected the idea and, for good measure, called for easing the burden on their own shoulders.
So there the matter would end, and the DPJ administration would have to bow to the inevitable. But what do I know? For Okada has continued to pursue the Kadena option as his “personal proposal,” and at least one news report claims that a senior member of the ruling coalition (phrasing that indicates that the person is not a member of the Hatoyama administration) has sounded out the locals with a scrap-and-build plan to move 28 out of the 48 U.S. F-15s stationed on Kadena Base. I am sure that the Obama administration will be very surprised, and not in a nice way, if the Hatoyama administration ever puts this on the negotiating table. I cannot believe that the Hatoyama would put placating the DPJ (and its own most radical, ex-Socialist elements) ahead of Japan and the United States’ individual and joint security concerns, but, as Okada himself admits, there’s no way of moving the helicopters to Kadena if it increases the net burden. Besides, the U.S. side has made it clear that air traffic control requirements preclude the location of the helicopter fleet conjointly with conventional aircraft on the existing space in Kadena.
So is Okada, and by extension Hatoyama, continuing to play the Kadena card as a show of exhausting all possible avenues? Perhaps. But in the meantime, the locals are getting restless. The good assemblymen of Nago have become irritated at the dithering and are threatening to rescind their offer to host the helicopters. An even more ominous turn in local politics, has the DPJ reportedly deciding to back an anti-helicopter base candidate against the pro-base incumbent in the January mayoral election. This, to me, effectively precludes the possibility of the Hatoyama administration giving the nod to Nago as the site within the year—for good, if the DPJ-backed anti-base candidate wins,
What will the fallout of the birth of an anti-base administration in Nago be like? In the near future, nothing—on the ground at least. The relocation of the U.S. troops from Futenma grinds to a stop, and everything is frozen in situ. But frustration and mistrust will build up among everyone involved—the people of Futenma, the Obama administration, the U.S. military, the Japanese national security establishment—with longer-term, negative consequences all around.
Showing posts with label Katsuya Okada. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Katsuya Okada. Show all posts
Sunday, November 01, 2009
Saturday, May 16, 2009
Hatoyama Beats Okada 124-95 (One Abstention, One Invalid Vote)
As so often has been the case, I failed to call it. Having said that…
It’s a secret ballot so we can’t know for sure, but based on the surveys that the mainstream media conducted in the lead-up to the vote, Hatoyama appears to have won thanks to a big lead in the Upper House vote. Okada seems to have at least held his own in the Lower House, whose members were more mindful of the upcoming election than their Upper House counterparts, only half of whom will face the public next year. Hatoyama likely held onto all of his group’s 30 votes as well as most of Ozawa’s 50 votes, so that was a huge head start against his independent opponent. Media surveys indicate that farther away from Ozawa’s group they were the less they preferred Hatoyama.
The question, of course, is: Will the sockpuppet (傀儡政権) trope stick? The media typically gives a new leader a grace period during which it says only nice things. (Remember when the chairman of Sharp, in deep trouble at the time, elevated a board member who was a journalist with no business experience to the chairman’s position and placed his own son, who had been placed on a special fast track, as president/CEO and the media hummed long to the company tune?) This may last only few days, but it’s important in Hatoyama’s case, because this is his best chance to establish himself as the real face of the DPJ. The polls will give him and the DPJ some momentum; it’s up to him to keep the snowball rolling.
Can Hatoyama do it? I noticed that he was a better speaker than I’d remembered. He has a better way with words than Okada. He also looked visibly animated during the DPJ election proceeding, as he no longer had to speak on behalf of the Ozawa DPJ. Speaking of whom, Ozawa must play his part by making himself scarce—something he has little trouble managing to do. In fact, this is the most important part of the DPJ electoral scenario.
This was a most civil election held between two highly civil candidates. It was definitely not politics as usual. The prospects of an imminent takeover must also have helped.
It’s a secret ballot so we can’t know for sure, but based on the surveys that the mainstream media conducted in the lead-up to the vote, Hatoyama appears to have won thanks to a big lead in the Upper House vote. Okada seems to have at least held his own in the Lower House, whose members were more mindful of the upcoming election than their Upper House counterparts, only half of whom will face the public next year. Hatoyama likely held onto all of his group’s 30 votes as well as most of Ozawa’s 50 votes, so that was a huge head start against his independent opponent. Media surveys indicate that farther away from Ozawa’s group they were the less they preferred Hatoyama.
The question, of course, is: Will the sockpuppet (傀儡政権) trope stick? The media typically gives a new leader a grace period during which it says only nice things. (Remember when the chairman of Sharp, in deep trouble at the time, elevated a board member who was a journalist with no business experience to the chairman’s position and placed his own son, who had been placed on a special fast track, as president/CEO and the media hummed long to the company tune?) This may last only few days, but it’s important in Hatoyama’s case, because this is his best chance to establish himself as the real face of the DPJ. The polls will give him and the DPJ some momentum; it’s up to him to keep the snowball rolling.
Can Hatoyama do it? I noticed that he was a better speaker than I’d remembered. He has a better way with words than Okada. He also looked visibly animated during the DPJ election proceeding, as he no longer had to speak on behalf of the Ozawa DPJ. Speaking of whom, Ozawa must play his part by making himself scarce—something he has little trouble managing to do. In fact, this is the most important part of the DPJ electoral scenario.
This was a most civil election held between two highly civil candidates. It was definitely not politics as usual. The prospects of an imminent takeover must also have helped.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
DPJ Election Update: Okada Rising
I suppose Junichiro Koizumi’s upset victory over Ryutaro Hashimoto in the 2001 LDP presidential race started it all, but whenever the LDP is about to elect a new president, mainstream dailies dial up the deputy heads of prefectural party chapters—the heads are usually Diet members, so their views do not necessarily reflect the wishes of the local chapter rank-and-file—to ask whom they favor and print the prefecture-by-prefecture results. The influence of the rank-and-file LDP party members has reached the point where a considerable number of Diet members will at least take the local votes into consideration when casting their own votes. Now, after electing it three previous leaders elected by acclaim, DPJ, with its Hatoyama-Okada showdown, is undergoing the same treatment.
The DPJ locals are clearly less used to flexing their muscle through media exposure, and none of the polls reflect the views of more than a third of the prefectural chapters. (Off the top of my head, I’d say that two-thirds or more of the LDP chapter deputy heads will let us know whom they favor.) Moreover, the results are wildly uneven, even though they all appear to have contacted the same person in each of the 47 chapters. Still, for your benefit:
Perhaps it was with this in mind that Tastuo Kawabata reportedly threw his support to Katsuya Okada this morning (14 May). This must be devastating to Hatoyama. On good terms with both Ozawa and Okada, Kawabata represents the 20 or so Diet members from former Democratic Socialists on the DPJ leadership council as one of the seven Deputy Presidents (outranked by three Honorary Advisors, the President, and two Acting Presidents but nominally outranking Hatoyama, the Secretary-General). There is no indication that he can actually carry the old DS vote, but he did make his announcement at the group’s morning get-together. Meanwhile, Naoto Kan’s group, in keeping with its leader’s arm’s-length approach to Ozawa, has released its members to vote their conscience. This has the looks of a surge for Okada. The question is: Are two days enough time for him to catch up?
Some worry that a split along faction boundaries—80 from Ozawa and Hatoyama’s groups vs. 50 from Maehara and Noda’s, while the rest scramble to balance the imperatives of their personal ties against those of their electoral prospects—will create a rift, particularly if Ozawa (and his closest associates) see a Hatoyama loss as a personal rejection. I don’t think that will happen, not to the extent that it will be a drag in the Lower House election. It’s the recriminations that will come if they lose or fail to form a stable working majority that the DPJ must be afraid of. All the more desirable it is then, to heed public opinion (even if it is to a great extent a media construct), as well as position itself to welcome post-election LDP splittists—the latter factor also favoring Okada.
The DPJ locals are clearly less used to flexing their muscle through media exposure, and none of the polls reflect the views of more than a third of the prefectural chapters. (Off the top of my head, I’d say that two-thirds or more of the LDP chapter deputy heads will let us know whom they favor.) Moreover, the results are wildly uneven, even though they all appear to have contacted the same person in each of the 47 chapters. Still, for your benefit:
Asahi: Okada 9, Hatoyama 8Iffy as the figures look, it seems that Okada is ahead with regard to the deputy heads who are not afraid to speak up. The online Mainichi online does not have a tally. However, just as important if not more so to the Lower House members (as well as other candidates) who must face an election in the coming months, Mainichi conducted an unscheduled national public opinion poll, in which Okada led the field with 25% to Hatoyama’s 13%. (Naoto Kan, Seiji Maehara and Akira Nagatsuma came in third, fourth and fifth with 12%, 8%, and 5% respectively.) Even the photos accompanying the Mainichi report—glum Hatoyama and radiant Okada—can’t resist editorializing, it seems.
Yomiuri: Okada 13, Hatoyama 4
Sankei: Okada 9, Hatoyama 3
Mainichi: Okada 8, Hatoyama 3 (overlooked; added 15 May)
Perhaps it was with this in mind that Tastuo Kawabata reportedly threw his support to Katsuya Okada this morning (14 May). This must be devastating to Hatoyama. On good terms with both Ozawa and Okada, Kawabata represents the 20 or so Diet members from former Democratic Socialists on the DPJ leadership council as one of the seven Deputy Presidents (outranked by three Honorary Advisors, the President, and two Acting Presidents but nominally outranking Hatoyama, the Secretary-General). There is no indication that he can actually carry the old DS vote, but he did make his announcement at the group’s morning get-together. Meanwhile, Naoto Kan’s group, in keeping with its leader’s arm’s-length approach to Ozawa, has released its members to vote their conscience. This has the looks of a surge for Okada. The question is: Are two days enough time for him to catch up?
Some worry that a split along faction boundaries—80 from Ozawa and Hatoyama’s groups vs. 50 from Maehara and Noda’s, while the rest scramble to balance the imperatives of their personal ties against those of their electoral prospects—will create a rift, particularly if Ozawa (and his closest associates) see a Hatoyama loss as a personal rejection. I don’t think that will happen, not to the extent that it will be a drag in the Lower House election. It’s the recriminations that will come if they lose or fail to form a stable working majority that the DPJ must be afraid of. All the more desirable it is then, to heed public opinion (even if it is to a great extent a media construct), as well as position itself to welcome post-election LDP splittists—the latter factor also favoring Okada.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Sankei Says Hatoyama Ahead; I Say Deuces Wild
According to the headline of this Sankei report, it’s Mr. Hatoyama in the Lead, Meets Mr. Kan and Asks for Support.
Maybe, maybe not.
Now, as I’ve related here, if Hatoyama adds most if not all of Ozawa’s 50 votes to his own 30, he has 80 or so out o f the 221 Diet members eligible to vote for party president. That is surely very doable. Then, if he can add the bulk of the 20 ex-Socialists—more favorably disposed to old-school LDP alumnus Ozawa than Okada and his new school allies—to this total, all he needs to do is corral a goodly portion of Kan’s 30 votes to put himself over the top.
Not so fast. The same Sankei notes that the three DPJ Diet members from Okayama Prefecture have decided to poll 3,000 local DPJ members to determine whom to vote for. Other media reports claim that other prefectural chapters are trying to follow suit.
Now, if you’ve been wondering, where have I heard this story before, you are not alone. For it was the local voting in the 2001 LDP Presidential primaries that compelled its Diet members to ditch overwhelming favorite and former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and throw their support behind once-fringe candidate Junichiro Koizumi. More recently in 2007, Taro Aso put the scare into Yasuo Fukuda in the local voting and paved the way for his succession the following year.
Ozawa has done his browbeating best to cut out the local yokels and to force the election on a Saturday, just four days after his resignation—precisely to forestall an uprising from the provinces. He knows that Okada has been spending almost every week of the last four years “trampling on the sewer coverings” and wading the rice paddies, talking (and listening) to Taro Q. Citizen, well before he began his own chiho jungyo. But that only diminishes Hatoyama in the media’s collective mind. The media has already been casting the two-horse race as a battle between Hatoyama the Ozawa Sockpuppet vs. Okada the Klutz. So guess who is going to win a media poll?
Okada has two days to put the scare into the local chapters. The race is wide open.
Maybe, maybe not.
Now, as I’ve related here, if Hatoyama adds most if not all of Ozawa’s 50 votes to his own 30, he has 80 or so out o f the 221 Diet members eligible to vote for party president. That is surely very doable. Then, if he can add the bulk of the 20 ex-Socialists—more favorably disposed to old-school LDP alumnus Ozawa than Okada and his new school allies—to this total, all he needs to do is corral a goodly portion of Kan’s 30 votes to put himself over the top.
Not so fast. The same Sankei notes that the three DPJ Diet members from Okayama Prefecture have decided to poll 3,000 local DPJ members to determine whom to vote for. Other media reports claim that other prefectural chapters are trying to follow suit.
Now, if you’ve been wondering, where have I heard this story before, you are not alone. For it was the local voting in the 2001 LDP Presidential primaries that compelled its Diet members to ditch overwhelming favorite and former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and throw their support behind once-fringe candidate Junichiro Koizumi. More recently in 2007, Taro Aso put the scare into Yasuo Fukuda in the local voting and paved the way for his succession the following year.
Ozawa has done his browbeating best to cut out the local yokels and to force the election on a Saturday, just four days after his resignation—precisely to forestall an uprising from the provinces. He knows that Okada has been spending almost every week of the last four years “trampling on the sewer coverings” and wading the rice paddies, talking (and listening) to Taro Q. Citizen, well before he began his own chiho jungyo. But that only diminishes Hatoyama in the media’s collective mind. The media has already been casting the two-horse race as a battle between Hatoyama the Ozawa Sockpuppet vs. Okada the Klutz. So guess who is going to win a media poll?
Okada has two days to put the scare into the local chapters. The race is wide open.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Hatoyama Backing into the Picture in the DPJ Succession
Not much more to say, but I thought a brief follow-up was warranted since it looks like Yukio Hatoyama may be throwing his hat in the ring after all.
The odds for Yukio Hatoyama standing for the election to succeed Ichiro Ozawa as DPJ leader are improving with every moment that he doesn’t say no. So it may be useful to look at an interesting chart on the second page of today’s morning Yomiuri. The chart gives the group-by-group numbers for the DPJ’s 221 MPs as well as the relationship between the groups. With the caveat that some MPs belong to more than one group, here’s what it says:
A. (Ichiro) Ozawa Group 50
B. (Yukio) Hatoyama Group 30
C. (Naoto) Kan Group 30
D. (Seiji) Maehara Group 30
E. Ex-Socialists 20
F. Ex-Democratic Socialists 20
G. Yoshihiko Noda Group 20
H. Independents (Okada et al) 25
They add up to 225, not many more than the 221 MPs that the DPJ actually has, and they are approximate figures. So let’s assume that they do provide an accurate picture of the relative strengths of the respective groups.
Next, the relationships:
A ♥ B&E.
B ♥ F.
D♥G.
A definitely does not ♥D&G.
A lukewarm C.
Now Hatoyama made a good show of supporting Ozawa. So if Ozawa was the kind of person who put a lot of stock in such personal service, he could conceivably put 50+20 votes to Hatoyama’s disposal. Hatoyama in turn would bring 30+20 votes on his own. That’s 120 votes, more than an outright majority of the DPJ MPs. But will Ozawa oblige? All he cares about is winning, and Hatoyama’s late-life association with Ozawa is a definite negative.
Neither Hatoyama with his humorless, beady-eyed carping nor Okada with his Clark-Kent looks and demeanor to match comes across as the second coming of Barack Obama. That being said, they’re definitely an upgrade on the ghostly presence of their predecessor-to-be as far as electoral campaigning is concerned, and the other wannabies (Maehara and Noda) appear to be unacceptable to the pro-Ozawa crowd. So it comes down after all to a showdown between Hatoyama and Okada, assuming Hatoyama actually stands.
No matter. The important thing, to repeat, is that the DPJ is set for a Lower House victory with a leader (whichever) who will be a far more palatable partner for a post-election LDP breakaway group that would assure an Upper House majority without bringing one or more of the mini-parties on board. This is more important than the identity of the eventual winner. And we only have to wait until Saturday at most to know.
I’ve been hitting the sauce early today after a hard day’s work, and it’s time to get to work on dinner. I promise to get back to your comments tomorrow.
The odds for Yukio Hatoyama standing for the election to succeed Ichiro Ozawa as DPJ leader are improving with every moment that he doesn’t say no. So it may be useful to look at an interesting chart on the second page of today’s morning Yomiuri. The chart gives the group-by-group numbers for the DPJ’s 221 MPs as well as the relationship between the groups. With the caveat that some MPs belong to more than one group, here’s what it says:
A. (Ichiro) Ozawa Group 50
B. (Yukio) Hatoyama Group 30
C. (Naoto) Kan Group 30
D. (Seiji) Maehara Group 30
E. Ex-Socialists 20
F. Ex-Democratic Socialists 20
G. Yoshihiko Noda Group 20
H. Independents (Okada et al) 25
They add up to 225, not many more than the 221 MPs that the DPJ actually has, and they are approximate figures. So let’s assume that they do provide an accurate picture of the relative strengths of the respective groups.
Next, the relationships:
A ♥ B&E.
B ♥ F.
D♥G.
A definitely does not ♥D&G.
A lukewarm C.
Now Hatoyama made a good show of supporting Ozawa. So if Ozawa was the kind of person who put a lot of stock in such personal service, he could conceivably put 50+20 votes to Hatoyama’s disposal. Hatoyama in turn would bring 30+20 votes on his own. That’s 120 votes, more than an outright majority of the DPJ MPs. But will Ozawa oblige? All he cares about is winning, and Hatoyama’s late-life association with Ozawa is a definite negative.
Neither Hatoyama with his humorless, beady-eyed carping nor Okada with his Clark-Kent looks and demeanor to match comes across as the second coming of Barack Obama. That being said, they’re definitely an upgrade on the ghostly presence of their predecessor-to-be as far as electoral campaigning is concerned, and the other wannabies (Maehara and Noda) appear to be unacceptable to the pro-Ozawa crowd. So it comes down after all to a showdown between Hatoyama and Okada, assuming Hatoyama actually stands.
No matter. The important thing, to repeat, is that the DPJ is set for a Lower House victory with a leader (whichever) who will be a far more palatable partner for a post-election LDP breakaway group that would assure an Upper House majority without bringing one or more of the mini-parties on board. This is more important than the identity of the eventual winner. And we only have to wait until Saturday at most to know.
I’ve been hitting the sauce early today after a hard day’s work, and it’s time to get to work on dinner. I promise to get back to your comments tomorrow.
Thursday, March 05, 2009
Ozawa’s Troubles Bigger than I Suspected
Media reports today suggest that Ozawa is in deeper trouble than I had suspected. An arrangement that funneled Nishimatsu money to the Ozawa camp reportedly began in 1995, when Ozawa was wresting control of the New Frontier Party, the first credible threat to the LDP since the latter’s founding in 1955, from his intra-party rivals. The arrangement called for 25 million yen annually, with some of the money going to Ozawa’s financial management organization, and the rest of it going to the Iwate Prefecture 4th District chapter—Ozawa’s electoral district and Iwate Prefecture chapter association of the New Frontier Party and now the DPJ. In the beginning, at least some of the money came directly from Nishimatsu Construction and its real estate subsidiary but later increasingly, after 2003 exclusively, funneled through two Nishimatsu dummy organizations. The money going to the Ozawa organization allegedly violates both the letter and the spirit of the law, which since 1999 has banned financial management organizations—think, PAC on steroids—through which all political funds to individual politicians must flow, from accepting political from accepting corporate money.
What’s relevant against this timeline is the fact that the top publicly-funded secretary who was arrested joined the Ozawa office in 1999 as a private secretary after losing a mayoral election. Thus, he could not have been involved in making the initial arrangements with Nishimatsu in 1995, nor the beginning of the shift to the two Nishimatsu dummies in 1995 and 1998. It is also unlikely that he had any significant role in making arrangements to circumvent the ban that came into force in 1999. In other words, someone other than the secretary was responsible for setting up the initial arrangement and most likely the alterations to camouflage the corporate source after the ban. The secretary merely walked into a situation that he subsequently was promoted to oversee and has been left holding the bag. Moreover, given the scope of the arrangement that covered the entire Iwate Prefecture and the initial legality of corporate contributions, it is hard to believe that Ozawa had not taken an active interest in the 1995 setup for Nishimatsu money, though it is also quite possible that he subsequently used his political machine to shield himself with a don’t ask, don’t tell information barrier.
The PPO cannot go back beyond the 2003 contributions as part of the accusations; the statute of limitations on criminal prosecution expires at the end of this month on the 7 million (received in 2003) out of the 21 million yen that Ozawa’s financial management organization received between2003-2008 and this has been given as the reason for the timing of the arrest. However, my guess is that the Criminal Procedure Code does allow the introduction of pre-March 2003 facts and evidence to support the case against the post-2003 infractions. The court of public opinion, of course, does not follow the Criminal Code, and will hear the case with Ichiro Ozawa as the main, albeit unindicted, suspect against a background of the entire 1995 arrangement, multiple allegations of political finance irregularities, and the graveyard shadow of the Fuligin General himself.
The next chapter of this saga is likely to come rather quickly, as the PPO must indict the secretary by the end of the month, or the statute of limitations expires on the 2003 money. An indictment will ratchet up the political pressure. Of course it’s still possible that Ozawa will be able to muster enough support within the DPJ to hang on—any threat that he might pull his troops out must be taken seriously in view of past experience and DPJ leaders are voicing their support in public—but that looks less likely as the full scope of the case unfolds. His rock-bed, diehard supporters are substantial but clearly in the minority, and the others should have no compunctions in taking him out if they see the damage outweighing the desire for party unity.
The electoral implications are more ambiguous. My money had already been on Katsuya Okada, ex-party leader once removed, as the most likely DPJ alternative if Ozawa resigns. He looks more and more the favorite, as a middle-of-the-road reformist without Ozawa’s money baggage—it’s easier to keep your nose clean when your father is a self-made billionaire—or enemies—the flip side is that backroom wheeling and dealing is not Okada’s forte—who has been tirelessly making the rounds of the boondocks since he resigned as party head after the 2006 Lower House election loss, while quietly voicing his loyal dissent as he sees fit. His wooden campaign style—think, Al Gore, without the bombast—is no help, but Ozawa is no Obama either. In any case, Ozawa’s travails improves the chances of Taro Aso making it to a snap election, even more so if Ozawa defies the odds and stays on. The media (and electorate) would no doubt prefer a Yosano-Okada matchup, but I’ll be surprised if both cards turn up.
Yes, I think that in the beginning I underestimated Ozawa’s problem. I may have a bias in favor of the status quo. I’ll have to think about that.
What’s relevant against this timeline is the fact that the top publicly-funded secretary who was arrested joined the Ozawa office in 1999 as a private secretary after losing a mayoral election. Thus, he could not have been involved in making the initial arrangements with Nishimatsu in 1995, nor the beginning of the shift to the two Nishimatsu dummies in 1995 and 1998. It is also unlikely that he had any significant role in making arrangements to circumvent the ban that came into force in 1999. In other words, someone other than the secretary was responsible for setting up the initial arrangement and most likely the alterations to camouflage the corporate source after the ban. The secretary merely walked into a situation that he subsequently was promoted to oversee and has been left holding the bag. Moreover, given the scope of the arrangement that covered the entire Iwate Prefecture and the initial legality of corporate contributions, it is hard to believe that Ozawa had not taken an active interest in the 1995 setup for Nishimatsu money, though it is also quite possible that he subsequently used his political machine to shield himself with a don’t ask, don’t tell information barrier.
The PPO cannot go back beyond the 2003 contributions as part of the accusations; the statute of limitations on criminal prosecution expires at the end of this month on the 7 million (received in 2003) out of the 21 million yen that Ozawa’s financial management organization received between2003-2008 and this has been given as the reason for the timing of the arrest. However, my guess is that the Criminal Procedure Code does allow the introduction of pre-March 2003 facts and evidence to support the case against the post-2003 infractions. The court of public opinion, of course, does not follow the Criminal Code, and will hear the case with Ichiro Ozawa as the main, albeit unindicted, suspect against a background of the entire 1995 arrangement, multiple allegations of political finance irregularities, and the graveyard shadow of the Fuligin General himself.
The next chapter of this saga is likely to come rather quickly, as the PPO must indict the secretary by the end of the month, or the statute of limitations expires on the 2003 money. An indictment will ratchet up the political pressure. Of course it’s still possible that Ozawa will be able to muster enough support within the DPJ to hang on—any threat that he might pull his troops out must be taken seriously in view of past experience and DPJ leaders are voicing their support in public—but that looks less likely as the full scope of the case unfolds. His rock-bed, diehard supporters are substantial but clearly in the minority, and the others should have no compunctions in taking him out if they see the damage outweighing the desire for party unity.
The electoral implications are more ambiguous. My money had already been on Katsuya Okada, ex-party leader once removed, as the most likely DPJ alternative if Ozawa resigns. He looks more and more the favorite, as a middle-of-the-road reformist without Ozawa’s money baggage—it’s easier to keep your nose clean when your father is a self-made billionaire—or enemies—the flip side is that backroom wheeling and dealing is not Okada’s forte—who has been tirelessly making the rounds of the boondocks since he resigned as party head after the 2006 Lower House election loss, while quietly voicing his loyal dissent as he sees fit. His wooden campaign style—think, Al Gore, without the bombast—is no help, but Ozawa is no Obama either. In any case, Ozawa’s travails improves the chances of Taro Aso making it to a snap election, even more so if Ozawa defies the odds and stays on. The media (and electorate) would no doubt prefer a Yosano-Okada matchup, but I’ll be surprised if both cards turn up.
Yes, I think that in the beginning I underestimated Ozawa’s problem. I may have a bias in favor of the status quo. I’ll have to think about that.
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