DPJ Deputy leader Yukio Hatoyama strikes a more than reasonable note on sending Self-Defense Force ships to protect the sea lanes against pirates. He stated that the DPJ would “consider the matter positively and favorably after [taking power]” and that “if we are to protect foreign ships as well as Japanese ones, we need a new law.” He may only be saying this to keep national security conservatives such as Akihisa Nagashima and Keiichiro Asao on side in the lead-up to the Lower House election, but I don’t think so. I am going to take his words at face value. Robert Dujarric sent me his latest Japan Times op-ed Japan in a Post-U.S. World, where he argues that Japan can and should do more to maintain and reinforce the public services that for the most the United States has provided during the post-WW II period. I agree (though I have some issues with his specific recommendations; I may talk about that later), and protecting the sea lanes in the Middle East and East Africa from pirates is one area where our national interests are squarely in line with the global public good.
I can’t quite see how Mr. Hatoyama can square that with the DPJ opposition to the Self-Defense Force refueling operations in the Indian Ocean on constitutional grounds. In both cases, the parties we’ll be going up against are non-sovereign entities engaging in illegal, often violent activities. Under international law, engaging them in battle would be a policing action by the JSDF, not an act of war, would it not? It doesn’t make sense from a legal point of view to choose one and reject the other.
Having said that, if it had to be one or the other, I’d say that patrolling the sea lanes against pirates is more important from a operational, if not necessarily diplomatic, point of view. Moreover, it’s the more radical and welcome departure from Japan’s traditionally circumspect approach to overseas projection of its military, not to mention more fun—fighting pirates indeed…Do I hear echoes of… yes, to the shores of Tripoli…
ADD: My reference to the U.S. Marines’ Hymn is partly in jest, partly a note of caution. For the line between policing actions on one hand and infringements on sovereignty and even war on the other can be blurry and subject to shifts.
Showing posts with label OEF refueling controversy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OEF refueling controversy. Show all posts
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Friday, August 29, 2008
Supermajority Override on Refueling Operations Possible without Komeito
Let’s see if I can clear out the most recent batch of otakkii clutter in my GlobalTalk 21 draft file. First up—a possible workaround for Komeito’s increasing reluctance to support a supermajority override on the counterterrorist refueling operation in the Indian Ocean (and the Persian Gulf). First, an excerpt from the Japanese Constitution:
Article 59. A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.Of the 480 seats in the Lower House, Komeito has 31. Subtracting the Komeito seats leaves 441. 2/3 of 441 equal 299.3. The LDP has 304 seats. Therefore, the LDP can override the Upper House by itself provided Komeito members absent themselves during the revote. That’s a last-resort, break-glass-in-emergency option, but it must be something that will cross the minds of coalition members as the extraordinary Diet session unfolds over the coming months.
2. A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.
3. The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law.
4. Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors.
Monday, August 18, 2008
The Indian Ocean—Where Hawk and Dove Pass Each Other in the Night
The headline from the 17 August Asahi says it all:
The Ruling coalition is getting the jitters over the re-extension of the law authorizing counterterrorist refueling operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean. Pushing the bill through the Lower House is easy, if still time-consuming, but the bill will stall in the Upper House, where the opposition jointly holds a majority will refuse to vote on it. That means that the ruling coalition will have to cool its heels there for an extra sixty days before it can use it Lower House supermajority to enact the extension. That means a long extraordinary Diet session—including an inevitable extension—in the 90-day neighborhood. The Komeito has only reluctantly supported the refueling operations. More importantly, for reasons that I’ll try to explain as part of a bigger Komeito story, it desperately wants to avoid a long Diet. Since the refueling operations are not popular with a majority/plurality of the electorate in the first place, some LDP figures have not been shying away from looking at alternatives that may meet the approval of the DPJ and thus may be able to avoid a Lower House override. So it is surprising to see notable dove Taku Yakamazaki—favorite target of tabloid allegations of sucking up to North Korea and China—standing firm behind the bill. Not so Taro Aso, Secretary-General of the LDP and war-mongering scourge to casual liberal observers of the West, who was spotted thinking out loud in a widely reported comment from a 5 August press briefing:
Never mind the international scorn that would befall Japan if JMSDF patrol boats putt-putt by escorting Japanese tankers and cargo ships while all the other participating naval forces are performing non-discriminatory areal operations; it is highly unlikely in the first place that JMSDF forces that can be spared from their normal national security operations would be able to cover anything more than a small fraction of the Japanese ships traversing the Indian Ocean. It would be both symbolically embarrassing and embarrassingly symbolic. Having said that, Mr. Aso’s idea is understandable as partly outreach to Komeito, partly a reflection of a genuine rapport with the junior coalition partner. But it is also a measure of the surprisingly eclectic approach that Mr. Aso takes with regard to hot-button issues on the supposed dove/hawk divide.
In case you’re wondering, I still think that the LDP will be able to coax Komeito into supporting a supermajority revote. But I have little more than my hunch to back me up on this, and few ideas on how the issue will unfold.
“Extend Refueling” Even If Revote Override Must Be Used, Emphasizes Mr. Yamazaki of the LDP
The Ruling coalition is getting the jitters over the re-extension of the law authorizing counterterrorist refueling operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean. Pushing the bill through the Lower House is easy, if still time-consuming, but the bill will stall in the Upper House, where the opposition jointly holds a majority will refuse to vote on it. That means that the ruling coalition will have to cool its heels there for an extra sixty days before it can use it Lower House supermajority to enact the extension. That means a long extraordinary Diet session—including an inevitable extension—in the 90-day neighborhood. The Komeito has only reluctantly supported the refueling operations. More importantly, for reasons that I’ll try to explain as part of a bigger Komeito story, it desperately wants to avoid a long Diet. Since the refueling operations are not popular with a majority/plurality of the electorate in the first place, some LDP figures have not been shying away from looking at alternatives that may meet the approval of the DPJ and thus may be able to avoid a Lower House override. So it is surprising to see notable dove Taku Yakamazaki—favorite target of tabloid allegations of sucking up to North Korea and China—standing firm behind the bill. Not so Taro Aso, Secretary-General of the LDP and war-mongering scourge to casual liberal observers of the West, who was spotted thinking out loud in a widely reported comment from a 5 August press briefing:
“If refueling can’t (be allowed) under any circumstances, we have to think something else, such as escorting Japanese transport ships.”
Never mind the international scorn that would befall Japan if JMSDF patrol boats putt-putt by escorting Japanese tankers and cargo ships while all the other participating naval forces are performing non-discriminatory areal operations; it is highly unlikely in the first place that JMSDF forces that can be spared from their normal national security operations would be able to cover anything more than a small fraction of the Japanese ships traversing the Indian Ocean. It would be both symbolically embarrassing and embarrassingly symbolic. Having said that, Mr. Aso’s idea is understandable as partly outreach to Komeito, partly a reflection of a genuine rapport with the junior coalition partner. But it is also a measure of the surprisingly eclectic approach that Mr. Aso takes with regard to hot-button issues on the supposed dove/hawk divide.
In case you’re wondering, I still think that the LDP will be able to coax Komeito into supporting a supermajority revote. But I have little more than my hunch to back me up on this, and few ideas on how the issue will unfold.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
If the Refueling Operations Are So Important, Why Not Use the Supermajority?
Nobutaka Machimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, is quoted here as saying, “Japan will drop out of the battlefront of the war on terror because of extremely domestic reasons. This will leave a large blot on Japan’s future, in the sense that Japan will be relegated to the minor leagues by giving up its responsibilities as a member of the international community.”
“Extremely domestic reasons” as in: We’re afraid that the opposition will pass a censure motion in the Upper House that will force Prime Minister Fukuda to call a snap election?
Now I’ve always had difficulty in understanding this logic, which says that exercising a constitutional prerogative inevitably leads to an early election, when the LDP knows that, regardless of the Moriya scandal, at the end of the day, Yomiuri and Sankei are going to support that. More seriously, if the LDP follows the advice of Bunmei Ibuki, its Secretary General, and Shigeru Ishiba, the Defense Minister, and leave the OEF-MIO refueling extension bill to be taken up again when the Diet reconvenes in January unless the public opinion polls show a two-thirds to 60% majority in favor, then it is giving up its responsibilities as the public's representative.
Few things can be more damaging in the long-run than a loss of political will, particularly when a plurality of both the public and the mainstream media has your back.
“Extremely domestic reasons” as in: We’re afraid that the opposition will pass a censure motion in the Upper House that will force Prime Minister Fukuda to call a snap election?
Now I’ve always had difficulty in understanding this logic, which says that exercising a constitutional prerogative inevitably leads to an early election, when the LDP knows that, regardless of the Moriya scandal, at the end of the day, Yomiuri and Sankei are going to support that. More seriously, if the LDP follows the advice of Bunmei Ibuki, its Secretary General, and Shigeru Ishiba, the Defense Minister, and leave the OEF-MIO refueling extension bill to be taken up again when the Diet reconvenes in January unless the public opinion polls show a two-thirds to 60% majority in favor, then it is giving up its responsibilities as the public's representative.
Few things can be more damaging in the long-run than a loss of political will, particularly when a plurality of both the public and the mainstream media has your back.
Saturday, October 20, 2007
A Monkey Wrench Named Takemasa Moriya in the OEF-ISAF Refueling Issue
I've been prefacing my prediction that the refueling extension bill will be passed with the words "barring unforeseen circumstances", or something of the sort. Those are part weasel words of someone who's been wrong too often, but also part truth. In politics, unforeseen circumstances do happen, with uncommon frequency. Here, I am thinking, Edmund Muskie's “tears”, Gary Hart-Donna Rice, Prime Minister Uno and the geisha girl, George Allen's macaca moment, ad infinitum.
And then, you have Takemasa Moriya.
Revelations of political financing irregularities that dogged the Abe administration (and the DPJ) continued under the Fukuda adminstration, and Yoichi Masuzoe, the Health, Labor and Welfare Minister and other LDP worthies have had their share of verbal gaffes in the new administration. But the media has been more or less willing to hand out mulligans to the media-friendly Prime Minister. But there is a good chance that this will end with the latest scandal to break out.
The DPJ had been pushing in the Diet to summon as a witness Takemasa Moriya, the previous Administrative Vice Minister at the Ministry of Defense, who had been the head of the MOD bureau responsible for the refueling operations when the 800,000-200,000 gallon accounting error occurred. The LDP had resisted, claiming that it was not the custom of the Diet to summon private citizens. For one, the LDP must be afraid of the spill over to another ongoing struggle, where the DPJ has also been trying to haul in Fujio Mitarai, head of Keidanren, for questioning on labor practices irregularities at his firm Canon.
But on Friday the deluge struck, as the media jumped all over Mr. Moriya with accusations of enjoying over a hundred all-expenses-paid golf and dinner outings courtesy of Yamada Yōkō, a mid-major MOD supplier, by way of a senior executive there. News reports add that his wife accompanied him on some of these excursions, and they signed in using aliases on at least some occasions. If true, all this would have served as grounds for severe punishment under Ministry rules. Although there is no way to formally punish him, barring criminal charges, the opposition is beside itself with joy. The fractious DPJ in particular has been handed an excellent sideshow in which to rake the MOD over the coals and take the public’s eyes off their own lack of agreement on a viable alternative. This not only calls into question the reliability of the executor of the refueling but also casts a pall of scandal on the defense establishment and more specifically the LDP-New Komeitō coalition government. Predictable calls from an unnamed LDP sources are suggesting that it might be wiser to shut the Diet down as scheduled and put the bill forward in the regular Diet session.
This should not have come as a total surprise to the LDP. Mr. Moriya had been asked about his relations with the executive at the press conference he held when he retired. He gave an evasive answer that sounded very much like playing for time until he could disappear from the scene. But it appears that the LDP had not prepared themselves for this contingency. Still, the LDP could throw him under the bus, and wait it out until the two months are up. Evading the Diet on the scandal now makes the Fukuda administration only makes it look even more guilty by association, raises questions of leadership, and calls into question the importance of the refueling operations. It’s not as if Mr. Moriya will conveniently take himself out in the meantime.
If only.
But the story could be bigger than the moral degeneracy of a wayward bureaucrat. Sankei has the best backstory on the scandal. According to the article, the former senior executive had been responsible for handling MOD and politicians. He left Yamada Yōkō with a few dozen colleagues to form his own company Nihon Mirise, which quickly became a formidable competitor to Yamada Yōkō. Ymada Yōkō is suing its former employees for 1.5 billion yen in damages, and Sankei believes that the Prosecutors Office is also questioning senior executives at both companies for accounting irregularities at Yamada Yōkō while the former executive worked there. For someone who may be under criminal suspicion, the former executive seems to be talking freely to anyone who comes asking. I assume that the DPJ will try to use this controversy to discredit the entire defense establishment.
Now all this is not directly linked to the refueling operations, and it does not have any of the makings of another Lockheed bribery scandal. But the plurality public support for the refueling operations is, like its majority/plurality support for constitutional amendment, lukewarm, and lacks the compelling power of domestic pocketbook issues. I'm not ready (vicariously) to throw in the towel yet, but the air of inevitability is definitely gone.
Quote of the day:
鳩山由紀夫「法案の形で[党独自のアフガン対策を]法案の形で作り上げたいが、(守屋氏の)疑惑を最優先にしていかなければならなくなった」(Yomiuri, 20 October; assuming, of course, that he actually said that)
“We would like to put [DPJ’s own proposal for Afghanistan] in the form of a bill, but we have been forced to make suspicions over (Mr. Moriya) our top priority.”
-Yukio Hatoyama, DPJ Secretary-General
And then, you have Takemasa Moriya.
Revelations of political financing irregularities that dogged the Abe administration (and the DPJ) continued under the Fukuda adminstration, and Yoichi Masuzoe, the Health, Labor and Welfare Minister and other LDP worthies have had their share of verbal gaffes in the new administration. But the media has been more or less willing to hand out mulligans to the media-friendly Prime Minister. But there is a good chance that this will end with the latest scandal to break out.
The DPJ had been pushing in the Diet to summon as a witness Takemasa Moriya, the previous Administrative Vice Minister at the Ministry of Defense, who had been the head of the MOD bureau responsible for the refueling operations when the 800,000-200,000 gallon accounting error occurred. The LDP had resisted, claiming that it was not the custom of the Diet to summon private citizens. For one, the LDP must be afraid of the spill over to another ongoing struggle, where the DPJ has also been trying to haul in Fujio Mitarai, head of Keidanren, for questioning on labor practices irregularities at his firm Canon.
But on Friday the deluge struck, as the media jumped all over Mr. Moriya with accusations of enjoying over a hundred all-expenses-paid golf and dinner outings courtesy of Yamada Yōkō, a mid-major MOD supplier, by way of a senior executive there. News reports add that his wife accompanied him on some of these excursions, and they signed in using aliases on at least some occasions. If true, all this would have served as grounds for severe punishment under Ministry rules. Although there is no way to formally punish him, barring criminal charges, the opposition is beside itself with joy. The fractious DPJ in particular has been handed an excellent sideshow in which to rake the MOD over the coals and take the public’s eyes off their own lack of agreement on a viable alternative. This not only calls into question the reliability of the executor of the refueling but also casts a pall of scandal on the defense establishment and more specifically the LDP-New Komeitō coalition government. Predictable calls from an unnamed LDP sources are suggesting that it might be wiser to shut the Diet down as scheduled and put the bill forward in the regular Diet session.
This should not have come as a total surprise to the LDP. Mr. Moriya had been asked about his relations with the executive at the press conference he held when he retired. He gave an evasive answer that sounded very much like playing for time until he could disappear from the scene. But it appears that the LDP had not prepared themselves for this contingency. Still, the LDP could throw him under the bus, and wait it out until the two months are up. Evading the Diet on the scandal now makes the Fukuda administration only makes it look even more guilty by association, raises questions of leadership, and calls into question the importance of the refueling operations. It’s not as if Mr. Moriya will conveniently take himself out in the meantime.
If only.
But the story could be bigger than the moral degeneracy of a wayward bureaucrat. Sankei has the best backstory on the scandal. According to the article, the former senior executive had been responsible for handling MOD and politicians. He left Yamada Yōkō with a few dozen colleagues to form his own company Nihon Mirise, which quickly became a formidable competitor to Yamada Yōkō. Ymada Yōkō is suing its former employees for 1.5 billion yen in damages, and Sankei believes that the Prosecutors Office is also questioning senior executives at both companies for accounting irregularities at Yamada Yōkō while the former executive worked there. For someone who may be under criminal suspicion, the former executive seems to be talking freely to anyone who comes asking. I assume that the DPJ will try to use this controversy to discredit the entire defense establishment.
Now all this is not directly linked to the refueling operations, and it does not have any of the makings of another Lockheed bribery scandal. But the plurality public support for the refueling operations is, like its majority/plurality support for constitutional amendment, lukewarm, and lacks the compelling power of domestic pocketbook issues. I'm not ready (vicariously) to throw in the towel yet, but the air of inevitability is definitely gone.
Quote of the day:
鳩山由紀夫「法案の形で[党独自のアフガン対策を]法案の形で作り上げたいが、(守屋氏の)疑惑を最優先にしていかなければならなくなった」(Yomiuri, 20 October; assuming, of course, that he actually said that)
“We would like to put [DPJ’s own proposal for Afghanistan] in the form of a bill, but we have been forced to make suspicions over (Mr. Moriya) our top priority.”
-Yukio Hatoyama, DPJ Secretary-General
Thursday, October 11, 2007
My Big Mistake on OEF-MIO Operations from the Persian Gulf and Incomplete Thoughts Thereon
I made a big mistake. In fact, I made a doubled-size, italics, bold-letter mistake here. Foreign Minister Komura under Diet questioning reaffirmed that naval vessels did participate in bombing sorties in Afghanistan after receiving fuel from JMSDF vessels, and that the new anti-terrorism bill would be limited to Maritime Interception Operations (OEF-MIO).
So, my unconditional, absolute apology to TIME and its intrepid reporting team.
But it was not to abase myself publicly that I am writing this. You see, the existence of such bombing operations is very important because that is the only plausible explanation for the USS Kitty Hawk engaging in OEF from the Persian Gulf during the three days (25-27 February 2003) that, according to Defense Minister Ishiba, it took to consume the 800,000 gallons that it received from the JMSDF refueling ship Tokiwa. (In fact, I'm very much embarrassed at the fact that I didn't see this point in the first place.)
Still, leaving aside the conceptual difficulty of wrapping your mind around the idea that you can somehow distinguish between the drops of JMSDF fuel and drops of non-JMSDF fuel in the same fuel tank (surely the Kitty Hawk was not running on empty when it was serviced by Tokiwa) the discrepancy between average daily fuel consumption figures under normal conditions (U.S. documents by way of Peace Depot-113,000 gallons, Mr. Ishiba-200,000 gallons) remains unresolved. Likewise, the Kitty Hawk command history that the Peace Depot accusations has uploaded appears to show that its objectives on this mission were to engage in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).
Moreover, the Kitty Hawk deck log, again courtesy of Peace Depot, together with a map attached to the hard copy version of this Yomiuri article on Mr. Ushiba's testimony raises a further question. The deck log shows the Kitty Hawk in "AT/PASSAGE FROM Malacca TO Persian Gulf" on two dates, 17 February and 27 February, the latter date being the day it changed command. I presume that subsequent log entries show the Kitty Hawk "AT/PASSAGE FROM the Persian Gulf TO". The Yomiuri map of the Kitty Hawk's final leg of its passage (did Mr. Ishiba display it during his Diet testimony?) shows the Kitty Hawk on the move continuously, as it approaches from the Indian Ocean on 24 February, refuels from the Tokiwa near the mouth of the Persian Gulf on 25 February, enters the Gulf on 26 February, then comes to settle off the narrow Iraqi outlet at the tip of the Gulf on 1 March. I suspect that if the log between its departure from Okinawa and arrival in the Gulf were disclosed, it would show that the Kitty Hawk had been in continuous movement every day. Now it is conceivable that it ran sorties to Afghanistan in passing as it neared its ultimate destination. But plausible? I have no military expertise whatsoever, so I'll leave it at that.
There's also the matter of the large amount of JMSDF-to-U.S. vessel refueling, both in number of operations and per operation volume, in FY 2001 (April-March) and FY 2002, and the dramatic drop-off thereafter. The 800,000 gallons in the 25 February operation is merely a small fraction of the total. OSW effectively ended with the successful subjugation of the Iraqi regime at the end of the Japanese FY 2002. This coincidence of the end of refueling large U.S. military vessels and the end of a continuous aerial operation must be matched against the rise and fall of battleground needs in Afghanistan at the time to derive any conclusions, though; and, again, I am in way over my head. Unfortunately for Ichiro Ozawa, DPJ wonks knowledgeable in defense matters do not seem to be in his corner in the attack on the anti-terrorism operations.
Okay, now back to life.
(note) Major operations in Afghanistan involving air power seemed to have subsided, at least for while, after Operation Anaconda in March 2002. And the Anaconda was run by the U.S. ARMY and Air Force and did not involve the Navy or the Marines.
So, my unconditional, absolute apology to TIME and its intrepid reporting team.
But it was not to abase myself publicly that I am writing this. You see, the existence of such bombing operations is very important because that is the only plausible explanation for the USS Kitty Hawk engaging in OEF from the Persian Gulf during the three days (25-27 February 2003) that, according to Defense Minister Ishiba, it took to consume the 800,000 gallons that it received from the JMSDF refueling ship Tokiwa. (In fact, I'm very much embarrassed at the fact that I didn't see this point in the first place.)
Still, leaving aside the conceptual difficulty of wrapping your mind around the idea that you can somehow distinguish between the drops of JMSDF fuel and drops of non-JMSDF fuel in the same fuel tank (surely the Kitty Hawk was not running on empty when it was serviced by Tokiwa) the discrepancy between average daily fuel consumption figures under normal conditions (U.S. documents by way of Peace Depot-113,000 gallons, Mr. Ishiba-200,000 gallons) remains unresolved. Likewise, the Kitty Hawk command history that the Peace Depot accusations has uploaded appears to show that its objectives on this mission were to engage in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).
Moreover, the Kitty Hawk deck log, again courtesy of Peace Depot, together with a map attached to the hard copy version of this Yomiuri article on Mr. Ushiba's testimony raises a further question. The deck log shows the Kitty Hawk in "
There's also the matter of the large amount of JMSDF-to-U.S. vessel refueling, both in number of operations and per operation volume, in FY 2001 (April-March) and FY 2002, and the dramatic drop-off thereafter. The 800,000 gallons in the 25 February operation is merely a small fraction of the total. OSW effectively ended with the successful subjugation of the Iraqi regime at the end of the Japanese FY 2002. This coincidence of the end of refueling large U.S. military vessels and the end of a continuous aerial operation must be matched against the rise and fall of battleground needs in Afghanistan at the time to derive any conclusions, though; and, again, I am in way over my head. Unfortunately for Ichiro Ozawa, DPJ wonks knowledgeable in defense matters do not seem to be in his corner in the attack on the anti-terrorism operations.
Okay, now back to life.
(note) Major operations in Afghanistan involving air power seemed to have subsided, at least for while, after Operation Anaconda in March 2002. And the Anaconda was run by the U.S. ARMY and Air Force and did not involve the Navy or the Marines.
Monday, October 08, 2007
Has TIME (Where Else?) Correspondent Fallen for Deadpan Foreign Minister's Joke?
Japan May Stop Afghan Mission Aid
(TOKYO) — Japan would scale back its support of the U.S. in Afghanistan by ending naval assistance to vessels involved in ground missions there under a ruling party proposal that officials predicted Sunday would gain parliament's approval.
Since 2001, Japan's navy has been providing fuel for coalition warships under an anti-terrorism law that has been extended three times. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has strongly pushed for another extension to the mission, which expires on Nov. 1.
However, Fukuda has been forced to make concessions because of strong resistance from the opposition bloc, which took control of parliament's upper chamber following a massive electoral defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in July.
A new draft law, submitted to the opposition Friday, would clearly limit the mission to naval refueling and supplying of water to vessels participating in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom's maritime patrol missions in the Indian Ocean.
"Under the new law, there will be no refueling to ships providing support for ground operations (in Afghanistan)," Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura said Sunday on a public broadcaster NHK talk show.
- TIME, 07 October 2007
Dang, we've been hearing about the new anti-terrorism bill doing away with "[non-existent] search and rescue missions, as well as [non-existent] humanitarian relief efforts", but maritime operations? Oddly, none of the mainstream media seem to be carrying the story. Doesn't anybody care anymore? So I wrack my brain all day, until I realize:
Afghanistan is a land-locked nation, hundreds of miles away from any serious body of seawater! In fact, it's hundred's of miles away from any serious body of water.
"Opposition lawmakers have also alleged that oil supplied by Japanese ships was diverted to U.S. operations in Iraq, triggering public outrage. "The government must more clearly disclose its activities over the last six years," DPJ secretary-general Naoto Kan told a Fuji TV talk show on Sunday."
Mr. Kan's low-key sarcasm does not come cross very well in print (you have to see it to feel the victim's irritation and frustration), and something is lost in translation, so I'll give the correspondent a pass on that. But where's the public outrage? Don't you have the presence of mind to quote a tabloid? Asahi? Actually, the relative lack of public outrage is something that has mildly surprised me through all this.
"On Saturday, the country's largest business daily, the Nikkei, said Japan was preparing to withdraw its ships entirely from the region because the government did not expect to meet the deadline — a report quickly denied by the Defense Ministry.
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba reiterated Sunday the government remained confident it can win backing of the opposition, which controls parliament's upper chamber. "We believe the new law will be approved in the upper house," Ishiba told a separate talk show aired by TV Asahi."
Maybe I was watching a different Shigeru Ishiba, because the Defense Minister that I saw kept saying something to the effect that this was not the time to talk of an override, and that much would hinge on how public opinion would evolve. But I'll take it on faith that Mr. Ishiba did say those things. Still, when most people believe that the DPJ has little room for moving away from its opposition to the extension of OEF-MIO, it's odd that these statements could be left out there without any context.
"But Fukuda, who took office last month, has sold himself as a compromiser and promised to reach a consensus with the opposition over the Afghan mission."
Nobody believes that he has made such a promise. He's made a best-effort commitment, nothing more.
And why does the article end on this note:
"Japan also hosts about 50,000 U.S. troops and is working with the U.S. on a joint missile defense system."
So true, but what does it have to do with the context? This article seems to begin with a missed joke, and end in a missing point.
Seriously, could the Foreign Minister have been referring to Iraq? It is also important to note that, under Ichiro Ozawa's reasoning, the JSMDF should be providing support for ground operations in Afghaniston, but not for what Mr. Komura purportedly limited the extension to.
(TOKYO) — Japan would scale back its support of the U.S. in Afghanistan by ending naval assistance to vessels involved in ground missions there under a ruling party proposal that officials predicted Sunday would gain parliament's approval.
Since 2001, Japan's navy has been providing fuel for coalition warships under an anti-terrorism law that has been extended three times. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has strongly pushed for another extension to the mission, which expires on Nov. 1.
However, Fukuda has been forced to make concessions because of strong resistance from the opposition bloc, which took control of parliament's upper chamber following a massive electoral defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in July.
A new draft law, submitted to the opposition Friday, would clearly limit the mission to naval refueling and supplying of water to vessels participating in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom's maritime patrol missions in the Indian Ocean.
"Under the new law, there will be no refueling to ships providing support for ground operations (in Afghanistan)," Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura said Sunday on a public broadcaster NHK talk show.
- TIME, 07 October 2007
Dang, we've been hearing about the new anti-terrorism bill doing away with "[non-existent] search and rescue missions, as well as [non-existent] humanitarian relief efforts", but maritime operations? Oddly, none of the mainstream media seem to be carrying the story. Doesn't anybody care anymore? So I wrack my brain all day, until I realize:
Afghanistan is a land-locked nation, hundreds of miles away from any serious body of seawater! In fact, it's hundred's of miles away from any serious body of water.
"Opposition lawmakers have also alleged that oil supplied by Japanese ships was diverted to U.S. operations in Iraq, triggering public outrage. "The government must more clearly disclose its activities over the last six years," DPJ secretary-general Naoto Kan told a Fuji TV talk show on Sunday."
Mr. Kan's low-key sarcasm does not come cross very well in print (you have to see it to feel the victim's irritation and frustration), and something is lost in translation, so I'll give the correspondent a pass on that. But where's the public outrage? Don't you have the presence of mind to quote a tabloid? Asahi? Actually, the relative lack of public outrage is something that has mildly surprised me through all this.
"On Saturday, the country's largest business daily, the Nikkei, said Japan was preparing to withdraw its ships entirely from the region because the government did not expect to meet the deadline — a report quickly denied by the Defense Ministry.
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba reiterated Sunday the government remained confident it can win backing of the opposition, which controls parliament's upper chamber. "We believe the new law will be approved in the upper house," Ishiba told a separate talk show aired by TV Asahi."
Maybe I was watching a different Shigeru Ishiba, because the Defense Minister that I saw kept saying something to the effect that this was not the time to talk of an override, and that much would hinge on how public opinion would evolve. But I'll take it on faith that Mr. Ishiba did say those things. Still, when most people believe that the DPJ has little room for moving away from its opposition to the extension of OEF-MIO, it's odd that these statements could be left out there without any context.
"But Fukuda, who took office last month, has sold himself as a compromiser and promised to reach a consensus with the opposition over the Afghan mission."
Nobody believes that he has made such a promise. He's made a best-effort commitment, nothing more.
And why does the article end on this note:
"Japan also hosts about 50,000 U.S. troops and is working with the U.S. on a joint missile defense system."
So true, but what does it have to do with the context? This article seems to begin with a missed joke, and end in a missing point.
Seriously, could the Foreign Minister have been referring to Iraq? It is also important to note that, under Ichiro Ozawa's reasoning, the JSMDF should be providing support for ground operations in Afghaniston, but not for what Mr. Komura purportedly limited the extension to.
Sunday, October 07, 2007
Refueling Issue Update
1. Newspaper reports say that the ruling coalition will introduce the bill only after the Budget Committee has completed its session on October 17. If true, this means that the earliest opportunity to submit the bill will be October 19, after the Cabinet meeting, giving the House of Representatives less than two weeks to vote on the bill. It is looking more likely that the supermajority revote will be held in January, before the Diet recesses and reconvenes in its annual regular session, most likely in the bottom half of January.
2. I had written here that the LDP considered both OEF-MIO and ISAF constitutionally acceptable. But I have recently seen Foreign Minister Komura state that direct participation in ISAF activities as of now would be unconstitutional, since the area could not yet be considered a non-combat area. Defense Minster Ishiba, the man who not only knows everything about military affairs but can also recite Article 9 by heart, gave a more elaborate explanation today on Sunday Project, pointing to two elements; 1) the existence of a conflict between states; and 2) a state of war that would make Japanese participation unconstitutional, and that 2) constitutionally barred Japan from taking part right now.
I don't think that this is a sound legal argument. War is war in a legal sense only because there are two or more states involved. Mr. Ishiba, in arguing for the continuation of the refueling activities, stated (and nobody is disputing) that there was no state as an enemy combatant in the case of OEF-MIO. But the same holds true for ISAF. In fact, Article 9 has even less to do with OEF-MIO (which did have Afghanistan as an enemy combatant to start with) than it does with ISAF (which has only non-state domestic insurgents and Al Qaeda as adversaries). But who asked me for my opinion? So this is a correction of the facts of the issue.
3) Mr. Ishiba also claimed that, although Pentagon is still in the process of conducting a thorough survey of the Kitty Hawk refueling controversy, he has so far been developing a conviction that the diesel fuel was not diverted to the Iraqi War. Everything seems to acquire more credibility - or at least plausibility - when Mr. Ishiba says it, so I'm going to suspend judgment until the case is laid out in public with due evidence, as he promised.
2. I had written here that the LDP considered both OEF-MIO and ISAF constitutionally acceptable. But I have recently seen Foreign Minister Komura state that direct participation in ISAF activities as of now would be unconstitutional, since the area could not yet be considered a non-combat area. Defense Minster Ishiba, the man who not only knows everything about military affairs but can also recite Article 9 by heart, gave a more elaborate explanation today on Sunday Project, pointing to two elements; 1) the existence of a conflict between states; and 2) a state of war that would make Japanese participation unconstitutional, and that 2) constitutionally barred Japan from taking part right now.
I don't think that this is a sound legal argument. War is war in a legal sense only because there are two or more states involved. Mr. Ishiba, in arguing for the continuation of the refueling activities, stated (and nobody is disputing) that there was no state as an enemy combatant in the case of OEF-MIO. But the same holds true for ISAF. In fact, Article 9 has even less to do with OEF-MIO (which did have Afghanistan as an enemy combatant to start with) than it does with ISAF (which has only non-state domestic insurgents and Al Qaeda as adversaries). But who asked me for my opinion? So this is a correction of the facts of the issue.
3) Mr. Ishiba also claimed that, although Pentagon is still in the process of conducting a thorough survey of the Kitty Hawk refueling controversy, he has so far been developing a conviction that the diesel fuel was not diverted to the Iraqi War. Everything seems to acquire more credibility - or at least plausibility - when Mr. Ishiba says it, so I'm going to suspend judgment until the case is laid out in public with due evidence, as he promised.
Friday, October 05, 2007
From Asahi, Peace Depot Update on JMSDF OEF-MIO? OIF? Refueling Activities
Today's Asahi brings us the news that Peace Depot, in the second installment of their investigations, which I previously chronicled here. Peace Depot has confirmed mainly through the log records of the Fleet Replenishment Oiler USNS Pecos, which had made the controversial 80,000 gallon retransfer to the USS Kitty Hawk, had subsequently refueled the Egis cruiser Coupens, then replenished locally and repeatedly refueled other US Marine and other vessels in the Persian Gulf. Peace Depot asserts that this deepens suspicions that the 800,000 gallon fuel oil in question, even if it had not been used to refuel the Kitty Hawk, was indeed used for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Asahi, perhaps weighted by its initial support of refueling activities back in the day, takes a We-Report, You-Decide approach to the latest revelations.
Asahi, perhaps weighted by its initial support of refueling activities back in the day, takes a We-Report, You-Decide approach to the latest revelations.
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Will the DPJ Push Mr. Ozawa's Legal Argument and Normal Country Inclinations to Their Ultimate Conclusion?
There is no difference of opinion between the LDP and the DPJ over the basic legal prerequisites for Japanese involvement in military operations in and around Afghanistan. Both parties believe that such operations must be authorized by UNSG resolutions. However, the two parties differ when it comes to the specific application of this legal principle. The LDP is of the view that both a) the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its activities and b) what the US named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; actually, OEF in Afghanistan in this post, as commonly accepted) and its participants have received such authorization, while the DPF asserts that only ISAF has done so. So, as far as the Constitution is concerned, the LDP position is that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces may engage in both activities, while the DPJ, with the victorious Ichiro Ozawa imposing his will on internal dissidents, allows to participation in ISAF only.
As a practical matter though, the LDP deems ISAF operations too dangerous and therefore has limited Japanese presence to OEF, where the JMSDF is undertaking the relatively safe, refueling operations on the open seas. On the other hand, the DPJ, prodded by Mr. Ozawa's openness to Japanese participation in ISAF - Mr. Ozawa has in the past shown a strong-pro US streak, and was the original proponent of "normal country" status for Japan, a concept that is more often associated with hawkish LDP politicians - is considering the matter, albeit with reluctance in many quarters. (Former party leader Seiji Maehara is one name that springs immediately to mind.) Thus, we have the intriguing situation where the LDP for practical reasons is limiting Japanese participation to modest proportions, while the DPJ is considering accepting the conclusions of its legal position (which has some force, if not quite a slam-dunk argument) and leapfrogging the LDP to the more dangerous phase of the operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. (There are reportedly DPJ voices calling for limiting participation to medical assistance and other civilian activities. It remains to be seen, though, if other nations with soldiers in Afghanistan will be willing, or even able, to baby-sit another gaggle of Japanese civilians and possibly lightly armed JSDF personnel.)
How will these legal and practical considerations play with the Japanese public?
OEF and the activities of ISAF in theory address different phases, or aspects of the war on terror; i.e. the former the continuing war against terror, and the latter the post-warfare stage "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment" UNSC Res.1386 (2001). But both activities are directed against Al Qaeda and its protectors the Taliban (if at least in the case of ISAF by no means exclusively so). Thus, for all practical purposes, they end up serving the same objective. In fact, until the whole controversy blew up over the extension of the anti-terrorism act, I confess that I was not aware of this distinction, and I hazard to guess that the Japanese public in general did not know much better either.
Remember that a plurality of the Japanese public has been coming around to an admittedly underwhelming support for the continuation of refueling activities. And it's the same theater against the same opponents; one operation is safe, the other is hazardous (and, by itself, might not even be welcomed).
I think that the practical consideration will prevail with the safety-first Japanese public. Unless the 800,000 gallon controversy spills over into operations beyond USS Kitty Hawk, or even the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I believe that the LDP position will prevail in the court of public opinion. A limited extension of two years for refueling operations only is definitely in the works, and, unless the potential budgetary repercussions of the ensuing delay of the next general Diet session become an overriding concern (I am now forced to add this caveat), will be passed within the year by a Lower House coalition supermajority revote. At least the Yomiuri editorial board seems to think so.
(Note) The Asahi editorial board is disappointed with Prime Minister Fukuda's answers in yesterday's Diet plenary, but officially remains agnostic. Mainichi is even more non-committal. The Sankei editorials no longer seem to be available after it replaced Mainichi as MSN's online news partner of choice. WTF?
Nikkei, Yomiuri and Asahi are collaborating on a joint website, joint distribution, and joint emergency production. Other newspapers are also welcome to join the party. At the same time, MSN has ditched Mainichi (or is it the other way around?) for Sankei. Whatever. Just give the world a deeper archive, so I won't have to keep copying the articles to my hard disk.
As a practical matter though, the LDP deems ISAF operations too dangerous and therefore has limited Japanese presence to OEF, where the JMSDF is undertaking the relatively safe, refueling operations on the open seas. On the other hand, the DPJ, prodded by Mr. Ozawa's openness to Japanese participation in ISAF - Mr. Ozawa has in the past shown a strong-pro US streak, and was the original proponent of "normal country" status for Japan, a concept that is more often associated with hawkish LDP politicians - is considering the matter, albeit with reluctance in many quarters. (Former party leader Seiji Maehara is one name that springs immediately to mind.) Thus, we have the intriguing situation where the LDP for practical reasons is limiting Japanese participation to modest proportions, while the DPJ is considering accepting the conclusions of its legal position (which has some force, if not quite a slam-dunk argument) and leapfrogging the LDP to the more dangerous phase of the operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. (There are reportedly DPJ voices calling for limiting participation to medical assistance and other civilian activities. It remains to be seen, though, if other nations with soldiers in Afghanistan will be willing, or even able, to baby-sit another gaggle of Japanese civilians and possibly lightly armed JSDF personnel.)
How will these legal and practical considerations play with the Japanese public?
OEF and the activities of ISAF in theory address different phases, or aspects of the war on terror; i.e. the former the continuing war against terror, and the latter the post-warfare stage "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment" UNSC Res.1386 (2001). But both activities are directed against Al Qaeda and its protectors the Taliban (if at least in the case of ISAF by no means exclusively so). Thus, for all practical purposes, they end up serving the same objective. In fact, until the whole controversy blew up over the extension of the anti-terrorism act, I confess that I was not aware of this distinction, and I hazard to guess that the Japanese public in general did not know much better either.
Remember that a plurality of the Japanese public has been coming around to an admittedly underwhelming support for the continuation of refueling activities. And it's the same theater against the same opponents; one operation is safe, the other is hazardous (and, by itself, might not even be welcomed).
I think that the practical consideration will prevail with the safety-first Japanese public. Unless the 800,000 gallon controversy spills over into operations beyond USS Kitty Hawk, or even the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I believe that the LDP position will prevail in the court of public opinion. A limited extension of two years for refueling operations only is definitely in the works, and, unless the potential budgetary repercussions of the ensuing delay of the next general Diet session become an overriding concern (I am now forced to add this caveat), will be passed within the year by a Lower House coalition supermajority revote. At least the Yomiuri editorial board seems to think so.
(Note) The Asahi editorial board is disappointed with Prime Minister Fukuda's answers in yesterday's Diet plenary, but officially remains agnostic. Mainichi is even more non-committal. The Sankei editorials no longer seem to be available after it replaced Mainichi as MSN's online news partner of choice. WTF?
Nikkei, Yomiuri and Asahi are collaborating on a joint website, joint distribution, and joint emergency production. Other newspapers are also welcome to join the party. At the same time, MSN has ditched Mainichi (or is it the other way around?) for Sankei. Whatever. Just give the world a deeper archive, so I won't have to keep copying the articles to my hard disk.
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
I Need a Life, But in the Meantime, Interesting Facts and Figures on the Refueling Issue
Shisaku points to some interesting numbers on the refueling issue. (So that's where the October 1 Yomiuri got those non-attributed numbers for its chart.)
Panel 10 shows that the amount of fuel oil that the JMSDF vessels provided dropped precipitously from 119,000 KL in FY 2001 and 175,000 KL in FY 2002 to 53,000 KL in FY 2003, and has stayed more or less in that ballpark (albeit with large fluctuations) since then. This, despite the fact that the number of refueling occasions leapt from 58 in FY 2001 to 130 in FY 2002, jumped further to 188 in FY 2003, and has also stayed in that neighborhood. Moreover, the number of U.S. and non-U.S. vessels were: 98 and 2 in FY 2001, 96 and 4 in FY 2002, and 56 and 44 in FY 2003 (and in that vicinity since then), respectively.
In other words, in FY 2001 and FY 2002, the JMSDF vessels for the most part serviced large U.S. vessels and, from FY 2003 on, have been provisioning smaller vessels of mixed origin (roughly half-U.S. and declining and half non-, of which Pakistani ships so far form a large plurality).
The Iraqi War officially began on March 20, 2003 (did they declare war before they attacked?) near the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2002 (April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003). Clearly, there are many dots to be connected here, helped along with a little bit of Diet investigation authority.
So, are you thinking what I'm thinking?
Yes, Ichiro Ozawa does owe Shisaku a nice lunch.
ADD:
The average amount of fuel provided per operation was highest in FY 2002, at 2,052 KL. The amount of fuel involved in the (mainly) U.S.S. Kitty Hawk discrepancy was 800,000 gallons, or, more accurately, 2,973 KL. The two KL figures are in the same ballpark.
I believe that the authorities will try to explain all this as merely topping up, as the ships arrived for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) surveillance and interception activities. But can they sort out the ships and operations dedicated to OEF and those to Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and match the right ones to JMSDF refueling activities? Will the numbers add up?
Panel 10 shows that the amount of fuel oil that the JMSDF vessels provided dropped precipitously from 119,000 KL in FY 2001 and 175,000 KL in FY 2002 to 53,000 KL in FY 2003, and has stayed more or less in that ballpark (albeit with large fluctuations) since then. This, despite the fact that the number of refueling occasions leapt from 58 in FY 2001 to 130 in FY 2002, jumped further to 188 in FY 2003, and has also stayed in that neighborhood. Moreover, the number of U.S. and non-U.S. vessels were: 98 and 2 in FY 2001, 96 and 4 in FY 2002, and 56 and 44 in FY 2003 (and in that vicinity since then), respectively.
In other words, in FY 2001 and FY 2002, the JMSDF vessels for the most part serviced large U.S. vessels and, from FY 2003 on, have been provisioning smaller vessels of mixed origin (roughly half-U.S. and declining and half non-, of which Pakistani ships so far form a large plurality).
The Iraqi War officially began on March 20, 2003 (did they declare war before they attacked?) near the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2002 (April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003). Clearly, there are many dots to be connected here, helped along with a little bit of Diet investigation authority.
So, are you thinking what I'm thinking?
Yes, Ichiro Ozawa does owe Shisaku a nice lunch.
ADD:
The average amount of fuel provided per operation was highest in FY 2002, at 2,052 KL. The amount of fuel involved in the (mainly) U.S.S. Kitty Hawk discrepancy was 800,000 gallons, or, more accurately, 2,973 KL. The two KL figures are in the same ballpark.
I believe that the authorities will try to explain all this as merely topping up, as the ships arrived for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) surveillance and interception activities. But can they sort out the ships and operations dedicated to OEF and those to Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and match the right ones to JMSDF refueling activities? Will the numbers add up?
Sunday, September 30, 2007
A Twofer Post: The Two Policy Research Council Chairmen Go Head to Head; Chief Cabinet Secretary Grilled on Diesel Fuel for USS Kitty Hawk
On Sunday Project - surely the TV program most often cited (if often not credited) by the national print media - it's Sadakazu Tanigaki batting for the LDP doing what he does best and likes most, which is talking about policy issues, and the need to raise taxes. Up against him is the new DPJ policy chief Masayuki Naoshima, an ex-salaryman with extensive labor union background, someone that I'm not sure even Tobias Harris has seen. At the end, I am left wondering, what the hell was Mr. Naoshima doing there? He clearly had read the DPJ policy manifest, but did he know anything beyond it? Did he even believe it?
Soichiro Tawara, the Tasmanian Devil of political journalism, pounds Mr. Naoshima mercilessly on public pension reform. And with good reason too, because Mr. Naoshima is maddeningly vague on the details, basically copping a plea, that they are working on a bill. Mr. Tanigaki is at his enthusiastic and congenial best as he brings his command of details as well as his understanding of the broader fiscal implications to talk rings around Mr. Naoshima. Significantly, he emphasizes the underlying commonalities between the two positions, and suggests that there is plenty of room for a dialogue here. Mr. Tanigaki, like the Prime Minister, is by temperament and talent supremely suited to the soft-sell approach, and it shows.
On the contrast between the existing government policy to favor consolidating agricultural acreage and the DPJ proposal to extend income supplements to all farmers, Mr. Tanigaki scores at least a debating point when he argues against the wisdom of giving money to aging part-time farmers, an allegation that Mr. Naoshima lets pass without denial or counterargument. Moreover, Mr. Tanigaki handles the issue within the metropolitan center-boondocks dichotomy context. He believes that the persistence of public works that the prefectures conduct with their own revenues (in contrast to the public works subsidized by revenue transfers or direct subsidies) indicates that there are better ways to boost local economies. Is this a pitch for raising the consumption tax rate? Of course. Is he hinting at a possible escape valve for local pressures against the annual 3% cut in the national public works budget allocations? Maybe. But Mr. Naoshima does next to nothing to hit back, or even to defend himself.
Before, the DPJ could cite a recalcitrant bureaucracy for the lack of detail to its proposals. But control of the Upper House has greatly augmented the opposition's Diet investigation authority (Constitution, Article 62), and the bureaucracy has stepped up its cooperation with the DPJ, no doubt with the blessing of the LDP-New Komeito coalition. Ignorance is no longer an excuse for the DPJ.
Actually, only a very small fraction of this will show up in the Monday morning editions of the major dailies. At least not in the way that I have described them. And the DPJ will surely knock Mr. Tanigaki for stating that, in order to achieve primary balance in FY2011, the consumption tax rate will have to be raised higher than the 8% that Heizo Takenaka has suggested, and it may well find sympathetic editorial writers and even LDP discontents. If Mr. Naoshima clearly lost a round, he did it on a TV program that is only about as popular as a Sunday morning talk show on politics and the economy can be. Still, if this is any indication of how the policy debate is going to unfold, the DPJ will run the risk of being labeled not ready for primetime.
The LDP is clearly out to treat the relationship between consenting adults and to do its best to make a show of wooing the DPJ, and this actually comes naturally to Mr. Tanigaki. Ichiro Ozawa clearly wants to make war, not love. But the message does not seem to have reached his party policy chief.
Nobutaka Machimura, Chief Cabinet Secretary, also appeared on the program and was grilled at length about the controversy over the alleged diversion of JMSDF diesel fuel from counter-terrorism surveillance activities to the Iraqi War. Mr. Machimura basically kept repeating that such diversion, if true, was a serious matter and that they were talking to the U.S. side to find out the truth. Mr. Tawara pushed hard to make him say that an extension would be taken off the table if it turned out to be a lie, and Mr. Machimura showed himself at his firm, confident, and congenial, stonewalling best.
I've written quite often on and around this matter, but this is the most useful post because it points to great investigative work by Peace Depot. I think that the U.S. is going to explain the 800,000 gallons as a regrettable but honest logistics and communications mix-up in the accelerated and incredibly complicated lead-up to the Iraqi War and admonish Centcom or some other part of the U.S. forces for the error. No, it will not show up in the service records of individual military officers. The explanation and the accompanying show of contrition will be accepted by the Fukuda administration, Asahi will make some noises, and a new, refueling-only law will be passed by a supermajority override, sometime late this year.
Two caveats:
One, the Fukuda administration will have to come up with a plausible explanation for the 200,000-800,000 discrepancy. My sixth sense says that this is the easy one.
Two, it better be just the 800,000 gallons. If systemic diversion beyond that intial phase of the Iraq War is uncovered, then all bets are off on the extension, and Mr. Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, will have some very serious atonement on his agenda.
Soichiro Tawara, the Tasmanian Devil of political journalism, pounds Mr. Naoshima mercilessly on public pension reform. And with good reason too, because Mr. Naoshima is maddeningly vague on the details, basically copping a plea, that they are working on a bill. Mr. Tanigaki is at his enthusiastic and congenial best as he brings his command of details as well as his understanding of the broader fiscal implications to talk rings around Mr. Naoshima. Significantly, he emphasizes the underlying commonalities between the two positions, and suggests that there is plenty of room for a dialogue here. Mr. Tanigaki, like the Prime Minister, is by temperament and talent supremely suited to the soft-sell approach, and it shows.
On the contrast between the existing government policy to favor consolidating agricultural acreage and the DPJ proposal to extend income supplements to all farmers, Mr. Tanigaki scores at least a debating point when he argues against the wisdom of giving money to aging part-time farmers, an allegation that Mr. Naoshima lets pass without denial or counterargument. Moreover, Mr. Tanigaki handles the issue within the metropolitan center-boondocks dichotomy context. He believes that the persistence of public works that the prefectures conduct with their own revenues (in contrast to the public works subsidized by revenue transfers or direct subsidies) indicates that there are better ways to boost local economies. Is this a pitch for raising the consumption tax rate? Of course. Is he hinting at a possible escape valve for local pressures against the annual 3% cut in the national public works budget allocations? Maybe. But Mr. Naoshima does next to nothing to hit back, or even to defend himself.
Before, the DPJ could cite a recalcitrant bureaucracy for the lack of detail to its proposals. But control of the Upper House has greatly augmented the opposition's Diet investigation authority (Constitution, Article 62), and the bureaucracy has stepped up its cooperation with the DPJ, no doubt with the blessing of the LDP-New Komeito coalition. Ignorance is no longer an excuse for the DPJ.
Actually, only a very small fraction of this will show up in the Monday morning editions of the major dailies. At least not in the way that I have described them. And the DPJ will surely knock Mr. Tanigaki for stating that, in order to achieve primary balance in FY2011, the consumption tax rate will have to be raised higher than the 8% that Heizo Takenaka has suggested, and it may well find sympathetic editorial writers and even LDP discontents. If Mr. Naoshima clearly lost a round, he did it on a TV program that is only about as popular as a Sunday morning talk show on politics and the economy can be. Still, if this is any indication of how the policy debate is going to unfold, the DPJ will run the risk of being labeled not ready for primetime.
The LDP is clearly out to treat the relationship between consenting adults and to do its best to make a show of wooing the DPJ, and this actually comes naturally to Mr. Tanigaki. Ichiro Ozawa clearly wants to make war, not love. But the message does not seem to have reached his party policy chief.
Nobutaka Machimura, Chief Cabinet Secretary, also appeared on the program and was grilled at length about the controversy over the alleged diversion of JMSDF diesel fuel from counter-terrorism surveillance activities to the Iraqi War. Mr. Machimura basically kept repeating that such diversion, if true, was a serious matter and that they were talking to the U.S. side to find out the truth. Mr. Tawara pushed hard to make him say that an extension would be taken off the table if it turned out to be a lie, and Mr. Machimura showed himself at his firm, confident, and congenial, stonewalling best.
I've written quite often on and around this matter, but this is the most useful post because it points to great investigative work by Peace Depot. I think that the U.S. is going to explain the 800,000 gallons as a regrettable but honest logistics and communications mix-up in the accelerated and incredibly complicated lead-up to the Iraqi War and admonish Centcom or some other part of the U.S. forces for the error. No, it will not show up in the service records of individual military officers. The explanation and the accompanying show of contrition will be accepted by the Fukuda administration, Asahi will make some noises, and a new, refueling-only law will be passed by a supermajority override, sometime late this year.
Two caveats:
One, the Fukuda administration will have to come up with a plausible explanation for the 200,000-800,000 discrepancy. My sixth sense says that this is the easy one.
Two, it better be just the 800,000 gallons. If systemic diversion beyond that intial phase of the Iraq War is uncovered, then all bets are off on the extension, and Mr. Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, will have some very serious atonement on his agenda.
Saturday, September 22, 2007
Asahi and Yomiuri Continue to Prowl the Battle Lines on the Counter-Terrorism Act
Yomiuri is in favor of continuing the refueling operations. Asahi to the best of my knowledge has not yet come out with an editorial that flatly comes out and says no, but it's obvious where its sympathies belong. The battle continues in the latest Yomiuri and Asahi articles, as the former dutifully recounts the press interview MOFA Vice Minister Itsunori Onodera gave on his return from a trip to OEF Headquarters in Bahrain. He claimed to be reassured that the Japanese diesel fuel was being used solely for OEF. Asahi all but says, no way, and interviews the Captain of the USS Enterprise, who freely admits that the ship under his command at the time received fuel directly from JMSDF supply ships, giving the lie to the "I don't know what they did with that stuff" defense.
On Afghanistan – yes, that is how the issue is perceived here, as elsewhere - the Japanese public is fairly evenly divided between pro, con, and indifferent. I'll try to take another turn on the effects of the revelation after the new Cabinet is installed.
On Afghanistan – yes, that is how the issue is perceived here, as elsewhere - the Japanese public is fairly evenly divided between pro, con, and indifferent. I'll try to take another turn on the effects of the revelation after the new Cabinet is installed.
Peace Depot Uses USNS Logs and Other Evidence to Assert JMSDF Fuel Oil Was Used In the Iraq War
The Peace Resource Cooperative, or Peace Depot for short, mainly using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act to access ship logs and other U.S. Naval Service documents as well as a GAO report, has made a strong case that the 786 thousand gallons (not 200 thousand gallons, as previously claimed by the Japanese government) of diesel oil that the Fleet Replenishment Oiler USNS Pecos received in 2003 from the JMSDF oiler Tokiwa had been used to refuel the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, which went on to participate in Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (not Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as previously claimed by the Japanese government). OSW maintained the Southern no-fly zone in the period between the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm; 1991) and the Iraq War (OIF; 2003- ). OIF was launched very soon after the Kitty Hawk arrived in the Persian Gulf.
Do you remember this and this? At the time, Nobuteru Ishihara as much as admitted that the US Naval ships in question were patrolling Iraqi waters, but claimed that they were watching for possible terrorist shipments and movements. After all, the Persian Gulf was part of the counter-terrorism act mandate. In the meantime, the offending US Centcom web pages had been taken down. However, Peace Depot kept digging until they came up with the evidence, put them together, and released its conclusions, together with copies of the relevant documents.
According to Asahi, the Director of the International Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Defense has admitted to an accounting error. He also backtracked a bit on the use of the diesel fuel, saying, "It is not that we are aware of all about everything". The article also depicts an unnamed LDP Defense zoku Diet member and anonymous MOD sources voicing suspicions of such use. Ironically, the article quotes then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda claiming that it would be impossible to use the fuel on iraq-related matters. Mainichi has more details on the official MOD explanation, but does not cover the reaction.
The DPJ will make good use of this information when the coalition government submits a new counter-terrorism bill as expected. I'm not quite ready to say that the extension is now in serious danger, but there is no doubt that this is a big problem for the (presumptive) Fukuda administration. The only excuse I can think of is, they must have been keeping watch on Al Qaida in Iraq…
Funny, where did I hear that story before?
It's too bad that the Peace Depot press release itself is available only in Japanese. But most of the documents are in English.
Do you remember this and this? At the time, Nobuteru Ishihara as much as admitted that the US Naval ships in question were patrolling Iraqi waters, but claimed that they were watching for possible terrorist shipments and movements. After all, the Persian Gulf was part of the counter-terrorism act mandate. In the meantime, the offending US Centcom web pages had been taken down. However, Peace Depot kept digging until they came up with the evidence, put them together, and released its conclusions, together with copies of the relevant documents.
According to Asahi, the Director of the International Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Defense has admitted to an accounting error. He also backtracked a bit on the use of the diesel fuel, saying, "It is not that we are aware of all about everything". The article also depicts an unnamed LDP Defense zoku Diet member and anonymous MOD sources voicing suspicions of such use. Ironically, the article quotes then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda claiming that it would be impossible to use the fuel on iraq-related matters. Mainichi has more details on the official MOD explanation, but does not cover the reaction.
The DPJ will make good use of this information when the coalition government submits a new counter-terrorism bill as expected. I'm not quite ready to say that the extension is now in serious danger, but there is no doubt that this is a big problem for the (presumptive) Fukuda administration. The only excuse I can think of is, they must have been keeping watch on Al Qaida in Iraq…
Funny, where did I hear that story before?
It's too bad that the Peace Depot press release itself is available only in Japanese. But most of the documents are in English.
Saturday, September 08, 2007
Pentagon: Counter-terrorism Oil Not Being Used for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Remember this? The following Yomiuri report says that a Pentagon spokesman has stated that the Japanese fuel oil provided under the counter-terrorism act is not being used for Operation Iraqi Freedom and the offending web pages have been altered to avoid any misunderstanding.
Although Mr. Ishihara did not say anything that was obviously wrong, he said so much in his extensive explanations to justify the Iraqi connection that the DPJ should find plenty of material to draw on in criticizing the coalition government when the Diet convenes. The saving grace is that he is no longer Chief Cabinet Secretary.
Incidentally, I've reached the tentative conclusion that there are only two probable outcomes to the counter-terrorism act extension: a new comprehensive act that arrives in time to allow the JSDMF refueling ships to continue its operations uninterrupted; or a new law authorizing the Afghanistan operations that creates a maximum two-month gap that must be filled. I'll see if I can find the time to put it together later in the day.
海自の給油、イラク戦争転用を否定…米国防総省報道官
【ワシントン＝五十嵐文】米国防総省のスチュワート・アップトン報道担当官は７日、読売新聞の取材に対し、テロ対策特別措置法に基づき海上自衛隊 がインド洋で実施している給油がイラク戦争にも転用されているのではないかとの指摘が出ていることについて、「日本の補給艦から給油を受けている参加国 は、ＯＥＦ（アフガニスタンでの『不朽の自由作戦』）を支援するために燃料を使うとの合意の下に活動している」と述べ、イラクへの転用説を否定した。
中東海域などを管轄する米海軍中央司令部などのウエブサイトで、日本の給油活動が、アフガニスタンでのＯＥＦではなく、イラクでの「イラクの自由作戦」（ＯＩＦ）の一環として紹介されたことから、民主党などが臨時国会で追及する構えをみせている。
アップトン報道担当官は、サイトは２００５年７月掲載で、「誤解を招くおそれがあるためすでに変更された」と説明した。
（2007年9月8日11時22分 読売新聞）
Although Mr. Ishihara did not say anything that was obviously wrong, he said so much in his extensive explanations to justify the Iraqi connection that the DPJ should find plenty of material to draw on in criticizing the coalition government when the Diet convenes. The saving grace is that he is no longer Chief Cabinet Secretary.
Incidentally, I've reached the tentative conclusion that there are only two probable outcomes to the counter-terrorism act extension: a new comprehensive act that arrives in time to allow the JSDMF refueling ships to continue its operations uninterrupted; or a new law authorizing the Afghanistan operations that creates a maximum two-month gap that must be filled. I'll see if I can find the time to put it together later in the day.
海自の給油、イラク戦争転用を否定…米国防総省報道官
【ワシントン＝五十嵐文】米国防総省のスチュワート・アップトン報道担当官は７日、読売新聞の取材に対し、テロ対策特別措置法に基づき海上自衛隊 がインド洋で実施している給油がイラク戦争にも転用されているのではないかとの指摘が出ていることについて、「日本の補給艦から給油を受けている参加国 は、ＯＥＦ（アフガニスタンでの『不朽の自由作戦』）を支援するために燃料を使うとの合意の下に活動している」と述べ、イラクへの転用説を否定した。
中東海域などを管轄する米海軍中央司令部などのウエブサイトで、日本の給油活動が、アフガニスタンでのＯＥＦではなく、イラクでの「イラクの自由作戦」（ＯＩＦ）の一環として紹介されたことから、民主党などが臨時国会で追及する構えをみせている。
アップトン報道担当官は、サイトは２００５年７月掲載で、「誤解を招くおそれがあるためすでに変更された」と説明した。
（2007年9月8日11時22分 読売新聞）
Tuesday, September 04, 2007
I Learn Something About Our War on Terror in the Iraqi Theater
No, not that theater. I am watching Sunday Project, my favorite TV program (after the wacky wushu serials on basic cable). Soichiro Tawara, the hard-hitting septuagenarian host, is questioning Nobuteru Ishihara, ex-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary and new Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, on the prospects for the extension of the counter-terrorism act.
Even as Mr. Ishihara is explaining the distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan and how Japanese withdrawal would mean a disaster for the valiant Pakistani navy, Mr. Tawara, as always - this is the rudest man on the planet we are talking about - interrupts him and whips out a web page printout, two pages be exact, courtesy, he says, of Yukio Edano, DPJ hyper-policy wonk. They have been taken from the US Centcom Web site, and shows that most of the fuel oil that the JSDN provides for refueling as logistic support for counter-terrorism activities actually goes to operations in Iraq. Mr. Tawara's point is that we'd been told that there's one law on the books for Iraq and another for the war on terror in Afghanistan but it turns out we've been mostly helping out in Iraq either way.
Mr. Ishihara does not skip a beat – he claims he wasn't aware of this information, and he does look sincere – and goes on to explain how the Indian Ocean [i.e. presumed theater of operations] stretches to the African coast and the Persian Gulf so the whole area must be patrolled of course and we wouldn't want the terrorists moving in and out of Iraq do we? Mr. Tawara keeps pressing his point, Mr. Ishihara keeps repeating that there is no way to draw the line between naval operations around Afghanistan - a landlocked state, come to think of it – and Iraq, and I am thinking, gee, call me stupid, but I wasn't aware of that… The two kept repeating themselves until Mr. Tawara gruffly broke it off.
Come to think of it, it makes sense. The counter-terrorism act says nothing about the theater of operations, and the Iraq act only covers "activities to support humanitarian reconstruction and activities to support secure safety". The jurisdictional distinction is functional, not geographical. The problem is, we've had Afghanistan/Iraq, Afghanistan/Iraq drummed into our heads over and over again and how everyone but Ichiro Ozawa and his cousin is supposed to be on board for Afghanistan; so the notion that the refueled ships actual operate mainly in the Iraqi war theater? That comes as a sort of double-take for me, not to mention for the obstinate Mr. Tawara. How will it play with the rest of the public? The fact that Mr. Edano passed it on is a sure sign that the DPJ is going to exploit this mostly-Iraq angle once the Diet convenes on Sept.10.
That's how I remember the exchange, though I probably misremember much of the details. (Like, was that Edano, or really Maehara?) (MTC, did you videotape it?)
Now I have a request. Do any of you know how to find the web pages? It appeared to have "Operation Iraqi Freedom" emblazoned at the top, a big picture of a couple of naval vessels, and tables to show how much fuel oil have gone where. I can't find it here.
Even as Mr. Ishihara is explaining the distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan and how Japanese withdrawal would mean a disaster for the valiant Pakistani navy, Mr. Tawara, as always - this is the rudest man on the planet we are talking about - interrupts him and whips out a web page printout, two pages be exact, courtesy, he says, of Yukio Edano, DPJ hyper-policy wonk. They have been taken from the US Centcom Web site, and shows that most of the fuel oil that the JSDN provides for refueling as logistic support for counter-terrorism activities actually goes to operations in Iraq. Mr. Tawara's point is that we'd been told that there's one law on the books for Iraq and another for the war on terror in Afghanistan but it turns out we've been mostly helping out in Iraq either way.
Mr. Ishihara does not skip a beat – he claims he wasn't aware of this information, and he does look sincere – and goes on to explain how the Indian Ocean [i.e. presumed theater of operations] stretches to the African coast and the Persian Gulf so the whole area must be patrolled of course and we wouldn't want the terrorists moving in and out of Iraq do we? Mr. Tawara keeps pressing his point, Mr. Ishihara keeps repeating that there is no way to draw the line between naval operations around Afghanistan - a landlocked state, come to think of it – and Iraq, and I am thinking, gee, call me stupid, but I wasn't aware of that… The two kept repeating themselves until Mr. Tawara gruffly broke it off.
Come to think of it, it makes sense. The counter-terrorism act says nothing about the theater of operations, and the Iraq act only covers "activities to support humanitarian reconstruction and activities to support secure safety". The jurisdictional distinction is functional, not geographical. The problem is, we've had Afghanistan/Iraq, Afghanistan/Iraq drummed into our heads over and over again and how everyone but Ichiro Ozawa and his cousin is supposed to be on board for Afghanistan; so the notion that the refueled ships actual operate mainly in the Iraqi war theater? That comes as a sort of double-take for me, not to mention for the obstinate Mr. Tawara. How will it play with the rest of the public? The fact that Mr. Edano passed it on is a sure sign that the DPJ is going to exploit this mostly-Iraq angle once the Diet convenes on Sept.10.
That's how I remember the exchange, though I probably misremember much of the details. (Like, was that Edano, or really Maehara?) (MTC, did you videotape it?)
Now I have a request. Do any of you know how to find the web pages? It appeared to have "Operation Iraqi Freedom" emblazoned at the top, a big picture of a couple of naval vessels, and tables to show how much fuel oil have gone where. I can't find it here.
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