It’s becoming evident that the LDP has been playing hardball since the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition forced the vote in the Lower House on the budget and budget-related bills including the tax bill covering the gasoline tax surcharge extension and passed them along to the Upper House. There, the DPJ, the Social Democrats and the New People’s Party are boycotting the Budget Committee, making it impossible to reach the required quorum to hold sessions. The rest of the business in the Upper House is reportedly at a standstill as well; the standoff should last all week, and possibly more.
This should not have been an unexpected turn of events. Boycotting parliamentary activities is a common political tactic, and it has been used extensively over the years by the opposition in the Japanese Diet as well. The big difference in the here and now, though, is that the opposition holds a collective majority in the Upper House. Armed with this powerful weapon, opposition leaders are claiming with varied nuances that the consent decree by the two Chairmen of the Houses that promised a decision on the tax bills by the end of this month no longer holds*. DPJ leaders are also making ominous noises about the replacement for BOJ Governor Toshihiko Fukui. So what did the LDP gain in exchange for all this ill-will and ominous threats from the opposition?
If DPJ claims are to be believed － the LDP has not denied them － it had offered to allow a Lower House vote after another, March 4, Budget Committee session. If, as is the custom, the bills were passed by the Lower House plenary and sent to the Upper House on the same day, the budget would become effective 30 days later on April 3 even if, as expected, the opposition rejected the budget in the Upper house, where it holds a collective majority. This would leave a two day gap during which there would be no government budget. But such things have happened before and there are laws in place to deal with such an event. A two-day hiatus by itself has no effect on the public weal. Far more serious would be the effects on the revenue side if the gasoline tax surcharge were allowed to expire. If the opposition-dominated Upper House refuses to vote on the tax bills (or any other ordinary legislation for that matter), the coalition must wait 60 days after the initial Lowe House vote before it can use its supermajority there to enact the legislation anyway**. The revenue loss will be substantial, and the administrative difficulties of suspending then re-imposing the surcharge would be substantial. There are no override provisions for Diet consent for BOJ, as well as other, appointments. So it appears that the coalition has taken a huge risk in exchange for a meaningless gesture in favor of fiscal probity. Now that the opposition, the DPJ in particular, is up in arms, one would expect that the coalition would go hat in hand to beg forgiveness, no?
But the hardball tactics continue. Yesterday, Mr. Yoshitada Kōnoike, the LDP Chairman of the Upper House Budget Committee*** called the committee to order. The entire Cabinet arrived before 9 AM and waited for about 50 minutes, when the Chairman canceled the session as the opposition failed to arrive and a quorum could not be reached. The opposition is understandably indignant, but the provocation continued today, as yet another Budget Committee session was called and canceled. The coalition is working on the Lower House too, as it is holding a session today of the Land, Infrastructure, and Transport Committee (where, this being the Lower House, it has a comfortable majority) absent its coalition members, who join their Upper House colleagues in the protest boycott.
The coalition has evidently shifted from a strategy centered on the low-profile, consensus-seeking posture that comes so naturally to Prime Minister Fukuda. Mr. Fukuda’s efforts had failed to achieve any understanding with the opposition on budget-related issues, let alone a Grand Coalition with the DPJ. Instead, it became clearer than ever that the DPJ would not stop at anything to force a snap election while public support for the coalition faded. As for the Fukuda administration itself, it looked increasingly weak and vacillating. The coalition leadership must have decided that, where the opposition was not forthcoming, it would be politically less damaging for the coalition’s political fortunes if it confronted the opposition rather than caved in the hopes of gaining a measure of cooperation.
There are real costs to this. The market would much prefer the BOJ succession settled as quickly as possible; any delay is potentially unsettling. As for the gasoline taxes, a one-month suspension** would open a one-shot, 20-plus billion yen hole in gasoline tax revenues during April; certainly not life-threatening certainly, but not peanuts either.
However, the DPJ has not made a good case independent of the political game to oppose ex-Vice Minister of Finance Toshirō Mutō, the government’s choice. As for the gasoline taxes and road construction, a healthy majority of the public wants the both side to come together on a compromise, and that’s exactly what the coalition has been advocating. Against this background, the coalition has evidently decided that the risk is worth taking in order to inject new life into the waning fortunes of the coalition and the Fukuda administration.
Neither the coalition nor the Fukuda Cabinet is going to abandon its quest for dialogue and collaboration on economic, financial and fiscal issues. But they are now holding a stick in the other hand***. They must be calculating that a total standoff that forces the coalition to find solutions on its own will be more damaging to the DPJ than to themselves. According to this line of thinking, the coalition can’t lose. In this, they have the unintended cooperation of the Communist Party, which is engaging the coalition instead of joining the boycott. Will it work? I have no idea. But that’s what appears to be going on.
* Satsuki Eda, the DPJ Chairman of the Upper House (technically an independent; by custom, a Chairman leaves his party when he is elected to the Chair), apparently thinks that the decree still holds.
** Committee Chairs are allocated in proportion to the number of seats each party holds in that House. The DPJ could have grabbed the Budget Committee Chair by forcing a vote on it.
*** According to my latest reading of the draft bill, it does not have to be amended before the Lower House can vote on it again even if April 1 passes without the bill having been adopted. I am now of the view that an unconstitutional retroactivity that I believed would arise from the gap can be interpreted away. I’ve changed my mind on this.
**** I suspect that the coalition tactic is the brainchild of Bunmei Ibuki, who has been advocating a hard-line approach every chance he gets. Besides, as LDP Secretary-General, he has the primary responsibility for parliamentary strategies in the first place.
Showing posts with label The Diet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Diet. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 05, 2008
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
The Diet Takes a Two-Day Winter Break and I Take a Brief Look Ahead
an update of sorts, on this
The 128-day 168th Diet session, extraordinary in more ways than one, closed today, after passing 26 laws, 14 of them submitted by the Cabinet, 12 by Diet members. (For more details, dig here). The big trophies were: the new stripped-down anti-terror act, campaign financing reform legislation, and the compensation bill for blood-transfusion-related hepatitis C victims. In case anybody wondered, the Cabinet batted 14 for 19, including four leftovers from the 163rd and 16th sessions. If this were the Japan Series, the Cabinet would be a serious MVP candidate*. This being the political game, let’s just say that the two sides showed that they can work together, with results somewhere between the best and worst case game-theory scenarios.
The Fukuda administration emerges battered and bruised, though not down and out. From Mr. Fukuda’s perspective, the main blows were more or less self-inflicted, more with regard to the hepatitis C and pension record misspeaks, less in the case of the Defense Ministry corruption scandal(s). I have for some time believed that the refueling controversy ceased to be of much importance to the Japanese public; nothing has happened to make me change my mind. Although the January Yomiuri polls have not come out yet, I assume that Mr. Fukuda’s popularity has edged back slightly there as well, and overall currently hovers in the mid-thirties ~ mid-forties range, depending on the poll that you consult. It will continue to inch forward ever so painfully as long as the administration keeps looking reasonably competent and the coalition can avoid serious mishaps, like the criminal indictment of a Cabinet Minister. I think that the public pension accounting scandal has run its course as far as public perception is concerned; unless there are further major revelations, the public will wait to see the quality of the repair work before it passes final judgment. On the other hand, I don’t see anything on the horizon for the duration of his term that will enable him to ramp up his popularity like Prime Minister Koizumi did for himself in 2005, nor does he have the ruthlessness and the flair to seize such a counterintuitive moment if it did come his way.
On the other side, I am mildly surprised by the good numbers that the DPJ has been getting in the polls. In fact, it’s outpolling the LDP. That, after the internal disarray, as well as all the mess that Ichirō Ozawa has been creating, and leaving poor Yukio Hatoyama wiping after him. In fact, not yet sated with walking out on the anti-terror bill revote, he has the next no-show lined up already, deciding to fly off to Davos instead of fronting his party at the questioning session following the Prime Minister’s policy speech at the beginning of the 169th Diet session, set to commence on Friday. Some people are Teflon politicians, the mud never sticks; Mr. Ozawa just swallows it like No Face and looks as strong as ever, if not more so. Mr. Ozawa is telling us, get used to it － and we are**. We are getting used to this mad scientist in our midst, the nutty, rich uncle; and it’s a plus for him. Going back to the numbers, I also suspect that some of the positives for the DPJ is a reflection of the public dissatisfaction with the LDP and, more broadly, the coalition.
The consequence of all this is that Mr. Fukuda is not going to call a snap election any time soon. It helps him that the public doesn’t want it either. If he really tanks, the coalition will force him to resign － they will shoot him if he tries to dissolve the Lower House － and turn to someone else in their fold to see if he can turn things around. Right now, Mr. Asō is the most likely candidate***.
The problem with this situation for Mr. Fukuda is that, without the snap election threat in his hands, the DPJ has that much more room to push without fear of negative political repercussions. That in turn will make Mr. Fukuda look weaker and less decisive. I have no way of quantifying this effect, or even confirming its effects, but I’ll let you know when I think that I see it.
I am running out of time. Briefly, before I go back to work and get smashed, more or less in that order:
The big crunch comes with the special tax measures that expire on April 1, and most acutely in the case of the temporary surcharge on the gasoline tax. I explored the technical reasons for this here, which I think was prescient in a clever, minor-key way****. But the real problem is more than substantial, since a multitrillion-yen chunk of revenue is at stake, with internal dissent rampant in both political camps and interest groups raising hell all over the political landscape. I can only guess what will happen. Let’s leave it at that, since the rest of my thoughts are of little meaning, even to me.
Looking somewhat more to the future, here are two other milestones: Two laws that are a crucial part of the quid pro quo in Japan’s alliance with the U.S. are set to expire next year, the new Anti-Terrorism Act (the legislation authorizing the resumption of refueling operations in the Indian Ocean) on January 11*****, and the Act Concerning the Implementation of Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Works Activities and Safety Ensuring Activities (this one is for Iraq) on August 1. Therefore, if the Emperor with the advice and consent of the Cabinet dissolves the Lower House before January 10, extension bills for both acts will die in the Upper House when the time comes, unless the coalition retains a supermajority. A later but pre-July 31 dissolution will most likely doom the Iraq bill while sparing the anti-terror bill. But so much can happen between now and then. For example, Democrat in the White House will ease any pain on dropping the ball on Iraq, but not on Afghanistan******. On the other hand, the DPJ and the ruling coalition may come to terms with a permanent bill, though I’m betting against it, since anything that is acceptable to Mr. Ozawa will be anathema to the LDP right and vice versa. Still, anything can happen between now and then, and this is no exception. Whatever happens, you have been forewarned.
Finally, I have to confess that I have not touched on any of the big questions with regard to statecraft. Unfortunately, I have no idea how we are going to deal with, in no particular order, the public deficit, the long-term health of the public healthcare and pension system, aging demographics, transition to a post-industrial energy profile, and climate change. (I’m sure that I’ve missed something, and more.) I am hoping with fingers crossed that one side or the other will, against all expectations, come up with a credible program to address them properly and convince me that they’ll do something about it.
* Speaking of Japanese baseball, I was right, the Celtics are in a slump. They’ve been tiring in the second half. Now, the first half isn’t looking too good either. They have to rest Garnett, and probably Ray Allen, even at the cost of losing some games. Which means it’s a good time to be a Patriots fan as well, only I started out as a Montreal Alouettes fan, and had lost interest in football by the time they folded in 1981. Fact: The current Montreal Alouettes were set up in Baltimore, U.S.A., then moved to Montreal and assumed the old Alouettes name. It claims the records of the old Alouettes as its own but does not recognize the Baltimore records. It’s a case of up yours, vous Americains, I suppose. In any case, this all somehow reminds me of the Imperial succession debate. Just sayin’.
** This is somewhat reminiscent of Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara bullying the Tokyo government press club into submission. Hey, I’ve got an idea. Let’s call these people: theButté Media.
*** I mention this here only because it gives me a chance to say this: I know that if it happens, those so-called experts over there will resurrect their alarm over yet another “hyper-nationalist” resurgence, only to be deeply embarrassed again to find that little of consequence will have changed. Broken clocks that nevertheless never manage to... There are important, fundamental questions that need to be addressed here. I am working on it. Stay tuned.
**** I say “minor-key” because I gave some more thought to the question and soon realized that the potential legal flaw can be patched if they draft the extension clause in a way that anticipates a possible (but not definite) hiatus. However, there is no way to get around the confusion at the pump in the likelihood of a switch and switchback in price and tax accounting.
***** To be precise, it expires at 0:00 AM, like a pumpkin.
****** I am, of course, ignoring Ron Paul here.
The 128-day 168th Diet session, extraordinary in more ways than one, closed today, after passing 26 laws, 14 of them submitted by the Cabinet, 12 by Diet members. (For more details, dig here). The big trophies were: the new stripped-down anti-terror act, campaign financing reform legislation, and the compensation bill for blood-transfusion-related hepatitis C victims. In case anybody wondered, the Cabinet batted 14 for 19, including four leftovers from the 163rd and 16th sessions. If this were the Japan Series, the Cabinet would be a serious MVP candidate*. This being the political game, let’s just say that the two sides showed that they can work together, with results somewhere between the best and worst case game-theory scenarios.
The Fukuda administration emerges battered and bruised, though not down and out. From Mr. Fukuda’s perspective, the main blows were more or less self-inflicted, more with regard to the hepatitis C and pension record misspeaks, less in the case of the Defense Ministry corruption scandal(s). I have for some time believed that the refueling controversy ceased to be of much importance to the Japanese public; nothing has happened to make me change my mind. Although the January Yomiuri polls have not come out yet, I assume that Mr. Fukuda’s popularity has edged back slightly there as well, and overall currently hovers in the mid-thirties ~ mid-forties range, depending on the poll that you consult. It will continue to inch forward ever so painfully as long as the administration keeps looking reasonably competent and the coalition can avoid serious mishaps, like the criminal indictment of a Cabinet Minister. I think that the public pension accounting scandal has run its course as far as public perception is concerned; unless there are further major revelations, the public will wait to see the quality of the repair work before it passes final judgment. On the other hand, I don’t see anything on the horizon for the duration of his term that will enable him to ramp up his popularity like Prime Minister Koizumi did for himself in 2005, nor does he have the ruthlessness and the flair to seize such a counterintuitive moment if it did come his way.
On the other side, I am mildly surprised by the good numbers that the DPJ has been getting in the polls. In fact, it’s outpolling the LDP. That, after the internal disarray, as well as all the mess that Ichirō Ozawa has been creating, and leaving poor Yukio Hatoyama wiping after him. In fact, not yet sated with walking out on the anti-terror bill revote, he has the next no-show lined up already, deciding to fly off to Davos instead of fronting his party at the questioning session following the Prime Minister’s policy speech at the beginning of the 169th Diet session, set to commence on Friday. Some people are Teflon politicians, the mud never sticks; Mr. Ozawa just swallows it like No Face and looks as strong as ever, if not more so. Mr. Ozawa is telling us, get used to it － and we are**. We are getting used to this mad scientist in our midst, the nutty, rich uncle; and it’s a plus for him. Going back to the numbers, I also suspect that some of the positives for the DPJ is a reflection of the public dissatisfaction with the LDP and, more broadly, the coalition.
The consequence of all this is that Mr. Fukuda is not going to call a snap election any time soon. It helps him that the public doesn’t want it either. If he really tanks, the coalition will force him to resign － they will shoot him if he tries to dissolve the Lower House － and turn to someone else in their fold to see if he can turn things around. Right now, Mr. Asō is the most likely candidate***.
The problem with this situation for Mr. Fukuda is that, without the snap election threat in his hands, the DPJ has that much more room to push without fear of negative political repercussions. That in turn will make Mr. Fukuda look weaker and less decisive. I have no way of quantifying this effect, or even confirming its effects, but I’ll let you know when I think that I see it.
I am running out of time. Briefly, before I go back to work and get smashed, more or less in that order:
The big crunch comes with the special tax measures that expire on April 1, and most acutely in the case of the temporary surcharge on the gasoline tax. I explored the technical reasons for this here, which I think was prescient in a clever, minor-key way****. But the real problem is more than substantial, since a multitrillion-yen chunk of revenue is at stake, with internal dissent rampant in both political camps and interest groups raising hell all over the political landscape. I can only guess what will happen. Let’s leave it at that, since the rest of my thoughts are of little meaning, even to me.
Looking somewhat more to the future, here are two other milestones: Two laws that are a crucial part of the quid pro quo in Japan’s alliance with the U.S. are set to expire next year, the new Anti-Terrorism Act (the legislation authorizing the resumption of refueling operations in the Indian Ocean) on January 11*****, and the Act Concerning the Implementation of Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Works Activities and Safety Ensuring Activities (this one is for Iraq) on August 1. Therefore, if the Emperor with the advice and consent of the Cabinet dissolves the Lower House before January 10, extension bills for both acts will die in the Upper House when the time comes, unless the coalition retains a supermajority. A later but pre-July 31 dissolution will most likely doom the Iraq bill while sparing the anti-terror bill. But so much can happen between now and then. For example, Democrat in the White House will ease any pain on dropping the ball on Iraq, but not on Afghanistan******. On the other hand, the DPJ and the ruling coalition may come to terms with a permanent bill, though I’m betting against it, since anything that is acceptable to Mr. Ozawa will be anathema to the LDP right and vice versa. Still, anything can happen between now and then, and this is no exception. Whatever happens, you have been forewarned.
Finally, I have to confess that I have not touched on any of the big questions with regard to statecraft. Unfortunately, I have no idea how we are going to deal with, in no particular order, the public deficit, the long-term health of the public healthcare and pension system, aging demographics, transition to a post-industrial energy profile, and climate change. (I’m sure that I’ve missed something, and more.) I am hoping with fingers crossed that one side or the other will, against all expectations, come up with a credible program to address them properly and convince me that they’ll do something about it.
* Speaking of Japanese baseball, I was right, the Celtics are in a slump. They’ve been tiring in the second half. Now, the first half isn’t looking too good either. They have to rest Garnett, and probably Ray Allen, even at the cost of losing some games. Which means it’s a good time to be a Patriots fan as well, only I started out as a Montreal Alouettes fan, and had lost interest in football by the time they folded in 1981. Fact: The current Montreal Alouettes were set up in Baltimore, U.S.A., then moved to Montreal and assumed the old Alouettes name. It claims the records of the old Alouettes as its own but does not recognize the Baltimore records. It’s a case of up yours, vous Americains, I suppose. In any case, this all somehow reminds me of the Imperial succession debate. Just sayin’.
** This is somewhat reminiscent of Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara bullying the Tokyo government press club into submission. Hey, I’ve got an idea. Let’s call these people: theButté Media.
*** I mention this here only because it gives me a chance to say this: I know that if it happens, those so-called experts over there will resurrect their alarm over yet another “hyper-nationalist” resurgence, only to be deeply embarrassed again to find that little of consequence will have changed. Broken clocks that nevertheless never manage to... There are important, fundamental questions that need to be addressed here. I am working on it. Stay tuned.
**** I say “minor-key” because I gave some more thought to the question and soon realized that the potential legal flaw can be patched if they draft the extension clause in a way that anticipates a possible (but not definite) hiatus. However, there is no way to get around the confusion at the pump in the likelihood of a switch and switchback in price and tax accounting.
***** To be precise, it expires at 0:00 AM, like a pumpkin.
****** I am, of course, ignoring Ron Paul here.
Wednesday, January 09, 2008
The Anti-Terrorism Bill Was More of a Distraction than Anything Else
The latest DPJ idea of proposing to continue the deliberation of the new anti-terror bill aimed at resuming refueling operation in the next Diet session had been at best a symbolic gesture, since the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition would be using the Lower House supermajority override during this Diet session regardless of what course the Upper House did (vote it down, extend or let it die*). The idea was that the ruling coalition would look more unreasonable in exercising the override in the face of an offer to continue Upper House deliberations rather than a no-vote or outright vote-down**. However, this distinction seemed to be lost on all but the DPJ’s leadership, giving rise to speculation in the media that the real reason for its latest maneuver stemmed from its fear that some of its Upper House members would actually vote for the bill. In any case, the other opposition parties in the Upper House, who had become increasingly annoyed at the DPJ since Ichirō Ozawa’s ill-fated attempt at a Grand Coalition, mercifully put it down.
In gauging the significance of this latest in the twist and turns that the DPJ has taken on the Japanese response to the War on Terror***, it is worth noting that most of the changes in direction except Mr. Ozawa’s initial opposition have had everything to do with poll-driven tactics and nothing to do with statecraft. In fact, some DPJ leaders such as Yukio Hatoyama were quite frank about this, routinely admitting that the DPJ would decide whether to do this (say, introduce a bill of its own) or that (say, hold an vote on the bill before the 60-day deadline) depending on the dictates of public opinion. This dithering and drifting on the part of the DPJ leadership is, of course, a reflection of deep fissures within the party on defense policy and more broadly on Article 9, a part of which can be traced to its varied origins. Luckily, the Japanese public had long decided that there were other, more compelling issues on the table****, so it appears to be doing little lasting damage to its credibility.
And with that out of the way, everybody should be ready for the popularity contest － will they bribe us with our (and your gaijin) money? － in the regular Diet session to begin. With the budget-related laws on deck － passing the budget itself will be a snap, since it is the de facto prerogative of the Lower House － the twisted Diet goes into truly uncharted waters. Keep in mind that it’s the measures that expire on April 1 that will be at the center of attention. If you have to keep an eye on one key item in that group, the gasoline tax, for mainly technical reasons but partly because of dissent within the LDP and DPJ, is the one. The unfolding Moriya et al scandal will serve as an unpredictable Greek chorus*****.
* A bit of parliamentary arcana: At the end of a Diet session, the two Houses must each make a decision on any bill (or any other issue that requires the decision of the Diet) that remains outstanding in that House. It can do nothing, which causes the bill to die, or decide by the usual simple majority vote to continue deliberation in the next Diet session. In the first case, the bill, if desired, must be introduced and go through the full legislative process all over again. In the latter, deliberations resume where it went off, and all previous decisions (such as the adoption of the bill by the other House) remain valid.
** Even more arcane arcana: The extension traditionally is given at the end of the Diet session in a single vote covering all the outstanding bills that the House has agreed to extend deliberations for; the DPJ wanted to vote for the extension of the anti-terror billbefore the 60-day limit expired and the Lower House could hold the override vote.
*** Which, I repeat is a policing action, not a war in the legal sense. The term itself is a mixed-up metaphor that the Bush administration used to its advantage
**** Mystifying to me is why the DPJ isn’t hitting the LDP harder on the Moriya et al scandal. Granted, this is still national security, but potential exposure of corruption has a visceral appeal that is lacking in the image of JSDF boats going back to the Indian Ocean.
.
***** I think that the chances of Fumio Kyūma being thrown under the bus has increased substantially.
In gauging the significance of this latest in the twist and turns that the DPJ has taken on the Japanese response to the War on Terror***, it is worth noting that most of the changes in direction except Mr. Ozawa’s initial opposition have had everything to do with poll-driven tactics and nothing to do with statecraft. In fact, some DPJ leaders such as Yukio Hatoyama were quite frank about this, routinely admitting that the DPJ would decide whether to do this (say, introduce a bill of its own) or that (say, hold an vote on the bill before the 60-day deadline) depending on the dictates of public opinion. This dithering and drifting on the part of the DPJ leadership is, of course, a reflection of deep fissures within the party on defense policy and more broadly on Article 9, a part of which can be traced to its varied origins. Luckily, the Japanese public had long decided that there were other, more compelling issues on the table****, so it appears to be doing little lasting damage to its credibility.
And with that out of the way, everybody should be ready for the popularity contest － will they bribe us with our (and your gaijin) money? － in the regular Diet session to begin. With the budget-related laws on deck － passing the budget itself will be a snap, since it is the de facto prerogative of the Lower House － the twisted Diet goes into truly uncharted waters. Keep in mind that it’s the measures that expire on April 1 that will be at the center of attention. If you have to keep an eye on one key item in that group, the gasoline tax, for mainly technical reasons but partly because of dissent within the LDP and DPJ, is the one. The unfolding Moriya et al scandal will serve as an unpredictable Greek chorus*****.
* A bit of parliamentary arcana: At the end of a Diet session, the two Houses must each make a decision on any bill (or any other issue that requires the decision of the Diet) that remains outstanding in that House. It can do nothing, which causes the bill to die, or decide by the usual simple majority vote to continue deliberation in the next Diet session. In the first case, the bill, if desired, must be introduced and go through the full legislative process all over again. In the latter, deliberations resume where it went off, and all previous decisions (such as the adoption of the bill by the other House) remain valid.
** Even more arcane arcana: The extension traditionally is given at the end of the Diet session in a single vote covering all the outstanding bills that the House has agreed to extend deliberations for; the DPJ wanted to vote for the extension of the anti-terror billbefore the 60-day limit expired and the Lower House could hold the override vote.
*** Which, I repeat is a policing action, not a war in the legal sense. The term itself is a mixed-up metaphor that the Bush administration used to its advantage
**** Mystifying to me is why the DPJ isn’t hitting the LDP harder on the Moriya et al scandal. Granted, this is still national security, but potential exposure of corruption has a visceral appeal that is lacking in the image of JSDF boats going back to the Indian Ocean.
.
***** I think that the chances of Fumio Kyūma being thrown under the bus has increased substantially.
Sunday, December 09, 2007
Ruling Coalition and Opposition Work Together, Earn Passing Grade
The hard-copy Yomiuri gives regular updates on legislative activities. As of last week, 11 legislative bills that the Yomiuri considers important had been adopted, with eight more likely to make it by the 15 December deadline. Of the former, eight had been submitted by the Cabinet, of which five were passed unanimously, while three were adopted after the ruling coalition and the opposition parties agreed on a joint amendment. Of the three adopted bills submitted by Diet members, two were jointly submitted by the coalition and the opposition parties while the other was a joint proposal that unified bills submitted from both sides. Of the eight bills likely to be adopted, one, an amendment to the Broadcasting Act submitted by the Cabinet is likely to be adopted since the coalition agreed to alter a controversial article that would have enhanced the power of authorities to take action against a broadcasting station that aired false information. Of the other seven likely to be adopted, one will be jointly submitted by the coalition and the opposition parties while the other six are joint proposals unifying a couple of bills submitted from the two sides.
The Yomiuri report lists 10 other legislative bills (five Cabinet submissions, five Diet member submissions) still under consideration for which there is no likelihood of being adopted by 15 December. The refueling resumption bill is one of them. Since four other minor legislative bills* have also been adopted, the post-15 December supermajority override will bring the total of legislative bills adopted at this Diet session to at least 25.
It has become customary for the Diet to hold lengthy extraordinary/special Diet sessions after the summer hiatus following the regular Diet session. In fact, with another, more brief “Golden Week” interruption to the regular session, the legislative schedule looks increasingly like a two-semester school year with a brief spring break. So let’s see how the “twisted” Diet compares with its previous incarnations and issue grades.
In 2005, in the 42-day special Diet session (11 September-1 November) following Prime Minister Koizumi’s landslide victory in the Lower House general election, the Diet passed 28 legislative bills. Of this legislative total, seven were submitted by Diet members, of which five were submitted by committee chairmen. The last figure is significant, because a chairman submission appears to signify that there was at least some positive opposition input*. In 2006, an 84-day extraordinary Diet session (26 September-19 December) saw 25 legislative bills (as well as one treaty) adopted, of which 18 were Cabinet submissions and seven were Diet members submissions (including four committee chairmen submissions).
So the score is 2005 (Koizumi administration) 28, 2006 (Abe administration) 25, and 2007 (Fukuda administration) 25 minimum. Now the 2005 special Diet session did it in 42 days, and the 2007(-2008) extraordinary session is going to take 122 days (with the extension to 15 January), unless the DPJ decides that enough is enough and agrees to cut a deal. Moreover, there’s more to evaluating results than the number of legislative bills passed**. Still, making allowances for the time wasted by the Abe-Fukuda handoff and the Grand Coalition difficulties and the need to adjust to life under a “twisted” Diet, the current session appears to stack up quite nicely with comparative sessions from balmier days.
The real test will come in the regular session that convenes in the bottom half of January, particularly as the March 31 expiration date for so much time-limited legislation － most importantly special tax measures*** － approaches. But if the experience of this Diet session means anything, it is that, despite the contentiousness borne of the uncertainties of a divided house, including all the fuss about a censure motion and/or snap election, the ruling coalition and the opposition have worked to keep the legislative mill rolling. And the need to look reasonable and responsible in the public eye by convincing the media to see matters in that light is likely to keep it that way.
I do believe that the “twisted” Diet will make it more difficult to deal with the more serious questions concerning the long-term health of the nation, which I’ve briefly mentioned elsewhere. That, in fact, is why there is a good case to be made for a grand coalition. (No, not that Grand Coalition.) Still, the ruling coalition and the opposition do deserve passing grades for this lesser of the two semesters.
* I’d be happy to check this if someone paid me for doing it. Otherwise, you’ll have to do it yourself, or accept my educated guess.
** By law, salaries of public servants in four categories require annual adjustments by separate legislation. Housekeeping matters of the Diet sometimes require legislative action, further inflating the number of bills passed in any given session.
*** The loss of gasoline surtaxes alone could reduce the public take by a trillion yen more or less.
The Yomiuri report lists 10 other legislative bills (five Cabinet submissions, five Diet member submissions) still under consideration for which there is no likelihood of being adopted by 15 December. The refueling resumption bill is one of them. Since four other minor legislative bills* have also been adopted, the post-15 December supermajority override will bring the total of legislative bills adopted at this Diet session to at least 25.
It has become customary for the Diet to hold lengthy extraordinary/special Diet sessions after the summer hiatus following the regular Diet session. In fact, with another, more brief “Golden Week” interruption to the regular session, the legislative schedule looks increasingly like a two-semester school year with a brief spring break. So let’s see how the “twisted” Diet compares with its previous incarnations and issue grades.
In 2005, in the 42-day special Diet session (11 September-1 November) following Prime Minister Koizumi’s landslide victory in the Lower House general election, the Diet passed 28 legislative bills. Of this legislative total, seven were submitted by Diet members, of which five were submitted by committee chairmen. The last figure is significant, because a chairman submission appears to signify that there was at least some positive opposition input*. In 2006, an 84-day extraordinary Diet session (26 September-19 December) saw 25 legislative bills (as well as one treaty) adopted, of which 18 were Cabinet submissions and seven were Diet members submissions (including four committee chairmen submissions).
So the score is 2005 (Koizumi administration) 28, 2006 (Abe administration) 25, and 2007 (Fukuda administration) 25 minimum. Now the 2005 special Diet session did it in 42 days, and the 2007(-2008) extraordinary session is going to take 122 days (with the extension to 15 January), unless the DPJ decides that enough is enough and agrees to cut a deal. Moreover, there’s more to evaluating results than the number of legislative bills passed**. Still, making allowances for the time wasted by the Abe-Fukuda handoff and the Grand Coalition difficulties and the need to adjust to life under a “twisted” Diet, the current session appears to stack up quite nicely with comparative sessions from balmier days.
The real test will come in the regular session that convenes in the bottom half of January, particularly as the March 31 expiration date for so much time-limited legislation － most importantly special tax measures*** － approaches. But if the experience of this Diet session means anything, it is that, despite the contentiousness borne of the uncertainties of a divided house, including all the fuss about a censure motion and/or snap election, the ruling coalition and the opposition have worked to keep the legislative mill rolling. And the need to look reasonable and responsible in the public eye by convincing the media to see matters in that light is likely to keep it that way.
I do believe that the “twisted” Diet will make it more difficult to deal with the more serious questions concerning the long-term health of the nation, which I’ve briefly mentioned elsewhere. That, in fact, is why there is a good case to be made for a grand coalition. (No, not that Grand Coalition.) Still, the ruling coalition and the opposition do deserve passing grades for this lesser of the two semesters.
* I’d be happy to check this if someone paid me for doing it. Otherwise, you’ll have to do it yourself, or accept my educated guess.
** By law, salaries of public servants in four categories require annual adjustments by separate legislation. Housekeeping matters of the Diet sometimes require legislative action, further inflating the number of bills passed in any given session.
*** The loss of gasoline surtaxes alone could reduce the public take by a trillion yen more or less.
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