Airline Issues “Apology” to American Muslims

AIRTRAN AIRWAYS OFFERS APOLOGY TO CUSTOMERS ON FLIGHT 175 YESTERDAY

We sincerely regret that the passengers on flight 175 did not have a positive travel experience on January 1, 2009.

While ultimately this issue proved to be a misunderstanding, the steps taken were necessary.

Alert passengers reported to the flight crew what they believed were inappropriate comments allegedly made by one of the passengers onboard, and the flight crew notified the federal air marshals that were assigned to the flight…After deplaning the remaining passengers and performing a sweep of the aircraft and rescreening all passengers, crew, checked and carry-on baggage, the flight departed two hours late without the nine passengers who were detained for questioning.

We regret that the issue escalated to the heightened security level it did on New Year’s Day, but we trust everyone understands that the security and the safety of our passengers is paramount and cannot be compromised.

We apologize to all of the passengers – to the nine who had to undergo extensive interviews from the authorities and to the 95 who ultimately made the flight. Nobody on Flight 175 reached their destination on time on New Year’s Day, and we regret it.

And with this letter from AirTran, CNN claims “AirTran apologizes to Muslim family removed from plane”? And wait, there’s more to it:

One family member, Kashif Irfan, said Friday he was "very appreciative and surprised" by AirTran's apology. "It's a very generous gesture," he said.

“[A]ppreciative”? “[G]enerous”? No multimillion-dollar law suit? No wonder AirTran isn’t apologizing for kicking them off the flight. They weren’t real Americans.

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Now this Arab guy, he gets it. And he’s only a resident.

Abu Aardvark, on the Internets and Al Qaeda

The world needs more of this kind of thinking. I'm not just talking about AQ. This could spawn a whole new academic discipline, if it hasn't already.

Clarification or Step-back? The 2007 US Report on North Korea as State Sponsor of Terrorism

I took this up last September. Now the 2007 State Sponsors of Terror Overview is out. Take a look. I’ve highlighted the before-and-after in bold. I think that the change reflects the latest turn of events, and is intended to reassure US hardliners that the Bush administration will require quid pro quo at each step of the denuclearization process. The abductees remain, in my view, a side issue with regard to the delisting process.

Country Reports on Terrorism; Chapter 3—State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview; North Korea

2006 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."

2007 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002. As part of the Six-Party Talks process, the United States reaffirmed its intent to fulfill its commitments regarding the removal of the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in parallel with the DPRK’s actions on denuclearization and in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law.

But Are They War Crimes? － The Gitmo Trials

Anticipating international criticism over plans to seek the death penalty for accused September 11, 2001, terrorists, the State Department is advising U.S. diplomats to point out that Nazis were executed after their war crime trials.
－ CNN, 2008 February 13

Since the War Tribunals, the US military has rarely imposed the death penalty*. In fact, it last carried out a death sentence in 1961, when it hanged a certain John A. Bennett, Pvt. 1st. Class. His crime? Rape, and attempted murder, of an 11-year-old Austrian girl. No, there were no fatalities. In fact, the girl and her parents wrote letters to President Kennedy asking him to spare Bennettt's life.

What media reports on the new Gitmo trials do not tell you is that Private Bennett was an African-American.

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ADD (February 14): The huge dissonance between the title and the substance is intentional, but I realize now that it is very confusing. My intent was to place the politicization of the military criminal procedure system (the Gitmo suspects in a constitutional limbo between the military and the civilian, Private Bennett falling in the societal abyss between the Jim Crow and post-Civil Rights Act worlds) as the backdrop to the many doors that the small historical footnote in the articles on the Gitmo trials opened. But it obviously does not work too well, as ross’s comment shows.

I still have a lot to learn about this craft. My only excuse: I’m new at writing for myself.

National Defense Twofer:Minister Wants Procurement Done His Way, and Seiji Maehara Denies Ichiro Ozawa

One of the quirks of Japanese defense procurement is that trading companies have traditionally acted as go-betweens for foreign vendors in their dealings with the Self-Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense). This is why trading companies showed up in the center of the 1976 Lockheed bribery scandal, which took down a Prime Minister (Kakuei Tanaka), a Transport Minister (in Japan, although the Grumman-Lockheed battle for the JSDA next-generation fighter was at the core of the controversy, the criminal case revolved mainly around government influence on the procurement of civilian aircraft by Japanese airlines), the Marubeni CEO, and a host of other lesser political figures and businessmen. (It also spawned the New Liberal Club, the first of the so-far unsuccessful challenges to provide a viable alternative to the LDP.) They were also featured in the 1978 Grumman/McDonnell-Douglas bribery scandal, which threatened to implicate LDP politicians, before the investigation petered out the following year after a key witness, a senior executive in the trading company Nissho-Iwai (now part of Sojitsu), committed suicide, leaving many questions unanswered. Raizo Matsuno, the one Diet member whose career was derailed by the scandal, managed to escape prosecution. Things have changed little, if the latest scandal is any indication.

Shigeru Ishiba, the LDP defense otaku, doesn’t like this state of affairs one bit, and has long been an advocate of taking the trading companies out of the procurement process and dealing directly with vendors. Now, as Minister of Defense, he is in a position to do it. And, as luck would have it, the Takemasa Moriya scandal gives him the opportunity to do something about it, and he vowed this morning on the Sunday Project, the must-see program for Japan politics otakus), to do just that.

It will not be an easy task; the bureaucracy will be required to do a lot of homework that the trading companies had been doing for them, and people do not become smart overnight. Less significantly, foreign vendors will have to face the consequences of the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) or the EU equivalent thereof. But the establishment has no choice, since corruption is something that the public can wrap its mind around, and the extension of the refueling operations, on which so much of the Fukuda administration’s credibility depends, will turn on how Mr. Ishiba handles not only Takemasa Moriya (under the bus, drawn-and-quartered, Class A War Criminal), but the broader issue as well.

The silver lining for the LDP in the latest defense procurement scandal is that it does not look likely to implicate anyone beyond the bureaucracy. In that sense (and that sense only), it is more like the Defense Facilities Administration Agency scandal, where it came to light that former DFAA officials employed by construction firms and other vendors had been at the center of widespread collusion in bidding for DFAA contracts. The DFAA was fully folded in the Self-Defense Agency as a consequence, allowing the mainstream JSDA bureaucracy to rein in the somewhat autonomous DFAA.

I suspect that there are some people out there who are wondering, what are the political prospects of Shigeru Ishiba if he saves the day? For my two bits: zero chance of becoming Prime Minister. He’s a one-trick pony, and defense wins only in the NBA.

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Mr. Ishiba’s DPJ soulmate Seiji Maehara joined him on Sunday Project. Think Romeo and Juliet, without the sex. Yes, they argued. Three things caught my attention:

Mr. Maehara stated at least twice that the DPJ has never claimed that the OEF-MIO operations are unconstitutional and that Ichiro Ozawa’s views are his personal opinions, nothing more. This is, of course, not what the public is hearing from Mr. Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama, his DPJ deputy and two-time party head.

Mr. Maehara gave the lack of proper governance and civilian control, citing the long string of JSDA/MOD misdeeds (he mentioned corruption in the JDAA, the Winny information leaks, 800,000/200,000 gallon discrepancy, missing ship logs, and possibly one or two others; Shisaku should have the video tape) as the main reason for opposing extension. As for the 800/200 K, he repeatedly said that it was one thing to say that there had been mistakes back then, but the refueling activities are crucial to Japan’s national interest and quite another to claim that nothing was amiss and demand that the extension be passed under that premise. This is, of course, not what the public is hearing from Mr. Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama, his DPJ deputy and two-time party head.

Mr. Maehara would not say that the DPJ would submit a bill on Japanese participation in ISAF, no matter how hard Sōichirō Tawara, the ugliest emcee this side of the Crypt Keeper, pushed him. Only an outline; that seems to be the limit for Mssrs. Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Maehara. For now.

Why Would Waiting An Extra Month or More Would Make It Any Easier to Pass the Refueling Bill?

There is talk within the LDP about not forcing a House of Representatives supermajority override vote on the new bill to extend the OEF-MIO refueling operations for another year during this extraordinary Diet. Instead, some LDP Diet members are talking about postponing the initial H.R. vote to the next regular session (typically convened in the bottom half of January), or even to let it die in the House of Councilors and resubmit it to start again at square one at the regular session. The reasoning appears to be that forcing the issue now would cause the DPJ and the opposition to pass a censure motion of the Fukuda Cabinet, which could force the Prime Minister to dissolve the H.R. for an early election. The reluctance of the pacifist coalition partner New Komeito to force the matter is also cited as a concern. Taku Yamazaki, head of the LDP-New Komeitō special team for the legislation, and former LDP Secretary-General Hidenao Nakagawa, are two prominent LDP members calling for restraint.

But why do the people doing this talking believe that waiting up to another extra month (in the case of H.R. vote postponement) or three months or more (in the case of resubmission) to get the deal done will bring more of the public - let alone the DPJ - around to the LDP's views? To the general public, this is not an issue on the death-and-taxes level, or one with the emotional resonance of, say, the abductees. Thus, what public perception there is will continue to be molded by the media, rather than the other way around.

As it is, Yomiuri and Sankei are firmly behind an extension, while Asahi continues to question the accountability of the operations and their link to the Iraq War. I have little awareness of how this is playing out on TV, but I assume that the broadcasting networks are not doing things that materially change perception created by the mainstream print media. Accordingly, the bulk of the don't-knows have climbed off the fence over the last couple of months and tended to migrate to the support column; if you average out the left-to-right media polls, it looks like the public has come around to give the operations a reasonably strong plurality. And the media does not look likely to change their tune. Thus, to let your decision on the supermajority override turn on further enhancing this support by bringing the remaining fence-sitters to your corner or even converting some doubters looks like a dangerous course of action.

The people suggesting a delay must be hoping that the need to attend to such domestic affairs will give the Prime Minister a good excuse not to call a snap election in the inevitable H.C. censure vote after the H.R. override. But the Fukuda administration will have to balance that against a four-, five-month gap in Japanese operations, which would be a serious diplomatic embarrassment. Add to this the serious leadership question this will raise if he is seen to be caving in to the opposition. There's a point where man of reason tips over into wimp.

And how serious is the threat of an early election anyway? Will the media call on the Fukuda administration to resign or seek a new mandate in the case of an override during the current Diet session, and the public follow suit? And if the Prime Minister does neither, and causes the DPJ to step up its intransigence and obstruct proceedings altogether during the regular Diet session, do the LDP members now calling for restraint think that the media and the public will blame the LDP, but not the DPJ?

Barring an unforeseen turn for the worse in public sentiment, I don't see the Prime Minister backing off and tabling the issue until the regular Diet session.

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Also important is the fact that, at the regular Diet session, the media spotlight will be on the new FY 2208 budget proposal and other bread-and-butter issues such as the public pension system and taxes. As a practical matter, the extension bill will have to share the Diet agenda with the budget and all the other legislative bills, and the delay could stretch ahead even longer, into the early months of FY 2008, April and beyond, before the bill is even introduced.

There is a further technical issue involved here, namely, whether the refueling bill is a budget-related bill, that is, legislation linked to the execution of the budget. I don't remember enough about the definition, but the fact that the bill can be introduced now without the occasion of a supplementary budget suggests that it's not. If this casual guess of mine is correct, that means that, by custom, the bill will not be resubmitted until April, after the budget has passed and all the budget-related bills have been taken care of. That would take the JMSDF out of refueling operations until June at the earliest.

The LDP Accommodates New Komeitō on Refueling Extension. Will It Try to Go for Two for Two with the DPJ?

The LDP reportedly has acceded to New Komeitō and will seek a one-year extension for the JMSDF refueling activities under the Maritime Interception Operations instead of the two years that it had originally intended. New Komeitō wants to enhance the role of the Diet and the LDP has decided to assuage the New Komeitō, whose leadership is under fire from its rank and file for having been too accommodative of the Abe administration and suffering the consequences at the polls in the July House of Councilors general election. On the other side, Ichiro Ozawa seems to be softening on his push for a (presumably) JDSF role in ISAF, as the DPJ appears to be moving towards a legislative proposal that will focus on reconstruction and development tasks and/or humanitarian efforts, in contrast to the more conflict-oriented security activities.

I suspect that it must be tempting to the soft-sell Fukuda administration to offer to add the eventual DPJ proposal to its own package. I doubt that the DPJ would accept it, given Mr. Ozawa's uncompromising stand on the unconstitutionality of the refueling activities. But it would make great political theater and help the LDP cast itself as the more reasonable and responsible of the two. The LDP would also hope that this would reopen internal fissures that the DPJ will have papered over with its proposal.

Whether it would work in practice is another matter. Japan already does provide considerable development assistance to Afghanistan through JICA, which has a good number of shoes on the ground as technical and engineering experts. There are also a number of Japanese NGOs active there. These brave men and women reportedly have been free from harm so far. Thus, it seems at first glance that, if we could find the right people - the money should not be a problem - we could repackage and expand these activities under the ISAF brand.

However, placing Japanese activities under the ISAF umbrella carries the risk of bringing Japan under the suspicion of insurgents and terrorists as enemy combatants. And this is not Samawa. At a minimum, it would carry added security risks that require protection that the other ISAF participants will be loathe to provide. Moreover, reconstruction and development activities are a terrible fit in a piece of extraordinary legislation that nominally expires in a year.

This does not mean that the Fukuda administration should reject such an idea altogether. It could push it as a new and improved, reconstruction and development package of mid- to long-term assistance with more substantive but still civilian presence as the development, attacking-the-roots side of our efforts to bring peace and prosperity to the region, or something of the sort. Human resource constraints will put a practical limit on the speed and extent of its implementation. There are only so many qualified and competent Japanese who will be willing to go and work under prevailing conditions. Still, with judicious use of non-Japanese actors, the Japanese government actually might be able to do something useful that does not increase the risks to the individuals already engaged in our activities there. And, back home, it could still be sold politically as constructive engagement with the opposition.

ADD: I don't believe in synchronicity (actually, he put his post up much earlier), but it looks like Tobias Harris and I have similar takes on the situation. I note that he has more on the domestic political background, though I'm sure that everyone reading this also goes to the Japan Observer and everyone is already aware of the fact. The main difference seems to be my own skepticism about forcing ourselves on the other ISAF participants. Under current political and practical constraints, Japanese activities should maintain a certain distance from ISAF, even if that limits their scope.

My Big Mistake on OEF-MIO Operations from the Persian Gulf and Incomplete Thoughts Thereon

I made a big mistake. In fact, I made a doubled-size, italics, bold-letter mistake here. Foreign Minister Komura under Diet questioning reaffirmed that naval vessels did participate in bombing sorties in Afghanistan after receiving fuel from JMSDF vessels, and that the new anti-terrorism bill would be limited to Maritime Interception Operations (OEF-MIO).

So, my unconditional, absolute apology to TIME and its intrepid reporting team.

But it was not to abase myself publicly that I am writing this. You see, the existence of such bombing operations is very important because that is the only plausible explanation for the USS Kitty Hawk engaging in OEF from the Persian Gulf during the three days (25-27 February 2003) that, according to Defense Minister Ishiba, it took to consume the 800,000 gallons that it received from the JMSDF refueling ship Tokiwa. (In fact, I'm very much embarrassed at the fact that I didn't see this point in the first place.)

Still, leaving aside the conceptual difficulty of wrapping your mind around the idea that you can somehow distinguish between the drops of JMSDF fuel and drops of non-JMSDF fuel in the same fuel tank (surely the Kitty Hawk was not running on empty when it was serviced by Tokiwa) the discrepancy between average daily fuel consumption figures under normal conditions (U.S. documents by way of Peace Depot-113,000 gallons, Mr. Ishiba-200,000 gallons) remains unresolved. Likewise, the Kitty Hawk command history that the Peace Depot accusations has uploaded appears to show that its objectives on this mission were to engage in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).

Moreover, the Kitty Hawk deck log, again courtesy of Peace Depot, together with a map attached to the hard copy version of this Yomiuri article on Mr. Ushiba's testimony raises a further question. The deck log shows the Kitty Hawk in "AT/PASSAGE FROM Malacca TO Persian Gulf" on two dates, 17 February and 27 February, the latter date being the day it changed command. I presume that subsequent log entries show the Kitty Hawk "AT/PASSAGE FROM the Persian Gulf TO". The Yomiuri map of the Kitty Hawk's final leg of its passage (did Mr. Ishiba display it during his Diet testimony?) shows the Kitty Hawk on the move continuously, as it approaches from the Indian Ocean on 24 February, refuels from the Tokiwa near the mouth of the Persian Gulf on 25 February, enters the Gulf on 26 February, then comes to settle off the narrow Iraqi outlet at the tip of the Gulf on 1 March. I suspect that if the log between its departure from Okinawa and arrival in the Gulf were disclosed, it would show that the Kitty Hawk had been in continuous movement every day. Now it is conceivable that it ran sorties to Afghanistan in passing as it neared its ultimate destination. But plausible? I have no military expertise whatsoever, so I'll leave it at that.

There's also the matter of the large amount of JMSDF-to-U.S. vessel refueling, both in number of operations and per operation volume, in FY 2001 (April-March) and FY 2002, and the dramatic drop-off thereafter. The 800,000 gallons in the 25 February operation is merely a small fraction of the total. OSW effectively ended with the successful subjugation of the Iraqi regime at the end of the Japanese FY 2002. This coincidence of the end of refueling large U.S. military vessels and the end of a continuous aerial operation must be matched against the rise and fall of battleground needs in Afghanistan at the time to derive any conclusions, though; and, again, I am in way over my head. Unfortunately for Ichiro Ozawa, DPJ wonks knowledgeable in defense matters do not seem to be in his corner in the attack on the anti-terrorism operations.

Okay, now back to life.

(note) Major operations in Afghanistan involving air power seemed to have subsided, at least for while, after Operation Anaconda in March 2002. And the Anaconda was run by the U.S. ARMY and Air Force and did not involve the Navy or the Marines.

Ask The Jurisprudence Guy: Why Joining ISAF Is Constitutional

Okay, nobody asked, so I guess that makes this a promo.

I don't know where Foreign Minister Komura gets his legal advice, but I find the argument that engaging in ISAF activities is unconstitutional unconvincing to say the least.

Article 9, paragraph 1, says that "the Japanese people renounce forever" the "use of force as means of settling international disputes". Now, the last time I looked, I did not find one sovereign state openly in military conflict with the ISAF forces, or supportive of the non-state actors who are the subject of ISAF activities, and the Afghan government more than welcomes ISAF. So where is the "international" conflict? As far as international law is concerned, surely this is merely a policing action.

If I were the LDP leadership, I would accept the constitutionality of Japanese participation in ISAF, and hammer Ichiro Ozawa on the practicalities of the intervention until Mr. Ozawa has no choice but to come out of hiding to make his case. Which he will botch.

But this is a soft-sell administration, and there must be LDP people on the right who do not want to look wimpy in the first place, so it won't happen.

Has TIME (Where Else?) Correspondent Fallen for Deadpan Foreign Minister's Joke?

Japan May Stop Afghan Mission Aid

(TOKYO) — Japan would scale back its support of the U.S. in Afghanistan by ending naval assistance to vessels involved in ground missions there under a ruling party proposal that officials predicted Sunday would gain parliament's approval.
Since 2001, Japan's navy has been providing fuel for coalition warships under an anti-terrorism law that has been extended three times. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has strongly pushed for another extension to the mission, which expires on Nov. 1.
However, Fukuda has been forced to make concessions because of strong resistance from the opposition bloc, which took control of parliament's upper chamber following a massive electoral defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in July.
A new draft law, submitted to the opposition Friday, would clearly limit the mission to naval refueling and supplying of water to vessels participating in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom's maritime patrol missions in the Indian Ocean.
"Under the new law, there will be no refueling to ships providing support for ground operations (in Afghanistan)," Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura said Sunday on a public broadcaster NHK talk show.

- TIME, 07 October 2007

Dang, we've been hearing about the new anti-terrorism bill doing away with "[non-existent] search and rescue missions, as well as [non-existent] humanitarian relief efforts", but maritime operations? Oddly, none of the mainstream media seem to be carrying the story. Doesn't anybody care anymore? So I wrack my brain all day, until I realize:

Afghanistan is a land-locked nation, hundreds of miles away from any serious body of seawater! In fact, it's hundred's of miles away from any serious body of water.

"Opposition lawmakers have also alleged that oil supplied by Japanese ships was diverted to U.S. operations in Iraq, triggering public outrage. "The government must more clearly disclose its activities over the last six years," DPJ secretary-general Naoto Kan told a Fuji TV talk show on Sunday."

Mr. Kan's low-key sarcasm does not come cross very well in print (you have to see it to feel the victim's irritation and frustration), and something is lost in translation, so I'll give the correspondent a pass on that. But where's the public outrage? Don't you have the presence of mind to quote a tabloid? Asahi? Actually, the relative lack of public outrage is something that has mildly surprised me through all this.

"On Saturday, the country's largest business daily, the Nikkei, said Japan was preparing to withdraw its ships entirely from the region because the government did not expect to meet the deadline — a report quickly denied by the Defense Ministry.
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba reiterated Sunday the government remained confident it can win backing of the opposition, which controls parliament's upper chamber. "We believe the new law will be approved in the upper house," Ishiba told a separate talk show aired by TV Asahi."

Maybe I was watching a different Shigeru Ishiba, because the Defense Minister that I saw kept saying something to the effect that this was not the time to talk of an override, and that much would hinge on how public opinion would evolve. But I'll take it on faith that Mr. Ishiba did say those things. Still, when most people believe that the DPJ has little room for moving away from its opposition to the extension of OEF-MIO, it's odd that these statements could be left out there without any context.

"But Fukuda, who took office last month, has sold himself as a compromiser and promised to reach a consensus with the opposition over the Afghan mission."

Nobody believes that he has made such a promise. He's made a best-effort commitment, nothing more.

And why does the article end on this note:

"Japan also hosts about 50,000 U.S. troops and is working with the U.S. on a joint missile defense system."

So true, but what does it have to do with the context? This article seems to begin with a missed joke, and end in a missing point.

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Seriously, could the Foreign Minister have been referring to Iraq? It is also important to note that, under Ichiro Ozawa's reasoning, the JSMDF should be providing support for ground operations in Afghaniston, but not for what Mr. Komura purportedly limited the extension to.

Refueling Issue Update

1. Newspaper reports say that the ruling coalition will introduce the bill only after the Budget Committee has completed its session on October 17. If true, this means that the earliest opportunity to submit the bill will be October 19, after the Cabinet meeting, giving the House of Representatives less than two weeks to vote on the bill. It is looking more likely that the supermajority revote will be held in January, before the Diet recesses and reconvenes in its annual regular session, most likely in the bottom half of January.

2. I had written here that the LDP considered both OEF-MIO and ISAF constitutionally acceptable. But I have recently seen Foreign Minister Komura state that direct participation in ISAF activities as of now would be unconstitutional, since the area could not yet be considered a non-combat area. Defense Minster Ishiba, the man who not only knows everything about military affairs but can also recite Article 9 by heart, gave a more elaborate explanation today on Sunday Project, pointing to two elements; 1) the existence of a conflict between states; and 2) a state of war that would make Japanese participation unconstitutional, and that 2) constitutionally barred Japan from taking part right now.

I don't think that this is a sound legal argument. War is war in a legal sense only because there are two or more states involved. Mr. Ishiba, in arguing for the continuation of the refueling activities, stated (and nobody is disputing) that there was no state as an enemy combatant in the case of OEF-MIO. But the same holds true for ISAF. In fact, Article 9 has even less to do with OEF-MIO (which did have Afghanistan as an enemy combatant to start with) than it does with ISAF (which has only non-state domestic insurgents and Al Qaeda as adversaries). But who asked me for my opinion? So this is a correction of the facts of the issue.

3) Mr. Ishiba also claimed that, although Pentagon is still in the process of conducting a thorough survey of the Kitty Hawk refueling controversy, he has so far been developing a conviction that the diesel fuel was not diverted to the Iraqi War. Everything seems to acquire more credibility - or at least plausibility - when Mr. Ishiba says it, so I'm going to suspend judgment until the case is laid out in public with due evidence, as he promised.

From Asahi, Peace Depot Update on JMSDF OEF-MIO? OIF? Refueling Activities

Today's Asahi brings us the news that Peace Depot, in the second installment of their investigations, which I previously chronicled here. Peace Depot has confirmed mainly through the log records of the Fleet Replenishment Oiler USNS Pecos, which had made the controversial 80,000 gallon retransfer to the USS Kitty Hawk, had subsequently refueled the Egis cruiser Coupens, then replenished locally and repeatedly refueled other US Marine and other vessels in the Persian Gulf. Peace Depot asserts that this deepens suspicions that the 800,000 gallon fuel oil in question, even if it had not been used to refuel the Kitty Hawk, was indeed used for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Asahi, perhaps weighted by its initial support of refueling activities back in the day, takes a We-Report, You-Decide approach to the latest revelations.

Will the DPJ Push Mr. Ozawa's Legal Argument and Normal Country Inclinations to Their Ultimate Conclusion?

There is no difference of opinion between the LDP and the DPJ over the basic legal prerequisites for Japanese involvement in military operations in and around Afghanistan. Both parties believe that such operations must be authorized by UNSG resolutions. However, the two parties differ when it comes to the specific application of this legal principle. The LDP is of the view that both a) the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its activities and b) what the US named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; actually, OEF in Afghanistan in this post, as commonly accepted) and its participants have received such authorization, while the DPF asserts that only ISAF has done so. So, as far as the Constitution is concerned, the LDP position is that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces may engage in both activities, while the DPJ, with the victorious Ichiro Ozawa imposing his will on internal dissidents, allows to participation in ISAF only.

As a practical matter though, the LDP deems ISAF operations too dangerous and therefore has limited Japanese presence to OEF, where the JMSDF is undertaking the relatively safe, refueling operations on the open seas. On the other hand, the DPJ, prodded by Mr. Ozawa's openness to Japanese participation in ISAF - Mr. Ozawa has in the past shown a strong-pro US streak, and was the original proponent of "normal country" status for Japan, a concept that is more often associated with hawkish LDP politicians - is considering the matter, albeit with reluctance in many quarters. (Former party leader Seiji Maehara is one name that springs immediately to mind.) Thus, we have the intriguing situation where the LDP for practical reasons is limiting Japanese participation to modest proportions, while the DPJ is considering accepting the conclusions of its legal position (which has some force, if not quite a slam-dunk argument) and leapfrogging the LDP to the more dangerous phase of the operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. (There are reportedly DPJ voices calling for limiting participation to medical assistance and other civilian activities. It remains to be seen, though, if other nations with soldiers in Afghanistan will be willing, or even able, to baby-sit another gaggle of Japanese civilians and possibly lightly armed JSDF personnel.)

How will these legal and practical considerations play with the Japanese public?

OEF and the activities of ISAF in theory address different phases, or aspects of the war on terror; i.e. the former the continuing war against terror, and the latter the post-warfare stage "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment" UNSC Res.1386 (2001). But both activities are directed against Al Qaeda and its protectors the Taliban (if at least in the case of ISAF by no means exclusively so). Thus, for all practical purposes, they end up serving the same objective. In fact, until the whole controversy blew up over the extension of the anti-terrorism act, I confess that I was not aware of this distinction, and I hazard to guess that the Japanese public in general did not know much better either.

Remember that a plurality of the Japanese public has been coming around to an admittedly underwhelming support for the continuation of refueling activities. And it's the same theater against the same opponents; one operation is safe, the other is hazardous (and, by itself, might not even be welcomed).

I think that the practical consideration will prevail with the safety-first Japanese public. Unless the 800,000 gallon controversy spills over into operations beyond USS Kitty Hawk, or even the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I believe that the LDP position will prevail in the court of public opinion. A limited extension of two years for refueling operations only is definitely in the works, and, unless the potential budgetary repercussions of the ensuing delay of the next general Diet session become an overriding concern (I am now forced to add this caveat), will be passed within the year by a Lower House coalition supermajority revote. At least the Yomiuri editorial board seems to think so.

(Note) The Asahi editorial board is disappointed with Prime Minister Fukuda's answers in yesterday's Diet plenary, but officially remains agnostic. Mainichi is even more non-committal. The Sankei editorials no longer seem to be available after it replaced Mainichi as MSN's online news partner of choice. WTF?

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Nikkei, Yomiuri and Asahi are collaborating on a joint website, joint distribution, and joint emergency production. Other newspapers are also welcome to join the party. At the same time, MSN has ditched Mainichi (or is it the other way around?) for Sankei. Whatever. Just give the world a deeper archive, so I won't have to keep copying the articles to my hard disk.

I Need a Life, But in the Meantime, Interesting Facts and Figures on the Refueling Issue

Shisaku points to some interesting numbers on the refueling issue. (So that's where the October 1 Yomiuri got those non-attributed numbers for its chart.)

Panel 10 shows that the amount of fuel oil that the JMSDF vessels provided dropped precipitously from 119,000 KL in FY 2001 and 175,000 KL in FY 2002 to 53,000 KL in FY 2003, and has stayed more or less in that ballpark (albeit with large fluctuations) since then. This, despite the fact that the number of refueling occasions leapt from 58 in FY 2001 to 130 in FY 2002, jumped further to 188 in FY 2003, and has also stayed in that neighborhood. Moreover, the number of U.S. and non-U.S. vessels were: 98 and 2 in FY 2001, 96 and 4 in FY 2002, and 56 and 44 in FY 2003 (and in that vicinity since then), respectively.

In other words, in FY 2001 and FY 2002, the JMSDF vessels for the most part serviced large U.S. vessels and, from FY 2003 on, have been provisioning smaller vessels of mixed origin (roughly half-U.S. and declining and half non-, of which Pakistani ships so far form a large plurality).

The Iraqi War officially began on March 20, 2003 (did they declare war before they attacked?) near the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2002 (April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003). Clearly, there are many dots to be connected here, helped along with a little bit of Diet investigation authority.

So, are you thinking what I'm thinking?

Yes, Ichiro Ozawa does owe Shisaku a nice lunch.

ADD:

The average amount of fuel provided per operation was highest in FY 2002, at 2,052 KL. The amount of fuel involved in the (mainly) U.S.S. Kitty Hawk discrepancy was 800,000 gallons, or, more accurately, 2,973 KL. The two KL figures are in the same ballpark.

I believe that the authorities will try to explain all this as merely topping up, as the ships arrived for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) surveillance and interception activities. But can they sort out the ships and operations dedicated to OEF and those to Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and match the right ones to JMSDF refueling activities? Will the numbers add up?

A Twofer Post: The Two Policy Research Council Chairmen Go Head to Head; Chief Cabinet Secretary Grilled on Diesel Fuel for USS Kitty Hawk

On Sunday Project - surely the TV program most often cited (if often not credited) by the national print media - it's Sadakazu Tanigaki batting for the LDP doing what he does best and likes most, which is talking about policy issues, and the need to raise taxes. Up against him is the new DPJ policy chief Masayuki Naoshima, an ex-salaryman with extensive labor union background, someone that I'm not sure even Tobias Harris has seen. At the end, I am left wondering, what the hell was Mr. Naoshima doing there? He clearly had read the DPJ policy manifest, but did he know anything beyond it? Did he even believe it?

Soichiro Tawara, the Tasmanian Devil of political journalism, pounds Mr. Naoshima mercilessly on public pension reform. And with good reason too, because Mr. Naoshima is maddeningly vague on the details, basically copping a plea, that they are working on a bill. Mr. Tanigaki is at his enthusiastic and congenial best as he brings his command of details as well as his understanding of the broader fiscal implications to talk rings around Mr. Naoshima. Significantly, he emphasizes the underlying commonalities between the two positions, and suggests that there is plenty of room for a dialogue here. Mr. Tanigaki, like the Prime Minister, is by temperament and talent supremely suited to the soft-sell approach, and it shows.

On the contrast between the existing government policy to favor consolidating agricultural acreage and the DPJ proposal to extend income supplements to all farmers, Mr. Tanigaki scores at least a debating point when he argues against the wisdom of giving money to aging part-time farmers, an allegation that Mr. Naoshima lets pass without denial or counterargument. Moreover, Mr. Tanigaki handles the issue within the metropolitan center-boondocks dichotomy context. He believes that the persistence of public works that the prefectures conduct with their own revenues (in contrast to the public works subsidized by revenue transfers or direct subsidies) indicates that there are better ways to boost local economies. Is this a pitch for raising the consumption tax rate? Of course. Is he hinting at a possible escape valve for local pressures against the annual 3% cut in the national public works budget allocations? Maybe. But Mr. Naoshima does next to nothing to hit back, or even to defend himself.

Before, the DPJ could cite a recalcitrant bureaucracy for the lack of detail to its proposals. But control of the Upper House has greatly augmented the opposition's Diet investigation authority (Constitution, Article 62), and the bureaucracy has stepped up its cooperation with the DPJ, no doubt with the blessing of the LDP-New Komeito coalition. Ignorance is no longer an excuse for the DPJ.

Actually, only a very small fraction of this will show up in the Monday morning editions of the major dailies. At least not in the way that I have described them. And the DPJ will surely knock Mr. Tanigaki for stating that, in order to achieve primary balance in FY2011, the consumption tax rate will have to be raised higher than the 8% that Heizo Takenaka has suggested, and it may well find sympathetic editorial writers and even LDP discontents. If Mr. Naoshima clearly lost a round, he did it on a TV program that is only about as popular as a Sunday morning talk show on politics and the economy can be. Still, if this is any indication of how the policy debate is going to unfold, the DPJ will run the risk of being labeled not ready for primetime.

The LDP is clearly out to treat the relationship between consenting adults and to do its best to make a show of wooing the DPJ, and this actually comes naturally to Mr. Tanigaki. Ichiro Ozawa clearly wants to make war, not love. But the message does not seem to have reached his party policy chief.

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Nobutaka Machimura, Chief Cabinet Secretary, also appeared on the program and was grilled at length about the controversy over the alleged diversion of JMSDF diesel fuel from counter-terrorism surveillance activities to the Iraqi War. Mr. Machimura basically kept repeating that such diversion, if true, was a serious matter and that they were talking to the U.S. side to find out the truth. Mr. Tawara pushed hard to make him say that an extension would be taken off the table if it turned out to be a lie, and Mr. Machimura showed himself at his firm, confident, and congenial, stonewalling best.

I've written quite often on and around this matter, but this is the most useful post because it points to great investigative work by Peace Depot. I think that the U.S. is going to explain the 800,000 gallons as a regrettable but honest logistics and communications mix-up in the accelerated and incredibly complicated lead-up to the Iraqi War and admonish Centcom or some other part of the U.S. forces for the error. No, it will not show up in the service records of individual military officers. The explanation and the accompanying show of contrition will be accepted by the Fukuda administration, Asahi will make some noises, and a new, refueling-only law will be passed by a supermajority override, sometime late this year.

Two caveats:

One, the Fukuda administration will have to come up with a plausible explanation for the 200,000-800,000 discrepancy. My sixth sense says that this is the easy one.

Two, it better be just the 800,000 gallons. If systemic diversion beyond that intial phase of the Iraq War is uncovered, then all bets are off on the extension, and Mr. Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, will have some very serious atonement on his agenda.

It's a Yomiuri Poll So Asahi Readers Get up to a 10 Percentage-Point Discount

In a show of how quickly the tide can turn (and turn again), the latest Yomiuri poll gives the Fukuda Cabinet 57.5% support against 27.3% opposed. 47% favor the extension of JMSFD refueling activities in the Indian Ocean while 40% oppose it.

Asahi should have its own numbers in tomorrow's morning edition, and early polls - likewise the JMSM – always go easy on the newbie. Still, it's something to think about for Ichiro Ozawa.

070925What the State Department Thinks of North Korea as a Sponsor of Terrorism

Ever wondered what the bureaucrat-vetted version of U.S. policy concerning North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism looked like? I thought so.

Well, I'm going to force you to read them anyway, with excerpts of the introduction to the chapter on State Sponsors of Terror Overview and the section on North Korea. For both 2005 and 2006!

They were both published in April of the subsequent year. Two major differences:

The introduction in the 2006 Report has dropped reference to North Korea altogether. This is no oversight. The 2006 introduction is much longer, 280 words to 2005's 127.

The 2006 section on North Korea has also been truncated. Moreover, it includes the ominous statement:

In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."

What of the abductees? The 2005 Report says:

Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War.

But the 2006 Report says:

The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002.

What at the end of 2005 remained a contentious issue was now merely a continuing demand from the Japanese government for a full accounting. All reference to other abductees, including South Koreans, had been removed. Moreover, there was no evident link between the Japanese demands and North Korean de-listing.

What happened in between was, of course, the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement.

It had become something of a ritual, where Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Hill would intimate de-listing without regard to the Japanese abductees, then the Japanese powers-that-be would claim that they had talked to President Bush, or Condoleezza Rice, and received reassurances that such was not the case. Now, the latest report from Washington says that Secretary Rice has also defected to the other side. I should not have been surprised, since, on September 16, I had already watched then LDP Secretary-General Nobuteru Ishihara kiss off the Six-Party Talks in a fit of anger at the U.S. "change of heart".

In turn, though, I wonder how Mr. Ishihara could have held it in so long, since February 13? And if he had needed any further confirmation to have the message sink in, surely he should have read the writing on the cyberwall when he saw the April 30 Report.

Or maybe, just maybe, these people had known what was going on all along?

Consider this post complementary to this.

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Country Report on Terrorism (2005)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 28, 2006

Chapter 6 -- State Sponsors of Terror Overview

Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.

North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

Country Report on Terrorism (2006)
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 30, 2007


Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other destabilizing technologies that could get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.

As a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsors of terrorism on June 30. Since pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States and the international community on counterterrorism efforts.

Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the War on Terror. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.

Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as "not fully cooperating" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The designation, included in Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, was based on a review of Venezuela's overall efforts to fight terrorism. Effective October 1, the decision imposed sanctions on all commercial arms sales and transfers. It remains in effect until September 30, 2007, when it may be renewed by a determination by the Secretary. (Venezuela is the only nation certified as "not fully cooperating" that is not a state sponsor of terrorism.)

North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated to Japan since 2002. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the United States agreed to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism."

Asahi and Yomiuri Continue to Prowl the Battle Lines on the Counter-Terrorism Act

Yomiuri is in favor of continuing the refueling operations. Asahi to the best of my knowledge has not yet come out with an editorial that flatly comes out and says no, but it's obvious where its sympathies belong. The battle continues in the latest Yomiuri and Asahi articles, as the former dutifully recounts the press interview MOFA Vice Minister Itsunori Onodera gave on his return from a trip to OEF Headquarters in Bahrain. He claimed to be reassured that the Japanese diesel fuel was being used solely for OEF. Asahi all but says, no way, and interviews the Captain of the USS Enterprise, who freely admits that the ship under his command at the time received fuel directly from JMSDF supply ships, giving the lie to the "I don't know what they did with that stuff" defense.

On Afghanistan – yes, that is how the issue is perceived here, as elsewhere - the Japanese public is fairly evenly divided between pro, con, and indifferent. I'll try to take another turn on the effects of the revelation after the new Cabinet is installed.

Peace Depot Uses USNS Logs and Other Evidence to Assert JMSDF Fuel Oil Was Used In the Iraq War

The Peace Resource Cooperative, or Peace Depot for short, mainly using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act to access ship logs and other U.S. Naval Service documents as well as a GAO report, has made a strong case that the 786 thousand gallons (not 200 thousand gallons, as previously claimed by the Japanese government) of diesel oil that the Fleet Replenishment Oiler USNS Pecos received in 2003 from the JMSDF oiler Tokiwa had been used to refuel the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, which went on to participate in Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (not Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as previously claimed by the Japanese government). OSW maintained the Southern no-fly zone in the period between the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm; 1991) and the Iraq War (OIF; 2003- ). OIF was launched very soon after the Kitty Hawk arrived in the Persian Gulf.

Do you remember this and this? At the time, Nobuteru Ishihara as much as admitted that the US Naval ships in question were patrolling Iraqi waters, but claimed that they were watching for possible terrorist shipments and movements. After all, the Persian Gulf was part of the counter-terrorism act mandate. In the meantime, the offending US Centcom web pages had been taken down. However, Peace Depot kept digging until they came up with the evidence, put them together, and released its conclusions, together with copies of the relevant documents.

According to Asahi, the Director of the International Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Defense has admitted to an accounting error. He also backtracked a bit on the use of the diesel fuel, saying, "It is not that we are aware of all about everything". The article also depicts an unnamed LDP Defense zoku Diet member and anonymous MOD sources voicing suspicions of such use. Ironically, the article quotes then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda claiming that it would be impossible to use the fuel on iraq-related matters. Mainichi has more details on the official MOD explanation, but does not cover the reaction.

The DPJ will make good use of this information when the coalition government submits a new counter-terrorism bill as expected. I'm not quite ready to say that the extension is now in serious danger, but there is no doubt that this is a big problem for the (presumptive) Fukuda administration. The only excuse I can think of is, they must have been keeping watch on Al Qaida in Iraq…

Funny, where did I hear that story before?

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It's too bad that the Peace Depot press release itself is available only in Japanese. But most of the documents are in English.

Some Thoughts on The Fukuda Administration and Somewhat Beyond

Some pungent words were used in the creation of this post. They have been maintained in the interests of preserving the original intent of the author. This is in no way to be interpreted as a general endorsement of offensive language in public discourse.

Here are my answers to questions that I received, as well as my comments on some points to the article that was attached to it. They have been edited for use as a blog post. I've omitted anything that has become irrelevant, such as comments based on the article's assumption (as well as mine at the time that the article was written) that Taro Aso R.I.P. was the likely successor. If my comments appear to be selective and disconnected, it's a long article, and I merely touched on the points where I believed that I had something meaningful to add.

1. Here, near the bottom, is my latest take on how long it will be before the next Lower House general election. As a subsequent development:

Yomiuri quotes Takeo Yasuo Fukuda saying,"I would like to search [for the right timing to dissolve the Lower House]. At a minimum, the (FY 2008) budget should be passed." This gives us a May election at the earliest. He adds, "When there is an important bill (in the regular Diet session), there could be an occasion to discuss the timing of dissolution with the DPJ and other opposition parties."

If I had to parse his words, I'd say that he's telling us that if the DPJ is so obstructionist that it won't let anything pass without a revote and the public sees the DPJ in that light as well, he's willing to let the LDP take a few losses, mainly Daizo Sugimura and other flaky specimens from the Koizumi Kids gang, in exchange for a near 3-year extension on the Lower House mandate for the coalition government. In that case, he'll fill out his term and, if it's what he wants, possibly (ed. inadvertently omitted when first posted) more.

2. I don't think that Mr. Fukuda needs to make that many changes in substance in the course that the Abe administration had been taking on its own. I firmly believe that Mr. Abe's fall is attributable to the who's and how's of his rule, or lack there of. Mr. Fukuda is being welcomed as the antithesis there. Having said that, I expect him to talk with a wee bit more honesty about the consumption tax, but I think that the majority of the public will support him there, as long as he looks competent in keeping down expenditures while immediately shifting a good portion of it - say 500 billion yen? – to high-profile, disparity-correcting measures.

Mr. Fukuda will be smart to keep Yoichi Masuzoe to deal with The Public Pension 50,000,000. (He, along with Masahiko Komura (for purely political reasons in his case) and Nobutaka Machimura and/or Kaoru Yosano (for mainly but not purely political reasons), would be my holdovers.) There's only so much you can do about that shit, so the Fukuda administration must show that it is peeing "bloody urine" to that end, and make sure that the bureaucracy is seen to be paying for the mess. Mr. Masuzoe is the ideal hit man/public face for that.

I'm relatively skeptical about the conventional wisdom of the importance of the disparity issue to the Upper House election results and, more generally, the unpopularity of the Abe administration. However, it has become the trope, the problem, so the Fukuda administration must be seen to be doing something effective about it, or it will fail to claw back those Upper House seats in the outlying Prefectures. But the ruling coalition must to be careful; there's the urban lower-class phenomenon as well. These are two very different sets of the dispossessed.

3. In talking about Abe's vision for a broader Japanese role in the region, it must be kept in mind that revision of the "pacifist clause" in Article 9 and the reinterpretation of the concept of collective self-defense are connected but not necessarily synchronistic. The conceptual reinterpretation can be put into play and implemented if and when it is convenient to do so. It will take the aligning of many stars; still, it's a far cry from the difficulties of the Constitutional amendment process. Moreover, that is sufficient in order to expand Japan's regional role. It is, I believe, in the context of Japan's global aspirations that Constitutional rearrangements are in order.

4. True, the Fukuda administration will have to prioritize regaining public support, which may come at the expense of attention to key foreign policy issues, most significantly the North Korean nuclear issue. Still, this is at least better than the virtual paralysis under the Abe administration at its most potent. Even a cautious, tentative Fukuda administration has some chance of easing economic sanctions - the Abe administration rashly if understandably linked them to the abductees issues in October 2006 - if a nuclear deal is in the offing.

5. The speed with which the LDP rallied around Fukuda and the structural soundness of the LDP-New Komeito, which I explain here argues strongly against the return of the string of weak, short-term Prime Ministers during much of the '90s.

6. Barring a stunning turnaround by Ichiro Ozawa, there's going to be a one- to two-month gap in the JSDM refueling operations while the coalition engineers a low-key, Lower House revote event, and no amount of yelling and screaming by anyone, including US policymakers, is going to prevent it. So they should sit back, and quietly let on that it's going to be a very unfortunate turn of events in term of short-term logistics, but no big deal politically. I'm not worried. US policymakers are not that stupid, and, besides, neither the Bush administration nor the Congress has the people (in the former case) or the time (in both cases) to worry about this shit.