Nobutaka Machimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, is quoted here as saying, “Japan will drop out of the battlefront of the war on terror because of extremely domestic reasons. This will leave a large blot on Japan’s future, in the sense that Japan will be relegated to the minor leagues by giving up its responsibilities as a member of the international community.”
“Extremely domestic reasons” as in: We’re afraid that the opposition will pass a censure motion in the Upper House that will force Prime Minister Fukuda to call a snap election?
Now I’ve always had difficulty in understanding this logic, which says that exercising a constitutional prerogative inevitably leads to an early election, when the LDP knows that, regardless of the Moriya scandal, at the end of the day, Yomiuri and Sankei are going to support that. More seriously, if the LDP follows the advice of Bunmei Ibuki, its Secretary General, and Shigeru Ishiba, the Defense Minister, and leave the OEF-MIO refueling extension bill to be taken up again when the Diet reconvenes in January unless the public opinion polls show a two-thirds to 60% majority in favor, then it is giving up its responsibilities as the public's representative.
Few things can be more damaging in the long-run than a loss of political will, particularly when a plurality of both the public and the mainstream media has your back.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
The Japanese Government Needs Better Public Communications on the Need for Movement on the Remaining Abductees
Once every five years, the Japanese government conducts a public opinion poll on the protection of human rights, and one of the things it tries to find out is what human rights issues the public is interested in. This year, they included the "victims of abduction by North Korea, etc." for the first time. The issue/category came in fifth at 31.5%, behind "the handicapped (44.1%)", "the old (40.5%)", "children (35.0%)", and "human rights abuses using the Internet (32.7%)", but ahead of such issues/categories as "women (25.0%)", "victims of crime, etc. (24.1%)", and "HIV carriers, etc. (18.9%)".
This and other information on the abductees issue is available on this web page that came with the Headquarters for the Abductee Issue that the Abe administration established in September 2006. The web page is full of information on the abductees issue, with new material being added every month. Some of it is intriguing, such as this document, which lays out the Japanese case for all the discrepancies, irregularities, and lack of cooperation on the part of the North Koreans. As I read it, I realize that they must be the unanswered questions that are keeping Japan from pitching in with the fuel oil shipments and acquiescing to the US delisting of North Korea as a terrorist sponsor.
Unfortunately for all you monolingual gaijins, until recently, all this information was available only in Japanese. Somehow, the people who were responsible for this forgot that it was the other parties to the Six-Party Talks who were wondering when Japan would come around to helping out with the quid pro quo for the North Korean nuclear program, and that the Japanese government needed to work on public opinion beyond Japanese borders as well as the Japanese public. Somebody in the Fukuda administration must have notice the omission, and there is now an English-language page as well.
But there are problems. The English page is merely a digest version of the Japanese page. This means that the document I linked to in the second paragraph that argues the Japanese case becomes more of an English-language talking points memo. Perhaps more seriously, the page is poorly designed and lacks a sense of mission and purpose. There is little effort to draw attention to the salient points, to make your case leap out at you even before you start clicking on the links. Technically, intellectually, emotionally, it's a job done on the cheap.
If the objective of this and other PR campaign efforts (among other things, the web site links to Paul Stookey's Song for Megumi) is to show that "the government cares", then this state of affairs is fine. If the intent is to make sure that "the Japanese people care", then the fifth-place finish might be a cause for mild concern. But either way, the government needn't have bothered with the English-language digest version at all. But if it wants to win the hearts and minds of the public beyond its borders and convince them of the need for answers before it moves on, then it has a long way to go in public communications, starting here.
This and other information on the abductees issue is available on this web page that came with the Headquarters for the Abductee Issue that the Abe administration established in September 2006. The web page is full of information on the abductees issue, with new material being added every month. Some of it is intriguing, such as this document, which lays out the Japanese case for all the discrepancies, irregularities, and lack of cooperation on the part of the North Koreans. As I read it, I realize that they must be the unanswered questions that are keeping Japan from pitching in with the fuel oil shipments and acquiescing to the US delisting of North Korea as a terrorist sponsor.
Unfortunately for all you monolingual gaijins, until recently, all this information was available only in Japanese. Somehow, the people who were responsible for this forgot that it was the other parties to the Six-Party Talks who were wondering when Japan would come around to helping out with the quid pro quo for the North Korean nuclear program, and that the Japanese government needed to work on public opinion beyond Japanese borders as well as the Japanese public. Somebody in the Fukuda administration must have notice the omission, and there is now an English-language page as well.
But there are problems. The English page is merely a digest version of the Japanese page. This means that the document I linked to in the second paragraph that argues the Japanese case becomes more of an English-language talking points memo. Perhaps more seriously, the page is poorly designed and lacks a sense of mission and purpose. There is little effort to draw attention to the salient points, to make your case leap out at you even before you start clicking on the links. Technically, intellectually, emotionally, it's a job done on the cheap.
If the objective of this and other PR campaign efforts (among other things, the web site links to Paul Stookey's Song for Megumi) is to show that "the government cares", then this state of affairs is fine. If the intent is to make sure that "the Japanese people care", then the fifth-place finish might be a cause for mild concern. But either way, the government needn't have bothered with the English-language digest version at all. But if it wants to win the hearts and minds of the public beyond its borders and convince them of the need for answers before it moves on, then it has a long way to go in public communications, starting here.
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
The Future of Japan's Relations with the US and China Et Cetera Et Cetera… Glad You Asked…
LH is teaching a class on East Asia in the US. She has asked these questions of several people here, but I know of at least two people beyond her list who actually read this blog whose knowledge and understanding of these issues are far superior to mine, and several others whom I consider to be, at a minimum, my peers. And of course there must be others who I am not aware of. So I decided to post this draft on my blog, since I am sure that LH will very much appreciate any comments you may have.
LH asks: What you think about the future of Japan's relations with the US and China. Do you see a rivalry developing between China and Japan? What kind of foreign policy do you see developing with the new PM?
Me: I know all the answers to your questions. Unfortunately, God has told me that if I tell anyone, He will immediately strike me down with one of his trademark lightning bolts. And He told me in no uncertain terms where I would find myself when I came to. So I'll stay away from the crystal ball and confine myself to talking around the matter by outlining what I think are some (hopefully a very large proportion) of the most salient conditions that should be the basis of scenarios for the future.
First of all, I often hear questions similar to these about Japan and its relations with its two largest neighbors. I believe that this is mainly because of China's recent and remarkable economic, military and diplomatic ascendancy. Moreover, though an increasingly influential civil society has grown up within the confines of one-party rule, there are still enough political legacies in the Chinese regime from a more totalitarian era to cause people to see China in an inherently ominous light. Add to all this the impact from the sheer size of China in every dimension, and no wonder there is talk of the Chinese threat. But I have never seen things that way since I began thinking about this matter and I still do not.
The starting point of my argument is that the current regimes in Japan, the US and China share a fundamental interest in sustaining and enhancing a market-oriented global system. In the world we now live in, this makes Japan, the US and China status quo states with a strong interest in global and regional stability. The enormous geopolitical footprints of the US and China in East Asia, the asymmetries in their bilateral economic relationship, and fundamental differences in their approaches to governance, as well as Japanese fears of the Chinese ascendancy sometimes obscure this reality, but the issues speak for themselves.
Let's look at the main regional issues:
The Korean Peninsula. None of the regimes in the three states want North Korea to have a nuclear weapons program. The reasons for that are not necessarily consonant. That is, for the main part, the Japan regime does not want North Korea to have it because it is the most natural target for the nuclear weapons, the US regime because it fears nuclear proliferation, and the Chinese regime because of the arms race that a successful North Korean program might touch off. Thus, there are inevitable differences in the scope and extent of measures each state is willing to resort to in order to contain and roll back the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Still, the three states have enough in common that they can cooperate within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Also significant is the fact that, because of economic and security concerns, none of the three regimes seek a precipitous regime change there but would prefer a more graduated process of integration into the regional and global economic and security systems. This also happens to coincide with the interest of the South Korean regime.
Taiwan. Here again, the desires of the three regimes roughly coincide. All three regimes accept Chinese claims of sovereignty over the island but want the future course of the course of action to be determined peacefully. The US position is somewhat constrained by the Taiwan Relations Act, but, if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence, China will challenge this by force, and it is doubtful that the US would come to its rescue barring catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Japan has a role of sorts by way of the US military presence on its territory and the strategic ambiguity maintained over "areas surrounding Japan", but it is a subsidiary and passive one. In any case, the common interest of the three regimes lies in maintaining the status quo.
Looking beyond the regional stage, the most compelling issue is energy. Here again, the three regimes share a common objective that is often obscured by arguments about competition for oil and gas, as well as over human rights concerns in resource-rich states with poor and worse governance. China is sometimes accused, mainly by the US regime (most prominently by powerful members of the legislative wing) of propping up undesirable regimes - some of them downright repugnant - in order to obtain access to their energy (and other) resources, most evident in Sudan and Myanmar (or Burma, if you will). In fact, we are all net importer heavyweights and, as such, need to keep global supply steadily expanding and easily accessible. From an energy security perspective, any investment that increases supply is welcome. Besides, leaving aside for now the broader question of who is doing what business that enables which undesirable regimes to maintain itself by collecting and distributing economic rent on which scarce natural resources, China satisfies most of its oil and gas requirements the old fashioned way, that is, by paying what the market demands. This will be even more so, as they come to rely more and more on foreign sources to satiate an ever-expanding domestic demand. Some people in Japan and elsewhere see this as a threat in itself. But all sources of demand, not just the increments, for oil and gas compete against each other. The growth of Chinese (as well as Indian) demand is certainly an important factor to enter in our calculations, but to call it a threat merely obscures the way to the proper response, which is conserving energy and bringing additional and new energy sources to the market.
note: I am ignoring climate change as an issue here in great part because I am of two minds on that and consequently do not have a good idea on how to treat that matter within this context. More generally, it is difficult to talk about global externalities in bilateral and plurilateral contexts.
There is potential for real conflict in international trade. Such conflicts are not due to an inherent conflict between states under the WTO, free-trade regime, but are caused by domestic conflicts between the larger but diffused gains as the whole and the cumulatively smaller but individually more painful losses to specific interests. But understanding by policymakers of the common interest is keeping states from spinning into the damaging realms of extensive protectionism that swept the world in the inter-War years in the 20th Century. That is true of all three states concerned here.
note: An increasingly likely failure of the Doha Round does not mean that international trade will collapse. It merely signals that the free-trade system remains where it stands for the time being. All things considered, that is not such a bad place to be.
Having said all this, it is in the nature of the beast to compete. That is why we root for the home team, haggle over seating arrangements, and what have you. Politicians and pundits will pay heed to how the two states match up as measured by the nebulous concept of 'influence' over, say, ASEAN; and the Japanese authorities will chafe as their Chinese counterparts conspire to deny Japan a permanent seat at the UN Security Council's table. However, unless Japan is willing to surrender its sovereignty to the UN (and in effect to the Security Council), this disparity is almost as trivial to the Japanese national well being as the relative performance of our respective national teams at the next FIFA World Cup. The public, of course, understands this. That is why such matters never become the focus of our national debate come election time.
As for what the Fukuda administration will do by way of foreign policy, I can be brief. In a nutshell: continuity. This is not a prophecy; it is an observation. For it is remarkable the extent to which the need for popular consent ultimately winds up confining every Japanese administration within the perimeters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Now let's stretch it out a little.
Note that Prime Minister Abe's already modest ambitions for constitutional reform was drastically scaled down by the time the Diet got around to passing the procedural act (neglected for 60 years!). And his predecessor Prime Minister Koizumi was often mistakenly portrayed as a conservative revisionist or worse because of a misunderstanding over his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. But virtually all Japanese administrations since the Nakasone administration have continued efforts to find more uses for our military in a multilateral context; and enhance, where possible, mutual defense relationships of a modest nature. And, in more recent years, without increasing military budget expenditures. There is no reason to believe that the Fukuda administration will waver.
On international trade, Japan has been reduced (with an inaudible sigh of relief) to the sidelines of the Doha Round as the negotiations have apparently reached an insurmountable impasse mainly over agricultural products. In the meantime, Japan, like so many other states, seek to cultivate bilateral agreements - some erroneously assume in competition with China - with its Asia-Pacific neighbors and further abroad. There is no reason to believe that this situation will change either.
note: Popular consent also drives our policy on abductees, as well as the reshaping of the contours of US Forces in Japan. Here also can be seen how the need for popular consent enforces a form of continuity.
All this makes the Fukuda administration, indeed any Japanese administration, decidedly unthreatening to China, and at a minimum not seriously detrimental to US interests. Thus, the future of the relationships… but I fear that I am already inviting the wrath of the Almighty.
(Sidebar)
I notice that I have written mainly about China. Is this a sign of personal complacency over our relationship with the US?
It is important to note that China will be facing demographic pressures similar to Japan's in a couple of decades. Can China grow quickly enough to become rich before it becomes poor?
Japan is blessed with plenty of fresh clean water and fertile volcanic and sedimentary soil. Its archipelagic geography stretching from the subtropics to the northern edge of the temperate zone endow it with an outsized exclusive economic zone. China is less well-endowed; it is less resilient in the face of environmental challenges.
LH asks: What you think about the future of Japan's relations with the US and China. Do you see a rivalry developing between China and Japan? What kind of foreign policy do you see developing with the new PM?
Me: I know all the answers to your questions. Unfortunately, God has told me that if I tell anyone, He will immediately strike me down with one of his trademark lightning bolts. And He told me in no uncertain terms where I would find myself when I came to. So I'll stay away from the crystal ball and confine myself to talking around the matter by outlining what I think are some (hopefully a very large proportion) of the most salient conditions that should be the basis of scenarios for the future.
First of all, I often hear questions similar to these about Japan and its relations with its two largest neighbors. I believe that this is mainly because of China's recent and remarkable economic, military and diplomatic ascendancy. Moreover, though an increasingly influential civil society has grown up within the confines of one-party rule, there are still enough political legacies in the Chinese regime from a more totalitarian era to cause people to see China in an inherently ominous light. Add to all this the impact from the sheer size of China in every dimension, and no wonder there is talk of the Chinese threat. But I have never seen things that way since I began thinking about this matter and I still do not.
The starting point of my argument is that the current regimes in Japan, the US and China share a fundamental interest in sustaining and enhancing a market-oriented global system. In the world we now live in, this makes Japan, the US and China status quo states with a strong interest in global and regional stability. The enormous geopolitical footprints of the US and China in East Asia, the asymmetries in their bilateral economic relationship, and fundamental differences in their approaches to governance, as well as Japanese fears of the Chinese ascendancy sometimes obscure this reality, but the issues speak for themselves.
Let's look at the main regional issues:
The Korean Peninsula. None of the regimes in the three states want North Korea to have a nuclear weapons program. The reasons for that are not necessarily consonant. That is, for the main part, the Japan regime does not want North Korea to have it because it is the most natural target for the nuclear weapons, the US regime because it fears nuclear proliferation, and the Chinese regime because of the arms race that a successful North Korean program might touch off. Thus, there are inevitable differences in the scope and extent of measures each state is willing to resort to in order to contain and roll back the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Still, the three states have enough in common that they can cooperate within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Also significant is the fact that, because of economic and security concerns, none of the three regimes seek a precipitous regime change there but would prefer a more graduated process of integration into the regional and global economic and security systems. This also happens to coincide with the interest of the South Korean regime.
Taiwan. Here again, the desires of the three regimes roughly coincide. All three regimes accept Chinese claims of sovereignty over the island but want the future course of the course of action to be determined peacefully. The US position is somewhat constrained by the Taiwan Relations Act, but, if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence, China will challenge this by force, and it is doubtful that the US would come to its rescue barring catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Japan has a role of sorts by way of the US military presence on its territory and the strategic ambiguity maintained over "areas surrounding Japan", but it is a subsidiary and passive one. In any case, the common interest of the three regimes lies in maintaining the status quo.
Looking beyond the regional stage, the most compelling issue is energy. Here again, the three regimes share a common objective that is often obscured by arguments about competition for oil and gas, as well as over human rights concerns in resource-rich states with poor and worse governance. China is sometimes accused, mainly by the US regime (most prominently by powerful members of the legislative wing) of propping up undesirable regimes - some of them downright repugnant - in order to obtain access to their energy (and other) resources, most evident in Sudan and Myanmar (or Burma, if you will). In fact, we are all net importer heavyweights and, as such, need to keep global supply steadily expanding and easily accessible. From an energy security perspective, any investment that increases supply is welcome. Besides, leaving aside for now the broader question of who is doing what business that enables which undesirable regimes to maintain itself by collecting and distributing economic rent on which scarce natural resources, China satisfies most of its oil and gas requirements the old fashioned way, that is, by paying what the market demands. This will be even more so, as they come to rely more and more on foreign sources to satiate an ever-expanding domestic demand. Some people in Japan and elsewhere see this as a threat in itself. But all sources of demand, not just the increments, for oil and gas compete against each other. The growth of Chinese (as well as Indian) demand is certainly an important factor to enter in our calculations, but to call it a threat merely obscures the way to the proper response, which is conserving energy and bringing additional and new energy sources to the market.
note: I am ignoring climate change as an issue here in great part because I am of two minds on that and consequently do not have a good idea on how to treat that matter within this context. More generally, it is difficult to talk about global externalities in bilateral and plurilateral contexts.
There is potential for real conflict in international trade. Such conflicts are not due to an inherent conflict between states under the WTO, free-trade regime, but are caused by domestic conflicts between the larger but diffused gains as the whole and the cumulatively smaller but individually more painful losses to specific interests. But understanding by policymakers of the common interest is keeping states from spinning into the damaging realms of extensive protectionism that swept the world in the inter-War years in the 20th Century. That is true of all three states concerned here.
note: An increasingly likely failure of the Doha Round does not mean that international trade will collapse. It merely signals that the free-trade system remains where it stands for the time being. All things considered, that is not such a bad place to be.
Having said all this, it is in the nature of the beast to compete. That is why we root for the home team, haggle over seating arrangements, and what have you. Politicians and pundits will pay heed to how the two states match up as measured by the nebulous concept of 'influence' over, say, ASEAN; and the Japanese authorities will chafe as their Chinese counterparts conspire to deny Japan a permanent seat at the UN Security Council's table. However, unless Japan is willing to surrender its sovereignty to the UN (and in effect to the Security Council), this disparity is almost as trivial to the Japanese national well being as the relative performance of our respective national teams at the next FIFA World Cup. The public, of course, understands this. That is why such matters never become the focus of our national debate come election time.
As for what the Fukuda administration will do by way of foreign policy, I can be brief. In a nutshell: continuity. This is not a prophecy; it is an observation. For it is remarkable the extent to which the need for popular consent ultimately winds up confining every Japanese administration within the perimeters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Now let's stretch it out a little.
Note that Prime Minister Abe's already modest ambitions for constitutional reform was drastically scaled down by the time the Diet got around to passing the procedural act (neglected for 60 years!). And his predecessor Prime Minister Koizumi was often mistakenly portrayed as a conservative revisionist or worse because of a misunderstanding over his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. But virtually all Japanese administrations since the Nakasone administration have continued efforts to find more uses for our military in a multilateral context; and enhance, where possible, mutual defense relationships of a modest nature. And, in more recent years, without increasing military budget expenditures. There is no reason to believe that the Fukuda administration will waver.
On international trade, Japan has been reduced (with an inaudible sigh of relief) to the sidelines of the Doha Round as the negotiations have apparently reached an insurmountable impasse mainly over agricultural products. In the meantime, Japan, like so many other states, seek to cultivate bilateral agreements - some erroneously assume in competition with China - with its Asia-Pacific neighbors and further abroad. There is no reason to believe that this situation will change either.
note: Popular consent also drives our policy on abductees, as well as the reshaping of the contours of US Forces in Japan. Here also can be seen how the need for popular consent enforces a form of continuity.
All this makes the Fukuda administration, indeed any Japanese administration, decidedly unthreatening to China, and at a minimum not seriously detrimental to US interests. Thus, the future of the relationships… but I fear that I am already inviting the wrath of the Almighty.
(Sidebar)
I notice that I have written mainly about China. Is this a sign of personal complacency over our relationship with the US?
It is important to note that China will be facing demographic pressures similar to Japan's in a couple of decades. Can China grow quickly enough to become rich before it becomes poor?
Japan is blessed with plenty of fresh clean water and fertile volcanic and sedimentary soil. Its archipelagic geography stretching from the subtropics to the northern edge of the temperate zone endow it with an outsized exclusive economic zone. China is less well-endowed; it is less resilient in the face of environmental challenges.
Friday, October 26, 2007
I Arrive in Hino City; Two Years Later A Quarter Century of Communist Rule Ends There. Coincidence? Maybe…
Mind you, this happened in 1997, exactly ten years ago, even as the national government raised the consumption tax rate from 3% to 5% and the economy was taking a dive, which would lead the following year to an LDP loss of epic proportions in the Upper House election and the demise of the Hashimoto administration.
Then, again, the downfall of the Hino Communists may have had something to do with the fact that the incumbent had been mayor for all of those 24 years and was 85 years old when he hit the campaign trails for the last time.
In fact, Kimio Morita was the last surviving member of the massive wave of progressive governors and mayors supported by the Socialist and Communist Parties that saw its heyday in the mid-seventies. At its peak in 1975, 12 (out of 47) provinces including Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa and Kyoto were administered by progressive governors, and countless municipalities, including major metropolitan centers such as Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto and Kobe had progressive mayors. This progressive surge came during the high-growth sixties and maintained its front through the mid-seventies, but receded as Japan reached the bubbly eighties.
Currently, the progressives have only one governor (Yukiko Kada; Shiga Prefecture), eight city mayors including one in a Prefectural capital (Okinawa), and a smattering of mayors in smaller municipalities. Remarkably, four of the eight mayors, in Warabi, Higashi-Osaka, Yuzawa and Komae, are Japanese Communist Party members or received their main support from it in the election, while two others, in Ginowan and Kunitachi, received support from both parties. (The Ginowan candidate also received support from the DPJ and a local progressive party.) The other two mayors are Social Democrats.
This is a far cry from the Golden Era of progressive politics. Still, the public can be quite adventuresome in local governance (remember, these are winner-take-all elections), and experimentation is not limited to electing comedians.
But one of the principles of JCP diplomacy:
“We will work for the reversion of the Chishima (Kurile) Islands, and Habomai and Shikotan Islands, which are Japan’s historical territories.”
Those namby-pamby appeasers like Taro Aso and Shoichi Nakagawa will clearly have a hard time fitting into a coalition led by the revanchist JCP.
note: This is a very rough survey based on online sources (news reports and official websites). Wikipedia has an article on progressive governors and mayors if you would like to do your own digging.
Then, again, the downfall of the Hino Communists may have had something to do with the fact that the incumbent had been mayor for all of those 24 years and was 85 years old when he hit the campaign trails for the last time.
In fact, Kimio Morita was the last surviving member of the massive wave of progressive governors and mayors supported by the Socialist and Communist Parties that saw its heyday in the mid-seventies. At its peak in 1975, 12 (out of 47) provinces including Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa and Kyoto were administered by progressive governors, and countless municipalities, including major metropolitan centers such as Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto and Kobe had progressive mayors. This progressive surge came during the high-growth sixties and maintained its front through the mid-seventies, but receded as Japan reached the bubbly eighties.
Currently, the progressives have only one governor (Yukiko Kada; Shiga Prefecture), eight city mayors including one in a Prefectural capital (Okinawa), and a smattering of mayors in smaller municipalities. Remarkably, four of the eight mayors, in Warabi, Higashi-Osaka, Yuzawa and Komae, are Japanese Communist Party members or received their main support from it in the election, while two others, in Ginowan and Kunitachi, received support from both parties. (The Ginowan candidate also received support from the DPJ and a local progressive party.) The other two mayors are Social Democrats.
This is a far cry from the Golden Era of progressive politics. Still, the public can be quite adventuresome in local governance (remember, these are winner-take-all elections), and experimentation is not limited to electing comedians.
But one of the principles of JCP diplomacy:
“We will work for the reversion of the Chishima (Kurile) Islands, and Habomai and Shikotan Islands, which are Japan’s historical territories.”
Those namby-pamby appeasers like Taro Aso and Shoichi Nakagawa will clearly have a hard time fitting into a coalition led by the revanchist JCP.
note: This is a very rough survey based on online sources (news reports and official websites). Wikipedia has an article on progressive governors and mayors if you would like to do your own digging.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
When Is History History? (The U.S.H.R. Resolutions)
And here a terrible spectacle displayed itself: the women first cast their infants down the cliff, and then they cast themselves after their fallen little ones, and the men likewise. In such a scene, Aeneas the Stymphalian, an officer, caught sight of a man with a fine dress about to throw himself over, and seized hold of him to stop him; but the other caught him to his arms, and both were gone in an instant headlong down the crags, and were killed. Out of this place the merest handful of human beings were taken prisoners, but cattle and asses in abundance and flocks of sheep.
- from The Anabasis by Xenonphon (ca. 431 – 355 BC), as translated by H. G. Dakyns
I remember being stunned by this passage many, many years ago, in my youth. In fact, it is about the only thing I retained from the book. Nevertheless, it did not evoke the sense of anger and revulsion that I much, much later felt over the 9.11 attacks. It was, after all, history. (note: I was in Manhattan at the time.)
But so much of the Middle East has yet to pass into history. Europeans carved out Israel after WW II to solve their Jewish problem, and the wound continues to fester; many of the other ill-fitting borders they etched across tribal and religious boundaries have not lost their tenuousness either. Likewise, so many of the deeds and misdeeds of the local actors continue to resonate in the hearts of their descendants. The Armenian genocide may have looked like history to Democrats, but not to its Armenian-American constituency in California, nor to the Turks.
Did Nancy Pelosi think that since Japan was a good sport, Turkey would roll over too? But there was only one loach under this willow tree. Japan put WW II and everything that led to it behind when we lost to the Americans. Thus, we do not vent our anger at Russia for unlawfully shipping our soldiers and civilians to Siberia to use them as slave labor, or seek recompense for the Japanese women who were forced to provide sexual satisfaction to the Soviet soldiers who marched into Manchuria. And the Hiroshima Epitaph famously leaves us wondering, “Who will not repeat the mistake?” even as we bade them, “Sleep peacefully”. Never mind the righteousness (or not) of such grievances. We decided, collectively, that it was all history.
Actually, though I did not notice it at the time (I think), Xenophon, a disciple of Socrates, and his men appear to have been uncommonly civilized for those days. For later in the narrative, Xenophon explains: “But wherever we come, be it foreign or Hellenic soil, and find no market for provisions, we are wont to help ourselves, not out of insolence but from necessity. There have been tribes like the Carduchians, the Taochians, the Chaldaeans, which, albeit they were not subject to the great king, yet were no less formidable than independent. These we had to bring over by our arms. The necessity of getting provisions forced us; since they refused to offer us a market.”And there is nothing in the narrative to suggest that they did otherwise.
- from The Anabasis by Xenonphon (ca. 431 – 355 BC), as translated by H. G. Dakyns
I remember being stunned by this passage many, many years ago, in my youth. In fact, it is about the only thing I retained from the book. Nevertheless, it did not evoke the sense of anger and revulsion that I much, much later felt over the 9.11 attacks. It was, after all, history. (note: I was in Manhattan at the time.)
But so much of the Middle East has yet to pass into history. Europeans carved out Israel after WW II to solve their Jewish problem, and the wound continues to fester; many of the other ill-fitting borders they etched across tribal and religious boundaries have not lost their tenuousness either. Likewise, so many of the deeds and misdeeds of the local actors continue to resonate in the hearts of their descendants. The Armenian genocide may have looked like history to Democrats, but not to its Armenian-American constituency in California, nor to the Turks.
Did Nancy Pelosi think that since Japan was a good sport, Turkey would roll over too? But there was only one loach under this willow tree. Japan put WW II and everything that led to it behind when we lost to the Americans. Thus, we do not vent our anger at Russia for unlawfully shipping our soldiers and civilians to Siberia to use them as slave labor, or seek recompense for the Japanese women who were forced to provide sexual satisfaction to the Soviet soldiers who marched into Manchuria. And the Hiroshima Epitaph famously leaves us wondering, “Who will not repeat the mistake?” even as we bade them, “Sleep peacefully”. Never mind the righteousness (or not) of such grievances. We decided, collectively, that it was all history.
Actually, though I did not notice it at the time (I think), Xenophon, a disciple of Socrates, and his men appear to have been uncommonly civilized for those days. For later in the narrative, Xenophon explains: “But wherever we come, be it foreign or Hellenic soil, and find no market for provisions, we are wont to help ourselves, not out of insolence but from necessity. There have been tribes like the Carduchians, the Taochians, the Chaldaeans, which, albeit they were not subject to the great king, yet were no less formidable than independent. These we had to bring over by our arms. The necessity of getting provisions forced us; since they refused to offer us a market.”And there is nothing in the narrative to suggest that they did otherwise.
Walter Russell Mead Tells Us How America Can’t Help Being Good, Even When It Is Bad
Walter Russell Mead unleashes another big one, with Failing Upward, subtitled Relax, America will survive George W. Bush, in the New Republic. In the article, he asks:
For two centuries, the United States has astounded critics with its bad foreign policy--and, for two centuries, the United States has steadily risen to an unprecedented level of power and influence in the international system. Why does the team with the worst skills in the league end up with so many pennants?
His answer:
But there is another dimension to our special providence, one that has come into greater prominence during the Bush administration. U.S. foreign policy isn't successful just because our process reflects the varied interests and priorities of our diverse and dynamic society (which I think was the core argument in Special Providence, the book). We also succeed because our core strategic interests--liberal society, global economic growth, geopolitical stability--fit well with the interests and aspirations of other people around the world. They remain popular even when U.S. policy is widely disliked; when we fail to achieve our goals, others often do the work for us.
Does this sound like American triumphalism with a little help from its friends, neo-con lite, if you will? Perhaps. But Mr. Mead does a breathtaking around-the-world analysis for the Bush era that argues in essence that the world is indeed buying into the deal despite the Bush Presidency.
No doubt you should be able to amass all the regional downsides to construct a different argument For example, the concentration of liquid and gaseous energy resources in the Middle East and Russia is troubling; I also have no handle on what to me was a revelation over the inroads Christianity has been making in Africa and its effects.
Still, on first reading, I find him persuasive. I think that this is going to be one of those articles that are widely talked about.
The article is split into 10 pages, but it’s not that long and can easily be read during lunch break, if you must. You can also read page 9 for the gist of his underlying argument (it is not that unfamiliar; remember the resemblance to neoconservatism), then go over the entire piece.
For two centuries, the United States has astounded critics with its bad foreign policy--and, for two centuries, the United States has steadily risen to an unprecedented level of power and influence in the international system. Why does the team with the worst skills in the league end up with so many pennants?
His answer:
But there is another dimension to our special providence, one that has come into greater prominence during the Bush administration. U.S. foreign policy isn't successful just because our process reflects the varied interests and priorities of our diverse and dynamic society (which I think was the core argument in Special Providence, the book). We also succeed because our core strategic interests--liberal society, global economic growth, geopolitical stability--fit well with the interests and aspirations of other people around the world. They remain popular even when U.S. policy is widely disliked; when we fail to achieve our goals, others often do the work for us.
Does this sound like American triumphalism with a little help from its friends, neo-con lite, if you will? Perhaps. But Mr. Mead does a breathtaking around-the-world analysis for the Bush era that argues in essence that the world is indeed buying into the deal despite the Bush Presidency.
No doubt you should be able to amass all the regional downsides to construct a different argument For example, the concentration of liquid and gaseous energy resources in the Middle East and Russia is troubling; I also have no handle on what to me was a revelation over the inroads Christianity has been making in Africa and its effects.
Still, on first reading, I find him persuasive. I think that this is going to be one of those articles that are widely talked about.
The article is split into 10 pages, but it’s not that long and can easily be read during lunch break, if you must. You can also read page 9 for the gist of his underlying argument (it is not that unfamiliar; remember the resemblance to neoconservatism), then go over the entire piece.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
The Tokyo Special Investigations Department Has Gone into Action on the Yamada Yōkō Affair
To a Japanese public used to watching beleaguered CEOs, politicians, and top bureaucrats scurrying away from persistent TV reporters and their camera crews, it must have been a refreshing sight to see a calmly serious Takemasa Moriya in his civvies, holding an impromptu news conference in front of his doorsteps. Not that he appeared to be very forthcoming in the snippets that I caught, as he begged off, stating that he was being questioned by the Defense Ministry. I went to bed, thinking that Defense Minister Ishiba better get hold of Donald Rumsfeld's interrogation manual, get to the bottom of things, then do everything in his power to set things right. Mr. Moriya was sure to be grilled in the Diet, and it is usually the case that the conclusions of 'internal investigations' invariably fall apart in the light of serious third-party scrutiny. You don't want to be caught between lame excuses and harsh realities, nor do you want to cede the initiative to the opposition. And Prime Minister Fukuda should start showing face himself if he wants to salvage the refueling operations and shore up long-term prospects for his administration.
And then I get up, go out, pick up the morning paper, and the front page is emblazoned with the headline:
Yamada Yōkō's US Subsidiary Investigated
Yomiuri has found out that the Public Prosecutors Office has been receiving judicial assistance from US authorities in investigating the US subsidiary for accounting irregularities. According to the report (citing multiple Yamada Yōkō sources) a former head of the US subsidiary built a multimillion dollar slush fund, some of which the sources suspect was used to entertain JSDA officials visiting the US as well as US vendors. The former US subsidiary head was a close associate of the former Yamada Yōkō executive who had treated Mr. Moriya to golf and meals excursions, and was one of the people who joined hands with him to form Nihon Mirise. Ominously, the Special Investigations Department of the Tokyo Local Public Prosecutors Office is in charge of the case. This particular Special Investigations Department (Osaka and, since 1996, Nagoya have one each as well) handles most major economic and political crime investigations, as well as large tax evasion cases.
At a minimum, this guarantees that the issue will be in the public eye for the duration of this Diet session. I think that the chances of the Fukuda administration retaking the initiative on the refueling extension bill have diminished substantially.
Incidentally, running alongside this story on the same front page is yet another revelation (not yet online) in an ongoing medical scandal, where a pharmaceutical company and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has failed to act on information that could have led to early treatment for victims of drug-induced hepatitis. This falls on the shoulders of Yoichi Masuzoe, the MHLW Minister who is already charged with cleaning up the public pension records.
When it pours, it pours.
And then I get up, go out, pick up the morning paper, and the front page is emblazoned with the headline:
Yamada Yōkō's US Subsidiary Investigated
Yomiuri has found out that the Public Prosecutors Office has been receiving judicial assistance from US authorities in investigating the US subsidiary for accounting irregularities. According to the report (citing multiple Yamada Yōkō sources) a former head of the US subsidiary built a multimillion dollar slush fund, some of which the sources suspect was used to entertain JSDA officials visiting the US as well as US vendors. The former US subsidiary head was a close associate of the former Yamada Yōkō executive who had treated Mr. Moriya to golf and meals excursions, and was one of the people who joined hands with him to form Nihon Mirise. Ominously, the Special Investigations Department of the Tokyo Local Public Prosecutors Office is in charge of the case. This particular Special Investigations Department (Osaka and, since 1996, Nagoya have one each as well) handles most major economic and political crime investigations, as well as large tax evasion cases.
At a minimum, this guarantees that the issue will be in the public eye for the duration of this Diet session. I think that the chances of the Fukuda administration retaking the initiative on the refueling extension bill have diminished substantially.
Incidentally, running alongside this story on the same front page is yet another revelation (not yet online) in an ongoing medical scandal, where a pharmaceutical company and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has failed to act on information that could have led to early treatment for victims of drug-induced hepatitis. This falls on the shoulders of Yoichi Masuzoe, the MHLW Minister who is already charged with cleaning up the public pension records.
When it pours, it pours.
Sunday, October 21, 2007
National Defense Twofer:Minister Wants Procurement Done His Way, and Seiji Maehara Denies Ichiro Ozawa
One of the quirks of Japanese defense procurement is that trading companies have traditionally acted as go-betweens for foreign vendors in their dealings with the Self-Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense). This is why trading companies showed up in the center of the 1976 Lockheed bribery scandal, which took down a Prime Minister (Kakuei Tanaka), a Transport Minister (in Japan, although the Grumman-Lockheed battle for the JSDA next-generation fighter was at the core of the controversy, the criminal case revolved mainly around government influence on the procurement of civilian aircraft by Japanese airlines), the Marubeni CEO, and a host of other lesser political figures and businessmen. (It also spawned the New Liberal Club, the first of the so-far unsuccessful challenges to provide a viable alternative to the LDP.) They were also featured in the 1978 Grumman/McDonnell-Douglas bribery scandal, which threatened to implicate LDP politicians, before the investigation petered out the following year after a key witness, a senior executive in the trading company Nissho-Iwai (now part of Sojitsu), committed suicide, leaving many questions unanswered. Raizo Matsuno, the one Diet member whose career was derailed by the scandal, managed to escape prosecution. Things have changed little, if the latest scandal is any indication.
Shigeru Ishiba, the LDP defense otaku, doesn’t like this state of affairs one bit, and has long been an advocate of taking the trading companies out of the procurement process and dealing directly with vendors. Now, as Minister of Defense, he is in a position to do it. And, as luck would have it, the Takemasa Moriya scandal gives him the opportunity to do something about it, and he vowed this morning on the Sunday Project, the must-see program for Japan politics otakus), to do just that.
It will not be an easy task; the bureaucracy will be required to do a lot of homework that the trading companies had been doing for them, and people do not become smart overnight. Less significantly, foreign vendors will have to face the consequences of the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) or the EU equivalent thereof. But the establishment has no choice, since corruption is something that the public can wrap its mind around, and the extension of the refueling operations, on which so much of the Fukuda administration’s credibility depends, will turn on how Mr. Ishiba handles not only Takemasa Moriya (under the bus, drawn-and-quartered, Class A War Criminal), but the broader issue as well.
The silver lining for the LDP in the latest defense procurement scandal is that it does not look likely to implicate anyone beyond the bureaucracy. In that sense (and that sense only), it is more like the Defense Facilities Administration Agency scandal, where it came to light that former DFAA officials employed by construction firms and other vendors had been at the center of widespread collusion in bidding for DFAA contracts. The DFAA was fully folded in the Self-Defense Agency as a consequence, allowing the mainstream JSDA bureaucracy to rein in the somewhat autonomous DFAA.
I suspect that there are some people out there who are wondering, what are the political prospects of Shigeru Ishiba if he saves the day? For my two bits: zero chance of becoming Prime Minister. He’s a one-trick pony, and defense wins only in the NBA.
Mr. Ishiba’s DPJ soulmate Seiji Maehara joined him on Sunday Project. Think Romeo and Juliet, without the sex. Yes, they argued. Three things caught my attention:
Mr. Maehara stated at least twice that the DPJ has never claimed that the OEF-MIO operations are unconstitutional and that Ichiro Ozawa’s views are his personal opinions, nothing more. This is, of course, not what the public is hearing from Mr. Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama, his DPJ deputy and two-time party head.
Mr. Maehara gave the lack of proper governance and civilian control, citing the long string of JSDA/MOD misdeeds (he mentioned corruption in the JDAA, the Winny information leaks, 800,000/200,000 gallon discrepancy, missing ship logs, and possibly one or two others; Shisaku should have the video tape) as the main reason for opposing extension. As for the 800/200 K, he repeatedly said that it was one thing to say that there had been mistakes back then, but the refueling activities are crucial to Japan’s national interest and quite another to claim that nothing was amiss and demand that the extension be passed under that premise. This is, of course, not what the public is hearing from Mr. Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama, his DPJ deputy and two-time party head.
Mr. Maehara would not say that the DPJ would submit a bill on Japanese participation in ISAF, no matter how hard Sōichirō Tawara, the ugliest emcee this side of the Crypt Keeper, pushed him. Only an outline; that seems to be the limit for Mssrs. Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Maehara. For now.
Shigeru Ishiba, the LDP defense otaku, doesn’t like this state of affairs one bit, and has long been an advocate of taking the trading companies out of the procurement process and dealing directly with vendors. Now, as Minister of Defense, he is in a position to do it. And, as luck would have it, the Takemasa Moriya scandal gives him the opportunity to do something about it, and he vowed this morning on the Sunday Project, the must-see program for Japan politics otakus), to do just that.
It will not be an easy task; the bureaucracy will be required to do a lot of homework that the trading companies had been doing for them, and people do not become smart overnight. Less significantly, foreign vendors will have to face the consequences of the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) or the EU equivalent thereof. But the establishment has no choice, since corruption is something that the public can wrap its mind around, and the extension of the refueling operations, on which so much of the Fukuda administration’s credibility depends, will turn on how Mr. Ishiba handles not only Takemasa Moriya (under the bus, drawn-and-quartered, Class A War Criminal), but the broader issue as well.
The silver lining for the LDP in the latest defense procurement scandal is that it does not look likely to implicate anyone beyond the bureaucracy. In that sense (and that sense only), it is more like the Defense Facilities Administration Agency scandal, where it came to light that former DFAA officials employed by construction firms and other vendors had been at the center of widespread collusion in bidding for DFAA contracts. The DFAA was fully folded in the Self-Defense Agency as a consequence, allowing the mainstream JSDA bureaucracy to rein in the somewhat autonomous DFAA.
I suspect that there are some people out there who are wondering, what are the political prospects of Shigeru Ishiba if he saves the day? For my two bits: zero chance of becoming Prime Minister. He’s a one-trick pony, and defense wins only in the NBA.
Mr. Ishiba’s DPJ soulmate Seiji Maehara joined him on Sunday Project. Think Romeo and Juliet, without the sex. Yes, they argued. Three things caught my attention:
Mr. Maehara stated at least twice that the DPJ has never claimed that the OEF-MIO operations are unconstitutional and that Ichiro Ozawa’s views are his personal opinions, nothing more. This is, of course, not what the public is hearing from Mr. Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama, his DPJ deputy and two-time party head.
Mr. Maehara gave the lack of proper governance and civilian control, citing the long string of JSDA/MOD misdeeds (he mentioned corruption in the JDAA, the Winny information leaks, 800,000/200,000 gallon discrepancy, missing ship logs, and possibly one or two others; Shisaku should have the video tape) as the main reason for opposing extension. As for the 800/200 K, he repeatedly said that it was one thing to say that there had been mistakes back then, but the refueling activities are crucial to Japan’s national interest and quite another to claim that nothing was amiss and demand that the extension be passed under that premise. This is, of course, not what the public is hearing from Mr. Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama, his DPJ deputy and two-time party head.
Mr. Maehara would not say that the DPJ would submit a bill on Japanese participation in ISAF, no matter how hard Sōichirō Tawara, the ugliest emcee this side of the Crypt Keeper, pushed him. Only an outline; that seems to be the limit for Mssrs. Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Maehara. For now.
Saturday, October 20, 2007
A Monkey Wrench Named Takemasa Moriya in the OEF-ISAF Refueling Issue
I've been prefacing my prediction that the refueling extension bill will be passed with the words "barring unforeseen circumstances", or something of the sort. Those are part weasel words of someone who's been wrong too often, but also part truth. In politics, unforeseen circumstances do happen, with uncommon frequency. Here, I am thinking, Edmund Muskie's “tears”, Gary Hart-Donna Rice, Prime Minister Uno and the geisha girl, George Allen's macaca moment, ad infinitum.
And then, you have Takemasa Moriya.
Revelations of political financing irregularities that dogged the Abe administration (and the DPJ) continued under the Fukuda adminstration, and Yoichi Masuzoe, the Health, Labor and Welfare Minister and other LDP worthies have had their share of verbal gaffes in the new administration. But the media has been more or less willing to hand out mulligans to the media-friendly Prime Minister. But there is a good chance that this will end with the latest scandal to break out.
The DPJ had been pushing in the Diet to summon as a witness Takemasa Moriya, the previous Administrative Vice Minister at the Ministry of Defense, who had been the head of the MOD bureau responsible for the refueling operations when the 800,000-200,000 gallon accounting error occurred. The LDP had resisted, claiming that it was not the custom of the Diet to summon private citizens. For one, the LDP must be afraid of the spill over to another ongoing struggle, where the DPJ has also been trying to haul in Fujio Mitarai, head of Keidanren, for questioning on labor practices irregularities at his firm Canon.
But on Friday the deluge struck, as the media jumped all over Mr. Moriya with accusations of enjoying over a hundred all-expenses-paid golf and dinner outings courtesy of Yamada Yōkō, a mid-major MOD supplier, by way of a senior executive there. News reports add that his wife accompanied him on some of these excursions, and they signed in using aliases on at least some occasions. If true, all this would have served as grounds for severe punishment under Ministry rules. Although there is no way to formally punish him, barring criminal charges, the opposition is beside itself with joy. The fractious DPJ in particular has been handed an excellent sideshow in which to rake the MOD over the coals and take the public’s eyes off their own lack of agreement on a viable alternative. This not only calls into question the reliability of the executor of the refueling but also casts a pall of scandal on the defense establishment and more specifically the LDP-New Komeitō coalition government. Predictable calls from an unnamed LDP sources are suggesting that it might be wiser to shut the Diet down as scheduled and put the bill forward in the regular Diet session.
This should not have come as a total surprise to the LDP. Mr. Moriya had been asked about his relations with the executive at the press conference he held when he retired. He gave an evasive answer that sounded very much like playing for time until he could disappear from the scene. But it appears that the LDP had not prepared themselves for this contingency. Still, the LDP could throw him under the bus, and wait it out until the two months are up. Evading the Diet on the scandal now makes the Fukuda administration only makes it look even more guilty by association, raises questions of leadership, and calls into question the importance of the refueling operations. It’s not as if Mr. Moriya will conveniently take himself out in the meantime.
If only.
But the story could be bigger than the moral degeneracy of a wayward bureaucrat. Sankei has the best backstory on the scandal. According to the article, the former senior executive had been responsible for handling MOD and politicians. He left Yamada Yōkō with a few dozen colleagues to form his own company Nihon Mirise, which quickly became a formidable competitor to Yamada Yōkō. Ymada Yōkō is suing its former employees for 1.5 billion yen in damages, and Sankei believes that the Prosecutors Office is also questioning senior executives at both companies for accounting irregularities at Yamada Yōkō while the former executive worked there. For someone who may be under criminal suspicion, the former executive seems to be talking freely to anyone who comes asking. I assume that the DPJ will try to use this controversy to discredit the entire defense establishment.
Now all this is not directly linked to the refueling operations, and it does not have any of the makings of another Lockheed bribery scandal. But the plurality public support for the refueling operations is, like its majority/plurality support for constitutional amendment, lukewarm, and lacks the compelling power of domestic pocketbook issues. I'm not ready (vicariously) to throw in the towel yet, but the air of inevitability is definitely gone.
Quote of the day:
鳩山由紀夫「法案の形で[党独自のアフガン対策を]法案の形で作り上げたいが、(守屋氏の)疑惑を最優先にしていかなければならなくなった」(Yomiuri, 20 October; assuming, of course, that he actually said that)
“We would like to put [DPJ’s own proposal for Afghanistan] in the form of a bill, but we have been forced to make suspicions over (Mr. Moriya) our top priority.”
-Yukio Hatoyama, DPJ Secretary-General
And then, you have Takemasa Moriya.
Revelations of political financing irregularities that dogged the Abe administration (and the DPJ) continued under the Fukuda adminstration, and Yoichi Masuzoe, the Health, Labor and Welfare Minister and other LDP worthies have had their share of verbal gaffes in the new administration. But the media has been more or less willing to hand out mulligans to the media-friendly Prime Minister. But there is a good chance that this will end with the latest scandal to break out.
The DPJ had been pushing in the Diet to summon as a witness Takemasa Moriya, the previous Administrative Vice Minister at the Ministry of Defense, who had been the head of the MOD bureau responsible for the refueling operations when the 800,000-200,000 gallon accounting error occurred. The LDP had resisted, claiming that it was not the custom of the Diet to summon private citizens. For one, the LDP must be afraid of the spill over to another ongoing struggle, where the DPJ has also been trying to haul in Fujio Mitarai, head of Keidanren, for questioning on labor practices irregularities at his firm Canon.
But on Friday the deluge struck, as the media jumped all over Mr. Moriya with accusations of enjoying over a hundred all-expenses-paid golf and dinner outings courtesy of Yamada Yōkō, a mid-major MOD supplier, by way of a senior executive there. News reports add that his wife accompanied him on some of these excursions, and they signed in using aliases on at least some occasions. If true, all this would have served as grounds for severe punishment under Ministry rules. Although there is no way to formally punish him, barring criminal charges, the opposition is beside itself with joy. The fractious DPJ in particular has been handed an excellent sideshow in which to rake the MOD over the coals and take the public’s eyes off their own lack of agreement on a viable alternative. This not only calls into question the reliability of the executor of the refueling but also casts a pall of scandal on the defense establishment and more specifically the LDP-New Komeitō coalition government. Predictable calls from an unnamed LDP sources are suggesting that it might be wiser to shut the Diet down as scheduled and put the bill forward in the regular Diet session.
This should not have come as a total surprise to the LDP. Mr. Moriya had been asked about his relations with the executive at the press conference he held when he retired. He gave an evasive answer that sounded very much like playing for time until he could disappear from the scene. But it appears that the LDP had not prepared themselves for this contingency. Still, the LDP could throw him under the bus, and wait it out until the two months are up. Evading the Diet on the scandal now makes the Fukuda administration only makes it look even more guilty by association, raises questions of leadership, and calls into question the importance of the refueling operations. It’s not as if Mr. Moriya will conveniently take himself out in the meantime.
If only.
But the story could be bigger than the moral degeneracy of a wayward bureaucrat. Sankei has the best backstory on the scandal. According to the article, the former senior executive had been responsible for handling MOD and politicians. He left Yamada Yōkō with a few dozen colleagues to form his own company Nihon Mirise, which quickly became a formidable competitor to Yamada Yōkō. Ymada Yōkō is suing its former employees for 1.5 billion yen in damages, and Sankei believes that the Prosecutors Office is also questioning senior executives at both companies for accounting irregularities at Yamada Yōkō while the former executive worked there. For someone who may be under criminal suspicion, the former executive seems to be talking freely to anyone who comes asking. I assume that the DPJ will try to use this controversy to discredit the entire defense establishment.
Now all this is not directly linked to the refueling operations, and it does not have any of the makings of another Lockheed bribery scandal. But the plurality public support for the refueling operations is, like its majority/plurality support for constitutional amendment, lukewarm, and lacks the compelling power of domestic pocketbook issues. I'm not ready (vicariously) to throw in the towel yet, but the air of inevitability is definitely gone.
Quote of the day:
鳩山由紀夫「法案の形で[党独自のアフガン対策を]法案の形で作り上げたいが、(守屋氏の)疑惑を最優先にしていかなければならなくなった」(Yomiuri, 20 October; assuming, of course, that he actually said that)
“We would like to put [DPJ’s own proposal for Afghanistan] in the form of a bill, but we have been forced to make suspicions over (Mr. Moriya) our top priority.”
-Yukio Hatoyama, DPJ Secretary-General
Thursday, October 18, 2007
Why Would Waiting An Extra Month or More Would Make It Any Easier to Pass the Refueling Bill?
There is talk within the LDP about not forcing a House of Representatives supermajority override vote on the new bill to extend the OEF-MIO refueling operations for another year during this extraordinary Diet. Instead, some LDP Diet members are talking about postponing the initial H.R. vote to the next regular session (typically convened in the bottom half of January), or even to let it die in the House of Councilors and resubmit it to start again at square one at the regular session. The reasoning appears to be that forcing the issue now would cause the DPJ and the opposition to pass a censure motion of the Fukuda Cabinet, which could force the Prime Minister to dissolve the H.R. for an early election. The reluctance of the pacifist coalition partner New Komeito to force the matter is also cited as a concern. Taku Yamazaki, head of the LDP-New Komeitō special team for the legislation, and former LDP Secretary-General Hidenao Nakagawa, are two prominent LDP members calling for restraint.
But why do the people doing this talking believe that waiting up to another extra month (in the case of H.R. vote postponement) or three months or more (in the case of resubmission) to get the deal done will bring more of the public - let alone the DPJ - around to the LDP's views? To the general public, this is not an issue on the death-and-taxes level, or one with the emotional resonance of, say, the abductees. Thus, what public perception there is will continue to be molded by the media, rather than the other way around.
As it is, Yomiuri and Sankei are firmly behind an extension, while Asahi continues to question the accountability of the operations and their link to the Iraq War. I have little awareness of how this is playing out on TV, but I assume that the broadcasting networks are not doing things that materially change perception created by the mainstream print media. Accordingly, the bulk of the don't-knows have climbed off the fence over the last couple of months and tended to migrate to the support column; if you average out the left-to-right media polls, it looks like the public has come around to give the operations a reasonably strong plurality. And the media does not look likely to change their tune. Thus, to let your decision on the supermajority override turn on further enhancing this support by bringing the remaining fence-sitters to your corner or even converting some doubters looks like a dangerous course of action.
The people suggesting a delay must be hoping that the need to attend to such domestic affairs will give the Prime Minister a good excuse not to call a snap election in the inevitable H.C. censure vote after the H.R. override. But the Fukuda administration will have to balance that against a four-, five-month gap in Japanese operations, which would be a serious diplomatic embarrassment. Add to this the serious leadership question this will raise if he is seen to be caving in to the opposition. There's a point where man of reason tips over into wimp.
And how serious is the threat of an early election anyway? Will the media call on the Fukuda administration to resign or seek a new mandate in the case of an override during the current Diet session, and the public follow suit? And if the Prime Minister does neither, and causes the DPJ to step up its intransigence and obstruct proceedings altogether during the regular Diet session, do the LDP members now calling for restraint think that the media and the public will blame the LDP, but not the DPJ?
Barring an unforeseen turn for the worse in public sentiment, I don't see the Prime Minister backing off and tabling the issue until the regular Diet session.
Also important is the fact that, at the regular Diet session, the media spotlight will be on the new FY 2208 budget proposal and other bread-and-butter issues such as the public pension system and taxes. As a practical matter, the extension bill will have to share the Diet agenda with the budget and all the other legislative bills, and the delay could stretch ahead even longer, into the early months of FY 2008, April and beyond, before the bill is even introduced.
There is a further technical issue involved here, namely, whether the refueling bill is a budget-related bill, that is, legislation linked to the execution of the budget. I don't remember enough about the definition, but the fact that the bill can be introduced now without the occasion of a supplementary budget suggests that it's not. If this casual guess of mine is correct, that means that, by custom, the bill will not be resubmitted until April, after the budget has passed and all the budget-related bills have been taken care of. That would take the JMSDF out of refueling operations until June at the earliest.
But why do the people doing this talking believe that waiting up to another extra month (in the case of H.R. vote postponement) or three months or more (in the case of resubmission) to get the deal done will bring more of the public - let alone the DPJ - around to the LDP's views? To the general public, this is not an issue on the death-and-taxes level, or one with the emotional resonance of, say, the abductees. Thus, what public perception there is will continue to be molded by the media, rather than the other way around.
As it is, Yomiuri and Sankei are firmly behind an extension, while Asahi continues to question the accountability of the operations and their link to the Iraq War. I have little awareness of how this is playing out on TV, but I assume that the broadcasting networks are not doing things that materially change perception created by the mainstream print media. Accordingly, the bulk of the don't-knows have climbed off the fence over the last couple of months and tended to migrate to the support column; if you average out the left-to-right media polls, it looks like the public has come around to give the operations a reasonably strong plurality. And the media does not look likely to change their tune. Thus, to let your decision on the supermajority override turn on further enhancing this support by bringing the remaining fence-sitters to your corner or even converting some doubters looks like a dangerous course of action.
The people suggesting a delay must be hoping that the need to attend to such domestic affairs will give the Prime Minister a good excuse not to call a snap election in the inevitable H.C. censure vote after the H.R. override. But the Fukuda administration will have to balance that against a four-, five-month gap in Japanese operations, which would be a serious diplomatic embarrassment. Add to this the serious leadership question this will raise if he is seen to be caving in to the opposition. There's a point where man of reason tips over into wimp.
And how serious is the threat of an early election anyway? Will the media call on the Fukuda administration to resign or seek a new mandate in the case of an override during the current Diet session, and the public follow suit? And if the Prime Minister does neither, and causes the DPJ to step up its intransigence and obstruct proceedings altogether during the regular Diet session, do the LDP members now calling for restraint think that the media and the public will blame the LDP, but not the DPJ?
Barring an unforeseen turn for the worse in public sentiment, I don't see the Prime Minister backing off and tabling the issue until the regular Diet session.
Also important is the fact that, at the regular Diet session, the media spotlight will be on the new FY 2208 budget proposal and other bread-and-butter issues such as the public pension system and taxes. As a practical matter, the extension bill will have to share the Diet agenda with the budget and all the other legislative bills, and the delay could stretch ahead even longer, into the early months of FY 2008, April and beyond, before the bill is even introduced.
There is a further technical issue involved here, namely, whether the refueling bill is a budget-related bill, that is, legislation linked to the execution of the budget. I don't remember enough about the definition, but the fact that the bill can be introduced now without the occasion of a supplementary budget suggests that it's not. If this casual guess of mine is correct, that means that, by custom, the bill will not be resubmitted until April, after the budget has passed and all the budget-related bills have been taken care of. That would take the JMSDF out of refueling operations until June at the earliest.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
The LDP Accommodates New Komeitō on Refueling Extension. Will It Try to Go for Two for Two with the DPJ?
The LDP reportedly has acceded to New Komeitō and will seek a one-year extension for the JMSDF refueling activities under the Maritime Interception Operations instead of the two years that it had originally intended. New Komeitō wants to enhance the role of the Diet and the LDP has decided to assuage the New Komeitō, whose leadership is under fire from its rank and file for having been too accommodative of the Abe administration and suffering the consequences at the polls in the July House of Councilors general election. On the other side, Ichiro Ozawa seems to be softening on his push for a (presumably) JDSF role in ISAF, as the DPJ appears to be moving towards a legislative proposal that will focus on reconstruction and development tasks and/or humanitarian efforts, in contrast to the more conflict-oriented security activities.
I suspect that it must be tempting to the soft-sell Fukuda administration to offer to add the eventual DPJ proposal to its own package. I doubt that the DPJ would accept it, given Mr. Ozawa's uncompromising stand on the unconstitutionality of the refueling activities. But it would make great political theater and help the LDP cast itself as the more reasonable and responsible of the two. The LDP would also hope that this would reopen internal fissures that the DPJ will have papered over with its proposal.
Whether it would work in practice is another matter. Japan already does provide considerable development assistance to Afghanistan through JICA, which has a good number of shoes on the ground as technical and engineering experts. There are also a number of Japanese NGOs active there. These brave men and women reportedly have been free from harm so far. Thus, it seems at first glance that, if we could find the right people - the money should not be a problem - we could repackage and expand these activities under the ISAF brand.
However, placing Japanese activities under the ISAF umbrella carries the risk of bringing Japan under the suspicion of insurgents and terrorists as enemy combatants. And this is not Samawa. At a minimum, it would carry added security risks that require protection that the other ISAF participants will be loathe to provide. Moreover, reconstruction and development activities are a terrible fit in a piece of extraordinary legislation that nominally expires in a year.
This does not mean that the Fukuda administration should reject such an idea altogether. It could push it as a new and improved, reconstruction and development package of mid- to long-term assistance with more substantive but still civilian presence as the development, attacking-the-roots side of our efforts to bring peace and prosperity to the region, or something of the sort. Human resource constraints will put a practical limit on the speed and extent of its implementation. There are only so many qualified and competent Japanese who will be willing to go and work under prevailing conditions. Still, with judicious use of non-Japanese actors, the Japanese government actually might be able to do something useful that does not increase the risks to the individuals already engaged in our activities there. And, back home, it could still be sold politically as constructive engagement with the opposition.
ADD: I don't believe in synchronicity (actually, he put his post up much earlier), but it looks like Tobias Harris and I have similar takes on the situation. I note that he has more on the domestic political background, though I'm sure that everyone reading this also goes to the Japan Observer and everyone is already aware of the fact. The main difference seems to be my own skepticism about forcing ourselves on the other ISAF participants. Under current political and practical constraints, Japanese activities should maintain a certain distance from ISAF, even if that limits their scope.
I suspect that it must be tempting to the soft-sell Fukuda administration to offer to add the eventual DPJ proposal to its own package. I doubt that the DPJ would accept it, given Mr. Ozawa's uncompromising stand on the unconstitutionality of the refueling activities. But it would make great political theater and help the LDP cast itself as the more reasonable and responsible of the two. The LDP would also hope that this would reopen internal fissures that the DPJ will have papered over with its proposal.
Whether it would work in practice is another matter. Japan already does provide considerable development assistance to Afghanistan through JICA, which has a good number of shoes on the ground as technical and engineering experts. There are also a number of Japanese NGOs active there. These brave men and women reportedly have been free from harm so far. Thus, it seems at first glance that, if we could find the right people - the money should not be a problem - we could repackage and expand these activities under the ISAF brand.
However, placing Japanese activities under the ISAF umbrella carries the risk of bringing Japan under the suspicion of insurgents and terrorists as enemy combatants. And this is not Samawa. At a minimum, it would carry added security risks that require protection that the other ISAF participants will be loathe to provide. Moreover, reconstruction and development activities are a terrible fit in a piece of extraordinary legislation that nominally expires in a year.
This does not mean that the Fukuda administration should reject such an idea altogether. It could push it as a new and improved, reconstruction and development package of mid- to long-term assistance with more substantive but still civilian presence as the development, attacking-the-roots side of our efforts to bring peace and prosperity to the region, or something of the sort. Human resource constraints will put a practical limit on the speed and extent of its implementation. There are only so many qualified and competent Japanese who will be willing to go and work under prevailing conditions. Still, with judicious use of non-Japanese actors, the Japanese government actually might be able to do something useful that does not increase the risks to the individuals already engaged in our activities there. And, back home, it could still be sold politically as constructive engagement with the opposition.
ADD: I don't believe in synchronicity (actually, he put his post up much earlier), but it looks like Tobias Harris and I have similar takes on the situation. I note that he has more on the domestic political background, though I'm sure that everyone reading this also goes to the Japan Observer and everyone is already aware of the fact. The main difference seems to be my own skepticism about forcing ourselves on the other ISAF participants. Under current political and practical constraints, Japanese activities should maintain a certain distance from ISAF, even if that limits their scope.
Monday, October 15, 2007
Happy Birthday, Observing Japan
Happy Birthday, Observing Japan
I look forward to continue reading Tobias Harris in my fast-approaching dotage.
I look forward to continue reading Tobias Harris in my fast-approaching dotage.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
Why Japan Needs a (Big) Navy
Wikipedia says that Japan is the sixth largest sovereign state in terms of its exclusive economic zone plus territorial waters. China is less than one-fifth of Japan in this respect.
Not that it makes us feel any more magnanimous about the off-shore gas fields, mind you, but it gives you some idea of what the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces and the Japan Coast Guard are up against.
Not that it makes us feel any more magnanimous about the off-shore gas fields, mind you, but it gives you some idea of what the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces and the Japan Coast Guard are up against.
Why 準 Can't Swear (but Jun Can)
I have no idea. But there's something in the English language that brings out the muthaf#$#a in all of us, as Steven Pinker reminds us, by way of Andrew Sullivan. As opposed to Japanese.
Do you have any idea?
ADD: Two observations:
Steven Pinker doesn't take note of the fact that almost all swearing consists of Anglo-Saxon words.(He is a linguist, not a philologist.) In fact, in the examples he gives, Jesus Christ is the only one that uses words of Romance language origins. And Anglo-Saxon words are short, as are basic vocabularies; thus, the four-letter word.
In Japanese, the three most commonly used phrases used in situations where an English-language speaker would use swear words and phrases are variations of: kono yarō (this low-life man), chikushō (non-human animal life-form), and kuso (dung). Basically, they are no more than vulgar epithets, and are heard commonly on TV broadcast programs. They do not seem to carry the sense of taboo that continues to lurk behind the pungent parlance of that most permissive of societies, English-language America.
Do you have any idea?
ADD: Two observations:
Steven Pinker doesn't take note of the fact that almost all swearing consists of Anglo-Saxon words.(He is a linguist, not a philologist.) In fact, in the examples he gives, Jesus Christ is the only one that uses words of Romance language origins. And Anglo-Saxon words are short, as are basic vocabularies; thus, the four-letter word.
In Japanese, the three most commonly used phrases used in situations where an English-language speaker would use swear words and phrases are variations of: kono yarō (this low-life man), chikushō (non-human animal life-form), and kuso (dung). Basically, they are no more than vulgar epithets, and are heard commonly on TV broadcast programs. They do not seem to carry the sense of taboo that continues to lurk behind the pungent parlance of that most permissive of societies, English-language America.
Is It Time to Consider the Effect of Peace on the Korean Peninsula on Japanese Policy on National Security?
The Chinese authorities were the first to complain when ballistic missile defense (BMD) came up as a possible option for the Japanese Self-Defense Force in the early nineties in the form of the US theater missile defense.
The National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 2005 (sorry, I can't find a translation) gives the reason for its introduction as follows:
" The thinking on the response to and the institutional arrangements of the Self-Defense Forces for the new threats [including the progress of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and the activities of international terrorist organizations, etc.] and the wide variety of situations [that influence peace and safety] is as follows:
a) Response to ballistic missiles: Against ballistic missile attacks, [we] shall deal effectively by establishing the necessary institutional arrangementｓ including the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. Concerning the threat of nuclear weapons against our nation, [we] shall deal appropriately by such undertakings, together with the nuclear deterrence powers of the United States.
…"
It is not clear what is meant by the "wide variety of situations that influence peace and safety", but it does not explicitly exclude the rapid, continuous build-up of Chinese military capacities that the 2005- Outline lays out as follows:
"China, which has a major influence on security in this region, has pushed the modernization of its nuclear and missile military powers and naval and air power, and is also attempting to expand the areas of activity on the oceans; and it is necessary to continue to pay attention to such developments."
However, if the Chinese authorities still have serious qualms as the Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense System prepares to go into operation, the media are not paying notice.
Perhaps they have been assuaged by Japanese assurances like this:
"In relation to the right of collective self-defense, the purpose of the BMD systems that the GOJ will introduce this time is to exclusively defend Japan, and it will be operated based on Japan's decision on its own initiative and will not be used for the defense of third countries. From this point of view, no issue of the right of collective self-defense comes up." (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, "On the Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems and Other Measures " on December 19, 2003)
In other words, in the case of a military showdown over Taiwan, Japan will not dispatch those AEGIS ships equipped with SM3 missiles to shoot down Chinese ballistic missiles launched against Taiwan. (Or the US.)
On the Japanese side, at the beginning, the defense and foreign policy establishment appears to have been somewhat ambivalent, presumably over the financial costs and technical feasibility of the program. There may also have been some reluctance to antagonize China, with whom Japan had been careful to maintain good relations even after the 1989 Tienanmen Incident. However, the Nodong (1993) test in the Japan Sea and, more significantly, the Tepodong (1998) shot over Japanese air space into the Pacific Ocean appears to have galvanized domestic support. On other words, it was North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs that jointly tipped the scales in the BMD's favor. At a minimum, the introduction of the BMD would have taken a more tortuous road to fruition without Kim Jong Il's help.
Now, through the Six-Party Talks, North Korea seems to be seriously seeking a new equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula. I still think that by far the most likely better-case scenario for the foreseeable future is North Korea disabling its three facilities but holding onto its current nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles system at their current levels, enough to allow China and South Korea to keep sustaining the current North Korean regime without incurring US disfavor, but well short of normalization of the US-DPRK relations. Still, there is enough movement in the Six-Party Talks to make it worth considering: What will Japan's defense posture be like without a nuclear threat from North Korea? More specifically, what will become of the Japanese BMD System once China becomes the sole concern of direct military threats to the homeland?
The National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 2005 (sorry, I can't find a translation) gives the reason for its introduction as follows:
" The thinking on the response to and the institutional arrangements of the Self-Defense Forces for the new threats [including the progress of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and the activities of international terrorist organizations, etc.] and the wide variety of situations [that influence peace and safety] is as follows:
a) Response to ballistic missiles: Against ballistic missile attacks, [we] shall deal effectively by establishing the necessary institutional arrangementｓ including the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. Concerning the threat of nuclear weapons against our nation, [we] shall deal appropriately by such undertakings, together with the nuclear deterrence powers of the United States.
…"
It is not clear what is meant by the "wide variety of situations that influence peace and safety", but it does not explicitly exclude the rapid, continuous build-up of Chinese military capacities that the 2005- Outline lays out as follows:
"China, which has a major influence on security in this region, has pushed the modernization of its nuclear and missile military powers and naval and air power, and is also attempting to expand the areas of activity on the oceans; and it is necessary to continue to pay attention to such developments."
However, if the Chinese authorities still have serious qualms as the Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense System prepares to go into operation, the media are not paying notice.
Perhaps they have been assuaged by Japanese assurances like this:
"In relation to the right of collective self-defense, the purpose of the BMD systems that the GOJ will introduce this time is to exclusively defend Japan, and it will be operated based on Japan's decision on its own initiative and will not be used for the defense of third countries. From this point of view, no issue of the right of collective self-defense comes up." (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, "On the Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems and Other Measures " on December 19, 2003)
In other words, in the case of a military showdown over Taiwan, Japan will not dispatch those AEGIS ships equipped with SM3 missiles to shoot down Chinese ballistic missiles launched against Taiwan. (Or the US.)
On the Japanese side, at the beginning, the defense and foreign policy establishment appears to have been somewhat ambivalent, presumably over the financial costs and technical feasibility of the program. There may also have been some reluctance to antagonize China, with whom Japan had been careful to maintain good relations even after the 1989 Tienanmen Incident. However, the Nodong (1993) test in the Japan Sea and, more significantly, the Tepodong (1998) shot over Japanese air space into the Pacific Ocean appears to have galvanized domestic support. On other words, it was North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs that jointly tipped the scales in the BMD's favor. At a minimum, the introduction of the BMD would have taken a more tortuous road to fruition without Kim Jong Il's help.
Now, through the Six-Party Talks, North Korea seems to be seriously seeking a new equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula. I still think that by far the most likely better-case scenario for the foreseeable future is North Korea disabling its three facilities but holding onto its current nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles system at their current levels, enough to allow China and South Korea to keep sustaining the current North Korean regime without incurring US disfavor, but well short of normalization of the US-DPRK relations. Still, there is enough movement in the Six-Party Talks to make it worth considering: What will Japan's defense posture be like without a nuclear threat from North Korea? More specifically, what will become of the Japanese BMD System once China becomes the sole concern of direct military threats to the homeland?
Saturday, October 13, 2007
Yet Another Correction and Apology from Yours Truly as the Prime Minister Moves into the Official Residence. (Oh well, at Least I'm Not Mr. Ozawa.)
Yomiuri says:
Prime Minister Fukuda Inspects the Official Residence, Indicates Eagerness for Long-Term Regime
Prime Minister Fukuda, who continues to maintain a daily 30-minute commute from his private Tokyo residence, inspected the Official Residence located next to the Prime Minister's Office in anticipation of his move there.
The Prime Minister and his wife took approximately 45 minutes to look around the newly redecorated Official Residence. "It looks pretty now," he said, looking satisfied.
Asked by the group of reporters, "How long do you want to live here," the Prime Minister replied, "If I say one month, that is too short, but if I say ten years, that's too long. I guess it's somewhere in between, right," indicating in that "Fukuda way" his eagerness for a long tenure.
My intent, of course, is not to abject myself for yet another ("[a]nd he hates the Official Residence") of my exegetic sins, but to give you a sense of the relationship between the Prime Minister and his media minders. This reporter is ready to canonize the Prime Minister. Note the use of the collective in referring to the press as kishadan (which I translated as group of reporters) for this one question, as if he/she had expressed the collective will. Can there be anything that describes the good will and camaraderie between the Prime Minister and the reporters accompanying him on a Saturday to come away with no story but his inspection?
This is what the DPJ is up against.
Prime Minister Fukuda Inspects the Official Residence, Indicates Eagerness for Long-Term Regime
Prime Minister Fukuda, who continues to maintain a daily 30-minute commute from his private Tokyo residence, inspected the Official Residence located next to the Prime Minister's Office in anticipation of his move there.
The Prime Minister and his wife took approximately 45 minutes to look around the newly redecorated Official Residence. "It looks pretty now," he said, looking satisfied.
Asked by the group of reporters, "How long do you want to live here," the Prime Minister replied, "If I say one month, that is too short, but if I say ten years, that's too long. I guess it's somewhere in between, right," indicating in that "Fukuda way" his eagerness for a long tenure.
My intent, of course, is not to abject myself for yet another ("[a]nd he hates the Official Residence") of my exegetic sins, but to give you a sense of the relationship between the Prime Minister and his media minders. This reporter is ready to canonize the Prime Minister. Note the use of the collective in referring to the press as kishadan (which I translated as group of reporters) for this one question, as if he/she had expressed the collective will. Can there be anything that describes the good will and camaraderie between the Prime Minister and the reporters accompanying him on a Saturday to come away with no story but his inspection?
This is what the DPJ is up against.
Friday, October 12, 2007
Seeking "Normal Life", Takahide Kimura (LDP) Leaving Diet
52 year old Diet member Takahide Kimura (House of Representatives, Aichi 5th District, LDP) held a news conference on October 9 and announced that he would not seek a fifth term and would leave politics to return to a normal life. According to the Asahi, he confessed that he was "not fit to be a politician" and explained:
"I reached the same age as my father when he died and I considered how I should live from here on. I am not the kind who conducts giin rippō [legislation initiated by Diet members; most Japanese legislative bills are developed and submitted by the Cabinet)] and otherwise creates his own future. I am not appropriate to a new era when the fences between factions and parties are diminished and Diet members create new groups on their own. I apologize to my supporters for my selfish reasons."
(translated from: 父が亡くなった年と同じ年になり、これからをどう生きようか考えた。私は議員立法をするなど、自分で切り開くタイプではない。派閥や党の垣根が低くなり、議員同士がグループをつくる新しい時代には向いていない。身勝手な理由で、支持者の皆さんには申し訳ない。)
None of the newspapers gave an explanation of what Mr. Kimura thought of as the old era, but it's easy to imagine. Like other LDP members of the post-1955 regime, he could look forward to perhaps a couple of more decades in the Diet, during which he could expect to be appointed to a minor Cabinet post in his sixth term (fifth if he were exceptional, seventh if he were unlucky), and another one before he retired. In the case of Mr. Kimura, he does not seem to be a person who sought power within the party (say, angle for a share of the Big Three party posts), so he would have contented himself with the usual gig of bringing public works and other public money to his district and otherwise doing favors for his constituents, and, when the time came to choose the new LDP President, he would dutifully vote with (and hopefully for) his faction chief. After all, if Mr. Kimura were a typical LDP Diet member, faction sponsorship and support for his initial run for the Diet seat would have been crucial to his success (though, with his strong background in Prefectural politics, it may have not been as significant as for the average aspirant). The faction chief would also be tending to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet government appointments, as well as initial assignments to Diet committees. And he would also welcome your son or son-in-law with open arms when he succeeded you on your retirement. As for legislation, you voted for the bill that the Cabinet submitted, and left the hard thinking to the bureaucrats. Why they would even draft accompanying resolutions, if it came to that. You got along, to get along. Do it well enough, and you had a teensy-weensy chance of becoming House President, or the far less delectable but still prestigious LDP General Council Chairman, the least of the Big Three, along the way.
Contrast this with a world where faction members vote against the wishes of their leaders with impunity, and Diet members associate freely and new Diet members choose factions with leisure after they are elected and often decide not to join at all. And even (sometimes) submit their own legislative bills!
One of Mr. Kimura's two most memorable moments speaks eloquently of his lament for the old ways, for it turns out to have been a most unhappy occasion for him:
"I was opposed to the immediate privatization of the Post Office till the end. But in order to stand for election from the LDP, I could not maintain my opposition, and I continue to regret that even now."
(translated from: 私は最後まで即時の郵政民営化に反対だった。しかし、自民から選挙に出るため、反対を貫くことができずにいまだに悔やんでいる。)
Shinzo Abe, also opposed to the Koizumi proposal, also reluctantly went along, and was rewarded with a year in the Prime Minister's seat. Mr. Kimura, with his very different background but also staring mortality in the face, decided to walk out on his own two feet.
I do not know what kind of a "normal life" awaits a 52 year old man "not fit to be a politician" who has nevertheless been in elective office for 22 years - son of a Prefectural Assemblyman, Mr. Kimura succeeded his deceased father in 1985 before he ran successfully for the House of Representatives in 1996 – but I wish him the best.
"I reached the same age as my father when he died and I considered how I should live from here on. I am not the kind who conducts giin rippō [legislation initiated by Diet members; most Japanese legislative bills are developed and submitted by the Cabinet)] and otherwise creates his own future. I am not appropriate to a new era when the fences between factions and parties are diminished and Diet members create new groups on their own. I apologize to my supporters for my selfish reasons."
(translated from: 父が亡くなった年と同じ年になり、これからをどう生きようか考えた。私は議員立法をするなど、自分で切り開くタイプではない。派閥や党の垣根が低くなり、議員同士がグループをつくる新しい時代には向いていない。身勝手な理由で、支持者の皆さんには申し訳ない。)
None of the newspapers gave an explanation of what Mr. Kimura thought of as the old era, but it's easy to imagine. Like other LDP members of the post-1955 regime, he could look forward to perhaps a couple of more decades in the Diet, during which he could expect to be appointed to a minor Cabinet post in his sixth term (fifth if he were exceptional, seventh if he were unlucky), and another one before he retired. In the case of Mr. Kimura, he does not seem to be a person who sought power within the party (say, angle for a share of the Big Three party posts), so he would have contented himself with the usual gig of bringing public works and other public money to his district and otherwise doing favors for his constituents, and, when the time came to choose the new LDP President, he would dutifully vote with (and hopefully for) his faction chief. After all, if Mr. Kimura were a typical LDP Diet member, faction sponsorship and support for his initial run for the Diet seat would have been crucial to his success (though, with his strong background in Prefectural politics, it may have not been as significant as for the average aspirant). The faction chief would also be tending to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet government appointments, as well as initial assignments to Diet committees. And he would also welcome your son or son-in-law with open arms when he succeeded you on your retirement. As for legislation, you voted for the bill that the Cabinet submitted, and left the hard thinking to the bureaucrats. Why they would even draft accompanying resolutions, if it came to that. You got along, to get along. Do it well enough, and you had a teensy-weensy chance of becoming House President, or the far less delectable but still prestigious LDP General Council Chairman, the least of the Big Three, along the way.
Contrast this with a world where faction members vote against the wishes of their leaders with impunity, and Diet members associate freely and new Diet members choose factions with leisure after they are elected and often decide not to join at all. And even (sometimes) submit their own legislative bills!
One of Mr. Kimura's two most memorable moments speaks eloquently of his lament for the old ways, for it turns out to have been a most unhappy occasion for him:
"I was opposed to the immediate privatization of the Post Office till the end. But in order to stand for election from the LDP, I could not maintain my opposition, and I continue to regret that even now."
(translated from: 私は最後まで即時の郵政民営化に反対だった。しかし、自民から選挙に出るため、反対を貫くことができずにいまだに悔やんでいる。)
Shinzo Abe, also opposed to the Koizumi proposal, also reluctantly went along, and was rewarded with a year in the Prime Minister's seat. Mr. Kimura, with his very different background but also staring mortality in the face, decided to walk out on his own two feet.
I do not know what kind of a "normal life" awaits a 52 year old man "not fit to be a politician" who has nevertheless been in elective office for 22 years - son of a Prefectural Assemblyman, Mr. Kimura succeeded his deceased father in 1985 before he ran successfully for the House of Representatives in 1996 – but I wish him the best.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
My Big Mistake on OEF-MIO Operations from the Persian Gulf and Incomplete Thoughts Thereon
I made a big mistake. In fact, I made a doubled-size, italics, bold-letter mistake here. Foreign Minister Komura under Diet questioning reaffirmed that naval vessels did participate in bombing sorties in Afghanistan after receiving fuel from JMSDF vessels, and that the new anti-terrorism bill would be limited to Maritime Interception Operations (OEF-MIO).
So, my unconditional, absolute apology to TIME and its intrepid reporting team.
But it was not to abase myself publicly that I am writing this. You see, the existence of such bombing operations is very important because that is the only plausible explanation for the USS Kitty Hawk engaging in OEF from the Persian Gulf during the three days (25-27 February 2003) that, according to Defense Minister Ishiba, it took to consume the 800,000 gallons that it received from the JMSDF refueling ship Tokiwa. (In fact, I'm very much embarrassed at the fact that I didn't see this point in the first place.)
Still, leaving aside the conceptual difficulty of wrapping your mind around the idea that you can somehow distinguish between the drops of JMSDF fuel and drops of non-JMSDF fuel in the same fuel tank (surely the Kitty Hawk was not running on empty when it was serviced by Tokiwa) the discrepancy between average daily fuel consumption figures under normal conditions (U.S. documents by way of Peace Depot-113,000 gallons, Mr. Ishiba-200,000 gallons) remains unresolved. Likewise, the Kitty Hawk command history that the Peace Depot accusations has uploaded appears to show that its objectives on this mission were to engage in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).
Moreover, the Kitty Hawk deck log, again courtesy of Peace Depot, together with a map attached to the hard copy version of this Yomiuri article on Mr. Ushiba's testimony raises a further question. The deck log shows the Kitty Hawk in "AT/PASSAGE FROM Malacca TO Persian Gulf" on two dates, 17 February and 27 February, the latter date being the day it changed command. I presume that subsequent log entries show the Kitty Hawk "AT/PASSAGE FROM the Persian Gulf TO". The Yomiuri map of the Kitty Hawk's final leg of its passage (did Mr. Ishiba display it during his Diet testimony?) shows the Kitty Hawk on the move continuously, as it approaches from the Indian Ocean on 24 February, refuels from the Tokiwa near the mouth of the Persian Gulf on 25 February, enters the Gulf on 26 February, then comes to settle off the narrow Iraqi outlet at the tip of the Gulf on 1 March. I suspect that if the log between its departure from Okinawa and arrival in the Gulf were disclosed, it would show that the Kitty Hawk had been in continuous movement every day. Now it is conceivable that it ran sorties to Afghanistan in passing as it neared its ultimate destination. But plausible? I have no military expertise whatsoever, so I'll leave it at that.
There's also the matter of the large amount of JMSDF-to-U.S. vessel refueling, both in number of operations and per operation volume, in FY 2001 (April-March) and FY 2002, and the dramatic drop-off thereafter. The 800,000 gallons in the 25 February operation is merely a small fraction of the total. OSW effectively ended with the successful subjugation of the Iraqi regime at the end of the Japanese FY 2002. This coincidence of the end of refueling large U.S. military vessels and the end of a continuous aerial operation must be matched against the rise and fall of battleground needs in Afghanistan at the time to derive any conclusions, though; and, again, I am in way over my head. Unfortunately for Ichiro Ozawa, DPJ wonks knowledgeable in defense matters do not seem to be in his corner in the attack on the anti-terrorism operations.
Okay, now back to life.
(note) Major operations in Afghanistan involving air power seemed to have subsided, at least for while, after Operation Anaconda in March 2002. And the Anaconda was run by the U.S. ARMY and Air Force and did not involve the Navy or the Marines.
So, my unconditional, absolute apology to TIME and its intrepid reporting team.
But it was not to abase myself publicly that I am writing this. You see, the existence of such bombing operations is very important because that is the only plausible explanation for the USS Kitty Hawk engaging in OEF from the Persian Gulf during the three days (25-27 February 2003) that, according to Defense Minister Ishiba, it took to consume the 800,000 gallons that it received from the JMSDF refueling ship Tokiwa. (In fact, I'm very much embarrassed at the fact that I didn't see this point in the first place.)
Still, leaving aside the conceptual difficulty of wrapping your mind around the idea that you can somehow distinguish between the drops of JMSDF fuel and drops of non-JMSDF fuel in the same fuel tank (surely the Kitty Hawk was not running on empty when it was serviced by Tokiwa) the discrepancy between average daily fuel consumption figures under normal conditions (U.S. documents by way of Peace Depot-113,000 gallons, Mr. Ishiba-200,000 gallons) remains unresolved. Likewise, the Kitty Hawk command history that the Peace Depot accusations has uploaded appears to show that its objectives on this mission were to engage in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).
Moreover, the Kitty Hawk deck log, again courtesy of Peace Depot, together with a map attached to the hard copy version of this Yomiuri article on Mr. Ushiba's testimony raises a further question. The deck log shows the Kitty Hawk in "
There's also the matter of the large amount of JMSDF-to-U.S. vessel refueling, both in number of operations and per operation volume, in FY 2001 (April-March) and FY 2002, and the dramatic drop-off thereafter. The 800,000 gallons in the 25 February operation is merely a small fraction of the total. OSW effectively ended with the successful subjugation of the Iraqi regime at the end of the Japanese FY 2002. This coincidence of the end of refueling large U.S. military vessels and the end of a continuous aerial operation must be matched against the rise and fall of battleground needs in Afghanistan at the time to derive any conclusions, though; and, again, I am in way over my head. Unfortunately for Ichiro Ozawa, DPJ wonks knowledgeable in defense matters do not seem to be in his corner in the attack on the anti-terrorism operations.
Okay, now back to life.
(note) Major operations in Afghanistan involving air power seemed to have subsided, at least for while, after Operation Anaconda in March 2002. And the Anaconda was run by the U.S. ARMY and Air Force and did not involve the Navy or the Marines.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
There's News, There's Fake News, and… Holy Cow
from today's CNN web page, right under the featured article:
HEALTH.com
10 tricks to boost memory
Memory loss's normal at middle age, but don't put up with it. Tips to remember where the keys and car are
THE ONION
Satire: N. Korea nuke program
North Korea promised to dismantle its nuclear program. What do you think?
CNN HEROES
Vote for your favorite
Winner to be honored at tribute hosted by Anderson Cooper. This week: Medical Marvel.
HEALTH.com
10 tricks to boost memory
Memory loss's normal at middle age, but don't put up with it. Tips to remember where the keys and car are
THE ONION
Satire: N. Korea nuke program
North Korea promised to dismantle its nuclear program. What do you think?
CNN HEROES
Vote for your favorite
Winner to be honored at tribute hosted by Anderson Cooper. This week: Medical Marvel.
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