1: The China-ROK-Japan Trilateral
Summit is expected to be resumed over the weekend after a 3-year hiatus. Can
you first give us a brief introduction to the background of this meeting this
time?
I
believe that the gradual but steady thawing of the Japan-China from the spring
of 2014 including the two summits on the edges of multilateral sessions has set
the stage for normalization of the political relationship. More specifically, I
believe that the bilateral improvement spurred South Korea to seek a
rapprochement of its own. And what better venue for this than the trilateral
summit, which is South Korea’s turn to host—a home game, if you will? And Japan
has always been working tirelessly to this end. Indeed, it is unnatural for the
heads of three neighbors with deeply intertwined economies and highly reliant
on the global market for manufactured exports and commodity imports not to
discuss issues of common interest and/or concern. Moreover, each of the three
economies now faces serious structural challenges that it must confront
forcefully or suffer the long-term consequences. The trilateral summit goes a
long way in defusing a political distraction.
2: What sort of issues do you expect
that this summit will try to focus on? How important are they to the three
countries?
A
recent news report says that they will confirm cooperation in such areas as
disaster prevention, the environment, and tourism, and talk about cybersecurity
and making progress on the China-ROK-Japan FTA. Now the summit will have no
substantial bearing on most of these matters. They would move ahead just as
smoothly if the three heads kept kicking the trilateral can down road. One
exception is that it would give the ROK authorities sufficient political cover at
home if they decide to seriously pursue the trilateral FTA.
3: The three countries also resumed
negotiations over the China-ROK-Japan FTA. China and ROK have already signed a
bilateral FTA. The obstacles apparently remain between China and Japan as well
as ROK and Japan. How likely do you think that they may make a breakthrough?
The
three governments will behave constructively on the trilateral FTA. However, I
am rather pessimistic about the prospects for a breakthrough. ROK does not have
much to gain, since Japan already imports most manufactured products tariff-free.
And why would ROK want to compete in the Chinese market with Japan on an equal
footing? As for China, I’m sure that it wouldn’t mind having Japan compete with
ROK for its favors on an equal footing, but as I said, Japan already imports
most manufactured products tariff-free, so there’s not as much urgency for
China than there is for Japan. And, of course, it takes three to tango. I will
be very happy, though, if I’m proven wrong.
4: South Korea and China are not
members of the TPP. How will this affect China-ROK-Japan FTA negotiation? Will
this pushed the two countries to seek an early conclusion of the
China-ROK-Japan FTA negotiations?
I
think that it affects ROK negatively with regard to the trilateral FTA. I
expect ROK to focus on joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which
promises more substantial benefits than a trilateral FTA and is unlikely to
include China in the near future. As for China, I believe that it will find
that the TPP hurdle is too high, but a trilateral FTA is too small a
consolation prize. Instead, I expect China to focus on another broad-scope
trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which
will also serve as a geopolitical counterweight to TPP.
5: Earlier this week, China’s state
councilor Yang Jiechi visited Japan, where he met with Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe. Both sides expressed the willingness to improve ties. Can we see
this meeting as well as the upcoming summit as a thaw in relations between
China and Japan? Why do you think that this is happening even when the key
thorny issues between the two sides still remain unsolved?
This
is the culmination of a painstaking process of rapprochement since Prime
Minister Abe’s visit to Yasukuni in 2013. The “key thorny issues” are mostly
matters of perception; on their own, they have very little tangible effect on
the real world. Japan is not executing a landfills and building air strips on
the Senkaku Islands. China is not digging for oil on the Japanese side of the
median line. And so on. Now, Prime Minister Abe issued a 70th
Anniversary statement that was tolerable to the Chinese authorities, and has
stayed away from Yasukuni. There remained no reason that the heads of two
neighboring countries highly reliant on manufactured exports and commodity imports
should not meet to give their blessings to engagement in areas of common
interest and/or concern.
6: Do you expect the summit to add
strength to the China-Japan trade relations, which are going downhill since
2012?
I
expect it to make Japanese-brand goods and services marginally more acceptable,
but not by much. For better or worse, it has been business-as-usual on the
economic front for the last couple of years, and so it will remain. The vector
of the bilateral trade relations will mostly be determined by the same factors
that affect the rest of China’s trade relations. You know, things such as what
China will or won’t do with regard to what it considers to be strategic
industries or flagship companies, whether Chinese wages keep going up, and so
on.
7: Will this summit have any impact
on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in any way?
No.
The most that I expect to emerge from the summit on this issue is some vaguely
worded admonishment of North Korea. China is the only one that can turn the
screw hard enough to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programs completely, and it probably would if it could do so
without decisively destabilizing the North Korean regime. But it is not going
to risk the collapse of the Kim dynasty just to make Japan feel safe, or even
to make the United States happy.
