Komeito went into to the 30 August House of Representatives election with 31 seats and came out with only 21. Not satisfied with giving the junior coalition member a haircut, the Japanese electorate kicked out the Komeito leadership—all the single-member-district candidates including the party leadership had declined to take out insurance policies in their local proportional representation blocs, and were summarily rejected by their SMD constituents—in the bargain. Media reports carry understandable grumbling from the rank-and-file about the wisdom of the current relationship with the LDP.
As the proprietor of the Shisaku blog has pointed out in another forum, Komeito supporters, i.e. 8,000,000 or so eligible Sokagakkai voters, swung roughly 10 percentage points of the overall vote to the LDP in the proportional representation blocs*. This appears to have also been the case in past HOR elections under the current mixed membership-single non-transferable vote system. That’s a 20 percentage-point wing that the Komeito-Sokagakkai team can engineer at will, if their steadfastness within the coalition during the maelstrom was any indication. I also note that the DPJ majority’s center-left leanings are closer to Komeito thinking—pro-Asia, pro-individual, pro-handout—than the somewhat more rightish LDP core. Look at the manifestos, and the old Sokagakkai-Ozawa liaison.
Speaking of Ozawa, Gakkai-Ozawa animosities are widely considered the biggest obstacle for a potential DPJ-Komeito matchup. Perhaps. But this is politics. From the DPJ’s point of view, Komeito is a more natural ally policy-wise than the Social Democratic Party to the left and the People’s New Party to the right. And still has 21 seats in the House of Councilors after two election losses of its own, a baseline number that in a coalition would give the DPJ a wide margin of error in the 2010 HOC election. From Komeito’s point of view, the downside of a pre-HOC election deal is that after the switch, it may have to wait as many as 3 years before it receives the payoff in the next HOR election. An HOC payoff is just about impossible to engineer because there are only 29 single member districts in the HOC and none of them favor Komeito, predominantly urban party.
* If you can read Japanese, it’s easy to make this out from the third table in this Wikipedia entry (source: Jiji Tsūshin). Shisaku does more arithmetic here.
Showing posts with label New Komeito. Show all posts
Showing posts with label New Komeito. Show all posts
Thursday, September 03, 2009
Monday, May 25, 2009
Are We Looking at the Right Coalition Partner for the DPJ?
The DPJ-Shin-Ryokufukai-People’s New Party (PNP)-Nihon Shinto (NSP) coalition forms a Registered Upper House Association (considered a single party for parliamentary purposes, it’s a more formal version of the Democratic and Republican caucuses in the United States) holding 118 of the 242 seats in the Upper House. Since two of the remaining 224 seats belong to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the House, who leave their respective parties—in this case No.1 DPJ and No.2 LDP—and the Chairman casts the tiebreaking vote, the DPJ-led coalition needs two more seats to reach the 120 threshold to ensure passage of legislative bills without a supermajority in the Lower House.
As a practical matter, if the Japan Communist Party (JCP) decides to take its seven Upper House seats off the table and abstain, the DPJ-led coalition will have more than enough votes to pass the relevant legislative bill. Then there are the independents. So it’s not as simple as that. Suffice to say, though, that the DPJ-led coalition needs the cooperation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with its five votes, to ensure that it will be able to secure an Upper House majority without the cooperation of the JCP. Thus, the SDP will demand its pound of flesh in return for the loan of its votes, pushing domestic and foreign policy further to the left than its numbers on their own could ever justify.
The formal Upper House coalition as it is currently constituted without the SDP has its own problems. The PNP is a throwback to the pre-Koizumi LDP. It is reportedly pushing for a three-year, 50-trillion, public-works payout (financed perhaps by maintaining the gasoline surcharge), as well as a much-publicized bid for a return to the pre-privatization Post Office system. But these demands threaten to throw a wrench and much of the rest of the kit and caboodle into the DPJ’s reformist plans. This is obviously where the best-laid plans and rumors regarding Hidenao Nakagawa’s plans for a breakout rom the LDP to form a new centrist-progressive party come from.
Now some of reformist Nakagawa’s ideas—cut unnecessary expenditures, for example—dovetail nicely with the DPJ’s. But the hypothetical Nakagawa’s hypothetical startup-deck party will have its own newly formed political agenda, and some of the particulars are bound to conflict with the DPJ’s. Compromising its principles from the outset is an uncomfortable position to be for a new political party to be in. And this is where the New Komeito, with its 20! Upper House votes, comes in.
Komeito stands up for the little guy, and has a decidedly pacifist outlook. Otherwise, its political agenda is quite flexible, as evidenced by its political meanderings between the LDP and its opponents. In fact, the DPJ’s annual multitrillion-Yen outlay for child support checks to households with under-aged children could be considered a permanent, more refined version of the 2 trillion helicopter money that the New Komeito forced the Aso administration to cough up. And with regard to the DPJ’s generally more conciliatory approach towards China and the Koreas on history and other thorny bilateral issues, Komeito arguably has more in common with it than with the LDP’s more hard-line position. The DPJ’s reluctance—however tactical—to project the Japanese military except under the strictest of UN controls also appeals to the New Komeito, which has been forced to grudgingly go along with the LDP on such matters.
As we have seen here, the New Komeito is at least as natural an ally of the DPJ as a Nakagawa-led LDP breakout could be. And it’s not as if the Gakkai-Komei complex hasn’t flip-flopped between the LDP and an anti-LDP coalition before. Which begs the question: Why, then, is no one talking about the possibilities? Two names: Ichiro Ozawa, and Daisaku Ikeda, the lifetime head of Sokagakkai (an extremely powerful laic organization in the Nichiren Buddhist sect) and the power behind the New Komeito throne. The animosity between the two run deep, and is a clear hindrance to the New Komeito breaking out and joining a DPJ-led coalition.
That being said, there are no laws of physics that preclude a DPJ-New Komeito coalition. The idea deserves more attention than the media has been devoting to it, as Japan’s body politic approaches the Lower House general election.
As a practical matter, if the Japan Communist Party (JCP) decides to take its seven Upper House seats off the table and abstain, the DPJ-led coalition will have more than enough votes to pass the relevant legislative bill. Then there are the independents. So it’s not as simple as that. Suffice to say, though, that the DPJ-led coalition needs the cooperation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with its five votes, to ensure that it will be able to secure an Upper House majority without the cooperation of the JCP. Thus, the SDP will demand its pound of flesh in return for the loan of its votes, pushing domestic and foreign policy further to the left than its numbers on their own could ever justify.
The formal Upper House coalition as it is currently constituted without the SDP has its own problems. The PNP is a throwback to the pre-Koizumi LDP. It is reportedly pushing for a three-year, 50-trillion, public-works payout (financed perhaps by maintaining the gasoline surcharge), as well as a much-publicized bid for a return to the pre-privatization Post Office system. But these demands threaten to throw a wrench and much of the rest of the kit and caboodle into the DPJ’s reformist plans. This is obviously where the best-laid plans and rumors regarding Hidenao Nakagawa’s plans for a breakout rom the LDP to form a new centrist-progressive party come from.
Now some of reformist Nakagawa’s ideas—cut unnecessary expenditures, for example—dovetail nicely with the DPJ’s. But the hypothetical Nakagawa’s hypothetical startup-deck party will have its own newly formed political agenda, and some of the particulars are bound to conflict with the DPJ’s. Compromising its principles from the outset is an uncomfortable position to be for a new political party to be in. And this is where the New Komeito, with its 20! Upper House votes, comes in.
Komeito stands up for the little guy, and has a decidedly pacifist outlook. Otherwise, its political agenda is quite flexible, as evidenced by its political meanderings between the LDP and its opponents. In fact, the DPJ’s annual multitrillion-Yen outlay for child support checks to households with under-aged children could be considered a permanent, more refined version of the 2 trillion helicopter money that the New Komeito forced the Aso administration to cough up. And with regard to the DPJ’s generally more conciliatory approach towards China and the Koreas on history and other thorny bilateral issues, Komeito arguably has more in common with it than with the LDP’s more hard-line position. The DPJ’s reluctance—however tactical—to project the Japanese military except under the strictest of UN controls also appeals to the New Komeito, which has been forced to grudgingly go along with the LDP on such matters.
As we have seen here, the New Komeito is at least as natural an ally of the DPJ as a Nakagawa-led LDP breakout could be. And it’s not as if the Gakkai-Komei complex hasn’t flip-flopped between the LDP and an anti-LDP coalition before. Which begs the question: Why, then, is no one talking about the possibilities? Two names: Ichiro Ozawa, and Daisaku Ikeda, the lifetime head of Sokagakkai (an extremely powerful laic organization in the Nichiren Buddhist sect) and the power behind the New Komeito throne. The animosity between the two run deep, and is a clear hindrance to the New Komeito breaking out and joining a DPJ-led coalition.
That being said, there are no laws of physics that preclude a DPJ-New Komeito coalition. The idea deserves more attention than the media has been devoting to it, as Japan’s body politic approaches the Lower House general election.
Sunday, April 05, 2009
Request regarding New Komeito
Do you have recommendations for reading and/or insights on Komeito/New Komeito? Particularly welcome is anything that helps understand how and when it gets what it wants and when it doesn't as the LDP’s junior coalition partner. Both Japanese and English texts are welcome. This will be a key element of a book that a friend of mine is co-writing. The scholar comes to this blog fairly frequently (thanks), so please post any leads here. If for any reason you prefer not to post it here, please email: okumurajun@gmail.com. For offline material, please indicate, if possible, the title of the book/magazine/monograph and the names of the author and publisher.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
What Asahi Readers Tell Us Random-Digit-Dialing Poll Has to Say about Aso et al (and What to Make of It All)
Today’s Asahi (online) has the results of its Second Consecutive Public Opinion Poll (telephone) taken on October 11-12. Here are some numbers:
The financial crisis and the damage it is doing to the real economy has not hurt the LDP. Instead, it has turned public attention away from the nation’s future—the DPJ manifesto’s main subject—and its past—the wear and tear from 53 years of LDP in power—and instead is highlighting the here-and-now, where the administration has the advantage of being able to take the initiative by marshalling government resources to shore up the economy.
What about foreign policy? The Japanese public is very much focused on the domestic front. The Asahi poll did ask the respondents about the JMSDA refueling operations in the Indian Ocean—a point of contention that Ichiro Ozawa used to good effect against the Fukuda administration. The results were 42% in favor of an extension, 42% against—another dead heat. If this and the Yomiuri numbers are anything to go by, public opinion has softened, if only a shade, towards the operations. And the DPJ does not have a workable alternative. I do not think that North Korea—nuclear program, abductees—is going to be a major political issue either, once the disappointment over the U.S. action to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism blows over. Unless something big happens in the Six-Party talks that puts Japan on the spot, but that’s a big if.
The Aso administration, with a little help from U.S. financial institutions, has stanched the bleeding for now. Nobody is ready to put a sell call on the DPJ yet, but it’s time to play some offense (or grab an LDP fumble or two, which is another thing that you should never bet against) if it is to deny the LDP-New-Komeito coalition and fellow-traveler independents a majority in the upcoming Lower House election—a modest goal for the LDP Secretary-General to be shooting for to be sure, and a measure of how far the DPJ has come..
On a related matter, the Asahi, alone among the major dailies, continues to focus on DPJ ties to the maruchi shoho industry. Today, it named names, including Kenji Yamaoka’s. (By comparison, yesterday’s evening Yomiuri tucked the story away on the antepenultimate page, where lesser scandals go to die (unless they’re spillover from the penultimate page). And that seems to the end of it for now as far as the Yomiuri is concerned.) There is no clear evidence of illegal activities; the DPJ should be able to put this behind it without serious harm. But it’s obviously an unwanted distraction going into the election. More immediately, it gives them something to think about when it decides what to do or not to do with the Yano-Sokagakkai-Komeito sideshow in the remaining days of the current Diet session.
Aso Cabinet: support 42% (41%) not support 38% (42%)These numbers predictably are not as good for Aso/LDP as the Yomiuri ones. Still, an Asahi poll that actually gives a positive rating to the Aso Cabinet and has the LDP in a dead heat with the DPJ is a reminder not to bet against the LDP-New Komeito coalition maintaining a majority in the upcoming Lower House election.
Lower House proportional voting intent: LDP 32% (33%), DPJ 32% (34%)
October 4-5 poll numbers in parentheses
The financial crisis and the damage it is doing to the real economy has not hurt the LDP. Instead, it has turned public attention away from the nation’s future—the DPJ manifesto’s main subject—and its past—the wear and tear from 53 years of LDP in power—and instead is highlighting the here-and-now, where the administration has the advantage of being able to take the initiative by marshalling government resources to shore up the economy.
What about foreign policy? The Japanese public is very much focused on the domestic front. The Asahi poll did ask the respondents about the JMSDA refueling operations in the Indian Ocean—a point of contention that Ichiro Ozawa used to good effect against the Fukuda administration. The results were 42% in favor of an extension, 42% against—another dead heat. If this and the Yomiuri numbers are anything to go by, public opinion has softened, if only a shade, towards the operations. And the DPJ does not have a workable alternative. I do not think that North Korea—nuclear program, abductees—is going to be a major political issue either, once the disappointment over the U.S. action to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism blows over. Unless something big happens in the Six-Party talks that puts Japan on the spot, but that’s a big if.
The Aso administration, with a little help from U.S. financial institutions, has stanched the bleeding for now. Nobody is ready to put a sell call on the DPJ yet, but it’s time to play some offense (or grab an LDP fumble or two, which is another thing that you should never bet against) if it is to deny the LDP-New-Komeito coalition and fellow-traveler independents a majority in the upcoming Lower House election—a modest goal for the LDP Secretary-General to be shooting for to be sure, and a measure of how far the DPJ has come..
On a related matter, the Asahi, alone among the major dailies, continues to focus on DPJ ties to the maruchi shoho industry. Today, it named names, including Kenji Yamaoka’s. (By comparison, yesterday’s evening Yomiuri tucked the story away on the antepenultimate page, where lesser scandals go to die (unless they’re spillover from the penultimate page). And that seems to the end of it for now as far as the Yomiuri is concerned.) There is no clear evidence of illegal activities; the DPJ should be able to put this behind it without serious harm. But it’s obviously an unwanted distraction going into the election. More immediately, it gives them something to think about when it decides what to do or not to do with the Yano-Sokagakkai-Komeito sideshow in the remaining days of the current Diet session.
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Memo on DPJ’s New Election Manifest; Also, More Scrambling by LDP-New Komeito
I’d mentioned briefly that the DPJ was exploring the need for sequencing its multitrillion-yen election-manifest upgrade package. The DPJ had been working on an update for the 2007 election manifest for the last three weeks with exactly that in mind. Given all the fanfare around the LDP makeover and the most recent flap leading to the MLIT Minister Nakayama’s resignation, the media attention had not been giving much space to this process. But in recent days, the basic framework has emerged (25 September Asahi; Yomiuri, 27 September)). Asahi reports that party leaders have already agreed on the main features of the program scheduled to officially debut next month.
The manifest will be a four-year program, neatly fitting into the four-year Lower House term of office, and will be implemented in one-, two-, and four-year stages. According to the Yomiuri report, the main items to be implemented in the first year are: establishing a monthly 26,000 yen allowance per child (5.6 trillion per year), making highways toll-free (1.5 trillion yen), abolishing the gasoline tax surcharge (2.6 trillion), and reforming the medical care system (2 trillion; abolishing the late-term elderly medical care insurance system etc,). The second year will see income subsidies for individual farmers (1 trillion). A fully tax-funded public pension system—Prime Minister Aso himself has talked favorably about this idea—(5.8 trillion) is to be implemented in the fourth year. The program, costing 22 trillion in its final year—around 21 trillion according to Yukio Hatoyama today, but what’s a trillion more or less?—will be funded by savings of 12.6 trillion yen from downsizing national public works programs, savings on public procurement, 20% reduction of human resources costs for public servants (retirement pus pay cut?), and reducing subsidies to state-owned entities; 3 trillion from sales of state assets and elimination of business income tax benefits; 2.7 trillion from reducing personal income tax deductions; and 4 trillion yen from special account surpluses (the most fungible of the “buried treasures”, the Yomiuri report mentioned only the Foreign Exchange Special Account, but this figure appears to include the Fiscal Investment and Loans Program Special Account surplus as well). The figures in the Yomiuri report do not add up and the DPJ leadership have yet to grasp the full implications of the details—Mr. Hatoyama did not have a ready answer when Kazuo Kitagawa, the brainy no.2 man for the New Komeito, pointed out a major hole in the child allowance/income tax deduction exchange scheme—so I’ll leave the numbers at that for the time being. I hope to have more to say when the full program emerges.
An interesting development on the LDP-New Komeito side is that under the new Prime Minister and the prevailing economic circumstances, half-baked talk has broken loose about vastly expanding the 1.8/11.7 trillion stimulus package. True, it’s about short-term measures, but it does make their accusations against the DPJ of fiscal irresponsibility less convincing to public ears. The scrambling over Health, Welfare and Labor Minister Yoichi Masuzoe’s expressed intent to “fundamentally review the Late-term Elderly Medical Care Insurance System” and seconded by Mr. Aso—if I’m not mistaken, the ruling coalition has been frantically trying to scale back expectations—also has the feel of an administration calling audibles and not doing a very good job of it. Add to that Mr. Aso’s previously expressed sympathy for a fully tax-funded basic pension system, albeit shelved for the time being until the LDP can resume talk about a consumption tax hike—and it’s like having a new coach with a different offensive system coming in the day before the championship game.
The manifest will be a four-year program, neatly fitting into the four-year Lower House term of office, and will be implemented in one-, two-, and four-year stages. According to the Yomiuri report, the main items to be implemented in the first year are: establishing a monthly 26,000 yen allowance per child (5.6 trillion per year), making highways toll-free (1.5 trillion yen), abolishing the gasoline tax surcharge (2.6 trillion), and reforming the medical care system (2 trillion; abolishing the late-term elderly medical care insurance system etc,). The second year will see income subsidies for individual farmers (1 trillion). A fully tax-funded public pension system—Prime Minister Aso himself has talked favorably about this idea—(5.8 trillion) is to be implemented in the fourth year. The program, costing 22 trillion in its final year—around 21 trillion according to Yukio Hatoyama today, but what’s a trillion more or less?—will be funded by savings of 12.6 trillion yen from downsizing national public works programs, savings on public procurement, 20% reduction of human resources costs for public servants (retirement pus pay cut?), and reducing subsidies to state-owned entities; 3 trillion from sales of state assets and elimination of business income tax benefits; 2.7 trillion from reducing personal income tax deductions; and 4 trillion yen from special account surpluses (the most fungible of the “buried treasures”, the Yomiuri report mentioned only the Foreign Exchange Special Account, but this figure appears to include the Fiscal Investment and Loans Program Special Account surplus as well). The figures in the Yomiuri report do not add up and the DPJ leadership have yet to grasp the full implications of the details—Mr. Hatoyama did not have a ready answer when Kazuo Kitagawa, the brainy no.2 man for the New Komeito, pointed out a major hole in the child allowance/income tax deduction exchange scheme—so I’ll leave the numbers at that for the time being. I hope to have more to say when the full program emerges.
An interesting development on the LDP-New Komeito side is that under the new Prime Minister and the prevailing economic circumstances, half-baked talk has broken loose about vastly expanding the 1.8/11.7 trillion stimulus package. True, it’s about short-term measures, but it does make their accusations against the DPJ of fiscal irresponsibility less convincing to public ears. The scrambling over Health, Welfare and Labor Minister Yoichi Masuzoe’s expressed intent to “fundamentally review the Late-term Elderly Medical Care Insurance System” and seconded by Mr. Aso—if I’m not mistaken, the ruling coalition has been frantically trying to scale back expectations—also has the feel of an administration calling audibles and not doing a very good job of it. Add to that Mr. Aso’s previously expressed sympathy for a fully tax-funded basic pension system, albeit shelved for the time being until the LDP can resume talk about a consumption tax hike—and it’s like having a new coach with a different offensive system coming in the day before the championship game.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Why Does the DPJ Continue Picking on the New Komeito?
I never understood why the DPJ would want an early Lower House election. After all, the Prime Minister would only be calling a snap election when coalition fortunes were looking up. Besides, the DPJ needed time to identify, nominate, and set up its candidates. Now, coalition prospects are better than they’ve been for some time, and it will be heading into the election, reportedly to be held on 26 October, less than two weeks after it has been proclaimed on the 14th.
Within the ruling coalition, New Komeito had been pushing for an early election, around the turn of the year. It places great importance on the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly elections, and the next one is scheduled for next July. It is heavily reliant on the Sokagakkai Buddhist sect for its foot soldiers and did not want to overtax those resources by holding another major election (in this case the Lower House election) in its vicinity—thus the desire for an early Lower House election. Besides, the New Komeito was only reluctantly supporting the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, so it did not want to resort yet again to a supermajority override in the Lower House. A supermajority override would also prolong the upcoming extraordinary Diet session to the year’s end and possibly even early January.
Ichiro Ozawa decided to make sure that the New Komeito would put even more pressure on the LDP for a short session (thus ensuring an early election) by threatening to summon Junya Yano to the Diet for questioning. Mr. Yano is a former Komeito leader who later fell out with Komeito/New Komeito and Sokagakkai and is suing Sokagakkai for damages, claiming that it has tried to suppress his activities as a political analyst. He is very much willing to testify, presumably embarrassing both Sokagakkai and New Komeito. There is something sordid about hauling up a civil suit to the Diet as part of the political game, but a one-to-one connection between Sokagakkai and New Komeito does raise questions regarding the constitutional ban on state involvement in religious affairs.
In any case, the New Komeito has been running scared, just as Mr. Ozawa hoped. And with Prime Minister Fukuda’s surprise resignation and subsequent race for his LDP successor, an early election has been all but sealed and delivered.
Mr. Ozawa, however, is not letting up. When the DPJ announced the first batch of 187 candidates for the Lower House election, Mr. Ozawa’s name was left off the list, so that he could stand for election outside his Iwate Prefecture 4th District. It is widely believed that he is leaving himself the option to challenge New Komeito leader Akihiro Oota in his Tokyo Prefecture 12th District, where Mr. Oota hopes to be reelected, again with LDP support.
This looks like overkill to me. The early election is in the bag. An extra Lower House seat (assuming that whoever replaces Mr. Ozawa in his current district also is elected) could make the difference between any two of adjacent scenarios within the very wide range of possible outcomes. But assuming that the DPJ somehow wins a majority, there remains the task of gaining a majority in the Upper House. There, the DPJ has 108 out of 242 seats, 14 votes short of a majority. Since the nominally independent President (DPJ) and his Deputy (LDP) cancel each other out, five independents are affiliated with the DPJ, and one has received its support (as well as all the other opposition parties’ support) as an Upper House candidate, they might be able to make do with a minimum of seven more votes. Rule out the Communists (seven), the Reform Club (four; two DPJ outcasts and a couple of former conservative independents), and the DPJ is left to choose from leftish Social Democrats (five; the rump, unreconstructed Socialists), more-old-school-than-LDP People’s New Party (four), and the prickly New Party Nippon (one). In fact, the 21-strong Upper House New Komeito and its Lower House colleagues would be a better match for the DPJ than any of these other microparties. Not to mention the benefits of a bullet-proof, bicameral majority.
So isn’t it time for the DPJ to stop baiting the New Komeito? Or is the relationship between Mr. Ozawa and the New Komeito so beyond the pale that anything that the DPJ could do now would be useless?
* The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity. (Japanese Constitution, Article 20, paragraph 3.)
Within the ruling coalition, New Komeito had been pushing for an early election, around the turn of the year. It places great importance on the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly elections, and the next one is scheduled for next July. It is heavily reliant on the Sokagakkai Buddhist sect for its foot soldiers and did not want to overtax those resources by holding another major election (in this case the Lower House election) in its vicinity—thus the desire for an early Lower House election. Besides, the New Komeito was only reluctantly supporting the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, so it did not want to resort yet again to a supermajority override in the Lower House. A supermajority override would also prolong the upcoming extraordinary Diet session to the year’s end and possibly even early January.
Ichiro Ozawa decided to make sure that the New Komeito would put even more pressure on the LDP for a short session (thus ensuring an early election) by threatening to summon Junya Yano to the Diet for questioning. Mr. Yano is a former Komeito leader who later fell out with Komeito/New Komeito and Sokagakkai and is suing Sokagakkai for damages, claiming that it has tried to suppress his activities as a political analyst. He is very much willing to testify, presumably embarrassing both Sokagakkai and New Komeito. There is something sordid about hauling up a civil suit to the Diet as part of the political game, but a one-to-one connection between Sokagakkai and New Komeito does raise questions regarding the constitutional ban on state involvement in religious affairs.
In any case, the New Komeito has been running scared, just as Mr. Ozawa hoped. And with Prime Minister Fukuda’s surprise resignation and subsequent race for his LDP successor, an early election has been all but sealed and delivered.
Mr. Ozawa, however, is not letting up. When the DPJ announced the first batch of 187 candidates for the Lower House election, Mr. Ozawa’s name was left off the list, so that he could stand for election outside his Iwate Prefecture 4th District. It is widely believed that he is leaving himself the option to challenge New Komeito leader Akihiro Oota in his Tokyo Prefecture 12th District, where Mr. Oota hopes to be reelected, again with LDP support.
This looks like overkill to me. The early election is in the bag. An extra Lower House seat (assuming that whoever replaces Mr. Ozawa in his current district also is elected) could make the difference between any two of adjacent scenarios within the very wide range of possible outcomes. But assuming that the DPJ somehow wins a majority, there remains the task of gaining a majority in the Upper House. There, the DPJ has 108 out of 242 seats, 14 votes short of a majority. Since the nominally independent President (DPJ) and his Deputy (LDP) cancel each other out, five independents are affiliated with the DPJ, and one has received its support (as well as all the other opposition parties’ support) as an Upper House candidate, they might be able to make do with a minimum of seven more votes. Rule out the Communists (seven), the Reform Club (four; two DPJ outcasts and a couple of former conservative independents), and the DPJ is left to choose from leftish Social Democrats (five; the rump, unreconstructed Socialists), more-old-school-than-LDP People’s New Party (four), and the prickly New Party Nippon (one). In fact, the 21-strong Upper House New Komeito and its Lower House colleagues would be a better match for the DPJ than any of these other microparties. Not to mention the benefits of a bullet-proof, bicameral majority.
So isn’t it time for the DPJ to stop baiting the New Komeito? Or is the relationship between Mr. Ozawa and the New Komeito so beyond the pale that anything that the DPJ could do now would be useless?
* The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity. (Japanese Constitution, Article 20, paragraph 3.)
Wednesday, September 03, 2008
Taro Aso and the Competition… Plus, the Supermajority Override
In case anyone is wondering…Taro Aso’s positives:
1) Taro Aso managed a highly respectable finish in the 2007 LDP Presidential election with a hard-earned take of 197 votes (132 Diet members, 65 local chapter votes) against Mr. Fukuda’s 330 (254 Diet members, 76 local chapter votes), despite the fact that every other faction formally sided with Yasuo Fukuda as the “safe” establishment candidate.
2) Mr. Aso joined the Fukuda team as Secretary-General, second in command to Mr. Fukuda. He has subsequently been anointed by the LDP kingmaker Yoshiro Mori as the Prime Minister’s heir-apparent.
3) Mr. Aso gets along with the increasingly skittish junior coalition partner New Komeito.
4) Mr. Aso is a good campaigner and the most popular Prime Minister candidate in public opinion polls, easily outpolling Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ leader.
The negatives:
1) Mr. Aso has not always acted according to the wishes of the Fukuda administration, signaling early on his willingness to drop the extension of the counterterrorist refueling operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force and adopting a personal income tax relief/cash payout as part of the economic stimulus package, both in line with New Komeito wishes.
2) Mr. Aso is known for his loose lips, and some of his utterances have been quite off-the-wall.
The alternatives, in descending order of likelihood:
1) Yuriko Koike: A two-time Cabinet Minister under Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, she became one of the first and surely most celebrated “assasins” in the 2005 Lower House election when she famously switched districts to unseat, successfully, a Post Office rebel. For a former newscaster, she is a surprisingly uninspiring debater—she does better with sound-bites. Now, the media is touting her as a stalking horse for Hidenao Nakagawa and his band of diehard Koizumians. The well-travelled Ms. Koike has usually had her way with alpha dogs from Morihiro Hosokawa (Nippon New Party) to Ichiro Ozawa (New Frontier Party) to Ichiro Koizumi (LDP), but her popularity with lesser party lights and the rank-and-file is suspect. It is telling that she has not held down any significant party posts. She also botched the dismissal of her deputy when she was Defense Minister.
2) Kaoru Yosano: The troubleshooter of choice for fiscal conservatives, he is a weak campaigner, who lost his Lower House seat as an incumbent Cabinet Minister just when he was emerging as a possible future Prime Minister candidate. He turned 70 on 22 August, and suffered from serious health problems last year, not a good omen after two successive Prime Ministers have walked away from the seat of power, one of them at least partly for health reasons, in less than a year.
3) Sadakazu Tanigaki the ripe old age of age of 63, he still has the look and, worse, feel of a well-behaved little boy. He recently merged his micro-faction with Makoto Koga’s much larger one. He has all the appearance of a man who is too nice to win.
4) Nobuteru Ishihara: At age 51, he is still young enough in the LDP at least to be counted as an up-and-comer. He enjoys something of a celebrity status, mainly because of his association with his best-selling writer-turned-politician father, the charismatic Shintaro Ishihara. Often portrayed as a conservative in the gaijin media, he recently gave up his independent status and joined the China-lovin’, North Korea-coddlin’ Takui Yamazaki’s mid-tier faction. Like the other LDP policy-wonks of his generation—Shinzo Abe no exception—he has not managed to escape the impression of being the victim of a case of arrested development.
5) Kunio Hatoyama: He appears here only because his name appeared in the media. He is well on his way to becoming the Harold Stassen of Japanese politics, without ever being Harold Stassen IYKWIAS. (If Kunio Hatoyama is here, can Taro Kono be far behind?)
Th-th-th-th-that’s all, folks! G’night!
PS: If I were a betting man and betting were legal in Japan, I would bet that a Prime Minister Aso would be using the supermajority override to pass the consumer protection agency, while allowing the JMSDF refueling operations (and Japan’s permanent UNSC membership ambitions) to die a quiet death. My guess is that there are enough NGOs and their lawyer advocates who would prefer to have a friend in the bureaucracy like Mr. Fukuda’s CPA instead of a competitor like the DPJ’s independent government ombudsman to provide cover for an override.
The death of the refueling operations is a less sure thing: if it were my decision to make, I would go for broke; I think that there is enough of a sense of national pride—witness the outpouring of public grief and sympathy for Kazuya Ito, the 31 old NGO volunteer that was murdered in Afghanistan, as well as for every Japanese that died in Kampuchia and Iraq during public service—to gain political points if Prime Minister Aso decided to push the extension legislation in the face of an Upper House veto. In the media, Yomiuri and Sankaei would support him. I want to see how far New Komeito is willing to bend to cover his ass with regard to the LDP right before I really make up my mind.
Tuesday, September 02, 2008
New Komeito in the Equation: Some Structural Points, the Unpopularity of Ichiro Ozawa, and Unsolicited Advice for the DPJ
Most of my thoughts on the new Fukuda Cabinet and LDP leadership, and now the economic stimulus package, have been exhausted by a couple of for-clients-only reports, and I may have to do something on the latest dramatic turn of events—the announcement that Mr. Fukuda would be resigning as Prime Minister. (You can bet the house that Taro Aso will be taking over and calling a snap election after the extraordinary Diet session.) They help pay the bill, but definitely stand in the way of my bloglust in terms of both content and energy—I have only so many thoughts and so much time for Japanese politics. Here are a few technical thoughts, though, that will most likely not find their way into any moneymaking reports. Plus, some unsolicited advice for the DPJ.
The New Komeito, depending on actual turnout and incidental factors, draws 12-14% of the votes for the 180 proportional seats up for grabs in a Lower House election. The New Komeito throws the bulk of these mainly Sokagakkai voters to LDP candidates in most of the 300 single-seat districts, while the LDP throws its support to the New Komeito candidates in the remainder. It is more difficult to fine-tune this synergy in Upper House elections. This is a structural factor that works in favor of the ruling coalition in the Lower House. The higher representation of metropolitan areas in the Lower House presumably works against the more rurally-oriented LDP. It should be possible to get a better handle on these effects by a district-by-district analysis of voter behavior.
The one new structural factor in the upcoming Lower House election is the Communist Party’s decision to abandon its long-time policy of fielding candidates in every single-seat district. Any district where the Communist candidate is likely to gain less than the threshold of 10% of the effective votes for forfeiting the 3 million yen deposit can be subjected to this treatment. It is unclear how many of these disenfranchised Communist voters will throw their support to the DPJ candidates in single-seat districts, though a carefully designed public opinion poll should be able to tease out plausible guesstimates.
In sum, the LDP starts with somewhere around a 10 percentage-point handicap over the DPJ in a Lower House election, of which a few percentage points will be canceled out by voters who otherwise would be voting for Communist candidates.
A couple of other significant differences in contrast to the last Upper House election, which ended in a landslide victory for the DPJ, are the following:
Prime Minister Fukuda has been almost as unpopular as Prime Minister Abe was, but his antagonist Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ leader, is now as unpopular, if not more so. In fact, a recent Asahi telephone poll (12-13 August) had Mr. Fukuda beating Mr. Ozawa 37% to 28% head-to-head with 35% undecided as the one more fit to be Prime Minister. Taro Aso, Mr. poised to take over from Mr. Fukuda, has also significantly outpolled Mr. Ozawa in public opinion polls.
The bloom is off the DPJ phenomenon; the media are increasingly seeing its decision-making as being driven mainly by electoral considerations. This is affecting their reporting. Mr. Ozawa is being depicted as the face of this political drift.
So, if I'm right, if a Prime Minister Aso can keep his foot-in-mouth under control and his Cabinet choices—assuming he does a makeover—do a reasonably good job of staying scandal-free, an Ozawa-led DPJ will have a formidable job ahead to wrest control of the Lower House from the current ruling coalition by itself.
If I were advising the DPJ leadership, I would advise it to go easy on the New Komeito and stop going after Daisaku Ikeda*. After all, even if the DPJ wins the most seats in the Lower House election—quite possible if not probable—it will be likely that it will be able to form a government only with the help of the New Komeito. The DPJ’s relationship with the New Komeito is bad enough with Mr. Ozawa at the helm—the enmity goes back to the breakup of the New Progress Party and the events leading up to it. It doesn’t need nakedly political, strong-arm tactics that destroy any possibility of prying a post-election New Komeito away from the LDP’s clutches.
Sunday, April 13, 2008
As Big as the Gasoline Tax Surcharge Is, There’s a Much Bigger Tax (and Spend) Issue in Play
Two important bills have been passed by the House of Representatives and are now in the hands of the House of Councilors: the tax bill that, among other things, extends the gasoline tax surcharges for another ten years to 2018 March 31 (passed by the HR and sent to the HC on February 29); and the bill that extends the minimum level for the dedication of the gasoline tax revenues to road development and maintenance for the same period (passed by the HR and sent to the HC on March 13). The extension of the two measures is a logical consequence of the new ten-year Road Development and Maintenance Plan, which covers the same period.
Prime Minister Fukuda proposed – with subsequent quasi-official endorsement from the LDP and Kōmeitō leadership － to shorten the Road Plan to five years and more likely than not shrink its annual size based on new traffic demand estimates, and turn the road-dedicated funds (gasoline tax revenue) over to general purpose funds starting in 2009. He indicated, as an initial bid at least, to maintain the surcharge rate at its current level(25.1 yen per liter on gasoline), citing such reasons as global warming, international comparison of tax rates, and fiscal necessities. He intends to address that matter as part of a thoroughgoing tax reform. (This is extremely important. Please keep that in mind.)
Note that once you shorten and shrink the Road Plan, the surcharge (and, theoretically, even the base tax rate) must also be shortened and shrunk proportionately － unless the tax is delinked from its original purpose of developing and maintaining roads. By ceding the gasoline tax revenue to general purpose funds as part of a long-promised tax reform, the Fukuda proposal opens the door to keeping the gasoline tax at its current level indefinitely by subsuming the surcharge into the permanent tax rate. Within the LDP, this invokes the support of the fiscal hawks (people like Kaoru Yosano and Sadakazu Tanigaki), who want to take major steps to balance the budget but want to limit as much as possible what looks like an inevitable consumption tax hike; and the reformists (Junichirō Koizumi first and foremost), who want to complete unfinished business in the Koizumi reform (charitably describable as incomplete with regard to vested interests in the road money).
There is the predictable talk in the tabloids of the collapse of the Fukuda Cabinet as early as next month as the result of the battle between the reformists and the road tribe. I don’t see that happening. True, the bill currently in the hands of the HC extending the revenue dedication for another ten years － it is supposed to be eliminated in FY2009 － doesn’t make sense. However, the DPJ is holding out for an immediate discontinuation of the dedication, so it is unlikely to cooperate in amending the current bill now languishing in the HC to accommodate a one-year extension, and it doesn’t make sense for reformists to split the party and join hands with the DPJ just so the mandatory dedication can be discontinued a year earlier (while the actual budgetary allocation for this fiscal remains intact)*. It’s not impossible, but certainly improbable. Besides, on that specific issue, they can always split the party to far greater political effect if the LDP majority ultimately winds up rejecting the Fukuda proposal to end the dedication. That slightly more plausible but still highly unlikely event cannot happen until much later, in the lead-up to the throw-down with the DPJ over tax reform that begins in earnest in the fall.
The most serious potential for a reformist/roadist conflict lies in the debate over the substance of the Road Plan. The Plan will be by far the most important determinant of the eventual allocation of the revenue from the general purpose funds to road development and maintenance. There are two issues here: the length of the plan, and its size.
The five-year truncation will not be an issue, once the LDP and New Kōmeitō and the Cabinet take the necessary measures at the beginning of this workweek to bring the full authority of the ruling coalition and the administration to the Fukuda proposal. The New Kōmeitō is almost as well-disciplined as the Communist Party. In the LDP, the measure should have no trouble going through the Research Commission on the Tax System headed by fiscal hawk Shūji Tsushima and the Policy Research Council headed by the like-minded Sadakazu Tanigaki. The usually rubber stamp General Council gives the final authorization, but it is currently chaired by Toshihiro Nikai, who, together with Makoto Koga, head of Election Strategy Headquarters, are the two hetmen of the road tribe. However, the two kings of the roads gave their consent at the Wednesday meeting, so they will not give Mr. Fukuda any trouble here.
It is the determination of the amount that will give the Fukuda administration headaches. The fiscal hawks will make common cause with the reformists in battling the road tribe under the close scrutiny of the media and the opposition playing to an already mistrustful public. I expect that the coalition will come up with a new Plan, and agree to apportion the gasoline tax revenue accordingly. I have no idea what the public perception of the ultimate coalition package will be like. What I can be sure of is that the opposition’s response will driven largely by the public’s response, which in turn will largely molded by how it is received and depicted in the media.
But note that this is only part of the picture. At the same time, the ruling coalition must come up with a “thoroughgoing tax reform” package that places the gasoline taxes and the surcharge in proper context. The relationship is not trivial, by the way; the surcharge by itself is the rough equivalent of one percentage point of the consumption tax, currently at 5%.
A comprehensive tax package will have far greater political implications as an issue than the gasoline tax revenue. Fiscal policy perspectives cut across party lines, while the DPJ will also face a public reckoning of the fiscal consequences of the various promises that it has made under Mr. Ozawa’s leadership. This process will commence in full this fall and must be completed in substance by the end of the calendar year. Moreover, the ruling coalition must schedule possibly months of intensive negotiations with the opposition even if, or particularly if, it intends to exercise the HR supermajority override in the end. There will undoubtedly be major surprises as the process unfolds. The road money is a significant part of this process, but just that: only a part.
As a final note, it is important to remember that at least some of this can indeed happen under a different Prime Minister. Last Wednesday’s Diet faceoff with Ichirō Ozawa has been widely panned by the media and even some serious LDP politicians such as Tarō Asō and Kaoru Yosano, two men the media are playing up as pretenders to the Prime Minister’s seat. Although I only read an excerpted summary in the Sankei, in what I read, Mr. Fukuda came across as oddly querulous and plaintive, like an aging lover spurned in a 19th Century romance novel (or so one imagines). More seriously, this morning on Sunday Project, Mr. Yasano leveled strong criticism at the Prime Minister’s Office. Although it was an implicit indictment of Nobutaka Machimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary who replaced him and perhaps the Administrative Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary as well, the hint of leadership failure at an even higher level was also hard to miss.
I do not yet think that a premature departure is more likely than not. A Prime Minister has substantial staying power if he is willing to use the full arsenal of weapons available to him, Remember, Prime Minister Abe stayed on even after the disastrous 2007 HC election defeat and only left when his health finally failed him. Still, compared to fiscal reform that requires a consumption tax hike, the gasoline tax surcharge is almost a gimmie. Prime Minister Fukuda will not be able to get away with forcing his will on a divided coalition the way he did with his proposal on the road money. He will need every bit of help from the reformists and fiscal hawks to survive. He will also have to draw in likeminded Diet members from the opposition, mainly in the DPJ. One thing for sure: the tax package will make or break the Fukuda administration.
Prime Minister Fukuda proposed – with subsequent quasi-official endorsement from the LDP and Kōmeitō leadership － to shorten the Road Plan to five years and more likely than not shrink its annual size based on new traffic demand estimates, and turn the road-dedicated funds (gasoline tax revenue) over to general purpose funds starting in 2009. He indicated, as an initial bid at least, to maintain the surcharge rate at its current level(25.1 yen per liter on gasoline), citing such reasons as global warming, international comparison of tax rates, and fiscal necessities. He intends to address that matter as part of a thoroughgoing tax reform. (This is extremely important. Please keep that in mind.)
Note that once you shorten and shrink the Road Plan, the surcharge (and, theoretically, even the base tax rate) must also be shortened and shrunk proportionately － unless the tax is delinked from its original purpose of developing and maintaining roads. By ceding the gasoline tax revenue to general purpose funds as part of a long-promised tax reform, the Fukuda proposal opens the door to keeping the gasoline tax at its current level indefinitely by subsuming the surcharge into the permanent tax rate. Within the LDP, this invokes the support of the fiscal hawks (people like Kaoru Yosano and Sadakazu Tanigaki), who want to take major steps to balance the budget but want to limit as much as possible what looks like an inevitable consumption tax hike; and the reformists (Junichirō Koizumi first and foremost), who want to complete unfinished business in the Koizumi reform (charitably describable as incomplete with regard to vested interests in the road money).
There is the predictable talk in the tabloids of the collapse of the Fukuda Cabinet as early as next month as the result of the battle between the reformists and the road tribe. I don’t see that happening. True, the bill currently in the hands of the HC extending the revenue dedication for another ten years － it is supposed to be eliminated in FY2009 － doesn’t make sense. However, the DPJ is holding out for an immediate discontinuation of the dedication, so it is unlikely to cooperate in amending the current bill now languishing in the HC to accommodate a one-year extension, and it doesn’t make sense for reformists to split the party and join hands with the DPJ just so the mandatory dedication can be discontinued a year earlier (while the actual budgetary allocation for this fiscal remains intact)*. It’s not impossible, but certainly improbable. Besides, on that specific issue, they can always split the party to far greater political effect if the LDP majority ultimately winds up rejecting the Fukuda proposal to end the dedication. That slightly more plausible but still highly unlikely event cannot happen until much later, in the lead-up to the throw-down with the DPJ over tax reform that begins in earnest in the fall.
The most serious potential for a reformist/roadist conflict lies in the debate over the substance of the Road Plan. The Plan will be by far the most important determinant of the eventual allocation of the revenue from the general purpose funds to road development and maintenance. There are two issues here: the length of the plan, and its size.
The five-year truncation will not be an issue, once the LDP and New Kōmeitō and the Cabinet take the necessary measures at the beginning of this workweek to bring the full authority of the ruling coalition and the administration to the Fukuda proposal. The New Kōmeitō is almost as well-disciplined as the Communist Party. In the LDP, the measure should have no trouble going through the Research Commission on the Tax System headed by fiscal hawk Shūji Tsushima and the Policy Research Council headed by the like-minded Sadakazu Tanigaki. The usually rubber stamp General Council gives the final authorization, but it is currently chaired by Toshihiro Nikai, who, together with Makoto Koga, head of Election Strategy Headquarters, are the two hetmen of the road tribe. However, the two kings of the roads gave their consent at the Wednesday meeting, so they will not give Mr. Fukuda any trouble here.
It is the determination of the amount that will give the Fukuda administration headaches. The fiscal hawks will make common cause with the reformists in battling the road tribe under the close scrutiny of the media and the opposition playing to an already mistrustful public. I expect that the coalition will come up with a new Plan, and agree to apportion the gasoline tax revenue accordingly. I have no idea what the public perception of the ultimate coalition package will be like. What I can be sure of is that the opposition’s response will driven largely by the public’s response, which in turn will largely molded by how it is received and depicted in the media.
But note that this is only part of the picture. At the same time, the ruling coalition must come up with a “thoroughgoing tax reform” package that places the gasoline taxes and the surcharge in proper context. The relationship is not trivial, by the way; the surcharge by itself is the rough equivalent of one percentage point of the consumption tax, currently at 5%.
A comprehensive tax package will have far greater political implications as an issue than the gasoline tax revenue. Fiscal policy perspectives cut across party lines, while the DPJ will also face a public reckoning of the fiscal consequences of the various promises that it has made under Mr. Ozawa’s leadership. This process will commence in full this fall and must be completed in substance by the end of the calendar year. Moreover, the ruling coalition must schedule possibly months of intensive negotiations with the opposition even if, or particularly if, it intends to exercise the HR supermajority override in the end. There will undoubtedly be major surprises as the process unfolds. The road money is a significant part of this process, but just that: only a part.
As a final note, it is important to remember that at least some of this can indeed happen under a different Prime Minister. Last Wednesday’s Diet faceoff with Ichirō Ozawa has been widely panned by the media and even some serious LDP politicians such as Tarō Asō and Kaoru Yosano, two men the media are playing up as pretenders to the Prime Minister’s seat. Although I only read an excerpted summary in the Sankei, in what I read, Mr. Fukuda came across as oddly querulous and plaintive, like an aging lover spurned in a 19th Century romance novel (or so one imagines). More seriously, this morning on Sunday Project, Mr. Yasano leveled strong criticism at the Prime Minister’s Office. Although it was an implicit indictment of Nobutaka Machimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary who replaced him and perhaps the Administrative Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary as well, the hint of leadership failure at an even higher level was also hard to miss.
I do not yet think that a premature departure is more likely than not. A Prime Minister has substantial staying power if he is willing to use the full arsenal of weapons available to him, Remember, Prime Minister Abe stayed on even after the disastrous 2007 HC election defeat and only left when his health finally failed him. Still, compared to fiscal reform that requires a consumption tax hike, the gasoline tax surcharge is almost a gimmie. Prime Minister Fukuda will not be able to get away with forcing his will on a divided coalition the way he did with his proposal on the road money. He will need every bit of help from the reformists and fiscal hawks to survive. He will also have to draw in likeminded Diet members from the opposition, mainly in the DPJ. One thing for sure: the tax package will make or break the Fukuda administration.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
LDP, New Kōmeitō Want My Money
The top two news items on the front page of the Yomiuri (Tokyo edition; what does the Yomiuri front page look like in Osaka, Janne?):
Intention to Use Revote on Gasoline Taxes
Original Prices in Another Month Later Prime Minister to Explain at the End of This Month
ガソリン税再可決方針
1か月で元の値段 首相、月末に説明
Shin-Ginkō Tokyo: Bill to Inject 40 Billion Yen Passes
LDP and New Kōmeitō Vote in Favor in [Tokyo] Prefectural Assembly
新銀行東京 400億円可決出資案可決
都議会委 自公が賛成
There’s no need to elaborate on the first one unless you’re reading this blog for the first time (in which case please search my blog with the keyword “taxes”, since half of what I’ve been writing recently must have had something to do with this). The only thing I have to add at this point? Support for the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition appears to be down to its core while this story has been around for months, so this decision should have little effect on it either way for the time being. The same thing can be said for the equally unpopular DPJ, which hasn’t been able to capitalize on the Fukuda administration’s multiple mishaps as well as the LDP’s structural flaws during his regime, this issue being no exception.
The second headline may not be the top item elsewhere in Japan, but it’s an every-other-day headline here in Tokyo these couple of weeks. I touched on it here, but briefly: The responsibility for the failure of Shin-Ginkō Tokyo lies squarely at the feet of Governor Ishihara, who created the ill-conceived, ill-timed, and poorly-managed bank with 100 billion in Tokyo government money (and 11 billion yen from the private sector, including IT companies that apparently won contracts to set up the bank’s expensive and faulty computer system) against the opposition of the entire banking industry. The entire national media opposes the injection of additional funds, and 73% of the Tokyo public opposes it according to a Yomiuri poll. However, yesterday (26 March) the New Kōmeitō, which had been dithering, reluctantly went along with the LDP and voted in the Tokyo Assembly Budget Committee to inject 40 billion yen, which according to experts may balloon to 100 billion when the bank writes off all the bad debts, which could be as early as fiscal year 2008, when the bank receives the 40 billion. The bill is expected to pass the full Assembly on 28 March, a Friday.
Basically, Mr. Ishihara is placing a 40 billion yen bet that the bank will a) not have to write off all its current equity and b) be able to cover the opportunity costs of the 40 billion; many experts as well as the media doubt that and believe that the Tokyo government should cut losses. The silver lining is that this 140 billion yen (and counting) boondoggle will cut off for good the baseless talk that pops up from time to time in the foreign media about Mr. Ishihara having a meaningful role in a realignment of the Japanese political parties (which in turn I am highly skeptical about; but that’s another story).
Yet 51.1% of Tokyo voters according to that same Yomiuri poll still support Governor Ishihara. Factor former Prime Minister Koizumi’s enduring popularity, and there’s a lesson here for Japanese Prime Ministers and their wannabies.
Want to know more about Shin-Ginkō Tokyo and Governor Ishihara’s grudge match with the banking industry? Be my guest:
Governor Ishihara has a history of run-ins with the banking industry, which he accused of cutting back on its lending to small businesses during the banking crisis years. He also tried to tax them when the banks headquartered in Tokyo were not paying any local (or national) income taxes because of huge loss carryovers. This attempt to get money out of the banks also displeased the national authorities because they had injected trillions in national public funds to keep the banking industry afloat (which in turn was benefiting the Tokyo economy).
In any case, Mr. Ishihara launched Bank Ishihara － as the governor’s critics are fond of calling it － on 2005 April 1 to lend to creditworthy small businesses (as well as venture businesses) that he claimed were getting shafted by existing banks. However, the banking crisis had passed by then and the private sector banks were now making the risky but lucrative small business sector a top priority in their own businesses. Besides, the public sector already had an extensive loan guarantee and insurance system to help small businesses. Moreover, because of the enormous overhead, Bank Ishihara was under great pressure to ramp up its lending accounts. This led to shoddy lending practices there. It is no wonder, then, that the bank has been losing money hand over fist. To top all this, roughly half of the bank’s 200 billion-plus loans outstanding (against initial equity of 100 billion-plus!) has gone to big business. This may be prudent management, but surely not what Mr. Ishihara had in mind when he put the Tokyo Prefectural government in competition with the private banks and the public small business assistance network.
Fortunately for the financial sector, all this has meant that the bank is isolated metaphorically and physically from the mainstream banking sector. Mr. Ishihara stated after the Tokyo Assembly passed the 40 billion yen injection bill: I am grateful that the trigger won’t be pulled on a financial panic out of Tokyo. Actually, a Bank Ishihara failure would be the tree that falls in the forest that nobody hears.
Intention to Use Revote on Gasoline Taxes
Original Prices in Another Month Later Prime Minister to Explain at the End of This Month
ガソリン税再可決方針
1か月で元の値段 首相、月末に説明
Shin-Ginkō Tokyo: Bill to Inject 40 Billion Yen Passes
LDP and New Kōmeitō Vote in Favor in [Tokyo] Prefectural Assembly
新銀行東京 400億円可決出資案可決
都議会委 自公が賛成
There’s no need to elaborate on the first one unless you’re reading this blog for the first time (in which case please search my blog with the keyword “taxes”, since half of what I’ve been writing recently must have had something to do with this). The only thing I have to add at this point? Support for the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition appears to be down to its core while this story has been around for months, so this decision should have little effect on it either way for the time being. The same thing can be said for the equally unpopular DPJ, which hasn’t been able to capitalize on the Fukuda administration’s multiple mishaps as well as the LDP’s structural flaws during his regime, this issue being no exception.
The second headline may not be the top item elsewhere in Japan, but it’s an every-other-day headline here in Tokyo these couple of weeks. I touched on it here, but briefly: The responsibility for the failure of Shin-Ginkō Tokyo lies squarely at the feet of Governor Ishihara, who created the ill-conceived, ill-timed, and poorly-managed bank with 100 billion in Tokyo government money (and 11 billion yen from the private sector, including IT companies that apparently won contracts to set up the bank’s expensive and faulty computer system) against the opposition of the entire banking industry. The entire national media opposes the injection of additional funds, and 73% of the Tokyo public opposes it according to a Yomiuri poll. However, yesterday (26 March) the New Kōmeitō, which had been dithering, reluctantly went along with the LDP and voted in the Tokyo Assembly Budget Committee to inject 40 billion yen, which according to experts may balloon to 100 billion when the bank writes off all the bad debts, which could be as early as fiscal year 2008, when the bank receives the 40 billion. The bill is expected to pass the full Assembly on 28 March, a Friday.
Basically, Mr. Ishihara is placing a 40 billion yen bet that the bank will a) not have to write off all its current equity and b) be able to cover the opportunity costs of the 40 billion; many experts as well as the media doubt that and believe that the Tokyo government should cut losses. The silver lining is that this 140 billion yen (and counting) boondoggle will cut off for good the baseless talk that pops up from time to time in the foreign media about Mr. Ishihara having a meaningful role in a realignment of the Japanese political parties (which in turn I am highly skeptical about; but that’s another story).
Yet 51.1% of Tokyo voters according to that same Yomiuri poll still support Governor Ishihara. Factor former Prime Minister Koizumi’s enduring popularity, and there’s a lesson here for Japanese Prime Ministers and their wannabies.
Want to know more about Shin-Ginkō Tokyo and Governor Ishihara’s grudge match with the banking industry? Be my guest:
Governor Ishihara has a history of run-ins with the banking industry, which he accused of cutting back on its lending to small businesses during the banking crisis years. He also tried to tax them when the banks headquartered in Tokyo were not paying any local (or national) income taxes because of huge loss carryovers. This attempt to get money out of the banks also displeased the national authorities because they had injected trillions in national public funds to keep the banking industry afloat (which in turn was benefiting the Tokyo economy).
In any case, Mr. Ishihara launched Bank Ishihara － as the governor’s critics are fond of calling it － on 2005 April 1 to lend to creditworthy small businesses (as well as venture businesses) that he claimed were getting shafted by existing banks. However, the banking crisis had passed by then and the private sector banks were now making the risky but lucrative small business sector a top priority in their own businesses. Besides, the public sector already had an extensive loan guarantee and insurance system to help small businesses. Moreover, because of the enormous overhead, Bank Ishihara was under great pressure to ramp up its lending accounts. This led to shoddy lending practices there. It is no wonder, then, that the bank has been losing money hand over fist. To top all this, roughly half of the bank’s 200 billion-plus loans outstanding (against initial equity of 100 billion-plus!) has gone to big business. This may be prudent management, but surely not what Mr. Ishihara had in mind when he put the Tokyo Prefectural government in competition with the private banks and the public small business assistance network.
Fortunately for the financial sector, all this has meant that the bank is isolated metaphorically and physically from the mainstream banking sector. Mr. Ishihara stated after the Tokyo Assembly passed the 40 billion yen injection bill: I am grateful that the trigger won’t be pulled on a financial panic out of Tokyo. Actually, a Bank Ishihara failure would be the tree that falls in the forest that nobody hears.
Monday, March 10, 2008
One LDP Diet Member Who Needs to Make It up to the Sōkagakkai
The 65-year old Shigeo Ōmae is a relative newcomer on the national scene. In 2003, he wrested the Lower House seat from Hyōgo 5th District from then Socialist leader and former House Chairwoman (beating Nancy Pelosi by 14 years) Takako Doi, , and was reelected in the 2005 Koizumi landslide.
Mr. Ōmae is what liberal readers of this blog might call a revisionist-nationalist-conservative. He backs all the right/wrong causes, from a hard-line approach to North Korea to opposing legislation allowing both spouses to keep their pre-marriage surnames. So he probably got his wish in 2006 when the first Abe Cabinet gave him the junior political appointment in the Self-Defense Agency, later the Ministry of Defense.
Sidebar 1: Just to confuse you about the meaning of habatsu and also prove that opposites attract, Mr. Ōmae is a member of the Near Future Policy Study Group, the faction led by Taku Yamazaki, who is the polar opposite of Mr. Ōmae on most flashpoint political issues.
sidebar 2: Until the medieval era, women continued to be identified by their maiden names even after marriage. Moreover, other than for nobles and samurais, what passed for family names appears for much of Japanese history to have been not much more than a form of local identification. In fact, the vast majority of family names (but not the names of the actual population; samurai names like Satō and Suzuki are very common) mirror the geographical names of domiciles from the times when people led far less mobile lives. It is probably safe to say that for the vast majority of Japanese, the first time that they became conscious of their family names was the advent of the Meiji Era.
Mr. Ōmae no longer has the MOD job, but his experience apparently enables him to continue to speak with authority and sympathy for the beleaguered Ministry. For in a meeting with his Hyōgo supporters, he said, “Both sides must have been at fault and there is a need to reveal the causes from a fair point of view.” But, he went on to say more: according to him, the fishing boat “made grave errors, but that is not being mentioned at all”. He also said that the fishermen should have been wearing lifejackets in the first place.
Actually, there have been media reports that the fishing boat may have been partially at fault, and the lack of basic safety precautions on the part of the fishermen has been mentioned in the media as well. But given the lavish attention given to the errors and omissions of the Defense Ministry, he might have felt compelled to speak up on behalf of the defense establishment.
Never mind. An Asahi reporter got wind of his prejudgment of the case, his dissing of the media, and some other harsh words of his toward the two missing fishermen. His statements as well as his apology have been duly recorded.
Mr. Ōmae must be hoping that Sōka Gakkai will be in a sufficiently forgiving mood over his disrespect for the missing New Kōmeitō supporters to help out when the next Lower House election rolls around, God knows when, after the July G-8 Summit and the expiration of the Lower House mandate in September 2009.
Mr. Ōmae is what liberal readers of this blog might call a revisionist-nationalist-conservative. He backs all the right/wrong causes, from a hard-line approach to North Korea to opposing legislation allowing both spouses to keep their pre-marriage surnames. So he probably got his wish in 2006 when the first Abe Cabinet gave him the junior political appointment in the Self-Defense Agency, later the Ministry of Defense.
Sidebar 1: Just to confuse you about the meaning of habatsu and also prove that opposites attract, Mr. Ōmae is a member of the Near Future Policy Study Group, the faction led by Taku Yamazaki, who is the polar opposite of Mr. Ōmae on most flashpoint political issues.
sidebar 2: Until the medieval era, women continued to be identified by their maiden names even after marriage. Moreover, other than for nobles and samurais, what passed for family names appears for much of Japanese history to have been not much more than a form of local identification. In fact, the vast majority of family names (but not the names of the actual population; samurai names like Satō and Suzuki are very common) mirror the geographical names of domiciles from the times when people led far less mobile lives. It is probably safe to say that for the vast majority of Japanese, the first time that they became conscious of their family names was the advent of the Meiji Era.
Mr. Ōmae no longer has the MOD job, but his experience apparently enables him to continue to speak with authority and sympathy for the beleaguered Ministry. For in a meeting with his Hyōgo supporters, he said, “Both sides must have been at fault and there is a need to reveal the causes from a fair point of view.” But, he went on to say more: according to him, the fishing boat “made grave errors, but that is not being mentioned at all”. He also said that the fishermen should have been wearing lifejackets in the first place.
Actually, there have been media reports that the fishing boat may have been partially at fault, and the lack of basic safety precautions on the part of the fishermen has been mentioned in the media as well. But given the lavish attention given to the errors and omissions of the Defense Ministry, he might have felt compelled to speak up on behalf of the defense establishment.
Never mind. An Asahi reporter got wind of his prejudgment of the case, his dissing of the media, and some other harsh words of his toward the two missing fishermen. His statements as well as his apology have been duly recorded.
Mr. Ōmae must be hoping that Sōka Gakkai will be in a sufficiently forgiving mood over his disrespect for the missing New Kōmeitō supporters to help out when the next Lower House election rolls around, God knows when, after the July G-8 Summit and the expiration of the Lower House mandate in September 2009.
Thursday, November 29, 2007
Finance Minister Nukaga Seems to Be in the Clear and the Refueling Bill Continues on Course for a Supermajority Override
When even the Asahi says (English translation available tomorrow) that forcing Fukushirō Nukaga, the LDP “defense tribe” member and current Finance Minister, to testify under oath in the Upper House is a bad idea, well then, it is a bad idea. The lack of a plausible motive for dissembling about a dinner in honor of James Auer should have set off warning signs in the minds of DPJ leaders. Now, Mr. Nukaga has provided a relatively secure alibi for his presence elsewhere during the said dinner, as well as five of the eight people (not including a hypothetical Mr. Nukaga) corroborating his absence. As if that were not enough, Takemasa Moriya, who gave two extraordinary Yomiuri interviews for a total of seven hours on the 14th and 24th, stated:
“I kept saying, ‘(My memories) may be wrong,’ ‘I don’t want to cause inconvenience.’ But since they insisted, ‘Talk’… (Finance Minister Nukaga, etc. [ed. Akio Kyūma])) said, ‘I didn’t go’, I then became worried that I could have been mistaken.
The public had been led to believe that the DPJ had corroborating testimony on its side. Now, it turns out that what it had all along was a seating diagram and other bits of information coaxed out of Mr. Moriya himself, whose memory appears to be a few megabytes short of my PC. This is not on the order of the fake email that took down then DPJ leader Seiji Maehara, but it will be an embarrassment at best for the DPJ.
One plausible explanation for the DPJ’s continued insistence that Mr. Nukaga be called to testify on 3 December (it claims to want to question Mr. Moriya separately as part of the UH committee proceedings, in jail after he is arrested later today) is that they want to delay deliberations on the refueling bill as much as possible, partly to force the LDP to extend the current Diet session for another 30 days or so, partly because they want as much time as possible to get their own act together on their own ineffectual proposal. I have been surprised that the DPJ does not appear to be going after the allegations of potential influence peddling by Mr. Nukaga coming from Nobumasa Ōta. Perhaps it has good reasons to avoid its 2004 UH candidate Mr. Ōta, whom they pointedly did not endorse for a second try this year. I am also mystified as to why they are not throwing all their resources at attacking the overall procurement process, given the spread of corruption charges beyond the Defense Facilities Administration Agency scandals (2006) that left the MOD itself relatively untouched. Perhaps the DPJ does have something up its sleeve to spring on the unsuspecting LDP － say give names of LDP politicians who were on the take list at Yamada Yōkō and could be shown to have reciprocated with pressure on the bureaucracy － in which case they’re doing a very good job of hiding it*. Barring such surprises though, insisting on questioning Mr. Nukaga is a losing proposition, from which only LDP intransigence that would allow the DPJ to claim they are being forced to give it up so that the business of statecraft can go on can give them a face-saving out.
But so far, this is a mere sideshow blown up to unwarranted proportions. The broader issue of military procurement reform is in the capable hands of Nobutaka Machimura Chief Cabinet Secretary, though the formidable defense otaku and Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba will surely play a major role in the process. The DPJ needs to play a critical, but constructive, role here if it is to be seen as the reasonable, responsible party capable of taking the reins from the ruling coalition.
As for the main event politically, that is, the refueling bill, my assessment here remains unchanged, that a supermajority override and a motion of some kind, more specifically a censure vote, is a done deal; unless, of course, the opposition loses its nerve and forgoes the motion. After all, there will be few, if any, better occasions for the Fukuda administration to test the waters of supermajority override than a measure that has a modest majority or a sizable plurality (depending on which poll you believe) of support among a relatively informed and also relatively indifferent public. That way, you can avoid any risk of setting off an unforeseen catastrophe that would － admittedly in the most implausible of circumstances － force the Prime Minister to call a snap election** that the ruling coalition is sure to lose. And pulled off successfully, like most things, it will be easier the second time around and beyond.
*There’s potential blowback at Ichiro Ozawa, who received from Yamada Yōkō (and has now returned) almost three times as much political funds than Mr. Nukaga did. This is reminiscent of the political financing reporting controversy, which, among other things, revealed a string Mr. Ozawa’s real estate acquisitions with political funds, as well as a resurrection of the mysterious transfer of funds to Mr. Ozawa’s political coffers just before his Liberal Party was merged into the DPJ (2003), as I posted here. Having someone who embodies the old-school LDP at the helm has a downside.
**There is some talk from the LDP, some of them in positions of responsibility, about an early snap election following a censure motion. I have no access to those people, but I think that they are blowing smoke. The public will not like being asked for a new four-year mandate on the basis of a difference of opinion on a matter as esoteric and other-worldly as “right thing to do” around the Afghan war zone, so the chances of losing the two-thirds majority will be even higher. Mr. Ozawa would exit the scene, since there is little chance of the DPJ winning more seats than the LDP (the new, lower bar of success for the DPJ), but that would be a mixed blessing, and far from the clear upside that the LDP needs to justify taking a plunge.
Then what is the purpose of all the talk? Some of it could be genuine fear that public opinion might turn against them if they exercise the supermajority. But I doubt it, given the peripheral nature of the issue to the real concerns of the public. More importantly, I believe that there are at least a couple of matters motivating the party leadership to do it:
1) Keep the coalition members, most notably New Kōmeitō, in line. There is nothing an incumbent likes less than an early election, and the NK is particularly wary of going to the Sōkagakkai so soon after the September Upper House election, moreover after an override vote on an issue that does not have the full-hearted support of its rank-and-file.
2) Keep the DPJ on its toes. That helps in several ways, like tempting the DPJ to overplay its hand, which it is doing on the Auer-dinner, he-said, he-said trivia.
“I kept saying, ‘(My memories) may be wrong,’ ‘I don’t want to cause inconvenience.’ But since they insisted, ‘Talk’… (Finance Minister Nukaga, etc. [ed. Akio Kyūma])) said, ‘I didn’t go’, I then became worried that I could have been mistaken.
The public had been led to believe that the DPJ had corroborating testimony on its side. Now, it turns out that what it had all along was a seating diagram and other bits of information coaxed out of Mr. Moriya himself, whose memory appears to be a few megabytes short of my PC. This is not on the order of the fake email that took down then DPJ leader Seiji Maehara, but it will be an embarrassment at best for the DPJ.
One plausible explanation for the DPJ’s continued insistence that Mr. Nukaga be called to testify on 3 December (it claims to want to question Mr. Moriya separately as part of the UH committee proceedings, in jail after he is arrested later today) is that they want to delay deliberations on the refueling bill as much as possible, partly to force the LDP to extend the current Diet session for another 30 days or so, partly because they want as much time as possible to get their own act together on their own ineffectual proposal. I have been surprised that the DPJ does not appear to be going after the allegations of potential influence peddling by Mr. Nukaga coming from Nobumasa Ōta. Perhaps it has good reasons to avoid its 2004 UH candidate Mr. Ōta, whom they pointedly did not endorse for a second try this year. I am also mystified as to why they are not throwing all their resources at attacking the overall procurement process, given the spread of corruption charges beyond the Defense Facilities Administration Agency scandals (2006) that left the MOD itself relatively untouched. Perhaps the DPJ does have something up its sleeve to spring on the unsuspecting LDP － say give names of LDP politicians who were on the take list at Yamada Yōkō and could be shown to have reciprocated with pressure on the bureaucracy － in which case they’re doing a very good job of hiding it*. Barring such surprises though, insisting on questioning Mr. Nukaga is a losing proposition, from which only LDP intransigence that would allow the DPJ to claim they are being forced to give it up so that the business of statecraft can go on can give them a face-saving out.
But so far, this is a mere sideshow blown up to unwarranted proportions. The broader issue of military procurement reform is in the capable hands of Nobutaka Machimura Chief Cabinet Secretary, though the formidable defense otaku and Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba will surely play a major role in the process. The DPJ needs to play a critical, but constructive, role here if it is to be seen as the reasonable, responsible party capable of taking the reins from the ruling coalition.
As for the main event politically, that is, the refueling bill, my assessment here remains unchanged, that a supermajority override and a motion of some kind, more specifically a censure vote, is a done deal; unless, of course, the opposition loses its nerve and forgoes the motion. After all, there will be few, if any, better occasions for the Fukuda administration to test the waters of supermajority override than a measure that has a modest majority or a sizable plurality (depending on which poll you believe) of support among a relatively informed and also relatively indifferent public. That way, you can avoid any risk of setting off an unforeseen catastrophe that would － admittedly in the most implausible of circumstances － force the Prime Minister to call a snap election** that the ruling coalition is sure to lose. And pulled off successfully, like most things, it will be easier the second time around and beyond.
*There’s potential blowback at Ichiro Ozawa, who received from Yamada Yōkō (and has now returned) almost three times as much political funds than Mr. Nukaga did. This is reminiscent of the political financing reporting controversy, which, among other things, revealed a string Mr. Ozawa’s real estate acquisitions with political funds, as well as a resurrection of the mysterious transfer of funds to Mr. Ozawa’s political coffers just before his Liberal Party was merged into the DPJ (2003), as I posted here. Having someone who embodies the old-school LDP at the helm has a downside.
**There is some talk from the LDP, some of them in positions of responsibility, about an early snap election following a censure motion. I have no access to those people, but I think that they are blowing smoke. The public will not like being asked for a new four-year mandate on the basis of a difference of opinion on a matter as esoteric and other-worldly as “right thing to do” around the Afghan war zone, so the chances of losing the two-thirds majority will be even higher. Mr. Ozawa would exit the scene, since there is little chance of the DPJ winning more seats than the LDP (the new, lower bar of success for the DPJ), but that would be a mixed blessing, and far from the clear upside that the LDP needs to justify taking a plunge.
Then what is the purpose of all the talk? Some of it could be genuine fear that public opinion might turn against them if they exercise the supermajority. But I doubt it, given the peripheral nature of the issue to the real concerns of the public. More importantly, I believe that there are at least a couple of matters motivating the party leadership to do it:
1) Keep the coalition members, most notably New Kōmeitō, in line. There is nothing an incumbent likes less than an early election, and the NK is particularly wary of going to the Sōkagakkai so soon after the September Upper House election, moreover after an override vote on an issue that does not have the full-hearted support of its rank-and-file.
2) Keep the DPJ on its toes. That helps in several ways, like tempting the DPJ to overplay its hand, which it is doing on the Auer-dinner, he-said, he-said trivia.
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Sōkagakkai Members Lie and Other Odds and Ends from the Latest Public Opinion Polls
Yomiuri releases its latest public opinion poll (taken 10-11 November) and the headline is: Majority favor refueling mission for first time(English version); 給油継続「賛成」５１％、の過半数…読売調査Japanese version. I’ll get to that later, but what caught my eye was this:
Q. Which party do you support now? Name one.
A. … New Kōmeitō: 2.7% …
Now the NK regularly pulls in 8 million votes, give or take a few hundred thousand. That’s about 8% of the adult population, and there can’t be that many non-Sōkagakkai members who vote for the NK and vice versa. (Why vote NK when you can vote for the real thing?) So there must be a lot of Sōkagakkaimembers lying about their choices or disproportionately refusing to respond. For the poll, as usual, 3,000 randomly sampled eligible voters (60.33% response rate; par for the course) were interviewed directly. It appears that many people still do not want to reveal their affiliation with that lay Nichiren sect.
Turning to the big picture, the support numbers for the LDP (34.3%, down from 37.8%), DPJ (22.5%, up from 18.0%), and No Preference (36.0%) (as well as the 60.3% response rate) reaffirm the basic electoral framework: support base among active voters for the LDP hovering around the mid-thirties and the DPJ around the low twenties, with the swing vote in the mid-thirties. Put the real NK supporters on top of the LDP base, and you can see that the DPJ has a huge task ahead if it is to topple the ruling coalition in any Lower House election. Since the DPJ party platform is more a matter of not being the LDP than the result of any meaningful ideological distinctions (which is why it manages to swing wildly on, for example, national security issues without falling apart), another massive leadership failure of Abe administration proportions is needed to pull off it off. It is no wonder that Ichiro Ozawa has scaled back DPJ ambitions for the next Lower House election to what he calls the “third best strategy”, i.e. winning more seats than the LDP.
Support for the Fukuda Cabinet has dropped from 59.1% to 52.2%. This is in marked contrast to the FNN-Sankei poll (10,11 November; headlined内閣支持率４１・１％に急落 世論調査 Cabinet Support Rate Suddenly Drops to 41.1% - note the contrast with the Yomiuri headline), where it registered an even more precipitous fall from 55.3% to 41.1%. I have no way of proving it, but I think that this difference has everything to do with Yomiuri’s strong support for the Grand Coalition (though it could not thoroughly convince the public that it was a good thing) and Sankei’s more skeptical approach to the issue and its generally more hawkish views (in contrast to those of Prime Minister Fukuda himself). Sampling may be random, but the response definitely is not, and the media doing the polling is responsible for that.
On the OEF-MIO refueling resumption bill, despite the controversy over allegations that the fuel oil was diverted to the Iraqi War, not to mention the ongoing scandal at the Ministry of Defense over bribery/procurement suspicions, both polls recorded small gains for the ruling coalition, giving majority support (Yomiuri 50.6%, Sankei 51.8%) for resumption, though substantial opposition remained (Yomiuri 40.3%, Sankei 38.1%). I believe that this confirms my earlier assumptions that the electorate has more or less collectively made up its mind on the issue, and that talk from the LDP for a 60%/two-thirds majority for a supermajority override vote and the DPJ that a Lower House override vote plus an upper House censure motion equals snap election is just that: talk.
Q. Which party do you support now? Name one.
A. … New Kōmeitō: 2.7% …
Now the NK regularly pulls in 8 million votes, give or take a few hundred thousand. That’s about 8% of the adult population, and there can’t be that many non-Sōkagakkai members who vote for the NK and vice versa. (Why vote NK when you can vote for the real thing?) So there must be a lot of Sōkagakkaimembers lying about their choices or disproportionately refusing to respond. For the poll, as usual, 3,000 randomly sampled eligible voters (60.33% response rate; par for the course) were interviewed directly. It appears that many people still do not want to reveal their affiliation with that lay Nichiren sect.
Turning to the big picture, the support numbers for the LDP (34.3%, down from 37.8%), DPJ (22.5%, up from 18.0%), and No Preference (36.0%) (as well as the 60.3% response rate) reaffirm the basic electoral framework: support base among active voters for the LDP hovering around the mid-thirties and the DPJ around the low twenties, with the swing vote in the mid-thirties. Put the real NK supporters on top of the LDP base, and you can see that the DPJ has a huge task ahead if it is to topple the ruling coalition in any Lower House election. Since the DPJ party platform is more a matter of not being the LDP than the result of any meaningful ideological distinctions (which is why it manages to swing wildly on, for example, national security issues without falling apart), another massive leadership failure of Abe administration proportions is needed to pull off it off. It is no wonder that Ichiro Ozawa has scaled back DPJ ambitions for the next Lower House election to what he calls the “third best strategy”, i.e. winning more seats than the LDP.
Support for the Fukuda Cabinet has dropped from 59.1% to 52.2%. This is in marked contrast to the FNN-Sankei poll (10,11 November; headlined内閣支持率４１・１％に急落 世論調査 Cabinet Support Rate Suddenly Drops to 41.1% - note the contrast with the Yomiuri headline), where it registered an even more precipitous fall from 55.3% to 41.1%. I have no way of proving it, but I think that this difference has everything to do with Yomiuri’s strong support for the Grand Coalition (though it could not thoroughly convince the public that it was a good thing) and Sankei’s more skeptical approach to the issue and its generally more hawkish views (in contrast to those of Prime Minister Fukuda himself). Sampling may be random, but the response definitely is not, and the media doing the polling is responsible for that.
On the OEF-MIO refueling resumption bill, despite the controversy over allegations that the fuel oil was diverted to the Iraqi War, not to mention the ongoing scandal at the Ministry of Defense over bribery/procurement suspicions, both polls recorded small gains for the ruling coalition, giving majority support (Yomiuri 50.6%, Sankei 51.8%) for resumption, though substantial opposition remained (Yomiuri 40.3%, Sankei 38.1%). I believe that this confirms my earlier assumptions that the electorate has more or less collectively made up its mind on the issue, and that talk from the LDP for a 60%/two-thirds majority for a supermajority override vote and the DPJ that a Lower House override vote plus an upper House censure motion equals snap election is just that: talk.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
And the Winner Is… Makoto Koga? and Other Post-LDP Election Trivia
"…When I requested a meeting with Ichiro Ozawa, head of the DPJ, I had decided to resign, in view of my health. On that basis, I had intended to ask him to build a relationship of trust."
- Shinzo Abe, Sept. 24 press conference
At first, I am thinking, is he nuts? Did he really think giving himself up would convince Mr. Ozawa to stop trying to knock the LDP out of power? Then I realize that Mr. Abe is channeling those medieval warlords and - dare I say it? - our previous Emperor, who offered their lives in order to save their people. Still, this is odd; The LDP may have lost the battle, but, with an overwhelming majority in the decisive Lower House, it certainly hasn't lost the war. President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor seeking truce with Japan by offering to commit seppuku? Hmm, still doesn't quite work.
As new election czar, Makoto "I Am Prettier than Tamisuke Watanuki but Not as Cute as Shizuka Kamei" Koga wrests substantial power out of the hands of the Secretary-General, effectively making the LDP party leadership The Big Four instead of The Big Three. Post-Upper House election reports said that Mr. Koga had refused Prime Minister Abe's request to be the General Council Chairman, the least powerful among The Big Three. Asked by Yasuo Fukuda, he refused again, instead, asking for and getting the election portfolio.
Let's see: Secretary-General, Bunmei Ibuki, 69; Toshihiro Nikai, General Council Chairman, 62; Sadakazu Tanigaki, 62; Makoto Koga, 67. Well, at least they're all younger than the Prime Minister…
The LDP and the New Komeito leadership meet and agree to require receipts for all expenditures regardless of amount (there is currently a \50,000 floor for declaring individual expenditures). Prime Minister Abe had pushed the idea before the election, but had let it slip as his power continued to deteriorate. I thought that would be disastrous, tantamount to sticking out your neck, then giving Mr. Ozawa a sledgehammer. This is a smart, if obvious, move.
The Foreign Ministry looked like the only plausible place to put Taro Aso. Now it is opening up, as current Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura is switching to Chief Cabinet Secretary. True, there are philosophical differences between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Aso, but exogenous constraints (make nice with China, make nice with the US, keep hands and eyes on abductees issue, etc.) will confine any dissonance to symbolic, not substantive, quarters. Besides, what did Lyndon B. Johnson say about Edger J. Hoover? Long-time readers of my blog know, of course, that my predictive powers are on a par with Sylvia Brown and Uri Geller…
ADD. You know, Tobias Harris makes a good point about Mr. Aso here. No, I mean here. Actually, I thought that there would be a very high likelihood that Mr. Fukuda would offer the post, but it appears from the Sankei link that Mr. Aso is saying that if offered, he will not serve We'll know soon.
- Shinzo Abe, Sept. 24 press conference
At first, I am thinking, is he nuts? Did he really think giving himself up would convince Mr. Ozawa to stop trying to knock the LDP out of power? Then I realize that Mr. Abe is channeling those medieval warlords and - dare I say it? - our previous Emperor, who offered their lives in order to save their people. Still, this is odd; The LDP may have lost the battle, but, with an overwhelming majority in the decisive Lower House, it certainly hasn't lost the war. President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor seeking truce with Japan by offering to commit seppuku? Hmm, still doesn't quite work.
As new election czar, Makoto "I Am Prettier than Tamisuke Watanuki but Not as Cute as Shizuka Kamei" Koga wrests substantial power out of the hands of the Secretary-General, effectively making the LDP party leadership The Big Four instead of The Big Three. Post-Upper House election reports said that Mr. Koga had refused Prime Minister Abe's request to be the General Council Chairman, the least powerful among The Big Three. Asked by Yasuo Fukuda, he refused again, instead, asking for and getting the election portfolio.
Let's see: Secretary-General, Bunmei Ibuki, 69; Toshihiro Nikai, General Council Chairman, 62; Sadakazu Tanigaki, 62; Makoto Koga, 67. Well, at least they're all younger than the Prime Minister…
The LDP and the New Komeito leadership meet and agree to require receipts for all expenditures regardless of amount (there is currently a \50,000 floor for declaring individual expenditures). Prime Minister Abe had pushed the idea before the election, but had let it slip as his power continued to deteriorate. I thought that would be disastrous, tantamount to sticking out your neck, then giving Mr. Ozawa a sledgehammer. This is a smart, if obvious, move.
The Foreign Ministry looked like the only plausible place to put Taro Aso. Now it is opening up, as current Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura is switching to Chief Cabinet Secretary. True, there are philosophical differences between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Aso, but exogenous constraints (make nice with China, make nice with the US, keep hands and eyes on abductees issue, etc.) will confine any dissonance to symbolic, not substantive, quarters. Besides, what did Lyndon B. Johnson say about Edger J. Hoover? Long-time readers of my blog know, of course, that my predictive powers are on a par with Sylvia Brown and Uri Geller…
ADD. You know, Tobias Harris makes a good point about Mr. Aso here. No, I mean here. Actually, I thought that there would be a very high likelihood that Mr. Fukuda would offer the post, but it appears from the Sankei link that Mr. Aso is saying that if offered, he will not serve We'll know soon.
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