Rumble at the Yomiuri Giants and Most (But Definitely Not All) of the Media Goes Bananas

…It’s about time, so why not reboot here…

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You know that anyone who's looking for proof of Japanese media bias need only look at the Yomiuri sports pages and how they basically serve as the baseball powerhouse Yomiuri Giants’ fanzine. (Actually, I welcome media bias because it takes less time to go through them when you more or less know where they are coming from. They also give you media-driven baselines from which to make guesses at how public opinion will be trending, particularly on those rare moments—say, Kim Jong Il's admissions regarding the abductees—when Yomiuri and Asahi angles converge.) Well today, there was an incredible diatribe released by the representative/GM of the Yomiuri Giants (a former Yomiuri reporter proving that not all amakudari’s are necessarily handpuppets), who, if his lengthy statement (full text starts here is to be believed, apparently refused a bribe from powermonger and all-around meddler Tsuneo Watanabe in the form of more power and a promise of eventual elevation to CEO in exchange for going along with Watanabe's lies—not the rep/GMs words, but there’s no other way to put it—around his attempt to overturn Giants personnel decisions to which he had already given consent.

The late afternoon-early evening news broadcasts all appear to be featuring the story prominently—all, that is, except Nippon TV. I’ll give you one guess which media group owns Nippon TV.

But what am I doing watching TV when the rest of the Japanese world is working? Actually, this is relevant to my line of work, as it should spell the end of Watanabe's role as political fixer—anything fixer, really. If Ichiro Ozawa had held any hope that Watanabe could reprise anything like his 2007 role as go-between for an aborted deal between Ozawa and then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda for a Grand Coalition, it’s gone now. This diminishes the LDP's old guard as well, since Ozawa was their most familiar and likeminded interlocutor. An era is passing, and this incident is part of it.

Let’s see what if literally anything tomorrow’s Yomiuri has to say about this.

Ozawa Stands for Election and Realignment Draws Nearer

Who’d a-thunk. With former Prime Minister Hatoyama’s surprise (okay, so much for my predictive powers) full-throated support, Ichiro Ozawa is running against Prime Minister Kan in the 14 September DPJ presidential election. Support for Kan appears to be at best of the lesser of two evils variety, but the case against Ozawa remains strong as ever. I refuse to believe that a majority of the 411 Diet members will of their own volition vote for a candidate that is disapproved by an overwhelming majority in opinion polls—by contrast, although the Kan cabinet is beset by negative ratings, a healthy majority still wants to give Prime Minister Kan a second chance—and withstand the heavy and constant media beating that will follow an Ozawa victory. The rookies in particular have to worry about 2013. However, roughly one third of the voters will be cast by local party members and assemblymen, an factor that had largely remained off the radar till now. But from here on, they will matter, for two reasons. First and most obviously, they can be the deciding factor in a close Diet membership vote. Second, they can influence their local Diet members in their voting, especially in the case of fence-sitting parliamentarians. It has been unusual but by no means rare in party presidential elections for Diet members to explicitly vote according to the wishes of their local chapters, and broader if more subtle interactions must also happen. It would be surprising if similar thing did not happen in the upcoming DPJ election. Third, the national voting trends among the eligible supporters and assemblymen are likely to affect the overall voting behavior of the Diet members. Remember that Junichiro Koizumi’s surprise local victories in the 2001 LDP election over overwhelming favorite Ryutaro Hashimoto precipitated a landslide victory in the Diet member vote. True, the DPJ local votes will not be counted until the Diet members have voted, precisely to avoid such a happenstance. However, nothing will stop the national media to sic their local bureaus to provide day-to-day coverage on the intentions of the DPJ voters in the provinces. Expect everyone to know the approximate outcome of the local voting before the Diet members vote in Tokyo on 14 September.

Now most people seem to believe that Ozawa has something of an edge out there, given his formidable political machine and its extensive outreach into the provinces, including plenty of handholding, sewage cover-stomping, and rice paddy-wading on behalf of associate and/or political-newbie candidates past—a lot of political chits to redeem. However, the local eligibles in turn talk to the rest of the locals. And they will all access the media, and be influenced accordingly. It’s a dynamic process, is all I can say right now. I expect the majority to be what I consider to be rational and take the path of least public resistance, which is to reelect Kan, but what do I know?

Whatever the outcome, the election will most likely draw an indelible and permanent line between the pro- and anti-Ozawa forces, with the rest of the DPJ getting back up and sitting, uneasily, on the fence. I expect a Kan victory to be somewhat more reassuring to the markets, largely because of main street support for continuity and rejection of Ozawa’s likely revival of the more costly elements of the 2009 election manifesto. Either way, the two sides will shake hands and pretend to make up, and the winner will make the minimum concessions on cabinet, subcabinet, and political assignments to keep the other side from bolting. (Ozawa won’t want to, but that must be the minimal price of Hatoyama’s support.) However, I doubt that unity will be long-lived. The widening political fissures will threaten to erupt at moments of political adversity, which will surely come, on the economy, Okinawa, and any number of those incidents expected or not of varying consequences that cumulatively sap the political capital of administrations or even manage somehow to morph into major political crises on their own. In other words, schism is in the air, and none of the significant opposition parties, not the LDP, certainly not Your Party (I still fail to understand the logic behind expectations that it would join hands with the DPJ and kill its own brand before it even graduates the phenom stage), not even the New Komeito, the only meaningful party that, through its near-captive constituency, could withstand the curse of an alliance with what is likely than not to be a deeply unpopular DPJ. It looks increasingly as if the moment realignment has drawn closer, if still beyond the horizon—that is a long-term plus for governance in Japan. From that perspective, a Kan victory followed by an Ozawa prosecution would actually be a negative in that it would postpone the day of reckoning and more coherent policymaking.

Re Mark’s Wish List for Realignment

Blogger.com says that the following response to Mark’s comment is too long, so I’m posting it here. Sorry I don’t have time to post on the ongoing chicken race between Kamei and the DPJ. Will Kan call Kamei’s bluff? Stay tuned.

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Mark:

As a typical floater voter, I have my own set of wishes, but my aunts stubbornly refuse to turn into teacarts. So you’ll have to content yourself with what I think is likely/unlikely as per my current line of work, and I’m not going in the policy implications:

Now that it seems likely Japan will realign its political parties, I thought I’d weigh in with some suggestions.

I’d like to see the SDP and the JCP merge. This new party would focus on providing social security, child care, health care, and education. It would support government spending in those areas, but not necessarily in public works. It would try and raise taxes on the rich (particularly the capital gains tax). It would oppose raising the sales tax. It would try to reduce defense spending and it would do its best to uphold Article 9. It would call for a reduction in U.S. forces in Japan. It would also call for strong regulations for industry.

Policy-wise, a merger makes sense. It won’t happen. There’s too much history behind them. Besides, the remainder of the old Socialists that form the SDP are too unruly a group—reminds you a bit of the US Democratic Party—to be able to submerge themselves in the orderly, disciplined world of the JCP.

I’d like to see the Ozawa faction split off from Minshuto and form a new party called the Rural Revival Party. This party would be a sort of pork barrel politics party, focused on spending money in rural areas to win votes. It would, of course, oppose redistricting. I think Kokumin Shinto should get merged into this new party, as the new party would try to boost Japan Post and its affiliates, particularly in rural areas. This party would also oppose raising the sales tax. It would support infrastructure projects.

Makes a lot of sense. And don’t rule out the possibility of likeminded friends in the LDP joining them. Think big, Mark.

I’d like to see Your Party merged into what’s left of Minshuto. Yoshimi Watanabe, Yukio Edano, Seiji Maehara, Katsuya Okada, and Renho would be in this party. This party would focus on transparency, accountability, and the control of the bureaucracy by the politicians. This party would focus on reducing wasteful government spending, particularly public works spending.

What do you mean, “what’s left of Minshuto”? I’m willing to take under 100 in the over/under on the number of Diet members that Ozawa will be able to take with him if he decides to split. That said, your “New Party” does make sense—in the mid- to long-term. I don’t think that will happen before the next lower house election though; The post-boomers in Your Party has to see how far they can take its current configuration before they decide to submerge its identity in a bigger whole.

I’d like to see Shinzo Abe, Shigeru Ishiba, and Yuriko Koike move over to Tachiagare Nippon. This party would focus on international affairs. It might call for revising Article 9. It might call for increasing the ODA budget. It would call for reducing social welfare spending and public works spending. It would try to balance the budget.

Did you say Tachigare Nippon? Kidding. No. they are not a good fit.

What’s left of the LDP can form a new party called Kanryoto. This party would include Shinjiro Koizumi, Tadamori Oshima, and Taro Aso. This party would let the bureaucrats do what they want while the politicians did their political theater.

Doesn’t make sense, and that’s not what they are about, individually.

I don’t think it’s necessary for Japanese parties to have different trade policies. Japan already has low tariffs, which means making trade deals makes sense for Japan. The only thing Japan has to protect is its agriculture sector. Given that Japan only produces 40% of the food it consumes, I don’t think it makes sense for Japan to reduce protection in that industry.

But we could have a more rational agricultural policy, which would call for a different trade policy.

I don’t think immigration should be a focus of the new parties. I don’t think Japanese voters want a substantial increase in immigration and I don’t think it makes sense for Japan to do that. There aren’t many politicians who want that anyways. Hopefully, in the next election, Hidenao Nakagawa will lose and go away.

Don’t worry, it won’t be. Not yet.

As for the other parties, I’d break them up and have their members join the remaining parties.

That’s possible only when (if?) Daisaku Ikeda passes away.

Sunday Funnies: It’s My Party…

Did you enjoy my ramblings about political funds? Rejoice then; Sankei—bless their damn-the-corporate-sponsor conservative souls—has a nice story about fund-raising parties. It’s a reminder of the reason why the DPJ needs three more years to wean themselves off the corporate teat*.

This, and Hatoyama’s waffling around national security and agricultural policy, as well as Ozawa’s two bits on the latter, are not going to materially affect the outcome of the election. It’s increasingly shaping up as the “Consider the Alternatives” election, and the LDP has lost too many rounds to win on points.

Incidentally, I have a hard time understanding why the SDP is joining hands with the DPJ, which appears to be knee deep in a tacit conspiracy with the LDP to drive the micro-parties the way of the dodo and the passenger pigeon. Bu then, they are the diehard remnants of the Murayama Socialists, who chose a political instant of the illusion of power and have been paying for it with an eternity of insignificance.

* I have nothing against corporate money in politics as long as there is full disclosure to the last yen. For all donors.

Asahi Superimposes the Tokyo Results onto the Lower House Election—Not so Fast

Asahi makes an attempt to translate the results of the Tokyo’s Prefectural Assembly election to its single-member districts (SMDs) in the Lower House of the national Diet*. According to the report, the DPJ comes out ahead in 24 out of the 25 SMDs, and all 25 if you include the successful Networks candidate—which as I’ve noted before supports the DPJ in national elections—that the DPJ supported in the remaining one. So does that mean that the DPJ will sweep the board come 30 August? (Which reminds me, happy birthday CAO.)

Not so fast. If you are going to count the Network seat as a DPJ gimmie, then the LDP will surely want to add the Komeito votes in the national tally. The LDP and Komeito will put up only one candidate in each of the 300 SMD elections nationwide between the two. The LDP-Komeito vote combined take would beat the DPJ in 7 out of 15 seats in the Tokyo SMDS included in the 3-seat-and-up multi-member districts that Komeito did contest. That’s not really fair either. You have to add to the DPJ tally the Network votes—as well as a portion of the Communist vote in the SMDs where the JCP will not put up candidates. No matter. My point is that counting the Network seat without taking into account the Kometo vote is wishfulAsahi thinking.

* I’ve reproduced the relevant Asahi image at the top since Asahi usually takes its material off-line very quickly. Asahi, like most of the Japanese mass media, essentially hates the Internet.

A Little Historical Perspective on the Tokyo Election

Yomiuri says that 13.44% of eligible voters had voted by 11AM, up 3.19 percentage points from the 2005 elections, but down from the 3.98 percentage point margin at 9AM. So let’s say that this election winds up 3 percentage points ahead of the 2005 election: such a turnout, at 46.99%, would place the election at—14th out of 16 post-WW II Tokyo Prefectural Assembly elections. This should help political parties with rock-solid constituencies, such as Komeito and the Communist Party. It would also be an indication of public dissatisfaction over the choice between the LDP and DPJ as the core of the next national administration.

Historically, turnout has followed a downward trend everywhere and Tokyo is no exception. The assembly election turnout dropped from a 1959 high of 70.13%*, up from 1955’s 59.63%—very low for those early years—to a 1998 low of 40.80%.

But the peaks and troughs tell a story of their own. The 1959 peak coincided with the national battle over the renewal of the Japan-U.S. security relationship that was to reach its peak with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan on 19 January 1960, while the low point reached in the previous 1955 election had been preceded by a Lower House general election only a couple of months earlier. The second lowest at a 43.99% turnout, the 2005 assembly election preceded Prime Minister Koizumi’s Post Office election by a couple of months, but nobody had an inkling at the time that one month later Koizumi would dissolve the Lower House and call an election.

Although I won’t rule out the possibility that a more thorough examination may show otherwise, these examples suggest that the interest of Tokyo voters in the assembly election waxes and wanes with their interest in the national political scene. From this point of view, the disinterest demonstrated by a turnout in the mid 40 percentile range, will speak volumes about the disappointment on the part of the public on the political parties across the board.

Last Thought before the Tokyo Election

Actually, the polls have been open since 7:00AM and Asahi says voting in the first two hours was 3.98% of total eligible voters, up from 2005’s 3.20%. Could be people are out early, with a forecast of afternoon rain, but a high turnout will hurt the LDP and Komeito, who know that non-partisan voters are more likely to float to the opposition. Which reminds me of something that has been nagging me: Why did Aso draw attention to the elction by making himself so visible in the campaign? It drew media attention, and also made his denials of national impact ring hollow. That is like pushing for his own downfall before he gets to call snap election.

That’s it for now. I’ll get to your comments, Ross and Mark, later in the day.

A Brief Look at the Seiwa-kai’s Books

The FY2007 political financing report from the Seiwa-kai,, currently the largest LDP faction, which has not totally coincidentally produced four successive Prime Ministers—Mori, Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda—between 2000-2008 and has also stood behind incumbent Taro Aso’s “successful” bid, can be found here.

As with Prime Minister Aso’s Ikou-kai, some Seiwa-kai members are more equal than others. Rank-and-file Diet members paid 600,000 in dues, but senior members gave up 1,200,000 and ex-Diet members still in play got a discount rate of 350,000*. Mori’s Seifu-kai contributed 20,000,000—as did newly anointed faction head Nobutaka Machimura’s Shinyu-kai. Hidenao Nakagawa (now persona non grata) coughed up 10,000,000. arank-and-file Diet member received 2,000,000 in return. Now, this is only half of the 4,000,000 that Aso’s faction members received in the same year. But Upper House Seiwa-kai members who faced election that year received 5,000,000, while losers (and past losers who were still active) got as little extra at 7,000,000 or 10,000,000. Overall, the much larger Seiwa-kai appears to have taken a tailor-made approach in contrast to the Aso faction’s one-size-fits-all system, and was moreover able to help, indeed give an extra boost to, its less fortunate members. Size matters, it seems. But how different is that from any other business?

There are some variations, but that’s the general idea.

Nakasone, LDP Elders, etc., etc…

My dialogue with Mark the Techie continues:

Why do you like Nakasone? And what do you think of his son, Hirofumi?

The elder Nakasone had—still has—a clear vision of his objectives as a statesman and held to it as best he could throughout his political life. For him, the political game was secondary. He understood the need to set his priorities accordingly, as can be seen from his handling of the Yasukuni controversy. He matched this purposeful approach with an eloquence that is sorely missing otherwise from post-WW II politics in Japan. He also put his personal stamp on administrative reform. He was a worthy representative of the LDP at the high watermark of the 1955 regime. His son appears to be an amicable, inoffensive representative of the more conservative elements of the LDP, nothing more, nothing less. He’s the son of a Prime Minister, yet has spent all his political life in the Upper House; go figure. I’d love to have him as a neighbor though.

In your original post, you seem to discount the power of the faction heads. But in your first reply, you claim that many younger politicians obey their elders. Who are these elders that have control of the younger politicians?

I haven’t done a good job of explaining myself, have I? Let me take another crack at this theme.

I am sorely disappointed with the genteel fifty-somethings who have failed to step up in the post-Koizumi years and instead allowed their elders to play the political game with the Prime Minister’s chair and senior party posts. (Remember that the generally untested Abe essentially had the Prime Minister’s job dropped in his lap by Koizumi.) Don’t they understand that politics is a blood sport? Yoshimi Watanabe id leave the LDP, but his new movement (with Kenji Eda) is unlikely to emerge as significant focal point in any post-electoral search for realignment. Pockets of youthful dissidence do flare up as the party leadership lurches from one crisis to another, but ultimately come to naught as their elders preach unity, leaving the impression of aimlessness and disarray in the face of pending disaster. The junior varsity for the opposition has an excuse; Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Kan are, after all, the founding fathers of the DPJ and its predecessors. Besides, Okada and—even more significantly—Maehara have taken their turns.

Faction heads and their deputies are not totally powerless, insofar as parliamentarians continue to see value in their faction membership. But Yoshiro Mori appears to maintain substantial influence over his faction although it has been some years since he yielded formal leadership. Within the same faction and possibly beyond, Yoshinao Nakagawa has emerged as a focal point for diehard reformists, precipitating a bitter intra-faction schism.

By the way, I find it curious that you separate foreign policy from economic policy. Based on the success of Japan during the post war period, I'd say a successful economic policy is the most integral part of a successful foreign policy. After the Iraq war, and after nearly a decade of a botched reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, it seems funny for an ex-MITI bureaucrat to split foreign policy and economic policy like that.

If your point is that a strong domestic economy is essential to achieving ambitious foreign policy goals, I can’t agree with you more.

Globalization? Is that what it's called? Interesting. But for the West, I think another word is more applicable. I think it's called de-globalization. Think of Gordon Brown and his "British jobs for British workers" spiel. Or think of Sarkozy and his admonition against exporting jobs to eastern Europe. Or think of the Buy American provision. But most importantly, think of GE. Nearly three decades ago, Jack Welch unleashed his shareholder value ideology. Good for shareholders. Not good for the current account. About a week ago, Jeff Immelt said the U.S. had outsourced too much, and needed to have a stronger manufacturing base. Quite a difference, wouldn't you say?

The economic downturn has created a backlash. Let’s see what happens other than Buy American provisions in Obama’s economic package (which the other OECD member countries are opposing) that goes beyond rhetoric. For example, will Sarkozy propose limitations on the free movement of labor and capital within the EU? Suspend Poland’s membership?

I'm sure Japan's continued support for the IMF gives some relief to the U.S. and Europe, but I would note that since the crisis began, it seems like Japan has been most active through the institutions it controls - the ADB, JBIC, etc.
Japan was the first to extend a substantial amount of money to the IMF during the current crisis. JBIC is basically the lender of last resorts for Japanese exports and foreign investment. It’s going into action as part of the government-sponsored emergency financing efforts. Nothing unusual in that. I don’t know what we’re doing with regard to ADB right now, but I doubt there’s anything new there as well.

I don't know what happened in Australia for most of the 20th century and I don't really see why Australia's switch to the Asian Football Federation is particularly important. On the other hand, I would note that Kevin Rudd seems to be a big advocate for this Asia-Pacific thingy. I wonder why? Also, I believe his budget calls for buying lots of military equipment for defense against China. Presumably, he will buy this equipment from the U.S. In addition, Australia continues to pester Japan on whaling. Furthermore, it recently killed the Rio Tinto deal with Chinalco. Throughout that process, I heard many voices in Australia who expressed concern about Chinese investment. Frankly, his recent actions have made me wonder if Kevin Rudd's professed affection for China was more a stunt to attempt to panic Japan - a stunt that backfired because Japan itself wants to get closer to China.

In 1972 Gough Whitlam came to power and started the process that transformed Australia, which till then had drawn a neat racial parallel with the far more malignant regime in South Africa. Essentially, White Australia decided to become Asia(-Pacific) Australia. Australia’s switch to the Asian Football Federation is a cultural symbol of this transformation.

As for relations with China, remember that when Rudd came to power, China was still the new black. I don’t think it had anything to do with Japan, a mature market as far as Australia’s natural resources and agricultural industry were concerned. But it’s easy to get worked up over natural resources when they’re still in the ground. I think that’s silly—unlike factories, no one can dismantle a mine and cart it off out of your national jurisdiction—but that’s the way the world works. In any case, China national champions and state investment vehicles, unlike say Norwegian or Qatar sovereign wealth funds, are more likely to follow the dictates of non-commercial interests. Connect this to the not unrelated authoritarian nature of China’s political regime and more or less inchoate fears about rising Chinese dominance, and I can understand where the public outcry was coming from.

I don’t know what exactly triggered the perceived shift in Australia’s defense posture. Maybe the strategic implications of a growing Chinese blue-water navy pushed the Australia’s national security establishment past the tipping point. I happen to think that the threat is greatly overestimated, but I can see how things might look quite different from a Southeast Asia/South Pacific perspective. I’ll believe it when I see an Australian aircraft carrier.

The “research” whaling issue, if I understand it correctly, addressed a highly emotive concern of a particular Labor Party constituency. I believe that the Rudd administration has become considerably more subdued since the kangaroo slaughter controversy—total nonsense in my view, but I don’t have a vote on this.

I agree that the U.S. is becoming less white, though I think the financial crisis could alter that trend somewhat. You say this will have powerful cultural and social implications. What are they? What changes will result? I am very interested in hearing what you have to say on this issue.

Note that I wrote in the present tense. There’s a natural progression from blackface vaudeville routines to the Jack Benny Show to I Spy to Eddie Murphy. Then there’s the greatly expanded role of Hispanics in pop music. These are just a couple of examples of profound changes in U.S. popular culture. (And what high culture exists that was once not popular?) Social change: public acceptance of mixed race couples. Basically, cultural and social barriers of all sorts are coming down in a browning of America.

Since America is by far the greatest post-WW II exporter of cultural and social constructs, this change affects the rest of the world—a world where Al Qaeda uses rap video to recruit terrorists. In a thousand years, unless humanity fcuks up royally (there’s a not insignificant chance of that happening), they’ll all be subscribing to variations of a global culture using variations of a language vaguely resembling English—and it’ll be America’s fault.

Is Japan a Client State of the United States? And What of It?

The following is my response to a comment from Matt Dioguardi, with whom I had other enjoyable disagreements in the past, on this post. The blog rejected it as being too long—it only accepts up to 4,096 characters—so I’m posting it here as a separate post.

Matt: Always good to hear from you, although—because?—we hold very different views on many things. I think that the notion that major policy changes will not occur in Japan until something happens to drastically alter the U.S.-Japan relationship is certainly a defensible one, but unless properly defined and qualified, it throws out most of severely limits the notion of “major” on the economic front. Moreover, I don’t read anything that McCormack writes since I made it half way through a talk that he gave on North Korea and concluded that he was nuts; we can agree to disagree here. That said, let’s see if I have anything meaningful to say on the points that you raise.

“Japan exports to America, and reinvests in American Treasury bonds.”

Rephrase it “America borrows from Japan and uses the money to buy things from Japan”, and you begin to wonder which one is really the client. Actually, both statements put a highly simplified, anthropomorphic gloss on what is a complex phenomenon with a very large number of actors driven by many factors from both within and outside of the relationship. Moreover, there are so many policy decisions that must be made that have no direct bearing on the relationship (although many if not all of them are bound to affect our external balance in ways that produces changes in our foreign currency reserves) and yet are so momentous.

Incidentally, defined more precisely, there is a conscious choice that the Japanese government could make that would drastically alter the situation that is described in your statement. Namely, the Japanese government could decide not hold currency reserves and leave everything to market forces. Now, to engage in my own anthropomorphism, “Japan” still could run a trade surplus and “reinvest” the proceeds in American Treasury bonds, but this is one road that few countries running trade surpluses if any will ever take.

“Japan keeps a fairly vague stance (with meaningless rumblings of nationalism), while America does the heavy lifting diplomatically for Japan.”

This is a sweeping statement that could be said of every liberal democracy that does not have a) a nuclear arsenal; b) the capacity to project a serious military force beyond its borders (conduct major landing operations, dispatch multiple aircraft carrier fleets); and c) a permanent seat with veto powers on the UN Security Council. Also note that Japan is a regional power. It has played a meaningful role in Asian (defined as east of Bangladesh) politics that has usually but not always been consonant with the interests and values of the government or the majority of the public of the United States. The Middle East is just not our bailiwick, though events there do seriously affect our economy. But then, do France and the U.K. do any “heavy lifting”? Or to put it another way, do their opinions matter to the governments and increasingly the public of Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and other states in the region? The United States is the sole global superpower; as such, “America does the heavy lifting [militarily and almost ipso facto] diplomatically for all of us. There is some change afoot, which does not bode well for the rest of us, but there things stand for the moment. There are paradigms and paradigms; that fact that one cannot—should not?—be changed of our own volition does not render all other meaningless. Or is that not the point of your rhetorical flourish?

Note also that for both statements, you could insert “China” in place of “Jaan” and still end up with coherent, defensible statements. So would McCormack consider China to be a “client state” of the United States? Are we all “client states”? Just askin’.

“There's a speech on-line where Abe praises Japan's new two party system, and indirectly the growing opposition. Strange, if he were really ideologically driven, who cares about how many parties there are? Oh, well, gee, America has a two party system, so that must be good.”

Let’s face it, Abe, is only saying the right thing. Anything else would sound pretty gauche. Of course he is not the only one who is calling for a two-party system. The LDP has had a nice 55-year run, but it has gone stale and many serious problems are piling up that cannot all be blamed on the bureaucracy—I think that the idea is, If the bureaucracy is at fault, then what were you guys in the Diet doing on our munificent payroll?—there’s a widely held public desire for an alternative. It’s more a vote against a mono-party system than a vote for a two-party system. Also, note that the United States is not the only two-party democracy on this planet. In fact, at first glance, nations lacking serious social/cultural/ethnic divides and/or powerful regional rivalries tend to drift towards political systems with one or two dominant parties and a smattering of smaller, special-interest or ideology-driven parties. Even the United States has a socialist Senator. So no, nobody wants it just because America has one. If that were the case, it would happened long ago, when U.S. influence was much stronger here.

“We won't see seismic changes in Japan until the relationship with America seriously stumbles and/or collapses.”

I am unable to address this point unless I know what you mean by “seismic.” I have very limited power to think about economic and political matters in purely metaphorical terms.

”Say if the dollar suddenly dropped to about 40 yen to the dollar. That would make Japanese politics very lively over night.”

Hard to argue with that statement.

“Until something happens, well, not much is gonna happen. Of course, you knew that, didn't you?”

No, I don’t, honestly. I don’t know until it actually doesn’t happen. The political inertia is pretty strong though, that I’ll certainly agree to. Is that somehow a side effect of being a “client state”? I know that there are political commentators and academics who will write reams of stuff from such perspectives. Some are entertaining, a few can even be insightful, but it’s not my cup of tea. I prefer sturdy, fact-based logic.

There you are, Matt

Expecting Low Voter Turnout in Upcoming General Election

In the first decades of the 1955 System, voter turnout hovered in the low 70s to the high 60s. It gradually declined, falling to the low 60s, high 50s, and the Koizumi years brought no exceptions. I expect the upcoming Lower House general election to follow suit. The vast number of undecideds this close to the event (as well as the high number of people who reject Yukio Hatayama even before he’s had a chance) is a measure of the lack of public enthusiasm for the DPJ. No matter; the rumored campaign slogan for the DPJ—Regime Change (政権交代)—can only reinforce the impression that the Japanese electorate is so fed up that it will accept change for change’s sake, and that the DPJ is well aware of this fact. It’s let the bear catch the hindmost.

I expect to wait another election cycle or two before I see a real paradigm shift in the Japanese body politic at the policy end.

LDP and DPJ—Peas in a Pod? So? I Think the Electorate Wants to Let’s See How the DPJ Does.

This was intended to be a post elaborating something I said here in response to the third comment from LB. However, while I was away from my blog for a couple of days, I found that LB had returned with yet another fascinating (and very long) comment addressing that and other matters. I don’t know if I have the time today to deal with that and other comments that have come my way during that time, but I promise I’ll get to them, and take note of it when I do.

Regarding the DPJ, I think everyone including the DPJ themselves needs to see how (and with whom) it governs before a major realignment becomes a realistic option. It is becoming clearer that the erstwhile anti-Ozawa forces in the DPJ led by Seiji Masehara and Yoshihiko Noda are coalescing and Katsuya Okada is being drawn into their circle as a leader. But they are also intent on winning the Lower House election for the DPJ and will join a Hatoyama administration, if and when it happens, with enthusiasm and do their best to make it work. As policy wonks, they probably can’t help it anyway. The more serious governance issues are likely to be caused by the DPJ’s coalition partners formal and informal, the People’s New Party and the Social Democratic Party respectively. The PNP reportedly wants a massive, three-year public works spending program and a rollback of Post Office reform—wishes, if granted in full, would turn the calendar back to the pre-Koizumi era. The SDP, given its leftist leanings—the moderates defected to what is now DPJ some time ago—are likely to push an anti-business, anti-market agenda. On the foreign policy front, the DPJ may have problems of its own with the United States if it pushes too hard against the status quo in Japan and the near abroad, a course of action which the SDP will endorse and then some. So Upper House help from LDP defectors (or the New Komeito) may be a welcome alternative here. Not that I can point to any specific scenario that places the DPJ at such a juncture, but I think that the possibility is there.

In this respect, it’s also important to note that there’ are good reasons why the distinction between the two major parties blurs on close inspection. The Japanese electorate—and here I am speaking in the collective to simplify my story—likes universal healthcare and public pensions, for which it is more or less resigned to eventually paying more taxes. It also does not want the government to own and run businesses. In other words, we the Japanese voters are social democrats. On the foreign policy front, the Japanese public fears North Korea and is vaguely apprehensive of China but cares only marginally about any turn of events beyond the near abroad. Thus, we the Japanese voters support the Japan-U.S. alliance but give only lukewarm support to a limited, non-combat overseas role for Japanese troops. No Japanese administration can last long while ignoring any one of these desires of the Japanese electorate. Not even a (Shoichi) Nakagawa administration can escape—yes, I can see clearly now—the Yoshida Doctrine. And a DPJ-led administration is no exception.

Having said that, there are a couple of reasons why I believe that having two major parties matter. Within the confines of the national consensus, there are still important choices that Japan as a nation needs to be make, or have the choice made for them by the changing circumstances. It’s a good thing in principle to be in a position to make those choices through the electoral process than through the informal, vested interests-based process that prevails under a virtual one-party rule or the ad hoc deal-making that goes on within the cacophony of a badly splintered legislative body.

Just as important is accountability. The electorate deserves an alternative when the incumbent is not up to the job. Now, if we needed more evidence that the Aso administration is not exactly the A-Team, it has just laid a new one with the Prime Minister’s flip-flop on idea of splitting the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare*. It’s actually three administrations in a row. I think the public needs a break, in more ways than one.

* In a nutshell, Tsuneo Watanabe, the Yomiuri head and major-league dealmaker (he almost brokered a coalition deal between then Prime Minister Fukuda and DPJ leader Ozawa), put forth the idea in an advisory group for the Prime Minister, and Aso liked the idea and told Cabinet Ministers to look into it, but backed off in the face of opposition from his own party including the popular MHLW Minister Masuzoe—all this happening in the space of two weeks and in full public view. The idea itself is not without merit, but the problems vexing MHLW predate its creation in 2001 from the Health and Welfare Ministry and the Labor Ministry. One more Minister will do little to fix all the management and solvency issues of the public pension system, to give prominent example.

ADD: The notion of taking kindergartens away from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and putting them together with MHLW’s daycare centers and putting them under one of the two new Ministries also got shot down in the bargain.

Less Than Meets the Eye to LDP (Almost) Proposal to Deny Official Candidate Status to Heirloom TurkeysCandidates

Going one better on the DPJ, the LDP is moving to deny official candidate status to sons and daughters of retiring Diet members this Lower House general election. This measure, if enacted—it’s not yet a done deal—will affect two candidates, Hideo Usui and Shinjiro Koizumi, son of Junichiro “I will destroy the LDP” Kiozumi, the “reformist” Prime Minister. Now, I know nothing about the Usuis, but I am sure that this will enhance Mini-K’s chances of getting elected on the Kanagawa 11th District ballot.

Mini-K is a twenty-something about whom little is known except his parentage, his good looks, and a brief stay at CSIS, a Washington think tank. He is facing a challenge from a DPJ candidate that is about as far from him as is humanly possible. His “challenger” rose from modest upbringings—he is the son of a truck driver—to become a successful lawyer (note that becoming a lawyer in Japan requires a considerable amount of intelligence and an inhuman degree of time and effort) and has now decided to turn his gifts to making the world a better place for his fellow man. (And if I may say so, the photo on his official web site looks very different from other photos of him taken under less staged circumstances. To put it another way, the official photo looks about as natural as…well, if you’re interested in this subject, I suggest you read this.) Add to this the anti-LDP winds blowing through the nation, and it was no sure thing that Mini-K would be the first past the stile on his first try. Thus, the underdog sales pitch that the denial of official recognition will give him should be a welcome blast of tailwind.

To be sure, there are a couple of downsides to the loss of the LDP seal of approval. First, he won’t have access to LDP campaign funds. But he’ll still be much better off with his dad’s leftover money (yes, the Koizumis can pass it on, tax-free I believe, though I’ll have to check if you insist) and political machine.

…which brings me to my final point. Political allegiance at the local level is more personal than institutional, especially where it involves long-serving Diet Members. It is for nothing that the LDP is sometimes called the 自分党 (Me Party), not the 自民党 (LDP). If anything, the denial of official status will only make the Koizumi political machine work harder for the favorite son. And when he is elected, all will be forgiven as far as the LDP is concerned.

Mini-K does run another, more significant risk. If he loses to the DPJ candidate, he cannot sneak back in by way of a parallel, regional proportional candidacy. But let’s face it; if this guy has long-term political ambitions, he is much better off losing this election to fight another day (when an official LDP candidacy will be all but assured) than sneaking in through the back door. At least that’s how I see it.

Some Thoughts on Ozawa, “Old-School” and the DPJ Policy Agenda

LB’s comment here got me to thinking: What exactly do I mean by old-school? That led me to more thinking about Ozawa and the DPJ agenda. I decided to put my response up as a separate post—as a prelude of sorts to a more scenario-based examination of the post-electoral prospects for a breakaway by LDP dissidents.

First of all, Ozawa’s way with money (if at least some of the allegations appearing in the mainstream media are to believed) and relative disinterest in policy except as the means to electoral power certainly does make him something of a throwback. However, I was using the term “old school” shorthand for a desire to turn the clock back to the pre-Koizumi years, where the construction industry, the post office network and other conservative strongholds provided the money and muscle in return for public funds and protection from competition, while the Self-Defense Forces stayed put on the archipelago. (The reality was of course more complex, but this is close enough of a caricature to serve our purposes here.) The Ozawa DPJ has been making some concessions to these demands, though only in part to accommodate the PNP and the Social Democrats. However, I believe that there is still enough substance in its policy agenda as well as enough distance from traditionally powerful vested interests to distinguish the DPJ from both wings of the status quo from the pre-Koizumi era.

Now Ozawa may not have much interest in the DPJ policy agenda beyond its electoral implications, but he is not ideologically or temperamentally wedded to what I refer to here as old school either. Thus, he is not per se an obstacle to a reformist administration. The old Socialist wing and the labor unions will stake out their own claim, but it’s not as if they have anywhere else to go if they don’t get everything they want. And their intraparty power should be significantly diluted by a DPJ victory in the Lower House election.

Having said that, the Upper House breakdown will give the PNP and the Social Democrats disproportionately strong leverage over a DPJ administration. This is where the potential for a group of LDP dissident to join a more or less reformist DPJ administration comes in. I’m trying to work out a range of election scenarios against which such a turn of events can be projected. It’s going to take time though, and no one’s paying me to do it, so it won’t materialize in the next couple of days.

Ozawa Digs in, Complicating the DPJ’s Road to Victory

I had believed for some time that it was more likely than not that Ichiro Ozawa would bow out gracefully before the Lower House election. After all, the only DPJ Diet members speaking up for him were his diehard followers. Even faithful sidekick Yukio Hatoyama had been talking more like a captain going down with his ship than one who intended to bring it back to harbor. But I had forgotten what a contrarian Ozawa had always been; he’s the little boy who’ll do exactly the opposite of what you tell him to do. Now, the odds are surely better than even that he’ll do his damndest to stay the course. And what’s the reason for changing my mind? Because the DPJ put off the public opinion poll that the media had led the public to believe would—channeling Jason Todd—determine Ozawa’s fate.

The poll had already been postponed before in the wake of the indictment of Ozawa’s political aide in the Nishimatsu scandal—reasonable under the circumstances. Ozawa’s explanation this time around was essentially that all the media attention made a reliable poll all but impossible. Unfortunately for him, this all but guarantees that the media’s focus will pounce on the poll with increased fervor once the DPJ actually gets around to doing it. Trust me, someone in the DPJ is going to once again leak the event. Most important for the political game, it will help the LDP cast the Lower House election as a referendum on Ozawa.

DPJ Wins Nagoya Mayoral Election; Has the Tide Turned?

Not quite. The DPJ survived the 2006 Koizumi landslide to hold on to four out of the four-and-a-half Nagoya seats* in the Lower House. The DPJ also holds four out of the six Upper House seats allocated to Aichi Prefecture. Thus, fifth-term Lower House member Takashi Kawamura of the DPJ was not taking much of a risk to vacate his Aichi First District seat to run, successfully as it turned out, for mayor of Nagoya. The DPJ’s only worry was Ichiro Ozawa, whom it stashed away in the closet during the campaign.

I might have more to say after I see the final tally, but that’s what it is—nothing more, nothing less.

* The LDP has one seat that consists of two other cities and parts of Nagoya. For Aichi Prefecture as a whole, the LDP holds a nine to five edge in single-seat districts.

Great Giin Senkyo Website

I’ve had too many things going on to post the last couple of days, or even to respond to comments. (Sorry). And I might not surface till the weekend. So instead, I’ll do something far more useful (if you can read Japanese) than inflict my thoughts on you and show you what I came across. It’s a no-frills website that has all sorts of useful data on Japanese politics. Sorry, it’s only in Japanese.

That’s all for now, folks.

Three Events to Watch Out for in Ozawa’s Immediate Future

Aso-LDP up, Ozawa-DPJ down in the polls, and the DPJ-favored candidate loses in both gubernatorial elections. The 15/55 trillion economic package is getting mixed results—some analysts think it’s too expensive, others think the money isn’t going to the right places—but at least the ruling coalition is playing the game and going long. Ozawa, unpopular with the electorate even during the best of times, has become an albatross around the DPJ’s neck, a The Other LDP hachimaki wrapped around the head. It is hard to avoid the impression that he could make even his strongest supporters very happy by resigning as party president and concentrating on what he purportedly does best, run the election campaign. In that respect, there are three events that I will be watching.

The first one is the public opinion poll that the DPJ will be taking between April 24-26. The fact that the DPJ has disclosed the event is in itself surprising. We only know of the existence of internal polls through fleeting references in the mainstream media; indeed, to announce it would defeat its purpose if an unbiased assessment had been what was being sought. Note that media polls consistently show a partisan bias—Asahi to the left, Yomiuri to the right—leading most observers to conclude that individually they are useful only for the trend lines. Since the DPJ poll will be a one-off event, it can only be assessed in the context of those media polls. In short, Ozawa and the DPJ will have to do substantially better than the most contemporary Asahi polls to be able to credibly claim that they’ve managed to turn the corner.

The second event is the report from the four-member outside experts commission that the DPJ has set up to look into the accountability of politicians, public prosecutors, and the media. The commission is supposed to issue its report a month from now, in the middle of May. Let me make some guesses about the report. First of all, it will be highly critical of the Public Prosecutors Office for manipulating the media and by extension public opinion by a series of leaks and will demand transparency and accountability. Closely connected to this point will be an indictment of the media for playing along with PPO and failing to discharge its public duty. It may also cast doubt at the legal underpinning of the prosecution’s case against Ozawa’s deputy, but in that case will stop short of explicitly accusing the PPO of bringing a weak case to court just to save face. The report will not spare the politicians, criticizing them for the ruse that they employ to contravene the spirit if not the letter of the law regulating corporate contributions. The brunt of the blow will, implicitly if not explicitly, fall on the LDP—a pox on both houses if you will, with the LDP living out of the much bigger one. Still, it will not sidestep the contrivances of the Ozawa camp; it will be an event that the Ozawa team will be more than happy to put behind…if it can. In any case, what will not be in the report is the kind of wholesale indictment of “the establishment”, i.e. the conspiracy allegations that come from Ozawa’s hardcore DPJ supporters.

The timing of the third event, or even whether it will occur at all, is unknown to the public. Namely, will someone from METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai’s camp be indicted, and if so, when? The mainstream media have been awfully quiet on this front lately; you have to go to the daily tabloids and the weeklies to get a Nikai fix these days. I still have a hard time believing that the PPO can fail to formally charge someone there; if it doesn’t, there is no way that the media will let the matter die quietly—the PPO will have a lot of ‘splainin’ to do. If one or more of Nikai’s people is indicted, Nikai’s resignation will soon follow. A Cabinet Minister serves at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. Besides, there is no political upside for hanging on.

The first and third events, depending on how they turn out, can force Ozawa’s hand. The second event is unlikely to have that kind of force, but it will give Ozawa an opportunity to bow out gracefully in the interests of the Japanese public, the DPJ, and last but not least the greater cause of political change that he claims to serve.

In all this, it is interesting that the international front has all but disappeared from the political agenda. The North Korean missile launch and the administrative fumbling accompanying it and (to a lesser degree) the intricate Six-Party charades around the UN Security Council gave the media plenty of material, and the DPJ made some stabs at knocking the Aso administration for mismanagement. For the electorate, life basically went on as usual. It’s even more about simply going through the motions as far as Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels going up against Somali pirates are concerned, as the DPJ will only do the barest minimum to keep the skittish Social Democrats from bolting.

Finally, if anyone’s really interested, there’s Ozawa’s Ozawa’s 5:00PM press conference.

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The DPJ’s four-member commission consisting of three lawyer and a sociologist, professors all, deserves a closer look. Nobuo Gohara, an ex-prosecutor and corporate compliance expert, has been critical of the Public Prosecutors Office with regard to the Nishimatsu scandal, claiming among other things that the PPO has stretched the letter of the law to cover a situation that it was not meant to cover and ringing the alarm at the political dangers of this self-appointed vigilante role that the PPO is assuming. He has also been highly critical of the media in the past for lies and cover-ups regarding its own fraudulent reporting. Takaaki Hattori is a sociologist specializing in media studies, and is also a strong critic of media cover-ups. He is something of an activist on free speech issues; as such he has not endeared himself to the nationalist-conservative elements of the LDP. However that may be, neither of the two appear to be partisan figures. They appear to be the farthest things from go-to guys for a DPJ whitewash job.

Similarly, I cannot find a way to challenge the integrity and independence of the chairman, Jun Iio. Iio is a prominent political scientist and strong advocate of political change, but far from a DPJ mouthpiece. He has taken a wait-and-see approach to Ozawa’s latest travails, and apparently feels that the LDP regime has run its course in its current reincarnation. However, Ozawa does not appear to be the kind of change that he is looking for. I have no thoughts about the fourth member, a CPA and attorney-at-law.

A Couple of Political Points, Plus One Digression, on the Latest Economic Package

The latest economic package announced by the LDP-New Komeito coalition on Friday identifies two crises precipitated by the global financial and economic crises—the short-term risk that the Japanese economy will collapse and the structural weakness of an export-reliant economy—and proposes a three-step recovery process aimed at avoiding economic collapse (~FY2009 Q3-4), securing an economic recovery (FY2009 Q3-4~FY2010 Q3-4), and putting Japan on a new growth trajectory (FY2010Q3-4~). To that end, the coalition proposes to inject 56.8 trillion yen into the Japanese including yet another supplementary budget with 15.4 trillion yen in “freshwater”, or new money. I have little to say about the economics; the economic analysts themselves are all over the place on that and I’ve seen at least one that appears to be what we in Japan call “cherry blossom”—more on cherry blossoms on a later blog—so why bother adding more noise? Instead, I’ll raise a couple of points on the political side that are sure to be passed over by the media.

Before I do that though, I fail to resist this one digression, a repetition, actually. There is little attention being paid to the 56.8 trillion yen for the overall package of which \41.8 trillion yen belongs to the financial sector, mainly financing for working capital. The authorities themselves have for some time stopped touting the total figures for stimulus packages because the media have tended to criticize them—sometimes rightfully—for inflating the true value of the package and focus on the “freshwater” instead. However, in the current situation, there is a real danger of the business sector being hit by a giant credit crunch as the result of a shrinking cash flow caused by plummeting production and a lending squeeze by skittish banks anxious to avoid the kind of financial crisis that the rest of the “West” is going through. As a measure of how potentially serious the situation is, the authorities have already opened access to “small and medium” enterprise lending facilities to 100% subsidiaries of big businesses—the banks are not, to the best of my knowledge, complaining about the competition. So this time around, the 56.8 trillion yen, or 41.8 trillion yen if you prefer, does means something.

Now, to the politics. The package itself has been put forth as a joint ruling-party/government decision, with the full document available here on the LDP websiteand here on the Prime Minister’s Office website. One point in the full document that is unlikely to be picked up in the media is that the PKO (price-keeping operations for the Japanese stock market) provisions* leave the necessary legislation for consideration by the ruling parties. Now, few legislative bills of substance—that is, bills that have immediate budgetary consequences—that pass into law are submitted by Diet members; instead, most come from the sitting Cabinet, drafted by the ministerial bureaucracy and vetted by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Rarely if ever has a bill that is part of a government policy package been left in the hands of Diet members. The ruling coalition may indeed submit the requisite bills on its own; more likely, it is may only be a political trophy being claimed by the group of stock market-friendly LDP politicians—it is to be noted that the historical relationship between the market and LDP politicians has not always been a wholesome one—pushing this idea, who will toss back a prearranged outline back to the bureaucracy to fill out the details for Cabinet approval and submission. Either way, it surely reflects a genuine reluctance on the part of the ministerial authorities—the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and possibly MOF—who fear contaminating the stock market through politically motivated interventions, and likely signals a subtle shift in power between the political and the bureaucratic. The overall change has been going on for some time now, so the significance of this particular incident should not be exaggerated. Still, (what I believe to be) its formal recognition is notable, and should be recorded as such.

Another point of note and of more political consequence is the fact that it is indeed an economic package of historical proportions, particularly as it comes on the heels of two other stimulus packages and the new regular budget that came into effect a little more than a week ago. Discussion of its appropriateness and adequacy I leave to more learned if divided sources, but I cannot deny the sense of a genuine effort in size and scope to rise to an historical occasion, while the DPJ response is visibly lacking in this sense of political drama. I am, to repeat, incapable of passing economic judgment on its choice; I am quite sure, though, that this will hurt it come the Lower House election.

Incidentally, I’ve asserted that the DPJ’s relative lack of response to the economic crisis can be traced to Ichiro Ozawa’s indifference to policy issues. The latest initiative from the LDP-New Komeito coalition also highlights the enormous gap in policymaking expertise. If DPJ leaders think that a DPJ-led administration can better push its agenda by placing one hundred Diet members into the ministries—effectively doubling the number of political appointees—they are in for an unpleasant surprise.

* ○Utilizing the Bank Shareholdings Purchase Corporation
Preferred shares (preferred capital investment securities), ETF and J-REIT owned by financial institutions and preferred shares (preferred capital investment securities) of financial institutions held by business-operating juridical persons [think non-financial corporation] shall be added to the shares eligible for purchase by the BSPC (necessary legislation to be considered by the ruling parties).
○Responding to the Stock Market
A mechanism for government-related institutions to purchase shares, etc. from the market as extraordinary and exceptional measure shall be established in order to prepare for an exceptional case such as one where a situation continues of a serious obstruction of the price-discovery function of the market (necessary legislation to be considered by the ruling parties). Necessary budgetary measures, such as a \50 trillion yen government guarantee tranche for purchases—shall be taken.
○ 銀行等保有株式取得機構の活用
・金融機関が保有する優先株（優先出資証券）、ETF及びJ-REIT、並びに事業法人が保有する金融機関の優先株（優先出資証券）を買取対象に加える（そのための法律改正を与党において検討）
○ 株式市場への対応
・市場の価格発見機能に重大な支障が生じる状況が継続するような例外的な場合に備えて、臨時・異例の措置として、政府の関係機関が市場から株式等を買い取る仕組みを整備する（そのための法律改正を与党において検討）。借入に係る政府保証枠を50兆円とするなど、所要の予算措置を講じる

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My snarking on the Newsweek article to be continued.

Where’s Nikai?

Toshihiro Nikai, the LDP faction leader and current METI Minister, had been looking like the yin to Ichiro Ozawa’s yang, Chip to Ozawa’s Dale, in the Nishimatsu scandal. But he seems to have dropped out of the media’s sights, even before the weekend frenzy over the North Korean “satellite” launch. (Incidentally, I think that the press coverage was disproportionate to the public’s interest n the subject. Life mostly went on, unless a reporter stuck a mike in front of your face. This contrasts strongly with the abduction issues, where I believe that the public and the media did more feeding on each other.) His story appears to have been relegated to the back pages of a few tabloids. The Nikai side ain’t talkin’; in return, the Public Prosecutors Office has stopped leaking. Or have I missed something?

If someone in his camp is not indicted, it’ll fuel a lot of conspiracy theories. The PPO will have a lot of ‘splainin’ to do. Just sayin’.