Shūchoku Nakagawa Please Stand Up…

…and please…leave the room?

Page one of the evening edition Yomiuri is putting up, as I expected, Masuzoe, Ishiba and Ishihara—the headline belongs, of course, to Hatoyama, but at least they made it to page one without committing a crime, and that should count—and…do my eyes deceive me? Sadakazu Tanigaki? Oh well, so much for my predictive powers. At least Hidenao Nakagawa’s ambitions have been relegated to page two.

What those four men—Masuzoe, Ishiba, Ishihara and Tanigaki have in common, of course, is that none of them lost an SMD election—Masuzoe is an Upper House member. And Big Nakagawa lost. It’s as simple as that. But where’s the right-wing shift that experts have been looking for post-election? Why Tanigaki’s—yes, I find even the speculation hard to believe, though I find him personally so likeable—LDP old school-left to Ishihara’s LDP technocrat-center?

In a word, face. The LDP right does not have a convenient babyface on deck. You can bet that if the LDP right had a Hiranuma in waiting, it would have forced him on the rest of the LDP, and the rest of the LDP would have gone along.

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As if we shouldn’t have expected this from a party that was willing to elect in succession a nativist-moderate (Yoshiro Mori), an opportunist-dove (Junichiro Koizumi), a nationalist-conservative (Shinzo Abe), old-school-dove (Yasuo Fukuda), and a nationalist-moderate (Taro Aso) after the first one turned out to be a PR disaster.

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I’ll get back to that, Ross. But for today, I am whacked, it’s 10 PM already.

The LDP: “Who’s Up Next?”

You’ll be reading all about why the DPJ won/LDP lost, and what tasks it faces in governing/rebuilding. I assume that most of the commentary will be at least plausible—the takeover has been three years in building, with at least many months to coalesce, so there’s a high degree of consensus—and it’s Monday. So I’ll post later if and when I come up with something to add. In the meantime, the side story to the LDP side story:

I think that Shigeru Ishiba is the most natural choice, given his national appeal as an honest broker, defense and agriculture creds, and a moderate/progressive outlook that will not alienate the urban floaters. And he gets to keep Aso’s Akiba crowd. Okay, he’s a little weird, but he's relatively youthful, projects sincerity, qualities that the LDP desperately needs. I’d say Nobuteru Ishihara is highly unlikely to emerge on top, though he will have obvious uses as a babyface. I expect Yoichi Masuzoe to be given a very prominent role, given the need to win the 2010 House of Councilors election. Ichita Yamamoto, another articulate middle-of-the-road HOC member, will also be promoted, at least in the media. Oh, and I think Yasufumi Tanahashi is the favorite to emerge as the U-50 leader, though I see him as more an operator than public face.

It’s my response to an inquiry from a colleague, edited for public consumption. If I’m spot on—something that I’m not too good at—the public face of the LDP will have a geographically balanced rural/provincial/urban profile with a surprisingly moderate/progressive profile. I say “surprisingly” because some experts see a rural, conservative shift, given the drubbing in the metropolitan centers and among the Koizumi Kids.

Let me just add that many LDP elders are returning, and the ones that made it back on the SMD ticket need to be watched to see if they try to reassert their authority. Fat chance, you might think, but I suspect that Yoshiro Mori in particularly will have a hard time stepping aside gracefully.

“The Most Touching Middle School Class Ever?”

Not really; everyone who has not had an unremittingly unhappy adolescence—it is not unknown—knows that he/she is privy to “The Most Touching Middle School Class Ever.” That being said, the YouTube clip is most… fetching, is the word for it, I think.

Yet I couldn’t help notice. Tell me, what do you notice that distinguishes between the two groups of children (Grade 6?) separated by the aisle? Besides the colors of their shirts?

Random Factoids around the LDP Election

Taro Aso won most of the local chapter electoral votes, as I’ve already noted. And he didn’t do too badly with the popular vote either, according to today’s hardcopy Yomiuri. In the chapter-by-chapter voting to award the 141 electoral votes, Mr. Aso took 416,497, while Yuriko Koike came in a distant second at 71,820 votes. Nobuteru Ishihara, Kaoru Yosano and Shigeru Ishiba tallied 60 thousand, 42 thousand and 33 thousand respectively. This means that Mr. Aso won two-thirds of the total popular vote, almost the same as the percentage his share of the overall electoral vote, a coincidence, but notable nevertheless.

A Japanese commentator appeared on BBC (and yes, Chris Hogg made his obligatory homage to the liberal gods by describing Mr. Aso as “right-wing” and “foreign-policy hawk”) and explained that the reason that Mr. Aso all but swept the local chapters was that the locals liked his talk of fiscal stimulus. Perhaps. But note that he also swept urban centers Tokyo, Kangawa, Aichi and Osaka. In fact, the only places where he lost electoral votes were Tokushima, Shimane, Kochi and Tottori, which placed 44th, 45th, 46th and 47th among all 47 prefectures in per capita GDP (FY2005), and you can’t get more chiho than that. That’s right, the LDP members in the four poorest prefectures were the only ones to refuse to pay absolute fealty to the public-works-friendly Mr. Aso. True, Mr. Ishiba won only one electoral vote beside his three Tottori Shimane, favorite-son votes, and that came from neighbor-province Shimane. And I can’t deny that he had the message of the times for the LDP faithful. But you have to also credit his my-time-has-come party favorite status, his tireless stumping in the boondocks, his folksy, voluble, talking style (which irritates Western liberals no end)—all the things that said, we have a chance with this guy going up against Ichiro Ozawa—for his strong showing in all the provinces.

Speaking of foreign policy—more broadly including national security—it was not much of an issue in the LDP election and won’t be in the Lower House election either, unless something of catastrophic proportions happens. North Korea could do another nuclear test, and I don’t think that it will have any effect on the election outcome.

Junichiro Koizumi is an heirloom Diet member (third–generation). Shinzo Abe is an heirloom Diet member (third-generation). Yasuo Fukuda is an heirloom Diet member(second-generation). Mr. Aso is an heirloom Diet member (fifth-generation). That’s a Prime-Minister fourpeat for the LDP Heirlooms; MJ didn’t do it, Kobe hasn’t done it—in fact, you have to go all the way back to Red Auerbach and the 58/59-65/66 Boston Celtics to top it.

The Western media has focused on Mr. Aso’s Roman Catholic faith. In fact, he will be the third Christian Prime Minister in post-WW II Japan, after Tetsu Katayama (1947-48) and Masayoshi Ohira (1978-80), non-Catholics both. That’s three Christians out of 29 PMs, not bad when you consider that only 2 million out of 130 million Japanese are Christians. Sokagakkai has what, 16 million members? And all they get is one measly Minister per Cabinet. I’m pretty sure that you won’t find any Christians among the pre-WW II PMs though.

LDP Election Results in; Aso Near-Sweep of Local Chapters. Not So Cozy with Diet Members

Taro Aso: (local chapter votes 134, Diet member votes 217, total 351)
Kaoru Yosano (2, 64, 66)
Yuriko Koike (0, 40, 40)
Nobuteru Ishihara (1, 36, 37)
Shigeru Ishiba (4, 21, 25)
Total (141, 378, 519)

519 out of 527 eligible votes were cast, of which Mr. Aso won 351. That’s 67.6% of the votes actually cast. He owes this overwhelming majority to the local votes, where he cleaned up 134 out of 141, or 95% of the total. True, a large number of chapters held winner-take-all elections and the proportional chapters also heavily favored the across-the-board frontrunner. Still, the near-sweep was pretty impressive. Among the other four, only Mr. Ishiba apparently managed to carry his own, admittedly small, prefectural chapter. None of the Diet members who voted for any of the four appears to have been able to convince the local chapter to throw its votes to his/her candidate of choice—if he/she tried at all.

Mr. Aso did less well among the Diet members, where 578 out of 386 LDP Diet members cast their vote. He won 217, or 57.4% of the votes, a solid, but not overwhelming, majority. Personal or factional loyalties and policy choices appear to count at this level. This may not carry over to the local level, where national exposure and media coverage has a great effect.

I can easily envisage a situation where an attractive candidate wins a majority against a number of other candidates among the local chapters but only a plurality in the overall vote. Can the other candidates gang up against the public favorite and beat that person in a run-off? Unlikely, I think. We may have a chance to find out, sooner rather than later, if Mr. Aso leads the LDP to defeat in the Lower House election.

Very Briefly, on DPJ Courting of New People’s Party; and the LDP Race

Media reports have DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa meeting People’s New Party head Tamisuke Watanuki today to propose a merger. As quid pro quo in this buyout, Mr. Ozawa will offer a Post Office privatization freeze—another new item for the election platform, whose fiscal implications are unclear—and accept the PNP incumbents as the official DPJ candidates in their districts. At least two of them have felt threatened by the DPJ search for candidates of its own. Does it sound just a little bit like the beginning of a yakuza movie? Love and war, and politics, I guess.

This, like talking up Mr. Ozawa’s possible relocation to Tokyo 12th District to challenge incumbent Akio Oota, the New Komeito chief, may be sound political tactics and certainly has drawn some of the media attention ways from… well, drawn some media attention. But it’s a mixed blessing as far as their strategic implications are concerned. They put the spotlight on the least-attractive, gamesmanship face of the media-shy Mr. Ozawa. Let’s wait and see, though, if Mr. Watanuki, equally seasoned in old school politics, blinks.

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As expected, after Junichiro Koizumi failed to follow up his endorsement of Yuriko Koike with any further show of affection, and as Taro Aso continued to roll up the votes—media estimates already give him an absolute majority of the eligible votes—the media’s interest in the LDP race has been waning.

Taro Aso’s Chankonabe Administration

chankonabe (ちゃんこ鍋) is a Japanese stew (a type of nabemono or one-pot dish) commonly eaten in vast quantity by sumo wrestlers as part of a weight gain diet. It contains a dashi or chicken broth soup base with sake or mirin to add flavor. The bulk of chankonabe is made up of large quantities of protein sources (usually chicken (quartered, skin left on), fish (fried and made into balls), tofu, or sometimes beef) and vegetables (daikon, bok choy, etc). While considered a reasonably healthful dish in its own right, chankonabe is very protein-rich and usually served in massive quantities, with beer and rice to increase the caloric intake. Leftover chankonabe broth can also later be used as broth for somen or udon noodles.

It is not made according to a fixed recipe and often contains whatever is available to the cook
From Wikipedia

There will be no better metaphor for the LDP and Taro Aso’s prospective administration than the all-for-all, all-for-all sumo food chankonabe if “people close to Mr. Aso” talking to Yomiuri are to be believed when they say that he intends to include all four of his rivals in his administration. According to the Yomiuri report, Yuriko Koike will get an important cabinet post, Nobuteru Ishihara will be named to Secretary-General or some other party leadership position, and Kaoru Yosano and Shigeru Ishiba will also be appointed to the Aso Cabinet.

Now the media is replete with political ad balloons during these times, so you should take in such reports with more than a grain of salt. But if you think that this incongruous hodgepodge of hawks and doves, misers, reformists and spendthrifts—one of whom has openly speculated about a post-Lower House election realignment—doesn’t make sense, think again. They want to keep the refueling ships in the Indian Ocean and take the Class-A war criminals out of Yasukuni. They want to take more fat out of government before they raise the consumption tax. They won’t issue deficit bonds to finance the stimulus package; they’ll find the money elsewhere, most notably in the special account reserves—the most fungible part of the “buried treasures”. Yes, the reasoning can vary, and there are different degrees of conviction and commitment. But thrown together in a campaign foreshadowed by a looming Lower House election, the candidates are more and more in tune with each other as the process lurches toward an anticlimactic showdown on 22 September. If the resulting “broth” does not wind up in a “weight gain”, at least it will minimize weight loss by providing something for everybody in the Lower House election. Or so the “people close to Mr. Aso”—indeed, the entire LDP—must be hoping.

Ms. Koike, to her credit, still manages to echo the Koizumian battle cry of no pain, no gain. But without a more expressive show of support from Junichiro Koizumi, it will not be easy for her to assume the role of standard bearer for the reformist wing of the LDP. In fact, she continues to draw as much attention as the potential focal point for a post-electoral splittist movement. During the near-obligatory Sunday Project joint performance by the five candidates, she got most of her air time when the septuagenarian emcee Soichiro Tawara badgered her at length on cross-party political realignment, where she had to keep peeking at her CliffsNotes to make sure that she didn’t go off-message*.

* Ms. Koike’s heavy-footed, talking-points-only act comes across poorly in anything resembling a real debate (or cross-examination), but should be quite effective in the whistle-stop main event, when she can whack away in abandon at the unseen enemy. She wields a big stick. I remind you, though, that this is only one, fairly limited, measure of her overall intelligence and aptitude. Barack Obama, albeit in a very different way, has trouble with the rapid-fire, drive-by mode of political discourse, as opposed to his favorite format of big-crowd oratory. If Ms. Koike is doing her own writing, then she is an effective writer. Mr. Obama, of course, is an even better and more contemplative writer.

Koizumi Bump for Yuriko Koike Looking Smaller

Junichiro Koizumi has not surfaced since his endorsement of Yuriko Koike in the LDP presidential election splashed its way on to the tabloids. The tabloids were still carrying Mr. Koizumi today, but with nothing more than speculation to go on, it looks like it is fast becoming yesterday’s story in the mainstream media.

Mr. Koizumi’s endorsement was never going to change the immediate outcome. But with the now reclusive ex-Prime Minister, Ms. Koike’s appeal will be limited to diehard reform purists.

Koizumi Endorses Yuriko Koike, with Long-Term Implications

Yes, it will be far more exciting for political junkies like me if I turn out to be wrong and Yuriko Koike wins. But that’s the stuff of political fiction, I’m afraid.

We thought the LDP presidential race was all but over with ten days to go, with nearly half the Diet members and the majority of local leaders lining up behind Taro Aso, the Man Who’s Time Had Come. The restless media would be free to turn its attention to other matters during the run-up to the actual vote on the 22nd, such as DPJ efforts to slam the LDP with MAFF’s involvement in the diversion of tainted rice and yet another sordid set of revelations regarding SIA falsification of public pension records. This morning, Junichiro Koizumi changed all that, endorsing Yuriko Koike in response to a plea from a group of Yuriko Koike’s supporters including Seishiro Eto, Ms. Koike’s election chief and Tsutomu Takebe, head of New Wind and diehard Koizumian. This brings instant credibility to Ms. Koike as a Prime Minister candidate, and the media is all over the story.

The endorsement became public in a typically unorthodox fashion, by way of a report by Mr. Eto to a meeting of Ms. Koike’s supporters. According to Mr. Eto, Ex-Prime Minister Koizumi said, “I’m supporting Ms. Koike. I’ll vote for Ms. Koike. If Ms. Koike becomes [LDP] President, we can fight on an equal footing with the Ozawa DPJ.” Another Diet member attending the meeting with Mr. Koizumi added that he told them that they could make his endorsement public and that Diet members should consider whom they could win the election with.

However, this will not change the immediate outcome of the election, and Mr. Koizumi should be the first to realize that. Mr. Kozumi for all his weirdness had been a major figure in party politics—enough to be entrusted with the leadership of the Mori faction while its eponymous leader served an unhappy term as Prime Minister—while the well-traveled Ms. Koike is an upstart outsider. Moreover, the narrative has changed; none of the candidates are giving up reform, but there’s a time for soothing and healing the aches and bruises of the Koizumi reform years and that time is now. Besides, the public is worried about the economy. There may be no gain without pain, but even tightwad Kaoru Yosano is pitching a two-, three-year timeout. The pure Koizumi message, such as it was, will not play well in the provinces.

Having said that, Mr. Koizumi’s endorsement will reverberate through the post-election days, and here we are really talking about the Lower House election. For the LDP-New Komeito coalition, retaining a Lower House majority still leaves the Upper House in opposition hands with almost certain veto power—the coalition is sure to lose its Lower House supermajority. If the DPJ defeats the coalition, it may very well fall short of an outright majority and end up cobbling together a coalition with a motley crew of old-school socialists (Social Democrats) and vested-interests politics (New People’s Party). Even if it does win an outright majority in the Lower House election, it will still need the cooperation of other parties to pass a bill in the Upper House, where it falls short of a majority. In other words, no matter who wins the Lower House election, it is likely that the new administration will have a rough go of it. The public will quickly tire of the kind of political game that has driven the last two sessions in a bisected Diet. One possibility is stepped-up across-the-aisle cooperation, possibly even a Grand Coalition of the kind that Mr. Ozawa envisaged. Another is a dynamic realignment of the political parties.

As recently as last January, Ms. Koike talked openly and enthusiastically about a possible realignment revolving around Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Ozawa. The endorsement of Ms. Koike by Mr. Koizumi—his third reform, the political, as aimed at “destroying the LDP”—in the face of overwhelming establishment support for Mr. Aso, brings that possibility closer to reality.

Interviewed for Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio

Jonathan Gadir interviewed me today for ABC Radio. I hope that I managed to make the following points:

1) The differences within the LDP and the DPJ are much wider than the differences between the two. There are no powerfully compelling political issues that split the nation into ideologically opposed camps of significance.
2) The DPJ in the Ozawa era has disappointed me by moving away from a fiscally responsible position purely for tactical reasons. The media reports this political opportunism and blames it on Mr. Ozawa. The DPJ suffers in the polls for this, even as the LDP flounders.
3) Having said that, competition is a good thing in itself. Moreover, the DPJ, with fewer ties to the vested interests that have accumulated during more than 50 years of mostly LDP rule, may be a better agent of change.
4) A Prime Minister Taro Aso improves the ruling coalition’s chances for victory (which depends, of course, on how you define victory). We’ll see a bump in the opinion polls, which will help it in a early snap election. And as poorly as the LDP is doing in the polls, it still can put its votes together with the New Komeito’s 12-14 percentage point Sokagakkai votes in the 300 single-seat districts.
5) Take your mind off Mr. Aso’s bark and take a better look at his bite. You’ll find that his positions/statements on Yasukuni, the touchstone for Japan-China relations; the Northern Territories, the remaining obstacle to completing the normalization of Japan-Russia relations; and the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, one of the two keystones in the projection of Japanese self-defense capabilities on the global stage, have been remarkably moderate. In any event, what passes for Japanese conservatism is often milquetoast by international standards.
6) Mr. Aso has insufficient gravitas for the Prime Minister’s job. He claims, rightly, economic credentials as a businessman. But a businessman’s perspective is not necessarily the right one for statecraft. Moreover, his policy preferences appear to lean more toward traditional remedies.
6) As for Yuriko Koike (the only other candidate that I was asked to comment on), her main interests were, are, international relations and national security. She has a substantial environment portfolio, but I suspect that it’s an acquired expertise, rather than something that comes from the heart.

I say “hope” because, frankly, I think it came out more like the incoherent ramblings of a couch-potato blogger. I’m not going to listen to it myself; I’m too self-conscious for that. But, in keeping in line with my past actions, I’ll post the link when it comes online in a few days, if only so that you can see if I actually did manage to make those points.

Finally, I offer my humble apology to Mr. Aso for claiming that he has insufficient gravitas for the Prime Minister’s job because he tends to think out loud. Imagine what he would say about my performance.

Can the Faction Leaders Deny Mr. Aso Victory? Highly Unlikely

CORR. 10 September: The 141 local chapter voters will vote in the second-round runoff as well. My mistake. Paradoxically, as a result, I may have to scale back my estimate of the extent of the empowerment of the locals. Let me think it over.

My mind may be clouded by the fact that I am already committed to the proposition that Taro Aso is going to win the LDP election. With that caveat…

There’s a speculative piece on the Sankei website that among other things raises the possibility of faction leaders seeking to maintain their power by managing the voting for the LDP Presidency in a two-candidate runoff. Its reasoning goes like this:

A five-way split of the votes between the likely candidates (Taro Aso, Yuriko Koike, Kaoru Yosano, Nobuteru Ishihara, and Shigeru Ishiba—the media appear to be skeptical about Yasufumi Tanahashi and Ichita Yamamoto meeting the 20-Diet member minimum requirement) may deny Mr. Aso an outright majority of the 528 eligible voters (141 local delegates; 387 Diet members) in the first round of voting. This will throw the election into a top-two runoff by a vote among the 387 Diet members only. At this point, faction leaders will try to reassert their authority in the horse-trading for votes by promises of cabinet and party posts.

I can’t imagine anything that would do a better job of driving away uncommitted voters (whose weight BTW I had been substantially overestimating; but that’s for another time) and bringing the collective wrath of the media on their heads. The local chapters, already unhappy that they are being denied the full 300 votes in a regularly scheduled election, will be beside themselves with anger as well. No doubt nothing would make the DPJ happier. For these reasons, I don’t see it happening unless Mr. Aso manages only a weak plurality against a strong second-place finisher in the local voting—a very low probability scenario in its own right. The following is a highly otaku update on the nuts and bolts that illustrates this point.

All 47 prefectural chapters have committed to selecting their three delegates each through popular vote by eligible voters (local party members and “party friends”. Of these, as of yesterday (6 September), 27 said that they would use the D'Hondt method, a form of proportional voting that in this case gives: 1) the first-place candidate all three electoral votes when he beats the second-place candidate by a margin of more than three to one; 2) the first-place candidate two electoral votes and the second-place candidate one if the first-place candidate beats the second-place candidate by a margin of less than three to one but beats the third-place candidate by a margin of more than two to one; 3) the top three vote-getters one electoral vote each if the margin between first and third is less than two to one. 12 chapters would hold winner-take-all votes, while 8 were undecided.

Yomiuri and Mainichi each conducted a survey of the LDP prefectural chapter leaders (mostly secretary-generals). 20 (Yomiuri) or 21 (Mainichi) supported Mr. Aso, while Mr. Ishihara and Mr. Ishiba received one voice of support each from Fukui and Tottori respectively. (Mr. Ishiba is a seven-time lower house member from one of Tottori’s two districts.) The other 24 or 25 did not express their preferences, but it is clear that there is currently overwhelming support for Mr. Aso at the prefectural leadership level. There is no assurance that the rank-and-file will follow the wishes of their leaders. Still, given his surprisingly strong showing in the last LDP election—admittedly against the much less glamorous party-establishment candidate Mr. Fukuda—and his relentless paddy-whacking efforts before and after his reappointment as party Secretary-General, it is highly likely that the popular vote will also break sharply his way. The three-votes-each rule means that the boondocks are overrepresented; this too will serve the fiscally more expansive and overall more conservative Mr. Aso well. To add to his luck, the local chapters whose leaders are leaning in his favor tend to favor winner-take-all races.

To complete this guessing game, let’s assume that the popular vote goes the way of the local party leaders. Eight of the 12 winner-take-all chapters will go to Mr. Aso; that’s 24 electoral votes. For the 12 chapters favoring Mr. Aso that use the D’Hondt method, assume that they give him two electoral votes each. That’s 24 more electoral votes, bringing his total to 48 from 20 chapters. Even if he fails to gain one electoral vote from Fukui or Tottori—they both intend to use the D’Hondt method—he needs only 23 electoral votes out of the 75, or less than a third of the remainder, from the remaining 25 chapters to win an outright majority of the local electoral votes. Unless the local leadership is totally out of touch with the rank-and-file, nothing short of a felony investigation is likely to derail him at the local level.

Mr. Fukuda’s Rising Popularity before His Resignation

As an answer to my plea, Ross has sent me a NIKKEI graph-and-table that shows Prime Minster Fukuda’s poll numbers making a steady climb after April except for the precipitous drop after the post-Cabinet reshuffle. (Longtime readers with long memories will remember that this was something that I had predicted for 2008. It came months later than I had expected; I plead extenuating circumstances.) But bump itself was anomalous and very much out of line with other media polls. If you take that unscheduled poll out of the equation, Mr. Fukuda’s numbers were improving up until the very end. Ross believes that this disproves any theory that links Mr. Fukuda’s resignation to deteriorating poll numbers. I agree with this, and I don’t have a better answer than his assessment that “it was the uselessness of pushing ahead in the legislative arena that drove his decision.”


Ross poses a couple of interesting questions here: Why did the media miss this? And why didn’t the Prime Minister’s handlers identify the improvement and play it up? I have no answer to the first question, having missed it myself. As for the second one, an insider close to Junichiro Koizumi expressed strong dissatisfaction with the current Prime Minister’s office. So maybe incompetence? Mr. Fukuda’s aversion to self-promotion—I saw it once, up close, while he was out of office—couldn't have helped either.

More, More, More, Said the Media… and the LDP Obliges… What It All Means

I thought that I’d given you all the names of the suspects. Silly me. It turns out that Kunio Hatoyama (59) was never in it in the first place—he’s supporting prohibitive favorite Taro Aso (almost 68)—Sadakazu Tanigaki (63) never got his wagon train rumbling, and Taro Kono (45; mentioned in aside) didn’t find enough people to take him seriously. But…

Yasufumi Tanahashi (45); possibly the most influential leader of the LDP youth movement
Taichi Yamamoto (50); very popular, very articulate*
Shigeru Ishiba (51); popular go to guy on national security

all decided to throw their hats in the ring. Meanwhile, Fukushiro Nukaga (64), giving up hope of obtaining 20 signatures from his co-factionmates, consolidated his perennial almost-ran status.

* Mr. Yamamoto is an interesting phenomenon because he is still an upper house member, so he has zero chance of being elected LDP president. He is clearly positioning himself to move to the lower house and becoming a true Prime Minister candidate.

The immediate effect of all this has been to take some of the the wind out of Yuriko Koike’s (56) sails. The nomadic Ms. Koike’s hopes had been to run her banner up the the Koizumian reformist pole, provide a nice, youthful contrast to Mr. Aso (and the newly septuagenarian Kaoru Yosano) and likely use the occasion to build a real power base for the next spin around the tracks. With three new younger reformists in the ring in addition to the seasoned but still youthful Nobuteru Ishihara (51), she appears to be running into trouble corralling the 20 signatures necessary to put her name on the ballot—already a somewhat risky proposition, given her lack of backbench/rank-and-file support.

All this also generates a little uncertainty for Mr. Aso. All these candidates—assuming they manage to collect 20 signatures each, no certainty there—on the local prefectural ballots will inevitably take some of the popular vote away from Mr. Aso. Although Mr. Aso may, in a piece of political irony, do better on the 141 electoral votes as the result of a wider distribution of the non-Aso popular vote, the results of the popular vote will not be lost on the Diet members, who will feel more free to vote on the candidates of their choice, of whom there are now more to choose from. I still believe that Mr. Aso will win the nomination on the first ballot, but I now see the (admittedly very faint) possibility that the vote will go to a runoff, in which case anything can happen.

In any case, youth will have been heard. We have seen the future, and it is them. That perhaps is the point of it all for the newbie candidates.

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All this, of course, is a problem for the DPJ, where Ichiro Ozawa is running unopposed for reelection as party leader. Mr. Aso already led Mr. Ozawa 30%-8% as the best candidate for next Prime Minister, in a 2-3 September Asahi poll of all things. The DPJ leadership had already reacted poorly to the upcoming LDP race, allowing Yukio Hatoyama to publicly voice concern over the LDP monopolization of media attention, and later forming a committee (no kidding) to counter the threat, all apparently without a game plan. It is far too early to say that the tide has turned, but the odds have improved for an LDP-New Komeito hold on power in the lower house. The DPJ must be hoping that as few of the new wave as possible will make it on to the LDP ballot.

The LDP Presidential Election: Do the Locals Already Own the Process? And What of It?

The following memo addresses a phenomenon that deserves more attention. Perhaps Japanese political scientists and observers already cover this issue extensively and I’m the only one who doesn’t know. Either way, I welcome, as always, your thoughts on this.

The prefectural LDP chapters are complaining that they’re being undercounted in the haste to elect the new LDP president. Younger Diet members sided with the local chapters to no avail. They have nothing to worry about. There’ll be another day to fight that fight; in the meantime, the local chapters already have a much larger voice in the process than mere numbers show, transforming the LDP in the process. Let me explain:

In a LDP presidential election, Diet members—currently 387—each has one vote. Normally, the 47 prefectural chapters are allocated a total of 300 votes (3 each for a subtotal of 141 plus 159 allocated in proportion to the number of party members* in each chapter), which are awarded to the candidates chapter-by-chapter by a proportional form of popular vote among the local party members. When no candidate wins an outright majority, a runoff vote by the Diet members is held between the top two vote-getters. However, when the Presidency is vacated before the end of the term, the joint plenary of Diet members has the choice of calling an emergency and electing a new President by a vote of all Diet members—currently 387—and 3 representatives each from the local chapters—141, as we already saw. The joint plenary chose to do just that, to the chagrin of younger Diet members who wanted to follow normal procedures in accordance with the wishes of local chapters, giving them the full 300 votes.

It is up to the chapters to determine how to choose their representatives. In view of the emergency call—in this case the need to hold a quick election to summon an extraordinary Diet session—the expectation is that the local leadership council would choose the representatives; in fact, 46 out of the 47 chapters have decided to hold popular votes anyway, and the lone exception is expected to reconsider its decision.

This is significant. Back in 2001, Junichiro Koizumi rode a landslide victory in the party-member preliminaries to an upset victory over heavily favored ex-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. The current election rules are the recognition of the importance of the party rank-and-file. In a situation eerily similar to the current one, the 2007 election to replace Shinzo Abe after he gave up power less than a year into his first and only term saw a large number of chapters holding popular votes to determine their representatives. Several Diet members agreed to cast their own votes in line with the popular vote in their electoral districts, enhancing the clout of the local rank-and-file. This is possible because the results of the popular vote are disclosed before the Diet members cast their vote. Mr. Aso threw a scare into the leadership-favorite Yasuo Fukuda by winning 65 out of the 141 local votes. He fared much worse with the Diet member vote (132-254), though it was still impressive, considering that all the factions except his own had endorsed Mr. Fukuda. If all the chapters had held popular votes, Mr. Aso might actually have won the popular vote, where he did particularly well. This in turn would surely have thrown the outcome 386 Diet member votes into doubt as well.

This time around, most, likely all, of the chapters will hold popular votes, making a mockery of the “emergency” rule. It is likely that the rule will be changed posthaste to reflect this new reality, further enhancing the power of the chapters.

It won’t matter much in this election; Mr. Aso is a virtual shoo-in, no matter what the rules. The leadership in half of the chapters are already reportedly supporting him and he is if anything even more popular with the foot-soldiers. The last election shows that he has substantial support among the Diet members as well. But we can do a thought experiment. In the unlikely event that say, Nobuteru Ishihara tops the popular vote, it will be difficult for the Diet members to deny him victory in a runoff—there are now at least four credible candidates whose names are likely to be on the ballots on the 22 September; Mr. Aso is the only one who has a chance of winning on the first ballot—that excludes chapter representatives. In other words, local party members have become the virtual determinant of the LDP President. A subsequent rule change will only formalize the shift.

This has important implications for the political process in general. First of all, it all but eliminates the already dwindling power of the factions to determine the LDP leadership. Second, it strengthens the already considerable power of the LDP president over the other LDP Diet members. Last but not least, it amplifies the voices of local, often vested interests. I believe that these three factors all work to rejuvenate the LDP in the political game. Many factions are unlikely to endorse any candidate this time around. We already saw Mr. Koizumi impose his will over Post Office privatization. In an early era, Mr. Abe would not have been allowed to linger after his disastrous 207 campaign. An empowered rank-and-file will, among other things, help replace the loss of the post office electoral machine and the weakening of the construction businesses. However, I am far less sure of the impact on statecraft, particularly of the last point.

* “Party members” include members of two affiliate organizations.

Ross has some startling information on Fukuda’s poll numbers. I wonder if he’ll let me blog it, if he’s not saving it for clients.

It’s Now or Never for Yuriko Koike

Yuriko Koike must stand for the LDP Presidential election, and I think that she will. She’ll lose, but it doesn’t matter; it’s her only chance to become Prime Minister. Someday. And when it’s fight or flee, she fights. Let me explain:

Yuriko Koike has latched on to a succession of political leaders; that’s how she’s made it to here. The downside of this nomadic career path is that she lacks a readymade group of Diet members to support her, and has failed to built up street cred with the LDP ward heelers (rice-planting experience with paddywhackers?). With her political clock ticking—she is 56—it’s time for her to make a move. The LDP leadership race and the sooner-rather-than-later Lower House election give her an opportunity to satisfy both her needs.

Everybody realizes that this LDP election is Taro Aso’s to lose, and the campaign period—12-22 September—is too brief to expect Mr. Aso to make a gaffe big enough to blow it all. But what’s the use of an uncontested election? The LDP will benefit from the media buzz from a clean fight, while the DPJ will struggle to keep itself in the media’s inbox. So, with little to lose and a lot to gain, the LDP will welcome an internal challenge; all she has to do to erase any lingering resentment is to act the gracious loser and vow to do everything to return the ruling coalition to power. In the meantime, she has established herself as the babyface of the Koizumian movement.

And work she will, since she is—assuming that she follows my advice—going to campaign in the Lower House election for all first-termers, the Koizumi kids, who want her to swing her chariot their way. Let’s say that only one-third of the 83 Koizumi children make it back and that she has gone to bat for all of them. That’s 28 Lower House Diet members who will be indebted to her. If half of them decide to support her post-Aso, add her seat to the mix and, right there, that’s 15 in the Lower House alone—more or less the size of a starter-pack LDP faction.

Helping others while neglecting her own campaign could be costly. But the extended attention in the national media that she will draw for her efforts should make up for some of the touchy-feely time that she will be unable to devote to her local constituency. And if she does wind up losing her own seat, she becomes a martyr. Regain her seat in another two, three years, and the people—and their local-yokel volunteers and assemblymen—that she helped out will be even more beholden to her.

At least that’s the way I see the value of this race. Or rather, the way—I think—that a risk-tolerant politician is likely to see it.

Taro Aso and the Competition… Plus, the Supermajority Override

In case anyone is wondering…

Taro Aso’s positives:

1) Taro Aso managed a highly respectable finish in the 2007 LDP Presidential election with a hard-earned take of 197 votes (132 Diet members, 65 local chapter votes) against Mr. Fukuda’s 330 (254 Diet members, 76 local chapter votes), despite the fact that every other faction formally sided with Yasuo Fukuda as the “safe” establishment candidate.
2) Mr. Aso joined the Fukuda team as Secretary-General, second in command to Mr. Fukuda. He has subsequently been anointed by the LDP kingmaker Yoshiro Mori as the Prime Minister’s heir-apparent.
3) Mr. Aso gets along with the increasingly skittish junior coalition partner New Komeito.
4) Mr. Aso is a good campaigner and the most popular Prime Minister candidate in public opinion polls, easily outpolling Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ leader.

The negatives:

1) Mr. Aso has not always acted according to the wishes of the Fukuda administration, signaling early on his willingness to drop the extension of the counterterrorist refueling operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force and adopting a personal income tax relief/cash payout as part of the economic stimulus package, both in line with New Komeito wishes.
2) Mr. Aso is known for his loose lips, and some of his utterances have been quite off-the-wall.

The alternatives, in descending order of likelihood:

1) Yuriko Koike: A two-time Cabinet Minister under Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, she became one of the first and surely most celebrated “assasins” in the 2005 Lower House election when she famously switched districts to unseat, successfully, a Post Office rebel. For a former newscaster, she is a surprisingly uninspiring debater—she does better with sound-bites. Now, the media is touting her as a stalking horse for Hidenao Nakagawa and his band of diehard Koizumians. The well-travelled Ms. Koike has usually had her way with alpha dogs from Morihiro Hosokawa (Nippon New Party) to Ichiro Ozawa (New Frontier Party) to Ichiro Koizumi (LDP), but her popularity with lesser party lights and the rank-and-file is suspect. It is telling that she has not held down any significant party posts. She also botched the dismissal of her deputy when she was Defense Minister.

2) Kaoru Yosano: The troubleshooter of choice for fiscal conservatives, he is a weak campaigner, who lost his Lower House seat as an incumbent Cabinet Minister just when he was emerging as a possible future Prime Minister candidate. He turned 70 on 22 August, and suffered from serious health problems last year, not a good omen after two successive Prime Ministers have walked away from the seat of power, one of them at least partly for health reasons, in less than a year.

3) Sadakazu Tanigaki the ripe old age of age of 63, he still has the look and, worse, feel of a well-behaved little boy. He recently merged his micro-faction with Makoto Koga’s much larger one. He has all the appearance of a man who is too nice to win.

4) Nobuteru Ishihara: At age 51, he is still young enough in the LDP at least to be counted as an up-and-comer. He enjoys something of a celebrity status, mainly because of his association with his best-selling writer-turned-politician father, the charismatic Shintaro Ishihara. Often portrayed as a conservative in the gaijin media, he recently gave up his independent status and joined the China-lovin’, North Korea-coddlin’ Takui Yamazaki’s mid-tier faction. Like the other LDP policy-wonks of his generation—Shinzo Abe no exception—he has not managed to escape the impression of being the victim of a case of arrested development.

5) Kunio Hatoyama: He appears here only because his name appeared in the media. He is well on his way to becoming the Harold Stassen of Japanese politics, without ever being Harold Stassen IYKWIAS. (If Kunio Hatoyama is here, can Taro Kono be far behind?)

Th-th-th-th-that’s all, folks! G’night!

PS: If I were a betting man and betting were legal in Japan, I would bet that a Prime Minister Aso would be using the supermajority override to pass the consumer protection agency, while allowing the JMSDF refueling operations (and Japan’s permanent UNSC membership ambitions) to die a quiet death. My guess is that there are enough NGOs and their lawyer advocates who would prefer to have a friend in the bureaucracy like Mr. Fukuda’s CPA instead of a competitor like the DPJ’s independent government ombudsman to provide cover for an override.

The death of the refueling operations is a less sure thing: if it were my decision to make, I would go for broke; I think that there is enough of a sense of national pride—witness the outpouring of public grief and sympathy for Kazuya Ito, the 31 old NGO volunteer that was murdered in Afghanistan, as well as for every Japanese that died in Kampuchia and Iraq during public service—to gain political points if Prime Minister Aso decided to push the extension legislation in the face of an Upper House veto. In the media, Yomiuri and Sankaei would support him. I want to see how far New Komeito is willing to bend to cover his ass with regard to the LDP right before I really make up my mind.

Soichiro Tawara Revives Two Year-Old Story about Ichiro Ozawa's Money Issues and Yukio Edano Is Furious

Sunday Project features four policy wonks, Nobuteru Ishihara (LDP), Yukio Edano (DPJ), Yosuke Takagi (New Komeito), and Akira Koike (Japan Communist Party), to sock it out, right after the Plenary sessions, just before the Diet committees begin their work. Other things being equal, Mr. Edano would be running circles around Mr. Ishihara. Unfortunately for the DPJ, Mr. Edano is one of the most anti-Ozawa politicians in Japan, never mind the DPJ, and it shows. He makes it clear that he disagrees with Ichiro Ozawa on the Japanese anti-terror operations in and around Afghanistan, and the most he is willing to do is to explain Mr. Ozawa's position on Japanese presence in Afghanistan. In doing so he splits a legal hair by pointing out that Mr. Ozawa has stated that he wishes to have Japan participate in ISAF operations when he assumes power, but has not said he actually will.

That sounds very much like damning with faint praise. But it was nothing compared to Mr. Edano's act when the talks came around to political financing.

Now Prime Minister Fukuda has been having money issues of his own. His office has had to reacquire and resubmit approximately a hundred receipts that it altered inappropriately, and forced to return political donations from a construction company that relied heavily on public works contracts and a company in which foreigners (in this particular embarrassing case, North Koreans) held a majority stake. However, before it gets interesting, host of the show Soichiro Tawara, the cruelest septuagenarian this side of Uncle Scrooge, whips out a panel, which, together with further explanations, reveals:

When Mr. Ozawa's Liberal Party was dissolved and merged into the DPJ in 2003, the LP donated 1.3 billion yen to the Kaikaku Kokumin Kaigi (Reformatory People's Conference; yes, I know, but it sounds awkward in Japanese too), a political organization over which Mr. Ozawa had substantial control. The money included 0.56 billion yen of the political funds given to the LP under the Political Party Assistance Act. Moreover, just two days before the LP was dissolved, DPJ gave 0.3 billion yen, just like that.

This matter first came out on 2 February 2005, when Katsutoshi Matsuoka (yes, the MAFF Minister who committed suicide as allegations of irregularities and possible criminal acts piled up) raised it in the House of Representatives Budget Committee. The Kaikaku Kokumin Kaigi appears to be doing nothing particular these days, other than to sit on a pile of cash.

Mr. Edano is furious to learn this, because he was the DPJ Policy Research Council Chairman at the time but was not told anything at the time about the 0.3 billion yen gift to the soon-to-be-disbanded Liberal Party. In fact, he appears to be claiming that this is the first time he's heard about the Kaikaku Kokumin Kaigi itself. He says repeatedly that the DPJ has no right to attack the Fukuda administration on political financing issues unless it gives a satisfactory explanation, and vows to get to the bottom of the matter. And it is on that note this particular segment of the program ends. (The JCP, the only party that has elected to decline the public money, makes the more general point that unused public money should be returned to public coffers, but is understandably ignored by the other parties.)

Mr. Ozawa is in many ways old-school LDP, more so, actually, than any of the Tokyo-native, second-, third-, fourth-generation, neotenous contenders in the LDP. And this is, in fact, the second money issue that has been raised against him this year, and the other one also involved a large amount of loose money. The renewed accusations, though there appears to be nothing illegal about them, are strong incentives to make himself even scarcer in the Diet - he has been as elusive as Kim Jong Il during the Plenary sessions – and in the public eye; not exactly the kind of leadership that is conducive to a DPJ that is struggling to distance itself from the LDP without looking irresponsible while papering over significant internal policy differences and personality clashes.

(note) The precise facts and figures cited by Mr. Matsuoka were:
(24 September 2003)
DPJ gives LP 295,540,000 yen.
(26 September 2003; day of the DPJ-LDP merger)
LP gives Kaikaku Kokumin Kaigi 745,899,041 yen.
LP gives Kaikaku Kokumin Kaigi 560,964,143 yen in public funds that it has received under the Political Party Assistance Act.

TIME Did It Again, This Time on the LDP Election

"Abe's failure to address [many important issues, including the handling of over 50 million lost pension records, rural economic stagnation and tax reforms] cost his party control of Japan's upper house, and yet like their fallen predecessor, both Fukuda and Aso preferred to highlight their foreign policy differences — Fukuda called for open talks with Japan's neighbors, while the hawkish Aso took a conservative stance on the Yasukuni war shrine, a sore point in Asian relations. Both favored postponing a general election until next spring; both have also inherited Abe's insistence on continuing Japan's support of coalition forces in Afghanistan through its refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.
[…]

[W]ith Fukuda still unclear on how he intends to solve Japan's domestic economic issues, the LDP has until next spring's general elections to prove it can answer to the country's needs."
"
- TIME, 23 September 2007/09/27

I had started writing a post about how bad the article was, ran out of time, and left it in my draft file. Somehow, news on the Fukuda administration's poll numbers reminded me of it, so I dug it out. It would be a waste of time; it would be too long. So above you see what I think is the most egregious stretch of bad journalism.

If the correspondent had bothered to read the policy manifests of the two candidates, she would have known that that ["preferred to highlight their foreign policy differences note: later added for clarity while excising repeated sentence in the excerpt"] was the farthest thing from the truth. Then why did it appear as if they were talking about those subjects? Because those were the things the media chose to ask the candidates and highlight. Blame your Japanese colleagues. It's like Al Gore inventing the Internet.


As a matter of fact, in Mr. Aso's case, this point in the article has more than an echo of Al Gore's misfortune. If the correspondent had bothered to read this and this, she would have known that Mr. Aso has a very different view of what we should do about Yasukuni from, say Shoichi Nakagawa, and is, among other things, quite open to the idea of taking out the Class A War Criminals.

In passing, I'll mention that the general election is scheduled for September 2009. It's actually quite significant, at least to me, because Mr. Fukuda has never said that he will call an election in spring. He's been coy, if you listen to him carefully. I think that it will be later, and in any case when he thinks it's the right time to go to the public.

As you can see, there was nothing really wrong with the ending (except the writer's presumption that Mr. Fukuda must call an election in spring). But you don't need a whole error-filled article to say it.

As you can see, there was nothing really wrong with the ending (except the writer's presumption that Mr. Fukuda must call an election in spring). But you don't need a whole error-filled article to say it.

And the Winner Is… Makoto Koga? and Other Post-LDP Election Trivia

"…When I requested a meeting with Ichiro Ozawa, head of the DPJ, I had decided to resign, in view of my health. On that basis, I had intended to ask him to build a relationship of trust."
- Shinzo Abe, Sept. 24 press conference

At first, I am thinking, is he nuts? Did he really think giving himself up would convince Mr. Ozawa to stop trying to knock the LDP out of power? Then I realize that Mr. Abe is channeling those medieval warlords and - dare I say it? - our previous Emperor, who offered their lives in order to save their people. Still, this is odd; The LDP may have lost the battle, but, with an overwhelming majority in the decisive Lower House, it certainly hasn't lost the war. President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor seeking truce with Japan by offering to commit seppuku? Hmm, still doesn't quite work.

As new election czar, Makoto "I Am Prettier than Tamisuke Watanuki but Not as Cute as Shizuka Kamei" Koga wrests substantial power out of the hands of the Secretary-General, effectively making the LDP party leadership The Big Four instead of The Big Three. Post-Upper House election reports said that Mr. Koga had refused Prime Minister Abe's request to be the General Council Chairman, the least powerful among The Big Three. Asked by Yasuo Fukuda, he refused again, instead, asking for and getting the election portfolio.

Let's see: Secretary-General, Bunmei Ibuki, 69; Toshihiro Nikai, General Council Chairman, 62; Sadakazu Tanigaki, 62; Makoto Koga, 67. Well, at least they're all younger than the Prime Minister…

The LDP and the New Komeito leadership meet and agree to require receipts for all expenditures regardless of amount (there is currently a \50,000 floor for declaring individual expenditures). Prime Minister Abe had pushed the idea before the election, but had let it slip as his power continued to deteriorate. I thought that would be disastrous, tantamount to sticking out your neck, then giving Mr. Ozawa a sledgehammer. This is a smart, if obvious, move.

The Foreign Ministry looked like the only plausible place to put Taro Aso. Now it is opening up, as current Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura is switching to Chief Cabinet Secretary. True, there are philosophical differences between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Aso, but exogenous constraints (make nice with China, make nice with the US, keep hands and eyes on abductees issue, etc.) will confine any dissonance to symbolic, not substantive, quarters. Besides, what did Lyndon B. Johnson say about Edger J. Hoover? Long-time readers of my blog know, of course, that my predictive powers are on a par with Sylvia Brown and Uri Geller…

ADD. You know, Tobias Harris makes a good point about Mr. Aso here. No, I mean here. Actually, I thought that there would be a very high likelihood that Mr. Fukuda would offer the post, but it appears from the Sankei link that Mr. Aso is saying that if offered, he will not serve We'll know soon.

Mr. Fukuda Is the Next Prime Minister

Just before the vote, the newscaster divulges the outcome of the Prefectural chapter votes; Yasuo Fukuda has a comfortable though not overwhelming 76 to 65 edge. So there goes the last vestige of what little suspense remained, and you have what must be the most boring secret vote in TV history, if you want to watch.

Yes, secret vote. Imagine; the LDP Diet members, mostly men, grown ups all (there's you-know-who, but otherwise), are afraid to stand up and be counted.

Final tally: Fukuda 330, Aso 197 (one vote is void). So the Diet members went: Fukuda 254, Aso 132.

note: For what it's worth, the Yomiuri survey of the Diet members had given Mr. Fukuda 263 votes as of yesterday.

Mr. Aso must be feeling wistful; at 67, this is very likely his last hurrah, unless Mr. Fukuda fails badly and the LDP needs a caretaker Prime Minister for an early general election. Still, in an uphill battle against most of the leadership in the factions, he has fought a good fight, made a very respectable showing, yet has not quite embarrassed Mr. Fukuda either. This makes it easier for everybody to kiss and make up; in fact, they'll have to.

Mr. Fukuda delivers a brief speech, appropriately humble, thankful, determined. He tells the audience… Wait, are they… Yes, those are Diet members, arms extended, snapping I-Was-There pictures on their cell phones… The new LDP President tells the audience that he wants to revive an LDP in deep difficulties with everybody's help and recover public confidence in it. Later, Mr. Aso joins him on stage; the two greet each other warmly, they all do the customary three banzais for Mr. Fukuda, and suddenly, it's all over.

So, restructuring continues, with a human face. Achieving primary balance by FY 2011 is still in, and expanding public works is still out. Combine this with his dovish outlook, and we have a Koga-Tanigaki-Yamazaki-Koizumi-(yes, Koizumi)-friendly Prime Minister on deck. Mr. Fukuda will fill out his statecraft package when he delivers his first policy statement address; after he is elected Prime Minister by the Diet and anointed by the Emperor, and assembles his Cabinet. (He is expected to maintain all or most of the main players there; which is unlikely for the party leadership, beginning with Mr. Aso, the Secretary-General.) I only wish that I'll have something interesting to say when he does that.

The first item on the Prime Minister to-do list is, of course, pushing a counter-terrorism extension bill. Mr. Fukuda has steadfastly refused to say that he'll resort to the supermajority override. I firmly believe that this is merely part of the LDP charm offensive, beginning right after the Upper House election, when Nobutaka Machimura and other party worthies talked up the DPJ and even hinted at a Grand Coalition. This has continued with Mr. Fukuda's repeated talk of a negotiated Lower House dissolution (hanashiai kaisan)and general election, depending on prevailing sentiment after the FY 2008 budget is passed. (I still believe that it won't happen until well into the summer, and possibly later.) When the moment comes, however, he will, reluctantly and with no ill will of course, pull the trigger.

ADD. Mr. Fukuda has been elected to complete Mr. Abe's term as LDP President, which ends on 30 September 2009. According to party rules, he can (theoretically) serve two full three-year terms after that.