Everything Has a Price, Even South Korean Fishing Boats

“North Korea to free seven fishermen detained last month”. Would you believe it; they’re returning the boat too? While the United States is still waiting for the Pueblo…

The move comes at a time of a slight thaw in tense relations on the peninsula. South Korea announced last week that its Red Cross would donate $8.4 million to help with flood aid in the North.

Oh.

South Korean Probe Unlikely to Settle Dispute over Warship Sinking: Really?

The government's preliminary findings released in May were attacked as amateurish and crude by some South Korean–born scientists concerned that flawed science could be used to escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Oh wow. But wait:

”To me, this challenges the integrity of science,” Seung-Hun Lee, a physicist at the University of Virginia, tells TIME. “They say they reached these conclusions that have enormous consequences on the political and international stage. As a scientist and scholar, I felt it was my duty to check their conclusion.” Lee says bluntly that the government's conclusions are “absurd.”

But whatTIME fails to tell us is that Professor Lee’s area of expertise is solid state physics. He’s an expert “on strongly correlated materials such as non-conventional high temperature superconductors, quantum magnets, frustrated spin systems, magnetic molecules, and multiferroics,” not a “physicist” in the popular sense, that is, someone who is used to thinking about things that make big bangs or what happens to stuff around them when they do. In other words, nothing in his background suggests that he has anything meaningful to say about the case, which point being obvious from the next citation:

The residues that the governments say were caused by the blast “have nothing to do with the explosion, but are just aluminum hydroxide that can be naturally formed by corrosion when aluminum is exposed to water for a long time,” Lee says. He adds that he doesn't know why Seoul and Washington would invent such a scenario to explain the sinking. “That's a political thing that's beyond me,” he says.

This means that the aluminum hydroxide could have been formed naturally by corrosion, but why can he be so sure that it has “nothing to do with the explosion”? After all, aluminum hydroxide is only one of the pieces of evidence that the South Koreans produced. But at least Professor Lee is a “scientist.”

J.J. Suh, a professor and director of Korea Studies at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., also doesn't believe the government's story.

What TIME fails to tell us is that Associate Professor Suh is a political scientist and is a strong advocate of the Sunshine Policy that current President Lee Myung-bak rejected.

Of course the South Korean probe is unlikely to settle the dispute over the warship sinking. In that respect, “it certainly has echoes of conspiracy theories like those surrounding the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy.” And the moon landing. And the Holocaust. And the Nanjing Massacre… the list goes on. So I guess my question is: Are things that desparate at TIME magazine?

Actually, I’m giving Professor Lee the benefit of the doubt and willing to assume that he has more to say on this. And he’d better, because there are a good number of real experts whose integrity he has maligned. (Assistant Professor Suh doesn’t count; he’s not a real scientist.)

Addendum (August 19): My heartfelt apologies to Professor Seung-Hun Lee and TIME magazine. I should not have posted at all, or better, should have followed my usual procedure when I come across any interesting anomaly and gone to the source. Here, by Lee, and here, coauthored by Lee and Panseok Yang, are two papers that cast strong doubt on a key part of the evidence in the South Korean government’s yet-to-be-published report on the sinking of the Cheonan. Specifically, they point to serious discrepancies between the data for material taken from the ship and the torpedo on one hand and the data from material taken from a test explosion on the other as well as that undermine

But his logic is sound throughout, and any errors in his science should be easily refutable (or verified) by his peers and, where required, more tests. He also acknowledges that his argument do not disprove the South Korean government’s conclusion that a North Korean torpedo sank the Cheonan. However, it would knock out a significant piece of evidence behind the claim. I look forward to the release of the report, which should be forthcoming soon.

Again, my apologies. This is not the first time I’ve done such a thing, and it won’t be my last. But it’s been a good lesson. In the meantime I was prompted to read a couple of fascinating investigative documents, and that is a good thing in itself.

Addendum II (August 19): Now that I have time to elaborate on my mea culpa, let me state that I do agree with Janne’s comment about a scientist’s expertise extending his specific area of expertise, but only up to a point. For example, I would not take Professor Lee’s word over those of, say, experts on underwater explosions on the macrcophysical consequences of the event such as the dispersion pattern of fragments of the ship and its equipment and the possibility of some parts of the torpedo surviving the blast fairly intact. An explosion is an uneven and in many ways unique event: not the sort of phenomenon that a solid state physicist is likely to be very familiar with. This weakness actually shows in the experiment that he performed (see the second paper), substituting fine crystalline aluminum powder and 40 minutes of exposure to high-temperature for substantial aluminum pieces subjected to the extreme heat and pressure of a split-second explosion. This is a point that Lee’s detractors are sure to point to. But my focus in on his first document, where he uses the tools of his trade and his specific expertise to expose what appears to be serious shortcomings in the reports claims. And I have to see the full report. (The official announcement was only five pages long).

And yes, Paxy, I had been inclined to believe the South Korean government—for two reasons. First, I thought that there were too many people involved in the incident and the report to maintain a conspiracy in a democratic state. Second, the survey brought in overseas experts, making a cover-up even more difficult. But Lee’s papers have sown the seeds of doubt in my mind. So I’m looking forward to the report.

Our New York Philharmonic Visit against Your Presidential Inauguration, Says North Korea

Go to the New York Philharmonic website and look up its Asia 2008, “a five-city, eleven-concert tour, February 11–24, 2008, the first under the aegis of Global Sponsor Credit Suisse. The Orchestra begins in the south, with return visits to Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Hong Kong, and will make its debut in Shanghai before concluding the tour in performances in Beijing.” So it’s actually “The Chinas 2008”*.

But where’s Pyongyang? You know, the North Korean invitation, issued and accepted in balmier times, before the Six-Party Agreement, Second Phase, year-end deadline? But a mouseover at the NY Phil calendar tells you that on February 26 the orchestra is “On tour: Korea, 6:00 PM”. Click through, and you reach this, where you finally learn the details of the Pyongyang concert.

It could be mere coincidence that the event is being staged on the very day after South Korean President-Elect Kim Myung-bak’s inauguration ceremonies on February 25? After all, the Pyongyang date has been scheduled most conveniently, right after the Asia 2008 tour.

I doubt it. It is even more convenient for Kim Jong Il and the rest of the North Korean leadership to be able to beat the drums and issue the fanfare We Matter, right on the heels of the South Korean event. And no doubt about it, they will flood their domestic news outlets with reports not only on the concert itself but of the orchestra’s arrival, procession and whatever else by way of encouraging tidbits that they can squeeze out of the timely trip.

These grandmasters of spin never leave such matters to chance, for it is by stringing together these little tactical victories that they maintain their self-delusionary visions of strategic victory. It is, literally, a matter of life and death.

* Of course they couldn’t call it that, and they had to make it short and snappy; thus, Asia 2008. Compare to Japan Korea 2006. These people are mindful of the politics, since they have to mind the sensibilities of all sorts of donors and subscribers.

Professor Shigemura Thinks Three=North Korea+US+China, Not North Korea+South Korea+US

Toshimitsu Shigemura, the Korea expert, said unequivocally that Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong Il could not agree on the inclusion of South Korea in an ultimate peace agreement that would formally end the Korean War.

Maybe I shouldn't have been so accepting of the common view after all. Now that I think about it, it is absurd to think that North Korea would dare to keep China out of the final deal. This would also prove that Mr. Kim is in control of his faculties after all.

And for this, Mr. Roh gets a 20% bump in his popularity?

Kim Jong Il; Crazy, Crazy as a Fox, or Both?

I wondered here what was up with Dear Leader. At first glance, North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il was still on top of his game. During the three day summit with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, he:

a) kept his intents unknown until he did show up after all, to greet a relieved Mr. Roh, at the reception ceremonies on the latter's arrival in Pyongyang;

b) absented himself - somewhat against speculation - from the Arirang Mass Games, and instead let Kim Young Nam, figurehead Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, host Mr. Roh as they joined the masses in the glorification of Dear Leader and his father in gaudy cutout displays;

c) joked during the second day meetings about the concerns (hopes?) that his behavior had caused in the West; and

d) declined Mr. Roh's invitation to visit him in Seoul – the time is not ripe – offering to send Kim Young Nam his stead

while Mr. Roh went out of his way to praise Mr. Kim and, more generally, the North Korean regime throughout his visit. All in all, Mr. Kim made lame-duck President Roh look decidedly the overeager-to-please junior partner – Mr. Kim is the older of the two, a not unimportant distinction in these Confucian societies – over the course of the proceedings.

And what did Mr. Roh get in return? Well, he got Mr. Kim to agree to include South Korea in the ultimate conversion of the long-standing truce in the Korean War to an agreement for everlasting peace between the "three states or four states". This is not insubstantial, since what Mr. Roh gave up (beyond what he and his predecessor have already done) amounted to face. (This assessment of course accepts the common view the "three states" excludes China, not South Korea, which had been the traditional posture of North Korea.) Still, given that the main stage for this is the U.S.-North Korean bilateral WP in the Six-Party Talks and it is inconceivable that the U.S. can agree to a deal on the Peninsula without South Korea signing on, the entire deal has little more impact in the real world than to reinforce the impression that South Korea, at least under President Roh, is in the North Korean camp when it comes to its views on North Korea as an enduring threat.

(note) The mercurial Syngman Rhee, South Korean President at the time of the Korean War, boycotted the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and the North Koreans have used that to shut South Korea out of its formal dealings with the U.S.

So, it can be reasonably argued that Kim Jong Il knew exactly what he was doing throughout, and had merely been throwing in his well-practiced bag of political illusion tricks.

And yet, I cannot shake the image of the disinterested, distracted Mr. Kim on the first day, nor, on the second day, of the way he leaned somewhat forward and looked sidewise and up at the one man sitting beside him, almost as if to seek his approval, as they sat at an inordinately wide table, facing Mr. Roh, sitting alone on the other side. Then there is the final, second day photo op after the signing of their joint declaration, where after Mr. Roh goes hand-in-hand with Mr. Kim and proudly raises them like two boxers after a hard-fought draw. When the hands are lowered, even as a still joyful Mr. Roh turns toward his counterpart, an expressionless, Mr. Kim casually turns the other way. Were these calculated put-downs of a junior counterpart, a presumed tributary, and/or displays of feigned weakness - alternating with an alert, at times even mildly jocose, persona – employed to put Mr. Roh and his handlers off-guard? Or the inevitable and frequent mood swings of a deteriorating mind? In this light, even his surprise, second-day invitation during the morning session to an extra day for informal discussions, only to be rescinded near the end of that session, leaves me to wonder, was it a gambit tossed out only to be casually declined, or the wandering thoughts of an old man.

And there is more than prurient, tabloid fascination – to which I admit freely – that draws me to this question. Totalitarian-authoritarian regimes are notoriously poor at handling succession. The problem is eased greatly when the sovereign enjoys a good measure of legitimacy and there is a determinate line of succession. In North Korea, the former is arguable, the latter dubious. If the Dear Leader's mind slips away before he is able to firmly install one of his sons to replace him when he departs for that Great Big Mt. Baekdu in the Sky, there is a good likelihood that succession will be messy and, until a successor is firmly entrenched, the North Korean leadership will become even more insular and unpredictable. And Japan, if anybody, is firmly in the sights of North Korean missiles and is the least illogical among potential targets under what must be North Korea's increasingly irrelevant WMD strategy.

Frankly, I am of three minds.

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Commercial for Eurasia Group head Ian Bremmer: If you are interested in knowing more about authoritarian-totalitarian regimes and their inclinations, you can do worse than to read J-Curve. I'll be happy to lend you a copy if you know me personally.)

How Kim Jong Il Lost Japanese Fans: Say That Again?

Here is a generally competent TIME story about the decline of North Korean influence over Koreans who are permanent residents in Japan because of the persistent economic and moral decay of the North Korean regime. Unfortunately, the TIME copy editors have managed to make it sound like a story about Kim Jong Il (not totally off the mark) and the Japanese (completely wrong).

Oh well, to those people, I guess we all look alike.

What's amazing is that the headline is still there. Apparently, nobody has even bothered to point it out. As one who has been annoyed by the media's willingness to extensively rewrite an article then repost it without notice, perhaps I shouldn't complain. But the lack of interest is depressing.

By the way, I say "generally competent" because of the following explanation:

"[I]n the organization's heyday, South Korea was viewed among zainichi as little more than an American poodle."

That will come as a big surprise to the Mindan and its member zainichi. Mindan, established in 1946, is the anti-Communist, pro-South Korean doppelganger of the Chongyron. If you look at their website, you can see that the Mindan makes verifiable claims which show that it has always been a powerful social and economic force among the zainichi. Of course fortune has been much kinder to Mindan than to Chogyron in recent decades. The relative fortunes of the two, like everything else, mirror the relationship between the two Koreas themselves.

Incidentally, the fact that Bryan Walsh uses the word zainichi in its Japanese, not Korean, locution without hesitating may be an indication of the extent to which the Koreans in Japan have become assimilated. Their hearts still beat Korean, but their minds now work in Japanese.