Russia Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: A Milestone in the Lower-Case Cold War

The following is actually a prequel to the 28 August Glocom Commentary. I liked this one better, but Glocom understandably went with the later one on this fast-moving topic.

On a further note: The Western media sees the refusal of the other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to recognize independent South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a setback for Russia. (Typical example: NYT.) I don’t think so. Given all the ethnic and religious minority issues that its members have—starting with China—I don’t think that Russia had any illusions in the first place. The relatively neutral stance that SCO adopted was the best that Russia could have hoped for. The situations in the other points of West-Russia contention are very different from that with regard to Georgia. But the chill has set in; the rest of the world is going to stay on the sidelines, and that is what the SCO statement is all about.

I believe that, as geopolitical mistake go, the failure to bring Russia under the umbrella of accepted norms of the West is bigger, if of smaller practical consequence to Japan, than President Bush's war in Iraq. A plausible argument can be made that a large, possibly definitive, part of the error with regard to Iraq was operational. There, it is hard to deny that with better planning and execution things would have turned out much better.

With Russia, the problem is conceptual and strategic. At a moment of extreme Russian weakness, the West laid out a vision for an expanded post-Cold War NATO that explicitly excluded Russia. The Bush administration continued to pursue this and other geopolitical goals that had been questionable in the first place and became increasingly counterproductive in terms of national, regional and global security when Russia saw major improvements in its geopolitical assets―national cohesion, natural resources―and began to exercise them accordingly.

It did not help that the West pushed the markers deeper, and harder, into Russia's former sphere of sovereignty and influence as time went on. The United States successfully sought to place antiballistic missile defense system of dubious military value near Russia's borders and refused Russian offers of cooperation in their regard. The West accepted over strenuous Russian objections the demands of ethnic Albanians Kosovo for full sovereignty. The West extended offers of eventual NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia even while unwilling and unable to protect them through what would inevitably be a dangerous period of transition.

Yet even after the "ceasefire" in South Ossetia, Russian actions were graduated. But the U.S. response―sending warships, sealing an agreement with Poland on the missile defense system, generally confrontational rhetoric―left no room for Russia to scale back the post-battle confrontation. Although I was still surprised that Russia actually recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is the logical culmination of a long string of actions on both sides that began when the West decided to exclude Russia from its vision of a united Europe.

What's done is done though. I don't see either side trying to walk back this escalation process any time soon. Although Russia is not going to challenge the United States in its global reach―this is not a return to the Cold War, in the upper case at least―it will create even more mischief in the Middle East and other places where it can harm U.S. interests. The asymmetry between the two political economies makes this a much easier task for Russia than it would be for, say, China. There's fallout on the other side too. It is also hard to see any U.S. administration clearing the way for Russian accession to the WTO any time soon. I would also be surprised to see the U.S. President taking part in a G-8 summit process, i.e. one that continues to include Russia. The G8 could revert to the G7, or even be suspended for the indefinite future. These and other ramifications will be consequences that lesser nations like Japan will have to live with as an unpleasant fact of life

The silver lining to this most recent cloud is that Russia has made its point; it has achieved in South Ossetia and Abkhazia a new military, demographic and political equilibrium. It has bitten off a piece of an outpost of the West that it needs to chew over and digest. Thus, there appears to be a little time before something else happens to further disrupt the status quo. During this lull,, if it is possible for the United States to discreetly send a message that it is willing to explore alternative ways to enhance its security without neglecting the concerns of its new allies on Russia's borders―would refraining from setting a timetable for the BMD deployment in Poland without scrapping the plan altogether work?―that would go a long way to defusing the immediate situation and ultimately begin scaling back what has become a geopolitical confrontation of major proportions.

A Few Links on the Russo-Georgia War Georgia-Russia Conflict

For those of you who have a casual interest in the Georgia-Russia conflict, here are a couple of links courtesy of Alex the expert that express what I have been saying here with incomparably greater expertise and eloquence: The Belgravia Dispatch (see August 9 and 11 posts, so far) the blog and Fred Kaplan* writing for Slate.

For the sake of cosmic balance, here’s a salvo from the opposite direction by Zbignew Brzezinski, an Obama supporter who has far more gravitas and overall mainstream credibility than your run-of-the-mill neocon. Never having relinquished his deep suspicion of Russia even during the balmiest of the post-Cold War years, he does not even mention NATO, let alone question the decision to expand it up to Russia’s borders and leaving her out in the cold. If pressed, he might argue that it doesn’t matter how we got here, we’re stuck with the Russian threat so let’s deal with it. Which segues into my next point.

The most notable development of late has been the Bush administration’s commitment of troops to Georgia. It does up the ante for any possible Russian ambitions beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Let's hope that the Bush administration uses this improvement in its strategic position to ease tension and ultimately negotiate down NATO expansion and not to see it as just one step in tightening the screws on Russia. The Bush administration's tendency to negotiate only from a position of deteriorating strength suggests that the latter will be the case, which will only help President Saakashvili sustain his fantasies. I hope that I'm wrong.

* A fund manager, a conservative, in Japan stopped writing to me when I defended one of his articles. But that was during the early years of the ongoing war in Iraq.

Georgia on My Mind. Again

Russia Today’s report appears to be the closest to authoritative rendition of the “six-point peace plan” that President Sarkozy and President Medvedev offered to President Saakashvili. To quote:

At a meeting in Moscow, the Russian and French presidents called for the sides to sign up to the following principles:

1) Non-use of force.
2) Stop all military action.
3) Free access to humanitarian aid.
4) Georgian troops return to their previous positions before the conflict.
5) Russian troops return to the lines they held before the start of the military operation. Before an international solution is worked out Russian peacekeepers are taking up an additional security role.
6) The start of an international discussion over the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

According to BBC, the following is the deal that President Saakashvili accepted, six hours later:

1) No more use of force
2) Stop all military actions for good
3) Free access to humanitarian aid
4) Georgian troops return to their places of permanent deployment
5) Russian troops return to pre-conflict positions
6) International talks about future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia… This was later dropped from the BBC online report.

Note the difference between the two versions in the wording for points 4) and 5) (assuming that it is not merely the result of using different translators). The initial version appears to allow both sides to maintain positions taken up in the pre-conflict build-up but allows Russia to take up further positions in the name of an “additional security role”. The final agreement requires Georgia to give up any positions taken up in the pre-conflict build-up but allows Russia to maintain positions taken up in the pre-conflict build-up. Both versions confirm the Russia victory in the war, and the practical on-the-ground consequences may be more or less the same, though both sides will be haggling (and perhaps sometimes even shooting at each other) over individual situations. However, the wording of the final agreement does reduce the level of ambiguity exploitable by the Russian side. That must have been portrayed as a concession by Mr. Sarkozy in bringing Mr. Saakashvili around.

I am somewhat surprised that Russia agreed to drop point 6). From the Russian point of view, an “international discussion over the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazi” would have been a delightfully ironic counterpart to the UN-Sponsored talks over the future status of Kosovo. And everyone knows how that ended up. And where everybody was as the talks unfolded. The Russians must have wanted to issue a reminder so that no one would forget and that everyone would act accordingly. That would not have meant that Russia would be annexing the two territories any time soon. In fact, it would have been yet another piece of circumstantial evidence that it would not press such claims. Russian authorities must be confident that it has made its point, so that at least a breakaway, or two, is always looming, in case Georgia does not behave itself. And that the West makes sure that he does so.

---

Media reports tell us that many Georgians are talking up the brokered ceasefire agreement as a victory. Incredible, but I guess they need something to salvage their self-esteem with, and the Georgian authorities are not going to discourage such talk. To be fair, we’ve seen much, much worse in WW-II Japan; in fact, so bad that Daihonei Happyo, or Supreme Headquarters Announcement, passed into the post-WW II lexicon as the favored term to express disbelief at self-serving, blatantly untruthful statements. In any case, President Saakashvili is between a rock and a hard place. To escape blame for his disastrous decision-making, he must keep faulting Russia for the outbreak of hostilities and not be seen “caving” to Russia; yet to salvage what he can for Georgia out of the mess, he must make peace with the Russian leadership. He can’t blame the United States for not coming to the rescue either, because at the end of the day there’s no one else to turn to.

---

Has the fact that Russia has given South Ossetians Russian passports struck you as odd? I couldn’t understand why it wasn’t a big deal until just a couple of days ago. It may seem quite natural to Europeans, but in case anyone else is also wondering, here’s a hint: North Ossetia. Need another? Chris Kaman.

Russian Counterattack Ends as Quickly as Georgian Assault Began

The Russian counterattack is over (we hope), as quickly as the Georgian assault began. Dutifully fulfilling his role in the Russian good-cop/bad-cop routine (guess which), President Medvedev called a halt to the operations, stating according to BBC:

I’ve decided to finish the operation to force the Georgian authorities to peace. The safety of our peacekeeping forces and civilian population has been restored.

The aggressor has been punished, having sustained considerable losses. Its armed forces have been disorganized.

NATO membership is a lot like a nuclear weapons arsenal. It’s a terrific deterrent—once you have it, you’re safe. Ask India. North Korea. So much for your external threats. The difficult part is getting there. The more you want it, the more someone else doesn’t want you to have it. Your opponent will go all in to stop you. That is bad news when he has most of the chips.

You saw it happening in South Ossetia, between Georgia, the nominal sovereign, and Russia, protector of the ethnic Ossetians there. A regional specialist wrote that “[i]t is now important for western leaders to realize that their silence so far has only encouraged Moscow's aggressive behavior, and that they must now stand in solidarity with Georgia – in deeds, not only in words. Whether they do so will determine the future not only of the Caucasus, but also for Europe's security.” Of course they didn’t, which was good for Europe’s security.

So, is there a disturbing moral issue here in Russia’s actions towards Georgia? Of course. But there is also a thought experiment that deserves to be conducted. Namely: What if Georgia had never sought NATO membership? What if the NATO members never encouraged it if it did? After all, many former USSR republics feel perfectly safe without NATO membership. There’s no reason to believe that Georgia should have felt otherwise. NATO and the United States blindly pursued an agenda that they had dreamed up during Russia’s weakest moments, and President Saakashvili had underestimated the huge obstacle that had loomed over Georgia as it crept closer to the fairy cring that encircles NATO members.

What is also notable in all this is that Russia has not once supported independence for the South Ossetia, singly or as a member of the UN Security Council. Over the years it had sent in military forces (in the guise of volunteers and peacekeepers), and even given Russian passports to the Ossetians there. But even the latest counterattack, including the bombing of Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, has been described as a means to protect its passport holders and restore the status quo. Nothing President Medvedev said speaks to the contrary. (Although one of Prime Minister Putin’s statements suggest that Georgia is as likely to regain control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Japan is to regain sovereignty over the Northern Territories.)

There is nothing remarkable in this. Russia clearly respects the intra-USSR borders that existed before the breakup. It will not do anything to alter them to its momentary favor lest it lend legitimacy to any similar demands from its own ethnic minorities such as the Chechens. But any effort to change them against its favor meets with ferocious, unrelenting opposition. Likewise challenges to its influence over its near-abroad.

Russia is a revisionist, increasingly authoritarian, power. But President Saakashvili is obviously a foolhardy man. And the West did everything it can to encourage what turned out to be his fantasies. I wonder if anybody reminded Mr. Saakashvili of the 1991 uprising by Shiites in Iraq?

---

I think I’ve made it clear that the implication of all this for Japan is that Russia is not going to relinquish the four islands called the Northern Territories any time soon. Russia did agree in 1956 to return two very small islands out of the four as part of a comprehensive peace agreement and continue talking with Japan on the other two. But that was at most a Cold War ploy to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States. It is still more likely than not that Russia will settle for two if Japan relinquishes all claims to the rest. But it will not budge otherwise. The territorial ramifications for the last remaining 19th century empire are too serious to go any further than that.

Kosovo Redux

Here’s the substance of the answer, slightly edited, to a question that I received from an analyst. It’s for anyone else who found my previous post on this issue to be of any interest.

I would not say that Japan is taking an “overly”-cautious attitude toward the Kosovo question. After all, the overall direction is clear. We will in principle recognize Kosovo, and that should please the US and the Islam Nation (not that the Islamic states notice, though I'm sure that they would if we said no to an independent Kosovo). However, there are no public discussions of the real reasons for our tag-along approach; it's not a compelling issue for us. So I’m really guessing here. Having said that...

China surely has Taiwan in mind in its opposition to Kosovo independence, but I don't think that the matter is important enough to China that Japan would feel compelled to defer to its wishes if they are to maintain the current amicable relationship. The China-Taiwan relationship is overwhelmingly determined by local factors and is not going to be materially affected by the eventual fate of Kosovo. Russia, in contrast, is the state that has the geopolitical interest in Kosovo and the broader counter-status quo posture that make this a compelling issue for it. To put it another way, it is my view that Japan would take the same approach if Russia were the only permanent UNSC member opposing Kosovo independence, while Japan would afford more immediate recognition if China were the only one doing so. Of course China would have to accept it if Russia decided to drop its veto on UN accession for Kosovo, so the last scenario would never happen.

The one possibility that I did not consider in my previous post is the possibility that Greece and other EU member countries withholding recognition (but, crucially, not opposing EU takeover from KFORS) will one day reconsider. What will Japan do then? But that will be some time in coming, certainly not in time for Japan to have to face the question before Medvedev comes to the Hokkaido Summit. I don't call the shots here, so don't blame me if the authorities say, hell with Putin, to hell with Medvedev, let's recognize Kosovo ASAP. But I would definitely bet against it.

In the meantime, Japan should be providing humanitarian and other forms of assistance that will not offend the Russians.

Will Japan Recognize an Independent Kosovo?

Asahi certainly seemed to think Japan would indeed recognize an independent Kosovo pretty soon, when it ran a report on February 6 under the headline “Japan Considers Early Recognition of Independent Kosovo Following Europe and US (日本、独立コソボ承認へ　欧米に続き早期を検討). Otherwise, the Japanese media has been silent on the Japanese position.

According to the Asahi, the Japanese government feels that Boris Tadic’s victory in the Serbian presidential election raises hopes that a peaceful settlement is within sight. Perhaps; in which case Kosovo would have “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”* But Mr. Foreign Minister Masahiko Kōmura added an important caveat in his February 10 press conference:

Japan will consider the requirements for national recognition from a legal perspective in order to recognize Kosovo's independence, and make a judgment after observing how international society receives the issue.

Now I’ve always assumed that EU members and the US would quickly recognize an independent Kosovo, if only to keep the matter from boiling over into open violence and even civil war. In fact, Europe is dangling a possible EU membership as the carrot to the largely Moslem ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. No doubt the Middle East will also follow suit in recognizing the Moslem breakout from the Orthodox-Christian Serbia.

However, Russia will be none too happy. The Asahi article gives Bosnia and Herzegovina as a precedent of sorts for the Japanese authorities. But Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence was conclusively settled by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, to which both Serbia and Russia signed off. Russia is no longer that shambling, eager-to-please, impoverished relic of the Soviet era under an erratic President Yeltsin. It also remains to be seen whether Mr. Tadic will be able to use his slim 50.5% edge over ultranationalist Tomislav Nikolic’s 47.9% to give up sovereignty over Kosovo in exchange for a fast-track ride on the express to the EU.

What does it matter to Japan? Well, imagine that Kosovo leaves Serbia without an agreement with Serbia and Russia. If Japan endorses the break any time soon, President Putin will be none too pleased to see Prime Minister Fukuda in Moscow during the Japanese Golden Week. The issue could linger further and be yet another cause of conflict between Russia and the West at the G-8 Summit in Hokkaidō, a dispute that Prime Minister Fukuda, as host, will be hard put to mediate as a mere bystander. Just as serious in the context of domestic politics, Japanese recognition of an independent Kosovo in the face of Russian opposition should seriously compromise Japanese efforts to paper over the Russian refusal to hand over anything beyond the two small islands － if even that － out of the four that comprise the Northern Territories.

I suspect that Japanese recognition in effect will be very slow in coming.

* Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American); December 26, 1933; Article 1.

Just This Morning, Ian Bremmer Was Telling People at Keidanren…

Putin was likely to name someone you hadn't heard of as his successor. Now this.