I whacked
out the following answers to the questions from a media organization. I know
that it will not use a certain part of it in its report, so here’s it is, for public
viewing in its entirety.
What are the prospects for progress in the
comfort woman talks when Japanese and SKorean foreign ministers meet Monday?
I will be
astounded if the two foreign ministers do not come forth with a substantive and
irreversible framework for resolution.
What would that mean for bilateral
relations? What do the two sides stand to gain from improving relations?
It should
produce an immediate improvement in the background to the bilateral relations,
which should lead most prominently to more Korean entertainment (TV programs,
pop groups) coming Japan’s way and more Japanese tourists going the other way.
Prospects for progress in the Japan-China-ROK FTA negotiations will also be
marginally improved. Over the long-run, if the improvement holds, the direct
investment climate will also improve, leading to more synergy between the two
economies. Beyond the economic, we can expect better cooperation between the
two militaries and more broadly security establishments, which should please Washington
no end.
What other sticking points are there in
moves to repair relations between the two sides?
There’s the
back wages of the conscripted workers (about which I could go on forever, as
someone close to be was a conscripted Japanese student worker who went on to
work after the war at a company that had employed Korean workers (as well as
Japanese student workers, presumably)), but I suspect that the Blue House will
lean on the courts, who are themselves good at reading the prevailing public
view. There’s Takeshima, but South Korea has possession, so what the Japanese
authorities have to say and do about it is of less significance than the
symbolism that the comfort women issue has taken on. Another Yasukuni visit by
a Japanese prime minister would be problematic, but it’s more of a China
issue—Korea never fought a war against Japan, so the Class A war criminals are
not their problem—and the last thing that Mr. Abe wants to do at this point is
to provoke Mr. Xi Jinping and the PLA unnecessarily.
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