…and why, with a little more justification than with the League of Nations and the International Criminal Court, the United States is sitting this one out: The winner by 1.6 kilometres: Fairytale (one word), by Alexander Rybak, Norway.
Need I say more?
ADD: I am pleasantly surprised to learn that I can understand Norwegian. Every single word. There must be something in the adulterated water tonight.
Sunday, May 17, 2009
The Meaning of the Leadership Vacuum in the Embassies
President Obama has announced Jon Huntsman’s nomination as Ambassador to China. In the United States, it is justifiably regarded as a political coup of the first order. He is a moderate Republican governor of a socially conservative state (Utah), accentuating the inclusiveness of the Obama administration at the expense of the ever-shrinking moderate wing of the GOP. Many people also believe that he is uniquely suited to his new role (pending Senate confirmation) because he is fluent in Mandarin from his Mormon missionary work in Taiwan—no off-color comments about a “new missionary position” please; this is a serious blog—and it certainly doesn’t hurt that China and Taiwan are on excellent terms these days. What has received less, indeed little, attention is the very fact that the United States has been without an ambassador in Beijing for four months since Clark Randt resigned on January 20.
China is not alone. Thomas Schieffer resigned on the same day as Ambassador to Japan, where my formidably negative powers of prediction have produced yet another turnaround and we are waiting once again for Joseph Nye to make up his mind, or so I’ve been told. Now, there’s been a wholesale delay of political appointees in the Obama administration, so ambassadors in principle are the least of its worries. But how can the most important bilateral relationship and the most important bilateral partnership have been without U.S. Ambassadors for four months without anybody noticing?
In fact, it is the strategic importance of the relationship/partnership from national security and economic viewpoints—increasingly convergent in these turbulent times—itself that is the cause of this benign neglect. For the major issues are too important to be left to the discretion of the embassies, yet there are no raging controversies that require micromanagement at the local level. Place this fact against the historical background where progress in telecommunications and air transport have already rendered much of traditional diplomacy obsolete, and you have a situation that can easily tolerate a leadership vacuum in both embassies as long as the various departments are properly staffed.
Not that any warm body will do, though, since there’s the symbolic value. That means, however, that the authorities must come up with someone with sufficient gravitas and the patience to serve out a largely ceremonial role in admittedly pleasant quarters—unless something erupts and there’s a need for high-profile, in situ damage control. That’s not easy.
And no, I didn’t post this just because I wanted to write “new missionary position”. You don’t think I’m that juvenile, do you?
China is not alone. Thomas Schieffer resigned on the same day as Ambassador to Japan, where my formidably negative powers of prediction have produced yet another turnaround and we are waiting once again for Joseph Nye to make up his mind, or so I’ve been told. Now, there’s been a wholesale delay of political appointees in the Obama administration, so ambassadors in principle are the least of its worries. But how can the most important bilateral relationship and the most important bilateral partnership have been without U.S. Ambassadors for four months without anybody noticing?
In fact, it is the strategic importance of the relationship/partnership from national security and economic viewpoints—increasingly convergent in these turbulent times—itself that is the cause of this benign neglect. For the major issues are too important to be left to the discretion of the embassies, yet there are no raging controversies that require micromanagement at the local level. Place this fact against the historical background where progress in telecommunications and air transport have already rendered much of traditional diplomacy obsolete, and you have a situation that can easily tolerate a leadership vacuum in both embassies as long as the various departments are properly staffed.
Not that any warm body will do, though, since there’s the symbolic value. That means, however, that the authorities must come up with someone with sufficient gravitas and the patience to serve out a largely ceremonial role in admittedly pleasant quarters—unless something erupts and there’s a need for high-profile, in situ damage control. That’s not easy.
And no, I didn’t post this just because I wanted to write “new missionary position”. You don’t think I’m that juvenile, do you?
My Latest Thoughts on the DPJ Election
Woke up in the middle of the night (do not ask why), couldn’t resist looking at my email. Which led to an online look at the media’s reaction to the DPJ election. Basically, it boils down to: What the heck is Hatoyama going to do with Ozawa? My immediate reaction to that goes here, in my response to Ross’ comment.
I think I need a life. And sleep. Good night. If you like me, pray for the Celtics. And if you hate me, well, you know what to do.
I think I need a life. And sleep. Good night. If you like me, pray for the Celtics. And if you hate me, well, you know what to do.
Saturday, May 16, 2009
Hatoyama Beats Okada 124-95 (One Abstention, One Invalid Vote)
As so often has been the case, I failed to call it. Having said that…
It’s a secret ballot so we can’t know for sure, but based on the surveys that the mainstream media conducted in the lead-up to the vote, Hatoyama appears to have won thanks to a big lead in the Upper House vote. Okada seems to have at least held his own in the Lower House, whose members were more mindful of the upcoming election than their Upper House counterparts, only half of whom will face the public next year. Hatoyama likely held onto all of his group’s 30 votes as well as most of Ozawa’s 50 votes, so that was a huge head start against his independent opponent. Media surveys indicate that farther away from Ozawa’s group they were the less they preferred Hatoyama.
The question, of course, is: Will the sockpuppet (傀儡政権) trope stick? The media typically gives a new leader a grace period during which it says only nice things. (Remember when the chairman of Sharp, in deep trouble at the time, elevated a board member who was a journalist with no business experience to the chairman’s position and placed his own son, who had been placed on a special fast track, as president/CEO and the media hummed long to the company tune?) This may last only few days, but it’s important in Hatoyama’s case, because this is his best chance to establish himself as the real face of the DPJ. The polls will give him and the DPJ some momentum; it’s up to him to keep the snowball rolling.
Can Hatoyama do it? I noticed that he was a better speaker than I’d remembered. He has a better way with words than Okada. He also looked visibly animated during the DPJ election proceeding, as he no longer had to speak on behalf of the Ozawa DPJ. Speaking of whom, Ozawa must play his part by making himself scarce—something he has little trouble managing to do. In fact, this is the most important part of the DPJ electoral scenario.
This was a most civil election held between two highly civil candidates. It was definitely not politics as usual. The prospects of an imminent takeover must also have helped.
It’s a secret ballot so we can’t know for sure, but based on the surveys that the mainstream media conducted in the lead-up to the vote, Hatoyama appears to have won thanks to a big lead in the Upper House vote. Okada seems to have at least held his own in the Lower House, whose members were more mindful of the upcoming election than their Upper House counterparts, only half of whom will face the public next year. Hatoyama likely held onto all of his group’s 30 votes as well as most of Ozawa’s 50 votes, so that was a huge head start against his independent opponent. Media surveys indicate that farther away from Ozawa’s group they were the less they preferred Hatoyama.
The question, of course, is: Will the sockpuppet (傀儡政権) trope stick? The media typically gives a new leader a grace period during which it says only nice things. (Remember when the chairman of Sharp, in deep trouble at the time, elevated a board member who was a journalist with no business experience to the chairman’s position and placed his own son, who had been placed on a special fast track, as president/CEO and the media hummed long to the company tune?) This may last only few days, but it’s important in Hatoyama’s case, because this is his best chance to establish himself as the real face of the DPJ. The polls will give him and the DPJ some momentum; it’s up to him to keep the snowball rolling.
Can Hatoyama do it? I noticed that he was a better speaker than I’d remembered. He has a better way with words than Okada. He also looked visibly animated during the DPJ election proceeding, as he no longer had to speak on behalf of the Ozawa DPJ. Speaking of whom, Ozawa must play his part by making himself scarce—something he has little trouble managing to do. In fact, this is the most important part of the DPJ electoral scenario.
This was a most civil election held between two highly civil candidates. It was definitely not politics as usual. The prospects of an imminent takeover must also have helped.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
DPJ Election Update: Okada Rising
I suppose Junichiro Koizumi’s upset victory over Ryutaro Hashimoto in the 2001 LDP presidential race started it all, but whenever the LDP is about to elect a new president, mainstream dailies dial up the deputy heads of prefectural party chapters—the heads are usually Diet members, so their views do not necessarily reflect the wishes of the local chapter rank-and-file—to ask whom they favor and print the prefecture-by-prefecture results. The influence of the rank-and-file LDP party members has reached the point where a considerable number of Diet members will at least take the local votes into consideration when casting their own votes. Now, after electing it three previous leaders elected by acclaim, DPJ, with its Hatoyama-Okada showdown, is undergoing the same treatment.
The DPJ locals are clearly less used to flexing their muscle through media exposure, and none of the polls reflect the views of more than a third of the prefectural chapters. (Off the top of my head, I’d say that two-thirds or more of the LDP chapter deputy heads will let us know whom they favor.) Moreover, the results are wildly uneven, even though they all appear to have contacted the same person in each of the 47 chapters. Still, for your benefit:
Perhaps it was with this in mind that Tastuo Kawabata reportedly threw his support to Katsuya Okada this morning (14 May). This must be devastating to Hatoyama. On good terms with both Ozawa and Okada, Kawabata represents the 20 or so Diet members from former Democratic Socialists on the DPJ leadership council as one of the seven Deputy Presidents (outranked by three Honorary Advisors, the President, and two Acting Presidents but nominally outranking Hatoyama, the Secretary-General). There is no indication that he can actually carry the old DS vote, but he did make his announcement at the group’s morning get-together. Meanwhile, Naoto Kan’s group, in keeping with its leader’s arm’s-length approach to Ozawa, has released its members to vote their conscience. This has the looks of a surge for Okada. The question is: Are two days enough time for him to catch up?
Some worry that a split along faction boundaries—80 from Ozawa and Hatoyama’s groups vs. 50 from Maehara and Noda’s, while the rest scramble to balance the imperatives of their personal ties against those of their electoral prospects—will create a rift, particularly if Ozawa (and his closest associates) see a Hatoyama loss as a personal rejection. I don’t think that will happen, not to the extent that it will be a drag in the Lower House election. It’s the recriminations that will come if they lose or fail to form a stable working majority that the DPJ must be afraid of. All the more desirable it is then, to heed public opinion (even if it is to a great extent a media construct), as well as position itself to welcome post-election LDP splittists—the latter factor also favoring Okada.
The DPJ locals are clearly less used to flexing their muscle through media exposure, and none of the polls reflect the views of more than a third of the prefectural chapters. (Off the top of my head, I’d say that two-thirds or more of the LDP chapter deputy heads will let us know whom they favor.) Moreover, the results are wildly uneven, even though they all appear to have contacted the same person in each of the 47 chapters. Still, for your benefit:
Asahi: Okada 9, Hatoyama 8Iffy as the figures look, it seems that Okada is ahead with regard to the deputy heads who are not afraid to speak up. The online Mainichi online does not have a tally. However, just as important if not more so to the Lower House members (as well as other candidates) who must face an election in the coming months, Mainichi conducted an unscheduled national public opinion poll, in which Okada led the field with 25% to Hatoyama’s 13%. (Naoto Kan, Seiji Maehara and Akira Nagatsuma came in third, fourth and fifth with 12%, 8%, and 5% respectively.) Even the photos accompanying the Mainichi report—glum Hatoyama and radiant Okada—can’t resist editorializing, it seems.
Yomiuri: Okada 13, Hatoyama 4
Sankei: Okada 9, Hatoyama 3
Mainichi: Okada 8, Hatoyama 3 (overlooked; added 15 May)
Perhaps it was with this in mind that Tastuo Kawabata reportedly threw his support to Katsuya Okada this morning (14 May). This must be devastating to Hatoyama. On good terms with both Ozawa and Okada, Kawabata represents the 20 or so Diet members from former Democratic Socialists on the DPJ leadership council as one of the seven Deputy Presidents (outranked by three Honorary Advisors, the President, and two Acting Presidents but nominally outranking Hatoyama, the Secretary-General). There is no indication that he can actually carry the old DS vote, but he did make his announcement at the group’s morning get-together. Meanwhile, Naoto Kan’s group, in keeping with its leader’s arm’s-length approach to Ozawa, has released its members to vote their conscience. This has the looks of a surge for Okada. The question is: Are two days enough time for him to catch up?
Some worry that a split along faction boundaries—80 from Ozawa and Hatoyama’s groups vs. 50 from Maehara and Noda’s, while the rest scramble to balance the imperatives of their personal ties against those of their electoral prospects—will create a rift, particularly if Ozawa (and his closest associates) see a Hatoyama loss as a personal rejection. I don’t think that will happen, not to the extent that it will be a drag in the Lower House election. It’s the recriminations that will come if they lose or fail to form a stable working majority that the DPJ must be afraid of. All the more desirable it is then, to heed public opinion (even if it is to a great extent a media construct), as well as position itself to welcome post-election LDP splittists—the latter factor also favoring Okada.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Sankei Says Hatoyama Ahead; I Say Deuces Wild
According to the headline of this Sankei report, it’s Mr. Hatoyama in the Lead, Meets Mr. Kan and Asks for Support.
Maybe, maybe not.
Now, as I’ve related here, if Hatoyama adds most if not all of Ozawa’s 50 votes to his own 30, he has 80 or so out o f the 221 Diet members eligible to vote for party president. That is surely very doable. Then, if he can add the bulk of the 20 ex-Socialists—more favorably disposed to old-school LDP alumnus Ozawa than Okada and his new school allies—to this total, all he needs to do is corral a goodly portion of Kan’s 30 votes to put himself over the top.
Not so fast. The same Sankei notes that the three DPJ Diet members from Okayama Prefecture have decided to poll 3,000 local DPJ members to determine whom to vote for. Other media reports claim that other prefectural chapters are trying to follow suit.
Now, if you’ve been wondering, where have I heard this story before, you are not alone. For it was the local voting in the 2001 LDP Presidential primaries that compelled its Diet members to ditch overwhelming favorite and former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and throw their support behind once-fringe candidate Junichiro Koizumi. More recently in 2007, Taro Aso put the scare into Yasuo Fukuda in the local voting and paved the way for his succession the following year.
Ozawa has done his browbeating best to cut out the local yokels and to force the election on a Saturday, just four days after his resignation—precisely to forestall an uprising from the provinces. He knows that Okada has been spending almost every week of the last four years “trampling on the sewer coverings” and wading the rice paddies, talking (and listening) to Taro Q. Citizen, well before he began his own chiho jungyo. But that only diminishes Hatoyama in the media’s collective mind. The media has already been casting the two-horse race as a battle between Hatoyama the Ozawa Sockpuppet vs. Okada the Klutz. So guess who is going to win a media poll?
Okada has two days to put the scare into the local chapters. The race is wide open.
Maybe, maybe not.
Now, as I’ve related here, if Hatoyama adds most if not all of Ozawa’s 50 votes to his own 30, he has 80 or so out o f the 221 Diet members eligible to vote for party president. That is surely very doable. Then, if he can add the bulk of the 20 ex-Socialists—more favorably disposed to old-school LDP alumnus Ozawa than Okada and his new school allies—to this total, all he needs to do is corral a goodly portion of Kan’s 30 votes to put himself over the top.
Not so fast. The same Sankei notes that the three DPJ Diet members from Okayama Prefecture have decided to poll 3,000 local DPJ members to determine whom to vote for. Other media reports claim that other prefectural chapters are trying to follow suit.
Now, if you’ve been wondering, where have I heard this story before, you are not alone. For it was the local voting in the 2001 LDP Presidential primaries that compelled its Diet members to ditch overwhelming favorite and former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and throw their support behind once-fringe candidate Junichiro Koizumi. More recently in 2007, Taro Aso put the scare into Yasuo Fukuda in the local voting and paved the way for his succession the following year.
Ozawa has done his browbeating best to cut out the local yokels and to force the election on a Saturday, just four days after his resignation—precisely to forestall an uprising from the provinces. He knows that Okada has been spending almost every week of the last four years “trampling on the sewer coverings” and wading the rice paddies, talking (and listening) to Taro Q. Citizen, well before he began his own chiho jungyo. But that only diminishes Hatoyama in the media’s collective mind. The media has already been casting the two-horse race as a battle between Hatoyama the Ozawa Sockpuppet vs. Okada the Klutz. So guess who is going to win a media poll?
Okada has two days to put the scare into the local chapters. The race is wide open.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
I’ve Responded to (Most of) Your Comments
Helped by a nice hot bath that has done wonders for my sprained hand (and a liberal dose of adulterated water), I have now responded to all the comments that I have received in the last two days. Except one.
I do my best to respond to all comments, but this latest one is beyond the pale even for me. So I leave it to you to decide who’s the grown-up. Hey, maybe I’ll think differently about this when I’m sober. Then again, probably not.
I do my best to respond to all comments, but this latest one is beyond the pale even for me. So I leave it to you to decide who’s the grown-up. Hey, maybe I’ll think differently about this when I’m sober. Then again, probably not.
Hatoyama Backing into the Picture in the DPJ Succession
Not much more to say, but I thought a brief follow-up was warranted since it looks like Yukio Hatoyama may be throwing his hat in the ring after all.
The odds for Yukio Hatoyama standing for the election to succeed Ichiro Ozawa as DPJ leader are improving with every moment that he doesn’t say no. So it may be useful to look at an interesting chart on the second page of today’s morning Yomiuri. The chart gives the group-by-group numbers for the DPJ’s 221 MPs as well as the relationship between the groups. With the caveat that some MPs belong to more than one group, here’s what it says:
A. (Ichiro) Ozawa Group 50
B. (Yukio) Hatoyama Group 30
C. (Naoto) Kan Group 30
D. (Seiji) Maehara Group 30
E. Ex-Socialists 20
F. Ex-Democratic Socialists 20
G. Yoshihiko Noda Group 20
H. Independents (Okada et al) 25
They add up to 225, not many more than the 221 MPs that the DPJ actually has, and they are approximate figures. So let’s assume that they do provide an accurate picture of the relative strengths of the respective groups.
Next, the relationships:
A ♥ B&E.
B ♥ F.
D♥G.
A definitely does not ♥D&G.
A lukewarm C.
Now Hatoyama made a good show of supporting Ozawa. So if Ozawa was the kind of person who put a lot of stock in such personal service, he could conceivably put 50+20 votes to Hatoyama’s disposal. Hatoyama in turn would bring 30+20 votes on his own. That’s 120 votes, more than an outright majority of the DPJ MPs. But will Ozawa oblige? All he cares about is winning, and Hatoyama’s late-life association with Ozawa is a definite negative.
Neither Hatoyama with his humorless, beady-eyed carping nor Okada with his Clark-Kent looks and demeanor to match comes across as the second coming of Barack Obama. That being said, they’re definitely an upgrade on the ghostly presence of their predecessor-to-be as far as electoral campaigning is concerned, and the other wannabies (Maehara and Noda) appear to be unacceptable to the pro-Ozawa crowd. So it comes down after all to a showdown between Hatoyama and Okada, assuming Hatoyama actually stands.
No matter. The important thing, to repeat, is that the DPJ is set for a Lower House victory with a leader (whichever) who will be a far more palatable partner for a post-election LDP breakaway group that would assure an Upper House majority without bringing one or more of the mini-parties on board. This is more important than the identity of the eventual winner. And we only have to wait until Saturday at most to know.
I’ve been hitting the sauce early today after a hard day’s work, and it’s time to get to work on dinner. I promise to get back to your comments tomorrow.
The odds for Yukio Hatoyama standing for the election to succeed Ichiro Ozawa as DPJ leader are improving with every moment that he doesn’t say no. So it may be useful to look at an interesting chart on the second page of today’s morning Yomiuri. The chart gives the group-by-group numbers for the DPJ’s 221 MPs as well as the relationship between the groups. With the caveat that some MPs belong to more than one group, here’s what it says:
A. (Ichiro) Ozawa Group 50
B. (Yukio) Hatoyama Group 30
C. (Naoto) Kan Group 30
D. (Seiji) Maehara Group 30
E. Ex-Socialists 20
F. Ex-Democratic Socialists 20
G. Yoshihiko Noda Group 20
H. Independents (Okada et al) 25
They add up to 225, not many more than the 221 MPs that the DPJ actually has, and they are approximate figures. So let’s assume that they do provide an accurate picture of the relative strengths of the respective groups.
Next, the relationships:
A ♥ B&E.
B ♥ F.
D♥G.
A definitely does not ♥D&G.
A lukewarm C.
Now Hatoyama made a good show of supporting Ozawa. So if Ozawa was the kind of person who put a lot of stock in such personal service, he could conceivably put 50+20 votes to Hatoyama’s disposal. Hatoyama in turn would bring 30+20 votes on his own. That’s 120 votes, more than an outright majority of the DPJ MPs. But will Ozawa oblige? All he cares about is winning, and Hatoyama’s late-life association with Ozawa is a definite negative.
Neither Hatoyama with his humorless, beady-eyed carping nor Okada with his Clark-Kent looks and demeanor to match comes across as the second coming of Barack Obama. That being said, they’re definitely an upgrade on the ghostly presence of their predecessor-to-be as far as electoral campaigning is concerned, and the other wannabies (Maehara and Noda) appear to be unacceptable to the pro-Ozawa crowd. So it comes down after all to a showdown between Hatoyama and Okada, assuming Hatoyama actually stands.
No matter. The important thing, to repeat, is that the DPJ is set for a Lower House victory with a leader (whichever) who will be a far more palatable partner for a post-election LDP breakaway group that would assure an Upper House majority without bringing one or more of the mini-parties on board. This is more important than the identity of the eventual winner. And we only have to wait until Saturday at most to know.
I’ve been hitting the sauce early today after a hard day’s work, and it’s time to get to work on dinner. I promise to get back to your comments tomorrow.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Ozawa Resigns, Clearing the Way for DPJ Victory
Ichiro Ozawa held a press conference at 5:00PM today to announce that he would be resigning as DPJ President, opening the way for a scandal-free successor to lead his party in the next Lower House election. He gave no indication as to whom he would favor as his successor, but made it clear that he was not leaving politics and would be seeing to it that the DPJ would be running the election his way. He did not say if he would be contesting his Iwate seat, or any other (say, as rumored, New Komeito leader Hiroaki Ota’s Tokyo 12th District) for that matter, but that is trivial.
Two names, Katsuya Okada and Yukio Hatoyama, both former DPJ leaders, have been put forth as favorites to succeed Ozawa. Right now, my money is on Okada, and not just because he’s class of ’76 METI. He’s seen as a clean—if boring policy-wonk—presence, a welcome change from Ozawa. And as I have mentioned before, he has spent the two years crisscrossing the nation earning street cred with the local-rank-and-file, a very important thing for the long-term health of the DPJ, currently over-reliant on labor union muscle. I’m sure Ozawa prefers Hatoyama, another scandal-free figure who has until fairly late in the game served him as attack dog non pariel. Moreover, Hatoyama basically bankrolled the pre-merger DPJ and is on good terms with every group in the current DPJ. However, he has repeatedly averred that he would be going down with the captain if that turns out to be the case, and it’s difficult right now to see the overly serious Hatoyama going back on his words. Of course all this could change if the DPJ decides on an election, rather than a white-smoke-from-the-chimney consensus process. But that’s trivial. The important thing is that this removes the greatest obstacle for independents/floaters to voting for the DPJ.
One other important political implication is that this makes it easier for a post-electoral LDP breakaway group to join a DPJ-led coalition. This has policy implications as well, since it means that the DPJ may not need the Social Democrats (old-school socialists) or the People’s New Party (who want to turn the clock back on Post Office reform as well as public works expenditures) to hold a stable majority in the Upper House. I’ll see if I have more to say on this point, as well as the time to do so. In the meantime, for those of you who can read Japanese, this is the text of Ozawa’s Sherman speech, and this is the press Q&A.
Sorry, folks. I don’t think I’ll have the time today to respond to the comments on earlier posts. (Gotta take care of dinner.) I’ll get back to you as soon as I can, okay?
Two names, Katsuya Okada and Yukio Hatoyama, both former DPJ leaders, have been put forth as favorites to succeed Ozawa. Right now, my money is on Okada, and not just because he’s class of ’76 METI. He’s seen as a clean—if boring policy-wonk—presence, a welcome change from Ozawa. And as I have mentioned before, he has spent the two years crisscrossing the nation earning street cred with the local-rank-and-file, a very important thing for the long-term health of the DPJ, currently over-reliant on labor union muscle. I’m sure Ozawa prefers Hatoyama, another scandal-free figure who has until fairly late in the game served him as attack dog non pariel. Moreover, Hatoyama basically bankrolled the pre-merger DPJ and is on good terms with every group in the current DPJ. However, he has repeatedly averred that he would be going down with the captain if that turns out to be the case, and it’s difficult right now to see the overly serious Hatoyama going back on his words. Of course all this could change if the DPJ decides on an election, rather than a white-smoke-from-the-chimney consensus process. But that’s trivial. The important thing is that this removes the greatest obstacle for independents/floaters to voting for the DPJ.
One other important political implication is that this makes it easier for a post-electoral LDP breakaway group to join a DPJ-led coalition. This has policy implications as well, since it means that the DPJ may not need the Social Democrats (old-school socialists) or the People’s New Party (who want to turn the clock back on Post Office reform as well as public works expenditures) to hold a stable majority in the Upper House. I’ll see if I have more to say on this point, as well as the time to do so. In the meantime, for those of you who can read Japanese, this is the text of Ozawa’s Sherman speech, and this is the press Q&A.
Sorry, folks. I don’t think I’ll have the time today to respond to the comments on earlier posts. (Gotta take care of dinner.) I’ll get back to you as soon as I can, okay?
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Chilean Presidential Candidate Will Attract Japanese Attention
Marco Enríquez-Ominami is a Chilean actor-turned-politician who has left the ruling Socialist Party to run as an independent candidate in the 2009 presidential election. In doing so, he has gone against the wishes of his adoptive father Carlos Ominami, a Senator from the Socialist Party. Senator Ominami is the grandson of a Japanese immigrant and son of Carlos Ominami Daza, an Air Force Colonel who was tortured by the military junta and subsequently spent the dictatorship years in exile in Belgium. There’s little to no chance of an Enríquez-Ominami victory, but he’s not exactly a fringe candidate either. (He is expected to tilt the election in favor of the opposition candidate.) Add to that his matinee idol looks and his Japanese connection, and I bet the Japanese media will give him his quinze minutos.
If they notice.
I understand and respect Enríquez-Ominami’s decision to honor both fathers by keeping their surnames as a professional actor. Having said that, I have a question for my Latin American (particularly Chilean, if any) readers here: Does the unusual name Ominami add a touch of the exotic? Or is it like any other name in a land of immigrants?
In Brazil, my guess is that an Ominami would be tagged as part Indio. That is a rare name, even in Japan.
Colonel Ominami was known as “El Chino”, the same nickname bestowed on Peru’s ex-President Fujimori. That’s not unusual; many American kids in the early sixties thought Japan was part of China.
Speaking of Fujimori, I never understood what all the fuss over Japan refusing to hand him over to the Peruvian authorities was about? Japan and Peru do not have an extradition treaty between them, and Fujimori was/is a Japanese citizen. The most the Japanese authorities could have done was to arrest and try him for crimes under the Japanese Criminal Code—say, kidnapping and murder. Did the Peruvian authorities try that?
If they notice.
I understand and respect Enríquez-Ominami’s decision to honor both fathers by keeping their surnames as a professional actor. Having said that, I have a question for my Latin American (particularly Chilean, if any) readers here: Does the unusual name Ominami add a touch of the exotic? Or is it like any other name in a land of immigrants?
In Brazil, my guess is that an Ominami would be tagged as part Indio. That is a rare name, even in Japan.
Colonel Ominami was known as “El Chino”, the same nickname bestowed on Peru’s ex-President Fujimori. That’s not unusual; many American kids in the early sixties thought Japan was part of China.
Speaking of Fujimori, I never understood what all the fuss over Japan refusing to hand him over to the Peruvian authorities was about? Japan and Peru do not have an extradition treaty between them, and Fujimori was/is a Japanese citizen. The most the Japanese authorities could have done was to arrest and try him for crimes under the Japanese Criminal Code—say, kidnapping and murder. Did the Peruvian authorities try that?
Saturday, May 09, 2009
A Public Service Notice on the N1H1 Influenza Virus for People Who Are Thinking of Buying a Mask…
This essay by Patrick Smith, one of my favorite writers, brings a welcome perspective to the issue. If only our political leaders could speak with this degree of sanity.
To American conservatives: Yes, it’s Salon, but that doesn’t mean Smith doesn’t make sense.
To American conservatives: Yes, it’s Salon, but that doesn’t mean Smith doesn’t make sense.
A “Yes, But” to the Japanese Ranking for the “Mothers’ Index”
Asahi Shinbun claims that U.S.-based NGO Save the Children ranks Japan 34th out of 158 countries in a ranking of the “best places to be a mother”. Actually, according to the STC report, Japan probably did worse; it ranked 34th among 43 “more developed countries”. So you wonder where Japan would rank if “less developed countries” such as Israel, South Korea and Singapore were taken into account in evaluating Japan. It is even more embarrassing when you consider that the 34 “more developed countries” includes such paragons of development as Albania, Belarus (which outranks Japan), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.
The “Mothers’ Index”, fittingly, turns out to be a composite of a “Women’s Index” and a “Children’s Index”, and it is in the former that Japan fails, where it ranks 36th, in contrast to the latter, where it holds down 8th place. A look at the data shows that what’s dragging Japan down is “ratio of estimated female to male earned income (42nd place, barely beating out Austria for the booby prize)” and “participation of women in national government (% seats held by women) (40th place, in a tie with Malta and barely ahead of Ukraine and Albania)”.
Fair enough. The barriers to women in the Japanese workplace are well documented and leave much room for improvement. More to the point of the survey, the extremely low birth rate here tells us that something is amiss where it comes to accommodating the sometimes conflicting needs of the contemporary woman and motherhood. Indeed, there are also so many things that Japan as a society can do to help women (and men) who have children. However, there’s something about the data that tells us that the survey is not all that it’s cracked up to be.
For that, first, let’s turn to “lifetime risk of maternal mortality”. According to the survey, Japan ranks 14th at 1 death per 11,600 women—not bad but not so great. But when Ireland clocks in at 1 per 47,600, nearly twice as good as second-place Bosnia and Herzegovina (which ranks 8th from the bottom in terms of infant mortality) at 1 per 29,000, you know that there’s something seriously wrong about the data behind the rankings. There’s something fishy about “educational status” too. For example, the “expected years of formal schooling for females” in Australia is 21 years, in contrast to Japan’s, at 15. My arithmetic may be a little off, but it looks like the average Sheila earns a PhD while her counterpart Yamato Nadeshiko only manages a junior college degree. Something is fishy here. The “percent (sic) of women using modern contraception”, where Japan ranks a mediocre 23rd is also open to question as well. The pill has been available as a contraceptive by prescription in Japan since 1998. Couldn’t the results have more to do with historical legacy—the widespread use of condoms in Japan for instance—than the current socio-economic status of women?
Finally, with all due respect to white folks, lumping all those East and Central European countries into the “more developed countries” category while leaving everybody else including all of East Asia in the “less developed” and “least developed” categories seems a little.1960s, don’t you think?
This highlights a problem for global comparisons in general; the data are just not mutually compatible, as I’ve demonstrated before. Yet the analysts are tasked, so they put it all together, winding up with a mishmash of apples and oranges. Another point: Did the Asahi reporter actually read the STC report? Just askin’.
The “Mothers’ Index”, fittingly, turns out to be a composite of a “Women’s Index” and a “Children’s Index”, and it is in the former that Japan fails, where it ranks 36th, in contrast to the latter, where it holds down 8th place. A look at the data shows that what’s dragging Japan down is “ratio of estimated female to male earned income (42nd place, barely beating out Austria for the booby prize)” and “participation of women in national government (% seats held by women) (40th place, in a tie with Malta and barely ahead of Ukraine and Albania)”.
Fair enough. The barriers to women in the Japanese workplace are well documented and leave much room for improvement. More to the point of the survey, the extremely low birth rate here tells us that something is amiss where it comes to accommodating the sometimes conflicting needs of the contemporary woman and motherhood. Indeed, there are also so many things that Japan as a society can do to help women (and men) who have children. However, there’s something about the data that tells us that the survey is not all that it’s cracked up to be.
For that, first, let’s turn to “lifetime risk of maternal mortality”. According to the survey, Japan ranks 14th at 1 death per 11,600 women—not bad but not so great. But when Ireland clocks in at 1 per 47,600, nearly twice as good as second-place Bosnia and Herzegovina (which ranks 8th from the bottom in terms of infant mortality) at 1 per 29,000, you know that there’s something seriously wrong about the data behind the rankings. There’s something fishy about “educational status” too. For example, the “expected years of formal schooling for females” in Australia is 21 years, in contrast to Japan’s, at 15. My arithmetic may be a little off, but it looks like the average Sheila earns a PhD while her counterpart Yamato Nadeshiko only manages a junior college degree. Something is fishy here. The “percent (sic) of women using modern contraception”, where Japan ranks a mediocre 23rd is also open to question as well. The pill has been available as a contraceptive by prescription in Japan since 1998. Couldn’t the results have more to do with historical legacy—the widespread use of condoms in Japan for instance—than the current socio-economic status of women?
Finally, with all due respect to white folks, lumping all those East and Central European countries into the “more developed countries” category while leaving everybody else including all of East Asia in the “less developed” and “least developed” categories seems a little.1960s, don’t you think?
This highlights a problem for global comparisons in general; the data are just not mutually compatible, as I’ve demonstrated before. Yet the analysts are tasked, so they put it all together, winding up with a mishmash of apples and oranges. Another point: Did the Asahi reporter actually read the STC report? Just askin’.
Faceoff against Aso Shouldn’t Hurt Ozawa
Ichiro Ozawa has finally consented to face off on May 13 against Prime Minister Aso in the Diet session party-leader debate—launched nine years ago as (it is widely believed) an Ozawa initiative—that he had done his utmost to avoid even before his most recent political troubles began.
Frankly, I’m surprised that it took Ozawa so long to come around. He may be no great debater, but Aso isn’t one either. Nor is Aso an effective attack dog; he’s more of a friendly-banter, small-talk guy, cast in the same mold as George W. Bush. More important, the debate is brief (45 minutes according to Wikipedia and should in principle be focused on policy issues, of which there are plenty. Thus, a concentrated personal attack on Ozawa can damage public perception of Aso’s leadership. More seriously, it will backfire on the LDP, whose own far more extensive reliance on corporate money provides plenty of material for a counterattack. If it comes to that Ozawa could even decide to play to the crowds by throwing in a DPJ proposal to ban all corporate funds, though he personally dislikes the idea. Although I do not believe that the principals will avoid discussing political financing altogether—that would be bad for Ozawa as well—it should be a relatively minor factor in the debate.
This will give Ozawa and his DPJ allies and associates some ammunition to claim that he is not hiding himself and moreover has yet again publicly addressed the issue. It obviously will not slake the media’s thirst for political blood, but it will go some ways in quieting—though certainly not silencing—less friendly elements in the DPJ. That in turn means less material for the media’s Ozawa deathwatch.
Frankly, I’m surprised that it took Ozawa so long to come around. He may be no great debater, but Aso isn’t one either. Nor is Aso an effective attack dog; he’s more of a friendly-banter, small-talk guy, cast in the same mold as George W. Bush. More important, the debate is brief (45 minutes according to Wikipedia and should in principle be focused on policy issues, of which there are plenty. Thus, a concentrated personal attack on Ozawa can damage public perception of Aso’s leadership. More seriously, it will backfire on the LDP, whose own far more extensive reliance on corporate money provides plenty of material for a counterattack. If it comes to that Ozawa could even decide to play to the crowds by throwing in a DPJ proposal to ban all corporate funds, though he personally dislikes the idea. Although I do not believe that the principals will avoid discussing political financing altogether—that would be bad for Ozawa as well—it should be a relatively minor factor in the debate.
This will give Ozawa and his DPJ allies and associates some ammunition to claim that he is not hiding himself and moreover has yet again publicly addressed the issue. It obviously will not slake the media’s thirst for political blood, but it will go some ways in quieting—though certainly not silencing—less friendly elements in the DPJ. That in turn means less material for the media’s Ozawa deathwatch.
Thursday, May 07, 2009
Fareed Zakaria Plays to the Crowd
In his Newsweek essay entitled “Change We Can’t Believe in”, Fareed Zakaria casts a skeptical eye at Pakistan’s newfound seriousness in fighting militant Islam on the home front. He points to the Pakistani military and intelligence forces’ longstanding relationship with the Islamists as part of its geopolitical strategy that pitted it against India and a USSR-controlled Afghanistan. He gives kudos to a $15 billion Biden-Lugar aid bill that encourages the development of civil society, believing that it will encourage “more cooperation with its neighbors”. But he ends the essay with the following:
The Newsweek essay adopts what is at best a skeptical tone, emphasizing the historical weight of what to Western eyes comes across as a sinister, symbiotic relationship. The U.S. effort that is given the most play is a bipartisan bill. The Daily Show by contrast emphasizes the turnaround, and highlights the Obama administration at the expense of the Bush administration.
Molding the message to the audience is nothing new; you only have to remember Jesus’ parables to understand that. Still, when you do that at the expense of leaving a very different impression of the long-term prospects of the recent turnaround in Pakistan, you are no longer being an intellectual, or even an advocate; you have become an entertainer.
“Perhaps…the strategy of the past six decades has suddenly changed. But I recall what Warren Buffett once called the four most dangerous words in investing: ‘This time it's different.’”Zakaria appears to take a different tack in his guest appearance on The Daily show. Maybe it’s just me, but he appears to give the impression that the Pakistanis have finally seen the light on the dangers of radical Islam within its own borders. Moreover, he at best only hints at the Pakistani military and intelligence forces’ longstanding relationship with the Islamists as part of its geopolitical strategy that pitted it against India and a USSR-controlled Afghanistan, instead focusing on an army’s reluctance to fight at all. Meanwhile, he contrasts the Obama administration’s emphasis on the dangers in Pakistan favorably against the Bush administration’s singular focus on Afghanistan.
The Newsweek essay adopts what is at best a skeptical tone, emphasizing the historical weight of what to Western eyes comes across as a sinister, symbiotic relationship. The U.S. effort that is given the most play is a bipartisan bill. The Daily Show by contrast emphasizes the turnaround, and highlights the Obama administration at the expense of the Bush administration.
Molding the message to the audience is nothing new; you only have to remember Jesus’ parables to understand that. Still, when you do that at the expense of leaving a very different impression of the long-term prospects of the recent turnaround in Pakistan, you are no longer being an intellectual, or even an advocate; you have become an entertainer.
State of the Nation: Aso, LDP on Mini Roll While DPJ Flounders
Spring and the new fiscal year have brought Prime Minister Aso and the LDP-Komeito coalition good tidings. April did begin somewhat inauspiciously with front-to-back coverage of the flap over a false missile alert—the North Korean authorities wound up launching the Taepodong 2 one day later, on a Sunday morning—but it did them little harm, since the tracking system itself worked flawlessly and the SAC-3s and Patriot 3s never were tested. The fact that the mid-range ballistic missile is never going to be targeted at Japan also must have had a lot to with the fact that the whole incident blew by with little fallout on the domestic political scene.
But after that mini-setback that never really was, things have been looking up for the Aso administration. The official response to the swine flu epidemic has been generally good from a political point of view. The coordination between the national authorities and local governments (and immigration services) appears to have proceeded with few hitches**, and rapid disclosure of suspected cases—all turning up negative—has helped keep the media off their backs. The SARS experience must be serving them well. An actual outbreak—not just an isolated case—will change all this if they mishandle it, but so far so good. Thus, the DPJ has found little to slam the Aso administration here.
Just as important, the economy has shown some signs of bottoming out, with industrial production showing a modest uptick in March, with promises of a couple of more months of better times (compared to what, cynics will say, but any good news is welcome these days), and the stock market has been holding. The rise in industrial production has nothing to do with the latest stimulus package now in the hands of the Diet and everything to do with the precipitous inventory drawdown coming to an end, but the media is not going to deny the authorities some credit for the first two stimulus packages, which most importantly directly provided badly-needed financing to the business sector. The stock market (and ultimately the economy itself) continues to rise and fall with the U.S. market and the dollar-yen exchange rate, both matters that are out of the government’s hands. But so far, the FY2009 economy has been raising (I’m not ready to say “floating”) the Aso administration’s boat.
It has also helped Aso that the DPJ’s economic program has received little public attention. The media hasn’t been helpful, but that’s at least partly because there’s nobody around to sell it. The policy wonks who work on this sort of thing are generally not close to party leader Ozawa in the best of times; these days, many of them must be sticking pins in effigy dolls to hasten an outcome that should be increasingly inevitable**.
This of course brings us to the DPJ’s real problem. The only thing the media care about as far as the DPJ is concerned is what’s up with Ozawa, and, with few exceptions, that’s all they’re going to report. So the damage to the DPJ—to its credit and the LDP’s likely worry, public support for the DPJ has held up much better than it has for Ozawa personally—becomes greater with every day that passes without change. Unfortunately for the DPJ, the beleaguered Ozawa has reverted to type, retreating into a shell and digging in his heels at the same time. Yet the other leaders cannot force his hand because there’s a good chance that he’ll call forth his men and pocket his money and once again sunder a party that he helped create.
And that’s where things stand, as the Japanese political scene begins to awaken from the slumber and the overseas junkets of Golden Week (the short version***).
* A potential dustup between Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Yoichi Maszoe and Yokohama Mayor Hiroshi Nakata was avoided when Nakata brushed off unwarranted accusations of unpreparedness from the impetuous Masuzoe with minimum fuss. Incidentally, the coolly competent and still youthful Nakata should be at the head of the line or thereabouts when you make a list of local politicians who could play major roles in a national realignment of party politics. (And no, conservative nationalists will not rally around Shintaro Ishihara, only partly because he won’t indulge them.)
There were reported cases of doctors refusing to treat fever outpatients, but that seems to have been the result of a misunderstanding of an official notice to refer suspected cases to designated treatment centers. A few days have gone by without any further reports of such incidents.
** According to this Sankei report, the outside experts commission hasn’t been acting so kindly with regard to Ozawa either, as what I posted here also indicates. It’s Sankei, who wants Ozwa’s hide badly, reporting, but it does dovetail with my take on the commission.
*** Some people are taking this Thursday and Friday off too, stretching it out to a 26 April-10 May string of 15 uninterrupted holidays. And who says we Japanese work too hard?
There’s some talk of a cabinet reshuffle to spice things up before going into a Lower House election. That’s the one thing I’m very skeptical about. Every major makeover in recent years seems to come with shakedown problems, as political finance issues and gaffes force apologies and even resignations from newly-minted Ministers. The Aso administration finally got its act together after it ditched Shoichi Nakagawa and, tellingly, added the Finance Ministry to Economy Czar Kaoru Yosano’s portfolio instead of taking on a new Finance Minister. I think that the LDP will ditch Aso before he falls into such dire straits that he sees no harm in making that gamble.
But after that mini-setback that never really was, things have been looking up for the Aso administration. The official response to the swine flu epidemic has been generally good from a political point of view. The coordination between the national authorities and local governments (and immigration services) appears to have proceeded with few hitches**, and rapid disclosure of suspected cases—all turning up negative—has helped keep the media off their backs. The SARS experience must be serving them well. An actual outbreak—not just an isolated case—will change all this if they mishandle it, but so far so good. Thus, the DPJ has found little to slam the Aso administration here.
Just as important, the economy has shown some signs of bottoming out, with industrial production showing a modest uptick in March, with promises of a couple of more months of better times (compared to what, cynics will say, but any good news is welcome these days), and the stock market has been holding. The rise in industrial production has nothing to do with the latest stimulus package now in the hands of the Diet and everything to do with the precipitous inventory drawdown coming to an end, but the media is not going to deny the authorities some credit for the first two stimulus packages, which most importantly directly provided badly-needed financing to the business sector. The stock market (and ultimately the economy itself) continues to rise and fall with the U.S. market and the dollar-yen exchange rate, both matters that are out of the government’s hands. But so far, the FY2009 economy has been raising (I’m not ready to say “floating”) the Aso administration’s boat.
It has also helped Aso that the DPJ’s economic program has received little public attention. The media hasn’t been helpful, but that’s at least partly because there’s nobody around to sell it. The policy wonks who work on this sort of thing are generally not close to party leader Ozawa in the best of times; these days, many of them must be sticking pins in effigy dolls to hasten an outcome that should be increasingly inevitable**.
This of course brings us to the DPJ’s real problem. The only thing the media care about as far as the DPJ is concerned is what’s up with Ozawa, and, with few exceptions, that’s all they’re going to report. So the damage to the DPJ—to its credit and the LDP’s likely worry, public support for the DPJ has held up much better than it has for Ozawa personally—becomes greater with every day that passes without change. Unfortunately for the DPJ, the beleaguered Ozawa has reverted to type, retreating into a shell and digging in his heels at the same time. Yet the other leaders cannot force his hand because there’s a good chance that he’ll call forth his men and pocket his money and once again sunder a party that he helped create.
And that’s where things stand, as the Japanese political scene begins to awaken from the slumber and the overseas junkets of Golden Week (the short version***).
* A potential dustup between Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Yoichi Maszoe and Yokohama Mayor Hiroshi Nakata was avoided when Nakata brushed off unwarranted accusations of unpreparedness from the impetuous Masuzoe with minimum fuss. Incidentally, the coolly competent and still youthful Nakata should be at the head of the line or thereabouts when you make a list of local politicians who could play major roles in a national realignment of party politics. (And no, conservative nationalists will not rally around Shintaro Ishihara, only partly because he won’t indulge them.)
There were reported cases of doctors refusing to treat fever outpatients, but that seems to have been the result of a misunderstanding of an official notice to refer suspected cases to designated treatment centers. A few days have gone by without any further reports of such incidents.
** According to this Sankei report, the outside experts commission hasn’t been acting so kindly with regard to Ozawa either, as what I posted here also indicates. It’s Sankei, who wants Ozwa’s hide badly, reporting, but it does dovetail with my take on the commission.
*** Some people are taking this Thursday and Friday off too, stretching it out to a 26 April-10 May string of 15 uninterrupted holidays. And who says we Japanese work too hard?
There’s some talk of a cabinet reshuffle to spice things up before going into a Lower House election. That’s the one thing I’m very skeptical about. Every major makeover in recent years seems to come with shakedown problems, as political finance issues and gaffes force apologies and even resignations from newly-minted Ministers. The Aso administration finally got its act together after it ditched Shoichi Nakagawa and, tellingly, added the Finance Ministry to Economy Czar Kaoru Yosano’s portfolio instead of taking on a new Finance Minister. I think that the LDP will ditch Aso before he falls into such dire straits that he sees no harm in making that gamble.
Wednesday, May 06, 2009
Off the Media Radar
What happened to the mullahs? What about the Iranian connection? Why don’t we hear about the North Korean counterfeiting operations anymore? Meanwhile, in Japan, the Nikai investigation has dropped out of the media coverage on the Nishimatsu scandal.
Tuesday, May 05, 2009
Online NYT Edit Trips Up Saletan on Japanese Response to Swine Flu
The usually reliable William Saletan writes in “First They Came for Mexicans” Slate (5 May 2009):
I think this was an honest mistake on Saletan’s part, not carelessness. Note that the NYT report that he links to in order to back up his claim makes no mention of Japan at all. The writers of the NYT must have excised the (likely slightly incorrect) reference to Japanese action after they found out that they were wrong. Even newspapers sometimes alter their online articles without any notice; this must have been one of such cases.
Online sources are tricky, and there’s not too much the sources themselves can do about it.
As of this post, Saletan has not corrected his report, though that is not my point here.
…Japan began denying visas to Mexicans on arrival.“Denying visas…on arrival” doesn’t make sense; you’re supposed to obtain visas before you come. In fact, what happened was that Japan temporarily suspended the waiver of visa requirements. Given the disproportionately high incidence of reported cases in Mexico—just imagine the likely extent of unreported cases—it is not unreasonable to resume visa requirements; air flights between Mexico and Japan continue.
I think this was an honest mistake on Saletan’s part, not carelessness. Note that the NYT report that he links to in order to back up his claim makes no mention of Japan at all. The writers of the NYT must have excised the (likely slightly incorrect) reference to Japanese action after they found out that they were wrong. Even newspapers sometimes alter their online articles without any notice; this must have been one of such cases.
Online sources are tricky, and there’s not too much the sources themselves can do about it.
As of this post, Saletan has not corrected his report, though that is not my point here.
Saturday, May 02, 2009
Japan’s Surprise Economy Boost?
Well, that’s what the TIME article’s headline, copied almost verbatim from a BBC report—not most reliable of news outlets, as everyone who has been kind enough to follow my blog knows—that it links to. All that the TIME report itself says is:
Actually, if the BBC reporter had talked to real human beings (or read Japanese newspapers), they would have known that Japanese manufacturers would be coming out of the precipitous inventory adjustment downswing sometime during the spring anyway. So the issue is not the March uptick, much less its size, but whether an upward trajectory can be sustained.
Industrial output in Japan rose in March for the first time in six months, according to government figures.Now industrial production for March registered a 1.6% rise. So I guess my question is, if industrial production ended up in a 0.9% rise—the average of private sector forecasts—would that have meant that Japan’s “plunge in production and exports” would have no chance of “nearing an end”? Or would the same sentence have read:
The larger-than-expected increase is seen as a sign the country's plunge in production and exports may be nearing an end.
The expected increase is seen as a sign the country's plunge in production and exports may be nearing an end.I would not be carping if the reports had not used the words “surprise” and “may”.
Actually, if the BBC reporter had talked to real human beings (or read Japanese newspapers), they would have known that Japanese manufacturers would be coming out of the precipitous inventory adjustment downswing sometime during the spring anyway. So the issue is not the March uptick, much less its size, but whether an upward trajectory can be sustained.
Are the Yakuza an Easy Mark or What?
Japanese electoral politics has been boiled down to one thing—the Ozawa deathwatch. All else, barring unforeseen events, has become trivialized. In the meantime…According to a couple of media reports, on July 7 last year, the day of the Japanese Star Festival Tanabata, a heartless plumber and four of his meanie drinking pals ganged up on a senior official in the yakuza group Kyokuto-kai and a couple of his assistants who were peacefully working a food stall at—where else?—a Tanabata Festival. Armed with a fake 8-inch sword, a cooking knife, and two police batons, the amateur gang of five took only two hours to convince the yakuza to hand over 800,000 yen in sales and sign a note promising to pay another 500,00 yen. They believed that a yakuza would never file a complaint with the police and continued harassing him, issuing threats of harm to his family. The pressure apparently got so great that the yakuza did go to the police later in the month. Today, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Agency announced that it had finally cracked the case and arrested the five men.
It took almost ten months, but justice has come, once again, to the rescue of the weak and downtrodden. Hooray.
Friday, May 01, 2009
More Thoughts around the Taepodong Launch (and a Notice)
”The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.”
Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “If Necessary, Strike and Destroy”, The Washington Post (22 June 2006)
The North Korean perfection of a long-range nuclear missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country.
Philip Zelikow, “Be ready to strike and destroy North Korea's missile test”, Foreign Policy (22 February 2009)
The first op-ed, by a former Defense Secretary (Perry) and an Assistant Defense Secretary (Carter) in the Clinton Administration, came on the eve of the first launch of the Taepodong 2 and called on the Bush administration to conduct a preemptive strike if the North Korean authorities continued preparations. We know how that turned out. Zelikow, a career diplomat and counselor to Secretary of State Rice at the time (2005-2007), had opposed a preemptive strike at the time, by his own account arguing:
“(1) attainment of a long-range or intercontinental missile capability would require more tests, so this one did not place North Korea at the threshold of an operational capability; and (2) given point #1, it was better to use the test to draw a ‘red line’ with support from the international community.”Zelikow believed that the conditions had been satisfied and urged the newly-minted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to draw a red line. We know how that turned out as well, less than two months later.
Note that both op-eds assume that the Taepodong is a threat to Japan in the same way that it is a threat to the United States (though Carter and Perry are somewhat less explicit on that point). This is odd, since the long-range nuclear missile capability that a Taepodong 2 with a nuclear warhead poses makes sense only as a means to reach U.S. targets. Instead, it is the 200 or so land-mobile midrange Rodongs that pose an imminent danger to Japanese security.
The long-range Taepodong’s deployment may affect U.S. strategic thinking regarding retaliation under the mutual security treaty in the event of a North Korean missile attack on Japan. This is by no means trivial even if it is merely a matter of perception, since this could affect the deterrence value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the emergence of a North Korean threat to its 50 states will change the balance of U.S. concerns between counter-proliferation and deterrence—the second rising in relative importance—and align them more closely to Japan’s.
I’m not sure where this is leading to, so I’ll leave it at that for now.
In the meantime, let me go back to the op-eds that started this train of thoughts and ask: Where did this implicit assumption by top officials that there is no discernable distinction between U.S. and Japanese interests regarding the Taepodong come from?
I think it all goes back to the late 1990s, when the Japanese government was still reluctant to sign on to the expensive and experimental missile defense system that the United States had been urging Japan to adopt. But it all changed in 1998, when North Korea flew Taepodong 1 over Japan. This was not in itself out of the ordinary if you believed that North Korea’s claim that it was a satellite launch and North Korea had observed, instead of neglected, the proper protocols regarding such an event. Of course no one believed North Korea’s claim and North Korea dispensed with the niceties. So the launch caused great public consternation in Japan and became a material factor in the Japanese government’s decision to sign on to the U.S. program (which Secretary Gates is now trying to pare back under the Obama administration). In other words, it was the Japanese public that bought into the notion that the Taepodon was a threat to Japan. The writers of the op-ed, with nothing else to go by, have unthinkingly accepted this Japanese conventional wisdom.
But this begs yet another question: Why did the Japanese authorities also buy into this idea and agree to purchase a missile defense system that, if you agree with Keiichiro Asao, does not address the main Japanese concern—the hundreds of land-mobile Rodongs whose main targets are on Japanese territory—but was instead actually geared toward the relatively small number of the more expensive and cumbersome long-range missiles that nations such as North Korea and Iran might launch against the United States. But here again, I am at a loss; I can do some speculating, but I don’t have enough dots to connect to make it anything more than a list of possibilities.
Sorry, my explanation regarding the significance of the three sets of bureaucratic appointments by Prime Minister Aso within the context of the broader relationship between politics and the bureaucracy is still on the backburners. If it turns out to be too long and complicated to deal with on a blog, I’ll put together the main points of my argument and post that.
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