…some doodling for which I find no
immediate practical use…
The
pro-nuclear media is taking Yoichi Masuzoe’s landslide victory over antinuclear
candidates Kenji Utsunomiya and Morihiro Hosokawa as an endorsement of nuclear
power by Tokyo voters. Not necessarily. In fact, the election appears to have had
the potential of being even more of a toss-up than I had guessed. A few things
turning out differently for Hosokawa, and he could have been another example of
a governor of a key prefecture using his bully pulpit to affect an issue on the
national agenda*.
First,
the voting
outcome.
Yoichi Masuzoe: 2,112,979
votes
Kenji Utsunomiya: 982,594.767** votes
Morihiro Hosokawa: 956,063
votes
Toshio Tamogami: 610,865 votes
(The most any of the other
12 candidates received was 88,936 votes.)
(982,594.767 + 956,063)
÷ 2,112,979 = 0.91749977969
Is
an eight-percentage point difference—a four-point swing—that unlikely in a
Japanese election? Remember that most pundits believed that the 2003 “postal
reform” election would end in a decisive defeat for the LDP at the time that
Prime Minister Koizumi called it. And gubernatorial and mayoral elections in
metropolitan areas are even more volatile***. And look at the negatives that
Hosokawa carried (in descending order of importance): the disastrous non-launch
of his campaign, the moment of truth when the media and voters define the
candidate and his candidacy; the failure to dispel the lingering clouds of the
circumstances around the 100 million yen loan and his 1994 decision to resign as
prime minister instead of fully accounting for it; and his opposition to the
highly popular 2020 Tokyo Olympics.
Yes.
Change a few conditions, and the outcome of the election could have been very
different even if the public’s support or lack thereof for nuclear power had
been the same. A single-issue candidate can prevail even in an election where
that issue is seen as secondary, especially when there is little perception of distinction
on other issues between candidates.
What
would have been the effect on the national debate on nuclear power? More to the
point, how would that have affected the return of nuclear power units to the regional
grids, commissioning of the units under construction, and the construction of
others planned and yet-to-be planned? There would be even less practical use to
any answers to that question. For now, I’m satisfied to have reached the conclusion
that Hosokawa’s campaign would have had realistic hopes of winning with a
better candidate and a better-prepared campaign.
A
few caveats and/or unknowns.
First,
we do not know enough to confidently say that Utsunomiya would have abandoned
his campaign under strong public pressure. I believe that if the Communist and
Social Democratic Parties had threatened to abandon him for Hosokawa, he would
have gone along instead of hanging on as a true fringe candidate. I’m assuming
that his idealism is leavened by a strong streak of pragmatism nurtured through
a successful career as a leading member of the bar. But you never know.
Second,
some of the Utsunomiya votes would have gone to candidates other than Hosokawa.
Some of the progressives would have voted to the fifth-place candidate, a
youthful internet entrepreneur/social activist, some would go for Masuzoe, and some
with a maverick mindset would cast their votes for the hard-right (and only firmly
pro-nuclear) candidate Tamogami. With the same voters, the real swing required
was probably larger than four percentage points.
Second,
we do not know what the effect on voter turnout, at 46.15% the third lowest in
Tokyo history, a more competitive two-man race would have been. I suspect that
interest and therefore turnout would have been higher. Moreover, obviously less
committed, abstainers are more likely to be the “floaters,” who produce wild
swings, particularly in urban districts. They would at least have injected a
significant measure of uncertainty to the outcome.
Third,
the Hosokawa camp puts part of the blame on the Sochi Olympics and the record
snowstorm on the day before the election for the low turnout. Too busy watching
the Olympics to vote? Perhaps. But I am of two minds about the Hosokawa camp’s
spin on the weather. The sky had cleared up well before the voting stations
opened, but any snow remaining—enough snow remained on some side streets to
pose an obstacle to pedestrians—would have deterred some people from every
voting bloc except Sokagakkai, which
went overwhelmingly for the Komeito’s candidate of choice Masuzoe. Another point
of note is that the elderly, presumably more inclined to support the
conservative candidate, particularly someone like Masuzoe, who has a reputation
as a social welfare expert and on a more personal level someone who cared for
his aging mother, are more likely to be cautious in venturing out in the face
of unfavorable weather or its aftereffects. All things considered, there is no
way of gauging the impact of the voters who stayed home because of the effects
of the weather the day before without detailed statistics.
Fourth,
Masuzoe was lucky that this was Japan, not the United States. Masuzoe has some
serious issues from his personal history—charges of domestic violence from his
first wife, who now happens to be an LDP Diet member, and allegations of
insufficient financial support for one of two children of his sired out of
wedlock—that would have doomed him under American media rules, which consider
such matters fair game as revelation of the candidate’s character. The tabloids
are willing to venture into such territory, but the mainstream media ignores
those stories unless they are relevant to policy issues or involve misuse of public
office****.
Fifth,
an argument could be made that Tamogami could have been convinced to give up
his candidacy in favor of Masuzoe if Utsunomiya had thrown his support to
Hosokawa. Possible, but unlikely. Masuzoe hedged his bets by saying that he
wanted to minimize reliance on nuclear power. That surely did not go down well
with Tamogami. More importantly, Tamogami would have been loath to support a
pragmatist who, as drafter of the LDP proposal for a new constitution, eschewed
most of the nationalist trappings that are so dear to nationalist
conservatives. Tamogami may voice thoughts that many LDP politicians hold dear
but are afraid to articulate, but Masuzoe does not appear to be one of them.
Tamogami would have put the support from his constituency in jeopardy if he had
held his nose and supported Masuzoe. A movement figure who is not angling for a
political appointment cannot afford that.
*Case
in point: Toru Hashimoto, whose domination over the Osaka electorate as Osaka
governor and later as mayor of the city of Osaka, took the city to the brinks
of dismemberment in line with his vision for an Osaka renaissance. Prospects
for that outcome turned south, though, when he tried to take his local movement
to center ring. Progressives also had some success in the 1960s and 70s in leveraging
their prefectural and municipal footholds to influence the national agenda.
**
The fraction .767 is the sum of Utsunomiya’s prorated share of the votes cast
simply for “Kenji,” the given name he shared with another candidate.
***
Case in point: Yukio Aoshima, who entered the Tokyo governor’s race in 1995
with the promise to cancel the World City Expo Tokyo ’96 less than a year
before it was scheduled to be held, and left Japan during the campaign period,
only to return to realize that he had won. Ironically, his lackluster regime
was seen as generally under the control of the bureaucracy.
****
For example, a governor can sleep around all he (or she) likes when off-duty,
but must not use public property in doing so. Do not use the official car in
tending to an assignation. And the governor’s mansion is off-limits for sex
with anyone other than one’s spouse.
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