The following column
was intended for my MIGA column, but I haven’t heard back from the editor for a
whole week and counting, so here it is.
In
“Russian
and Chinese Assertiveness Poses New Foreign Policy Challenges”
from the HBO History Makers Series,
former US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates makes an astonishing and, for the
Obama administration, the following unhelpful claim:
“What -- what we have
accused the Chinese of doing, stealing American companies' secrets and
technology is not new, nor is it done only by the Chinese. There are probably a
dozen or 15 countries that steal our technology in this way.
“In terms of the next
capable next to the Chinese are probably the French. And they've been doing it
a long time.
“I often tell business
audiences, ‘How many of you go to Paris on business.’ Hands go up. ‘How many of
you take your laptops?’ Hands goes up. ‘How many of you take your laptops to
dinner?’ Not very many hands. I said for years, the French Intelligence
Services have been breaking into the hotel rooms of American businessmen and
surreptitiously downloading their laptops, if they felt those laptops had
technological information, or competitive information that would be useful to
French countries -- French companies.
“……We nearly are alone
in the world in not using our intelligence services for competitive advantage
of our businesses.”
Now
this may be helpful in selling his
book,
but it surely cannot be helpful to the US government in the execution of what
will likely be concerted efforts to convince US allies and fence-sitters to
join its years-long fight against China’s government-sponsored cybertheft
following its criminal charges against five PLA officers. I will not hazard a
guess as to the eventual success of the US endeavor—for that, I need to be
compensated for the time and effort it would take—but there are a couple of
points that I’ve looked at that may be of interest to you as you think forward.
First,
is the US being hypocritical in charging PLA officers with cybertheft for
commercial gain while overlooking France, to use Gates’ stark example? There’s
obviously too little information here to be sure one way or another, but I will
say this: It is not difficult to assume that the US government is going easier
on its allies than on China, but if we go by Gate’s allegations alone, the
differentiation in their treatment appears to be warranted, indeed, demanded by
rule of law. Note that the French theft occurred on French soil. In Japan, overseas
theft is punishable under the Penal Code only if the criminal is Japanese. How
about the United States? A cursory search turns up this CRS Report,
which strongly suggests that simple overseas theft where the only US connection
is the victim is unlikely to be prosecuted under US law (although the existence
of state laws muddies the situation somewhat), and this
FBI advisory, which makes it clear that the Economic
Espionage Act, under which the French actions obviously falls, only protects
against “theft that occurs …outside of the United States” when “(a) an act in
furtherance of the offense” has “been committed in the United States or (b) the
violator is a U.S. person or organization.” By contrast, a “federal grand jury
in Pittsburg…found that [the] five Chinese military officers conspired
together, and with others, to hack into the computers of organizations in Western Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the
United States,” according to this
announcement by US Attorney General Eric Holder.
Leaving
aside that fact that you need to identify suspects and connect them to the
crime with evidence to bring an indictment, prosecuting the French agents was
never an option as far as the facts alleged by Gates were concerned, at least
if the term “rule of law” means anything.
Second,
are US hands as clean as Gates claims they are? Well, many Japanese trade
officials and diplomats would dispute his expansive statement that “[w]e nearly
are alone in the world in not using our intelligence services for competitive
advantage of our businesses.” During the trade friction years when US trade
negotiators forcefully pushed their Japanese counterparts for concessions, Japanese
officials directly engaged in the negotiations were convinced that the US
government was wiretapping the Japanese embassy and hotel rooms in Washington
where Japanese negotiators were staying. They pointed to what they believed
were telltale signs of wiretapping, and routinely used payphones for sensitive
communication. It could not be proved then, it cannot be proved now, but you
will be hard put to find any of the negotiators at the time that would be
willing to even seriously doubt the allegation. And given how the US government
was working hand-in-glove at the time with US textile, steel, auto, electric
and electronic appliances, and computer industries (to name those that
immediately come to mind), it requires no stretch of the imagination to
consider those allegations, if true, to be “using [US] intelligence services
for competitive advantage of [US] businesses.”
Obviously,
a distinction needs to be made between allegations of a government acting as
the mastermind of an economic crime ring and a government attempting to gain a
negotiating edge, respectively. That said, the US government must be mindful
that the Snowden revelations will not be the only on the mind of its allies
when it comes to them to seek their cooperation in putting pressure on the
Chinese authorities regarding its (alleged) cybertheft activities.
4 comments:
Very good piece. As you note, it's hard to consider spying to help trade negotiators totally disconnected from promoting business interests, whatever Gates says.
There're probably several parameters involved in determining the US reaction (or for that matter that of any country).
1. The extent of the espionage. From what one reads (which could be untrue, of course) Chinese intel collection is on a massive scale.
2. The relationship with the country. It's not great to have IPR stolen by allies, but it's a lot worse when it's taken by what is for all practical purposes now seen as an enemy state in the US (and Japan).
Robert:
Yes, “the extent of the espionage” and “the relationship with the country” matter,albeit the former far more important than the latter. After all, if the Japanese government were allegedly conducting commercial espionage on the scale and scope of the alleged Chinese operations, would the Abe administration have been any less eager to indict five Japanese SDF officers? And remember, the US government had otherwise sought recourse before it resorted to criminal procedures against the PLA officers. Which brings me to a tangent in your comment, that “for all practical purposes now seen as an enemy state in the US (and Japan).” In fact, I would argue that China is “for all practical purposes now not seen as an enemy state in the US (and Japan)” but rather as a sometimes adversarial state that the US (and Japan) are doing their best to engage under the rules and norms that currently govern relationship between states at peace with each other.
Jun. Thanks. Neither Tokyo nor Washington have given hope that they can manage to avoid war with the PRC. Thus they -- rightly -- do everything they can (or almost) to avoid conflict with Beijing. But I think it's fair to see that those in the Japanese and US government who are paid to plan for war and if necessary fight see China as an enemy state.
I think that you’d have to redefine the word “war” and stretch the meaning of “enemy” for that to happen. That said, we’re all in for a long stretch of a difficult relationship, for which John Mearsheimer makes a strong theoretical case here: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204.
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