And here’s the text email that
spawned the text for the previous post:
...someone at another wire service
looked at a Kyodo wire today that said that the Abe administration was hoping
that Modi would make Japan his first overseas destination and got to wondering,
“Does Modi's election potentially affect the current balance of power in East
Asia?”
My response:
Funny you ask that; I’d just begun
to write a piece for the MIGA website that began with the sentence: “2014 has
most likely been a bad year for you if you happen to be a political analyst who
specializes in the states that used to form the Soviet Union”, then gone on to
talk about an equally disastrous outcome for India specialists, and what we
could learn from such cases. But to your question…
In a nutshell, no, at least not in
ways that would be different from what we’d already been seeing, which is a
gradual but limited development of the bilateral security relationship. The
youth vote propelled Modi and his BJP to a lower house majority, and to fix the
hidebound, stalling domestic economy. For that, he needs more trade and more investment,
and he’ll welcome all comers, including China. He’ll do his best to avoid being
sidetracked by issues that have no upside in that direction. There’s always
been a mutual attraction between the two nations that has been mostly free of
geopolitical conflict—India’s nuclear weapons program has been a sticking
point, but Japan has managed to mostly get over that—and Modi does appear to
have a warm relationship with the Japanese political and economic leadership
that is only set to grow, but it’s doubtful that he’ll go about that in a way
that would look like a deliberate snub of China.
I’m sure that Abe and his handlers
would like to see Modi make Japan his first diplomatic stop, but that occasion
is likely reserved for the July BRICs Summit in Brazil. So how about a pair of
stops on his way back from Fortaleza, Tokyo and Seoul, then a brief chat with
Xi Jinping at Beijing Airport before he finally heads back home? Long
trip, but it’s the least-controversial way of arranging the itinerary that I
can think of. If it happens, remember, you read it here first.
The one wild card in my view is the
possibility that the Chinese PLA might decide to test a new Modi
administration’s mettle through a clash around the territorial disputes. Or, to
state the matter more plausibly, any clash, deliberate or accidental, would be
correctly seen as a test of the Modi administration’s mettle. That would leave
the Modi administration no choicebut to step up India’s geopolitical game—reach
out more forcefully to China’s frenemies (I don’t think that China has
“enemies”)—if only for the sake of domestic consumption, a move that the Abe
administration would welcome and respond to with efforts to further enhance
security ties.
And now I have to find the time to write the MIGA post…
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