I received a “quick”
question about “[t]he stories about a new ministerial portfolio specifically to
deal with the use of force issue.” I’m putting my response (lightly edited) in
the public domain in the hopes that others will find it useful too.
The question may be quick, but the
answer is not. Where to start and, more important, where to stop?
Every reform-minded prime minister
(and even those that aren’t) tries to transcend interagency rivalries by
setting up HQs, offices and what have you for his pet policy initiatives around
the prime minister’s office and putting political appointees—often cabinet
ministers or, quite often, himself—in charge. But when a new prime minister
arrives, he is likely to have his own priorities (or may share his
predecessor’s but wants to put his personal stamp on it), usually resulting in
yet more what-have-yous around the prime minister’s office. Over time, they
accumulate until yet another reform-minded prime minister assumes power and
decides to scrape away the barnacles of initiatives past, so that he can start
anew and this time get it right…
Prime ministers do this not
necessarily out of mistrust of the bureaucracy or the ministers that lead them.
In this case, MOFA as an institution has always favored a strong defense
posture—do not think for a moment that Ambassador Yachi is one of those ex-MOFA
outliers who are startlingly and openly critical of MOFA and more generally
Japan’s foreign policy—and the MOD civilians and the JSDF leadership largely
lean in the same direction, although they do not like to see their budget
stretched because of the expanded demands. (Which reminds me of MOF, who is the
major force on the sidelines. The Ministry of Justice is irrelevant.) But
someone has to set the agenda and there are so many devils in the details, so
it does make sense to put someone in charge—on paper. In practice, that person,
even a cabinet minister, must rely on a bureaucracy consisting mostly of career
bureaucrats, mostly seconded from those very ministries until their typical
two-year assignments are up, after which they go back where they came from. In the
meantime, that minister cannot issue orders directly to the ministries and
other agencies to comply.
The more interesting question, if Mr.
Abe does decide to assign a specific portfolio, is whom he assigns it to. If he
puts himself or the chief cabinet secretary in charge, it won’t mean much
beyond the initial agenda-setting phase, since each has too many other things
to tend to on a day-to-day basis to give proper attention to the actual
implementation phase. And do not imagine that even that limited role will
survive past Mr. Abe’s tenure except in name. If he assigns it to a cabinet
minister without ministerial portfolio, there will be a little more action,
particularly if that minister is on good terms with the MOFA and MOD ministers
and he/she has true expertise, neither of which is not a given. (Thought
experiment: There’s huge competence gap even between the most ardent NASCAR fan
and the most incompetent NASCAR driver.) However, the guarantee of whatever
effectiveness this arrangement has lasts only as long as Abe’s tenure. The most
interesting twist will come if Abe decides to anoint the head of MOFA or (less
likely) MOD as the minister in charge of national security. For that minister will
have been set up as the senior-most of the ministers with ministerial portfolio
and can bring to bear the full force of a ministerial bureaucracy that will
have an institutional interest in maintaining and reinforcing its newfound institutional
superiority. That is, until a new prime minister comes in—Mr. Abe will not stay
on forever, even with the new miracle drugn that has restored his health—and
decides to do it, you know, his/her(?) way.
PS:
Actually, only two current cabinet ministers really matter on this question:
Prime Minister Abe, and Akihiro Ota, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism.
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