The Beijing TV apology for a cardboard/meat-filled steamed buns dumpling hoax is reassuring, but not only for the obvious reasons.
The Yomiuri reports that according to a July 18 report on an online news service run by the Beijing municipal government, the July 11 Beijing TV report claiming that meat-filled steamed buns sold at Beijing stalls were using cardboard trash in place of pork had been a hoax. The municipal security bureau found that temporary workers working on "Transparency", a Beijing TV program, handed meat and cardboard to four people including migrant workers and filmed them mixing the cardboard and meat. Beijing TV apologized, stating that they "exerted an undesirable influence on society by making a false report due to the lack of supervision." The perpetrators of the hoax were summarily executed after a trial that lasted fifty minutes, which reminds you that temps are the first to go in China as well. (Okay, I exaggerated. A little. Say, does this Zheng Ziaoyu guy remind you of a certain Japanese politician or what?)
This is good news in so many ways: first, it allays domestic and global fears about China's food industry, which has been taking a beating of late. Second, it is reassuring to know that the dreaded security bureau is no longer watching over foreigners so that they do not go around humping Chinese women (seriously, I have a first-hand witnesses) and instead worry about more immediate concerns. Finally, and most importantly, nothing makes me feel more secure than to know that Beijing TV shares the same eyeballs-driven values that Japanese TV holds so dear. If this isn't what the East Community is all about, I don't know what is
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Perhaps Everyone Who Comes to This Blog Also Goes to That One, Still…
I have to say, I haven't had time to look around at other people's blogs, but if you find any better mix of facts and speculation on the Upper House election aa well as the overall political background by a single individual than Observing Japan, let me know. For example, this July 14, seat-by-seat analysis (which I just noticed) requires a granular perspective of a real pro.
Addendum: Note that for the single-seat races, the July 18 Yomiuri called Iwate, Yamagata, Yamanashi, Mie, Shiga, Nara, Tokushima, and Okinawa Prefectures for the DPJ, and Gunma and Yamaguchi Prefectures for the LDP. (The rest were still tossups.) The ten calls are identical to the ones Japan Observer made in his post four days earlier. So the Western media could do worse than take his other 18 calls seriously as well.
Addendum: Note that for the single-seat races, the July 18 Yomiuri called Iwate, Yamagata, Yamanashi, Mie, Shiga, Nara, Tokushima, and Okinawa Prefectures for the DPJ, and Gunma and Yamaguchi Prefectures for the LDP. (The rest were still tossups.) The ten calls are identical to the ones Japan Observer made in his post four days earlier. So the Western media could do worse than take his other 18 calls seriously as well.
How the Upper House Proportional Seats Are Allocated; Also, More Post-Electoral Speculation
The following explanation of the allocation of the Upper House proportional seats and the subsequent post-electoral speculation are my answers to email questions that I received. Since the questions came from a long-time resident of Japan well versed in the Japanese economy and politics, I thought that my answers could be of benefit to some of my other readers as well. (Confession: people who do not know me well will be surprised (dismayed?) at how much of what I blog on the Upper House election I am learning on the fly.)
I, as a Japanese adult in good standing with the law of the land, have two votes in this Upper House election, one for the local seats (Tokyo is a multi-seat district, and gets five seats) and another for the proportional seats. I can cast my proportional ballot in two different ways.
For the proportional seats, each political party fields a national list of candidates. I am free to award my one proportional vote to any party or, alternatively, to any one of the individual candidates on any one of the party lists. After the voting is over, all the proportional votes that the individual candidates has received are attributed to the respective parties that listed those candidates in addition to the votes that the parties has each received in its own right. Then, the proportional seats are allocated in proportion to the number of votes each party has received. Finally, the seats that a party has won are allocated first to the candidate on its list who received the most votes, next to the one with the second most votes, and so on until the number of proportional seats that the party has won has been reached. By way of illustration:
Imagine that Japan has twenty eligible voters and the Japanese Upper House has four proportional seats, two of which are up for election, and that two political parties, A and B, are contesting this election with two candidates each, A1 and A2, and B1 and B2, respectively. On voting day the twenty-person electorate breaks overwhelmingly for A1, a golf dad, who gets twelve votes, while A2, ex-METI policy wonk, receives only two, and Party A itself only one vote in its own name. Party B, doing slightly better than Party A, receives two votes in its own name. Alas, its candidates are not able to emulate this institutional success; although Zenda ex-president B1 manages to gain three votes, B2 fails to receive a single vote. The final tally:
A: 1+13+2=15; B: 2+3+0=5.
A gets both seats, which go to A1 and A2, and B none, since 15/2 > 5, although, individually, Party B nominally outpolled Party A two to one and B1 beat A2 individually three to two. Of course, in the real world, 96 seats are contested, half of them every three years, which are enough to ensure that iniquities like the example above, where 25% of the votes go to naught, do not occur. But even in that crude example, it is easy to see how celebrity candidates who appeal to sizable constituencies that are independent of the party base can benefit the party twice over by this institutionalized coattail effect. A very poor vote getter or two may well slide in ahead of other more popular candidates in other parties if some of his/her co-candidates do exceedingly well. Thus the scramble to recruit golf dads, ex-presidents, ex-thug motivational speakers, and other B-list celebrities.
I believe that the steak analogy holds not only for the individual candidates but also for the LDP if there is enough time between the breaking of the pension scandals and the election date for the public to get over it. To push the analogy, recover from the bad experience with the e.coli on all those rare Del Monicos and also feel that they've had enough of that sautéed salmon (which came with its own little salmonella scare anyway). If "steak" is too charitable, think, the devil you know? Familiarity breeds consent?
But how much, you ask? That, I have no idea. You could do worse than ask Gerry Curtis. In fact, you can do much better than read this blog; Professor Curtis wrote the book on Japanese politics. Literally. Many times over. I heard he's in town.
It's difficult to say where Mssrs. Abe and Ozawa will be six months from now; if they survive the immediate aftermath, they should still be around; I think that mid-January is a little too early in the Diet schedule for the situation to become untenable in the Upper House. As for the election itself, Mr. Ozawa is too unpopular within his own party to be able to eat his words and stay on in the event of an outright ruling coalition majority as the immediate outcome. I say this is so even in the likely event that the DPJ beats the LDP one-on-one. Otherwise, Mr. Ozawa can plausibly claim that the opposition has beaten the coalition and I think stay on (and will stay on; he bleeds politics), even if the coalition does manage to cobble together a working majority. As for Mr. Abe, I am increasingly coming around to the view that he will stick around unless the coalition loses very badly. Figures like 39, 40 have been bandied about, and 40 does look as good as any for what is purely a mass psychology threshold.
But what are the chances of a working majority in the Upper House? Ah, the 64-seat question. Assuming 45 LDP and 14 New Komeito seats as the base case scenario, the coalition needs five more seats to reach the magic number. One and possibly both of the two Upper House defectors from the opposition, who are not up for election this time around, is assumed to be available at the right price. One "unaffiliated" conservative candidate is an overwhelming favorite to win and is a sure bet to join the coalition if he does. At that point, the New People's Party should be able to put them over the top. But will the PNP cooperate? I have become more and more skeptical of this possibility, given all the pro-opposition moves that it has been making with regards to the individual elections. In any event, the LDP will try extremely hard to pry loose a couple of opposition members or three. I do think that this post-election period will be a particularly problematic occasion to defect to the ins, but here I am edging precariously close to the realm of pure speculation.
That's about it for now.
I, as a Japanese adult in good standing with the law of the land, have two votes in this Upper House election, one for the local seats (Tokyo is a multi-seat district, and gets five seats) and another for the proportional seats. I can cast my proportional ballot in two different ways.
For the proportional seats, each political party fields a national list of candidates. I am free to award my one proportional vote to any party or, alternatively, to any one of the individual candidates on any one of the party lists. After the voting is over, all the proportional votes that the individual candidates has received are attributed to the respective parties that listed those candidates in addition to the votes that the parties has each received in its own right. Then, the proportional seats are allocated in proportion to the number of votes each party has received. Finally, the seats that a party has won are allocated first to the candidate on its list who received the most votes, next to the one with the second most votes, and so on until the number of proportional seats that the party has won has been reached. By way of illustration:
Imagine that Japan has twenty eligible voters and the Japanese Upper House has four proportional seats, two of which are up for election, and that two political parties, A and B, are contesting this election with two candidates each, A1 and A2, and B1 and B2, respectively. On voting day the twenty-person electorate breaks overwhelmingly for A1, a golf dad, who gets twelve votes, while A2, ex-METI policy wonk, receives only two, and Party A itself only one vote in its own name. Party B, doing slightly better than Party A, receives two votes in its own name. Alas, its candidates are not able to emulate this institutional success; although Zenda ex-president B1 manages to gain three votes, B2 fails to receive a single vote. The final tally:
A: 1+13+2=15; B: 2+3+0=5.
A gets both seats, which go to A1 and A2, and B none, since 15/2 > 5, although, individually, Party B nominally outpolled Party A two to one and B1 beat A2 individually three to two. Of course, in the real world, 96 seats are contested, half of them every three years, which are enough to ensure that iniquities like the example above, where 25% of the votes go to naught, do not occur. But even in that crude example, it is easy to see how celebrity candidates who appeal to sizable constituencies that are independent of the party base can benefit the party twice over by this institutionalized coattail effect. A very poor vote getter or two may well slide in ahead of other more popular candidates in other parties if some of his/her co-candidates do exceedingly well. Thus the scramble to recruit golf dads, ex-presidents, ex-thug motivational speakers, and other B-list celebrities.
I believe that the steak analogy holds not only for the individual candidates but also for the LDP if there is enough time between the breaking of the pension scandals and the election date for the public to get over it. To push the analogy, recover from the bad experience with the e.coli on all those rare Del Monicos and also feel that they've had enough of that sautéed salmon (which came with its own little salmonella scare anyway). If "steak" is too charitable, think, the devil you know? Familiarity breeds consent?
But how much, you ask? That, I have no idea. You could do worse than ask Gerry Curtis. In fact, you can do much better than read this blog; Professor Curtis wrote the book on Japanese politics. Literally. Many times over. I heard he's in town.
It's difficult to say where Mssrs. Abe and Ozawa will be six months from now; if they survive the immediate aftermath, they should still be around; I think that mid-January is a little too early in the Diet schedule for the situation to become untenable in the Upper House. As for the election itself, Mr. Ozawa is too unpopular within his own party to be able to eat his words and stay on in the event of an outright ruling coalition majority as the immediate outcome. I say this is so even in the likely event that the DPJ beats the LDP one-on-one. Otherwise, Mr. Ozawa can plausibly claim that the opposition has beaten the coalition and I think stay on (and will stay on; he bleeds politics), even if the coalition does manage to cobble together a working majority. As for Mr. Abe, I am increasingly coming around to the view that he will stick around unless the coalition loses very badly. Figures like 39, 40 have been bandied about, and 40 does look as good as any for what is purely a mass psychology threshold.
But what are the chances of a working majority in the Upper House? Ah, the 64-seat question. Assuming 45 LDP and 14 New Komeito seats as the base case scenario, the coalition needs five more seats to reach the magic number. One and possibly both of the two Upper House defectors from the opposition, who are not up for election this time around, is assumed to be available at the right price. One "unaffiliated" conservative candidate is an overwhelming favorite to win and is a sure bet to join the coalition if he does. At that point, the New People's Party should be able to put them over the top. But will the PNP cooperate? I have become more and more skeptical of this possibility, given all the pro-opposition moves that it has been making with regards to the individual elections. In any event, the LDP will try extremely hard to pry loose a couple of opposition members or three. I do think that this post-election period will be a particularly problematic occasion to defect to the ins, but here I am edging precariously close to the realm of pure speculation.
That's about it for now.
Wednesday, July 18, 2007
Why Prime Minister Abe Can Stay on Even if the Coalition Loses (if He Wants to)
Let's assume that the coalition loses badly enough that it cannot cobble together a working majority in the Upper House. The Diet convenes to let the Upper House elect its officers (including, presumably, a new president) and promptly goes into summer recess. At some point in September or thereabouts, the Diet convenes again, this time to consider an emergency budget to be submitted by the Cabinet. (No fiscal year has gone by without an emergency budget being submitted and passed within my memory.) The budget plan that the administration submits will include relief and reconstruction funds for the earthquake victims, so it will be difficult for the opposition to resist. In any case, the budget can be passed without the consent of the Upper House, so, at worst, it's some bad press. Unless there are pressing legislative concerns, the Diet can and will recess right then and there.
The same Constitutional rule applies to the main budget, which will be introduced at the next regular Diet session (usually convened in January), sometime in March. However, much new legislation will be needed to implement the budget, and that is where an Upper House deadlock will hurt. Yes, the coalition does have the Lower House supermajority to overrule the Upper House. But the Japanese media traditionally does not look kindly on a majority acting unilaterally against an opposition that has dug its heels in. More importantly, an opposition controlling procedures in the Upper House can make it extremely difficult for meaningful legislation to make it through the two Houses and back to the Lower House again, unless you are willing to extend the Diet session indefinitely. I don't think that the media will look kindly on such a prospect either.
Thus, at some point in early spring, the situation will likely become untenable for the administration, forcing the prime minister to dissolve the Lower House for a general election.
This is a scenario that can unfold regardless of who the prime minister is. So the question is, is the LDP better off with or without Mr. Abe in that situation? There is no obvious LDP leader that could run this near-caretaker administration and fight the general election better than Mr. Abe. So, it will be Mr. Abe's job to give up, if he so chooses.
Do I believe in what I'm saying? It is speculative in spots, but it is at least plausible. So there you are.
The same Constitutional rule applies to the main budget, which will be introduced at the next regular Diet session (usually convened in January), sometime in March. However, much new legislation will be needed to implement the budget, and that is where an Upper House deadlock will hurt. Yes, the coalition does have the Lower House supermajority to overrule the Upper House. But the Japanese media traditionally does not look kindly on a majority acting unilaterally against an opposition that has dug its heels in. More importantly, an opposition controlling procedures in the Upper House can make it extremely difficult for meaningful legislation to make it through the two Houses and back to the Lower House again, unless you are willing to extend the Diet session indefinitely. I don't think that the media will look kindly on such a prospect either.
Thus, at some point in early spring, the situation will likely become untenable for the administration, forcing the prime minister to dissolve the Lower House for a general election.
This is a scenario that can unfold regardless of who the prime minister is. So the question is, is the LDP better off with or without Mr. Abe in that situation? There is no obvious LDP leader that could run this near-caretaker administration and fight the general election better than Mr. Abe. So, it will be Mr. Abe's job to give up, if he so chooses.
Do I believe in what I'm saying? It is speculative in spots, but it is at least plausible. So there you are.
The MAFF Minister Un-Answers Questions: or, Reviving the Political Financing Scandal
In his first post-Geneva press briefing (by custom, all ministers give press briefing after the twice-weekly Cabinet meetings and are often forced to answer questions well outside their portfolio), MAFF Minister Norihiko Akagi stonewalled the press on disclosure of his political expenditures, stating that "it is important to treat the matter according to the law". The tabloids continued to eat him up (including two large mysterious patches of gauze showing up on his cheek and forehead), but Yomiuri buried it in page 33, the East Siberia of national news. (Example: Mainichi Reporter Charged with Assisting DUI… in case you need to know.)
So the Yomiuri has decided that this is yesterday's news. Indeed, the Akagi case is more of the same, and come to think of it, there's plenty of material out there on the election alone without rehashing all the issues all over again. Then there's earthquake, and the leaks at the nuclear power station…
Speaking of the earthquake, I did not have any problems with the Abe administration trying to make political capital out of the matter. Did you? You can't have your party leader doing a Putin (remember the Russian submarine going down while President Putin was taking a vacation?) and having the media all over you, so you might as well go the whole hog. (The Communist Party started a donation campaign (collecting money to send to the earthquake victims) in front of our local train station.) I did think it was a little tacky to claim that the prime minister was showing courage when he went in there despite the danger of aftershocks. It also did not do them any good to be seeing carping openly about a 12-hour delay before the report of the nuclear leak reached Cabinet headquarters. As if that were the main concern. Which it was, for the political people dealing with the media. Still.
Now there is one way to bring the political financing scandal back onto center stage. The DPJ can announce that, regardless of the new 50000 Yen per item disclosure threshold, it will disclose its finances to the DPJ proposal 10000 Yen limit. And it will do so retroactively, say, five years? Spring it on the DPJ one week before the vote, and you could have badly needed mo to put yourself over the top. Why not, you were willing to do it anyway, right? Just make sure Ichiro Ozawa doesn't spoil things by repeating his claim that he wanted disclosure down to the last Yen but the party wouldn't go along with it.
So, if you see that happening, remember, you read it here first.
So the Yomiuri has decided that this is yesterday's news. Indeed, the Akagi case is more of the same, and come to think of it, there's plenty of material out there on the election alone without rehashing all the issues all over again. Then there's earthquake, and the leaks at the nuclear power station…
Speaking of the earthquake, I did not have any problems with the Abe administration trying to make political capital out of the matter. Did you? You can't have your party leader doing a Putin (remember the Russian submarine going down while President Putin was taking a vacation?) and having the media all over you, so you might as well go the whole hog. (The Communist Party started a donation campaign (collecting money to send to the earthquake victims) in front of our local train station.) I did think it was a little tacky to claim that the prime minister was showing courage when he went in there despite the danger of aftershocks. It also did not do them any good to be seeing carping openly about a 12-hour delay before the report of the nuclear leak reached Cabinet headquarters. As if that were the main concern. Which it was, for the political people dealing with the media. Still.
Now there is one way to bring the political financing scandal back onto center stage. The DPJ can announce that, regardless of the new 50000 Yen per item disclosure threshold, it will disclose its finances to the DPJ proposal 10000 Yen limit. And it will do so retroactively, say, five years? Spring it on the DPJ one week before the vote, and you could have badly needed mo to put yourself over the top. Why not, you were willing to do it anyway, right? Just make sure Ichiro Ozawa doesn't spoil things by repeating his claim that he wanted disclosure down to the last Yen but the party wouldn't go along with it.
So, if you see that happening, remember, you read it here first.
The Yomiuri Features a Seat-by-Seat Rundown on the Upper House Election
The Yomiuri features a seat-by-seat rundown on the Upper House election (it's not available on its web site; let's what the Asahi does when it comes out with its own survey, as it must). Its conclusion is that the "ruling parties [are] likely to lose [its] seat majority" and (in the Japanese-language version) "the possibility is high that the number of seats that the LDP retain in the district and proportional representation elections may wind up in the lower half of the 40s unless it can turn back the winds that are blowing against it." This does not make my off-the-cuff over-under 45 call any less valid; elections tend to tighten up as the voting day draws near. I asked a veteran of many an election campaign about this phenomenon, and he came up with this analogy:
Let's say you're going to have dinner one month from now, and you're given a menu and asked what you want. There's steak, but there's all this other stuff, and you're not sure, you think you might have something else this time. Now, a month later, you actually walk into that restaurant, and they give you the menu and you see the steak and you wind up saying, oh, I'll have steak. (he's an American) You go with what you know.
Of the all-important 29 single-seat elections, the Yomiuri survey shows the DPJ ahead in eight and the LDP in only two, and the two parties running neck-and-neck in the other 19. The silver lining for the LDP is that the proportion of undecided voters among its supporters are generally (though not uniformly) substantially higher than the same proportion for the DPJ and its supporters. The LDP has a greater upside here; thus the caveat in the tentative conclusion in the Yomiuri article. So how strongly will its supporters want to punish the LDP? This question seems to be just as important as the non-aligned turnout and how that in going to break.
A look at the details yields some clues about post-election LDP maneuvering, most likely necessary, for a working majority. The Yomiuri survey lists seven unaffiliated candidates in six electoral districts who have excellent to reasonable chances of winning. Of the seven, only one is supported by the LDP while one other is a conservative candidate who failed to gain LDP authorization but is running anyway. The others are supported by the DPJ (plus in many cases the People's New Party as well; more on that later). Moreover, the conservative candidate is running neck and neck with the LDP incumbent and a DPJ-supported unaffiliated candidate, so a win by this unaffiliated conservative will be a wash at best for the LDP. It looks like there won't be many unaffiliated newly-minted Upper House members waiting for the LDP to come calling with its basket of goodies.
The PNP seems to have cast their lot with the DPJ if campaign alignments are any indication. The PNP is supporting the DPJ candidate in most of the electoral districts where it is not fielding its own candidates. More important to PNP fortunes, in single-seat Shimane Prefecture, the DPJ has gone all in for PNP candidate Akiko Kamei, the daughter of Lower House member Hisaoki Kamei (the other, gentler PNP Kamei). Ms. Kamei is gaining on the LDP incumbent, and could give the PNP a real coup in the district seat elections. Yes, politicians will change their minds about anything to get elected (see: Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney), but it is going to be difficult to forsake your allies so soon after the war. Moreover, the PNP set the bar high when it demanded a revision of the Post Office privatization package as the condition for cooperation with the LDP.
So, barring unforeseen major events (like another political scandal erupting), I expect that the LDP will edge back up. But given the slim pickings among the unaffiliated candidates and the intransigence on the part of the NPP, the overall picture still looks like a decidedly uphill battle for a working majority in the Upper House.
Let's say you're going to have dinner one month from now, and you're given a menu and asked what you want. There's steak, but there's all this other stuff, and you're not sure, you think you might have something else this time. Now, a month later, you actually walk into that restaurant, and they give you the menu and you see the steak and you wind up saying, oh, I'll have steak. (he's an American) You go with what you know.
Of the all-important 29 single-seat elections, the Yomiuri survey shows the DPJ ahead in eight and the LDP in only two, and the two parties running neck-and-neck in the other 19. The silver lining for the LDP is that the proportion of undecided voters among its supporters are generally (though not uniformly) substantially higher than the same proportion for the DPJ and its supporters. The LDP has a greater upside here; thus the caveat in the tentative conclusion in the Yomiuri article. So how strongly will its supporters want to punish the LDP? This question seems to be just as important as the non-aligned turnout and how that in going to break.
A look at the details yields some clues about post-election LDP maneuvering, most likely necessary, for a working majority. The Yomiuri survey lists seven unaffiliated candidates in six electoral districts who have excellent to reasonable chances of winning. Of the seven, only one is supported by the LDP while one other is a conservative candidate who failed to gain LDP authorization but is running anyway. The others are supported by the DPJ (plus in many cases the People's New Party as well; more on that later). Moreover, the conservative candidate is running neck and neck with the LDP incumbent and a DPJ-supported unaffiliated candidate, so a win by this unaffiliated conservative will be a wash at best for the LDP. It looks like there won't be many unaffiliated newly-minted Upper House members waiting for the LDP to come calling with its basket of goodies.
The PNP seems to have cast their lot with the DPJ if campaign alignments are any indication. The PNP is supporting the DPJ candidate in most of the electoral districts where it is not fielding its own candidates. More important to PNP fortunes, in single-seat Shimane Prefecture, the DPJ has gone all in for PNP candidate Akiko Kamei, the daughter of Lower House member Hisaoki Kamei (the other, gentler PNP Kamei). Ms. Kamei is gaining on the LDP incumbent, and could give the PNP a real coup in the district seat elections. Yes, politicians will change their minds about anything to get elected (see: Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney), but it is going to be difficult to forsake your allies so soon after the war. Moreover, the PNP set the bar high when it demanded a revision of the Post Office privatization package as the condition for cooperation with the LDP.
So, barring unforeseen major events (like another political scandal erupting), I expect that the LDP will edge back up. But given the slim pickings among the unaffiliated candidates and the intransigence on the part of the NPP, the overall picture still looks like a decidedly uphill battle for a working majority in the Upper House.
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
Guess Why I'm Not Going to Cash The TNI Check…
The check arrived today from The National Interest, and do you know what? I'm not going to cash it. But not because I'm going to frame it just yet, either. You see, I live in Japan, and the amount of the check is not even enough to cover the cost of having it cashed, then deposited in my bank account here. The BMW, which looked like this to me, now looks like this.
The moral of the story? Keep your McDay-Job, unless you've stumbled on to the next Harry Potter.
Just having a little fun, Nick. I'll write for you any time, okay?
The moral of the story? Keep your McDay-Job, unless you've stumbled on to the next Harry Potter.
Just having a little fun, Nick. I'll write for you any time, okay?
Monday, July 16, 2007
TV Commercials for the Upper House Election
For your viewing pleasure:
LDP: If you understand but cannot read Japanese, go to bottom left of the web page. The thirty and fifteen second versions of the commercial are third and fourth from the bottom respectively. This commercial is very much Shinzo Abe's baby. It faithfully goes through all the main talking points about the good things the LDP has done for us (it wisely avoids the Constitution) and concludes with "Kaikaku ka Gyakkou ka (Reform or Reversal?)". Basically, it's a policy statement in 30 (15) seconds..
DPJ: The five July versions pick up on the "Seikatsu ga Daiichi (Our Daily Life Is the Most Important)"theme revealed to us in the June commercial, but this time around manage to avoid the preachy tone of most Japanese political commercials altogether in an understated series of real-life (looking) people telling us that taxes/caring for the elderly/education/public services/public pensions/public safety (but no more than two at a time;l you have only 15 seconds, which is about as long as most people will listen to unexpected political messages) are their concerns and that DPJ cares. The commercials also do a good job of hiding Ichiro Ozawa's main weakness, which is that he is a visibly uncomfortable public speaker. Kudos to my good friend (as well as of many of you readers) for finally convincing the DPJ leadership to do it his way. Alas, it no longer gives us such surprise nuggets of information such as that Naoto Kan and Yukio Hatoyama can actually talk with each other in front of a TV camera without their heads exploding (revealed to us in the making-of-the-movie version that is no longer available on the DPJ website).
New Komeito: A straightforward statement from the party leader telling you that the New Komeito is for the little guy.
New People's Party: Next to the karaoke image are the NPP commercials. The top one, a barebones version, features Tamio Watanuki and Sizuka Kamei, the oldest and ugliest pair of party leaders on the planet outside of Cuba singing karaoke against a stark prison-wall-textured background. It is also the most endearing of all the commercials. And I mean the LDP, DPJ, New Komeito, and NPN ones as well. The Wind in the Willows would still be doing Broadway if the two gentlemen had been cast as Mr. Toad and Mr. Badger. The bottom one, which features Mr. Watanuki telling a group of young slackers to shape up, is fun too. The commercials use the "teikou seiryoku (resisting forces)" label that Prime Minister slapped on them to great effect in the lead-up to his 2005 Lower House landslide victory. The obvious awareness of the paerty's core constituency and the lack of a sense of self-importance on the part of the devil-may-care leaders allows the technically clunky commercials to rise above the gaggle of political commercials, including even the finely pitched DPJ 15-second takes. The two stars achieve an artless charm usually reserved to children and animals.
New Party Nippon: This may be the tormented party leader CM of this campaign. A nondescript statement of what the party stands for by Yasuo Tanaka, the party leader, against a somewhat distracting background of floating word strips, is suddenly replaced by a huge hand winding up a small windup doll version of Mr. Yasuo, who then fast-forwards automaton-like through what must be the NPN talking points, only I am too disturbed to listen.
The Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party web sites do not have links to commercials. Should we read any meaning into this?
Update: Julián Ortega Martínez informs the blog that the Japan Communist Party does have TV commercials on its website. Gracias, Julián.
LDP: If you understand but cannot read Japanese, go to bottom left of the web page. The thirty and fifteen second versions of the commercial are third and fourth from the bottom respectively. This commercial is very much Shinzo Abe's baby. It faithfully goes through all the main talking points about the good things the LDP has done for us (it wisely avoids the Constitution) and concludes with "Kaikaku ka Gyakkou ka (Reform or Reversal?)". Basically, it's a policy statement in 30 (15) seconds..
DPJ: The five July versions pick up on the "Seikatsu ga Daiichi (Our Daily Life Is the Most Important)"theme revealed to us in the June commercial, but this time around manage to avoid the preachy tone of most Japanese political commercials altogether in an understated series of real-life (looking) people telling us that taxes/caring for the elderly/education/public services/public pensions/public safety (but no more than two at a time;l you have only 15 seconds, which is about as long as most people will listen to unexpected political messages) are their concerns and that DPJ cares. The commercials also do a good job of hiding Ichiro Ozawa's main weakness, which is that he is a visibly uncomfortable public speaker. Kudos to my good friend (as well as of many of you readers) for finally convincing the DPJ leadership to do it his way. Alas, it no longer gives us such surprise nuggets of information such as that Naoto Kan and Yukio Hatoyama can actually talk with each other in front of a TV camera without their heads exploding (revealed to us in the making-of-the-movie version that is no longer available on the DPJ website).
New Komeito: A straightforward statement from the party leader telling you that the New Komeito is for the little guy.
New People's Party: Next to the karaoke image are the NPP commercials. The top one, a barebones version, features Tamio Watanuki and Sizuka Kamei, the oldest and ugliest pair of party leaders on the planet outside of Cuba singing karaoke against a stark prison-wall-textured background. It is also the most endearing of all the commercials. And I mean the LDP, DPJ, New Komeito, and NPN ones as well. The Wind in the Willows would still be doing Broadway if the two gentlemen had been cast as Mr. Toad and Mr. Badger. The bottom one, which features Mr. Watanuki telling a group of young slackers to shape up, is fun too. The commercials use the "teikou seiryoku (resisting forces)" label that Prime Minister slapped on them to great effect in the lead-up to his 2005 Lower House landslide victory. The obvious awareness of the paerty's core constituency and the lack of a sense of self-importance on the part of the devil-may-care leaders allows the technically clunky commercials to rise above the gaggle of political commercials, including even the finely pitched DPJ 15-second takes. The two stars achieve an artless charm usually reserved to children and animals.
New Party Nippon: This may be the tormented party leader CM of this campaign. A nondescript statement of what the party stands for by Yasuo Tanaka, the party leader, against a somewhat distracting background of floating word strips, is suddenly replaced by a huge hand winding up a small windup doll version of Mr. Yasuo, who then fast-forwards automaton-like through what must be the NPN talking points, only I am too disturbed to listen.
The Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party web sites do not have links to commercials. Should we read any meaning into this?
Update: Julián Ortega Martínez informs the blog that the Japan Communist Party does have TV commercials on its website. Gracias, Julián.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Youth Springs Eternal from the Japanese Communist Party and Other Tidbits from the List of Candidates
The following is for the convenience of people who have absorbed all the Upper House election material available online since July 12, when the campaign officially started, and is looking for something different. It may not be much, but I'm sure that you won't see it anywhere else.
The parties contesting the 48 proportional representation seats are at stake in the upcoming Upper House election are: LDP (incumbent candidates 12, all candidates 35, average age 54.7); DPJ (8, 35, 54.4); New Komeito (7, 17, 49.0); Japan Communist Party (3, 17, 46.0); Social Democratic Party (1, 9, 56.9); The People's New Party (0, 14, 62.6); Joseito (0, 12, 51.6); 9-Jo Net (0, 9, 59.0); Kyosei Shinto (0, 3, 54.7), New Party Nippon, and Ishin Seito Shinpu (0, 3, 57.2).
The LDP, DPJ, the New Komeito, and the JCP have the largest number of candidates, both in terms of incumbents and overall. As you can see, they also have English-language web pages. Of the remaining parties, the SDP has the only incumbent candidate; none of them has an English-language web page.
The average ages of the candidates for most of the parties are clustered around the mid-fifties. The People's New Party is also the oldest party, clocking in at 62.6. It is also fielding an extraordinary eight ex-Diet members among its 14 candidates, seven from the Lower House. No surprise here; the PNP is the larger of the two parties formed by the 2005 anti- Postal Service privatization exiles. It hopes that the grizzled veterans of elections past will bring in a substantial portion of the votes from their long-time supporters and allow some of them to get back in the game by way of the Upper House. The PNP is also fielding ex-President Fujimori as a candidate. Yes, the People's New Party is the Kokumin Shinto's official English translation.
The second-oldest group of candidates is the 9-Jo Net, which, as its name indicates, a pacifist party dedicated to maintaining Article 9 in its current form. Next comes the once-powerful SDP at barely under the Big 6-Oh, whose sole purpose for existence these days also seems to be keeping the flame for Article 9. Perhaps this is as good a sign as any that Article 9 is due for a facelift.
The JCP and New Komeito are the young outliers. Ideology and iron-fisted party discipline enable the JCP to constantly field a demographically optimal list of candidates. (Eight out of their 17 candidates are women, a ratio surpassed only by the eponymous Joseito, which has only female candidates, of whom five are or have been in the cosmetics distribution business.) New Komeito also boasts great party discipline, since most, if not all, of their candidates are Sokagakkai members who come up through the sect and party ranks.
But the JCP has only one candidate with a degree from the elite schools and one other from the local, semi-elite schools. I am surprised to see that has no candidates from Tokyo University, which has traditionally provided the JCP with its top leadership since the pre-WW II years. It also has only one doctor, and no lawyers, and no schoolteachers. Back in the Cold War era, these occupation groups provided the professionals who could run without fear of losing their livelihood while giving the JCP the social respectability and sense of normalcy that its history and international links it was otherwise denied. Perhaps the communist brand no longer attracts, nor repels.
Speaking of education, six of the 17 New Komeito candidates list the Soka University as the issuer of their final degree. (Another one has a Soka U. undergraduate degree.)
The parties contesting the 48 proportional representation seats are at stake in the upcoming Upper House election are: LDP (incumbent candidates 12, all candidates 35, average age 54.7); DPJ (8, 35, 54.4); New Komeito (7, 17, 49.0); Japan Communist Party (3, 17, 46.0); Social Democratic Party (1, 9, 56.9); The People's New Party (0, 14, 62.6); Joseito (0, 12, 51.6); 9-Jo Net (0, 9, 59.0); Kyosei Shinto (0, 3, 54.7), New Party Nippon, and Ishin Seito Shinpu (0, 3, 57.2).
The LDP, DPJ, the New Komeito, and the JCP have the largest number of candidates, both in terms of incumbents and overall. As you can see, they also have English-language web pages. Of the remaining parties, the SDP has the only incumbent candidate; none of them has an English-language web page.
The average ages of the candidates for most of the parties are clustered around the mid-fifties. The People's New Party is also the oldest party, clocking in at 62.6. It is also fielding an extraordinary eight ex-Diet members among its 14 candidates, seven from the Lower House. No surprise here; the PNP is the larger of the two parties formed by the 2005 anti- Postal Service privatization exiles. It hopes that the grizzled veterans of elections past will bring in a substantial portion of the votes from their long-time supporters and allow some of them to get back in the game by way of the Upper House. The PNP is also fielding ex-President Fujimori as a candidate. Yes, the People's New Party is the Kokumin Shinto's official English translation.
The second-oldest group of candidates is the 9-Jo Net, which, as its name indicates, a pacifist party dedicated to maintaining Article 9 in its current form. Next comes the once-powerful SDP at barely under the Big 6-Oh, whose sole purpose for existence these days also seems to be keeping the flame for Article 9. Perhaps this is as good a sign as any that Article 9 is due for a facelift.
The JCP and New Komeito are the young outliers. Ideology and iron-fisted party discipline enable the JCP to constantly field a demographically optimal list of candidates. (Eight out of their 17 candidates are women, a ratio surpassed only by the eponymous Joseito, which has only female candidates, of whom five are or have been in the cosmetics distribution business.) New Komeito also boasts great party discipline, since most, if not all, of their candidates are Sokagakkai members who come up through the sect and party ranks.
But the JCP has only one candidate with a degree from the elite schools and one other from the local, semi-elite schools. I am surprised to see that has no candidates from Tokyo University, which has traditionally provided the JCP with its top leadership since the pre-WW II years. It also has only one doctor, and no lawyers, and no schoolteachers. Back in the Cold War era, these occupation groups provided the professionals who could run without fear of losing their livelihood while giving the JCP the social respectability and sense of normalcy that its history and international links it was otherwise denied. Perhaps the communist brand no longer attracts, nor repels.
Speaking of education, six of the 17 New Komeito candidates list the Soka University as the issuer of their final degree. (Another one has a Soka U. undergraduate degree.)
Saturday, July 14, 2007
Meanwhile on CNN, a Yasukuni Story Broke Out in the Last 24 Hours…
In fact, the Reuters wire makes a scrupulous effort to tell the fascinating story of Li Ying, a Chinese film director who is releasing a documentary on Yasukuni that he has been working on for the last ten years. The article is filled with nuances, some of them likely unintended, but here they are:
Mr. Li has been living in Japan for the last seventeen years. The Tienanmen Incident occurred in 1989. This does not look like a coincidence. The fact that the Reuters wire comes out of Beijing though, where Mr. Li is seeking a permit to broadcast the documentary, speaks to the passing of the years. The Reuters wire quotes Mr. Li, "I believe there will be no problem [in getting the permit]. …Wouldn't it be ridiculous if this film can be shown in Japan and South Korea, but not China? The best would be if we could show it in all three at once." That he even has to consider such a possibility reflects the enormous post-Koizumi, pre-Beijing 2008 changes in China's approach to its relationship with Japan. As well as how much further China still has to go before it can be a state that no longer systemically manipulates dissent.
In its reference to "the Nanjing Massacre, or Rape of Nanking," Reuters finds a way to avoid attention being diverted to another stage by giving a death-toll estimate of "about 142,000 people, according to Allied estimates> after the war."
I have a couple of quibbles:
The headline Chinese Director Opens Wounds with Yasukuni Shrine Film is misleading. The wound has never closed. And for some, it never will; for there is no answer that will satisfy all.
The wire says, "The film follows Japanese veterans who believe their nation doesn't honor its war dead enough, as well as young Japanese protesters beaten by worshippers at the shrine.
"'I make Yasukuni like a stage, and all these people reveal themselves upon it," explained Li."
But this trope excludes most of the people of Japan, who eschew this stage altogether. They must already have been a majority when he started filming ten years ago. And the future does not look good for the kind of people who beat up protesters. The right wing activists have seen their ranks thin over the years. (Have the end of the bubble economy and the onset of an aging society taken the wind out of their sails?) Would Mr. Li be able to secure the same footage today? The battle seems to be taking place more and more on the Internet and the media, rather than on the streets.
That's about it. Except:
According to the Reuters wire, "Li's film was made with assistance and funding from Japan and Korea, while post-production support came from the Beijing Film Academy and a private Chinese production house." Of course the Japanese support must have been from private sources. But where does the Beijing Film Academy get its money? Japan, like it or not, is a pluralistic democracy. It is important to keep that in mind in interpreting the meaning of actions and attributing responsibility for them, as well as determining the political boundaries of the doable.
I may be giving this some more thought. But this is where I'm at on this.
Mr. Li has been living in Japan for the last seventeen years. The Tienanmen Incident occurred in 1989. This does not look like a coincidence. The fact that the Reuters wire comes out of Beijing though, where Mr. Li is seeking a permit to broadcast the documentary, speaks to the passing of the years. The Reuters wire quotes Mr. Li, "I believe there will be no problem [in getting the permit]. …Wouldn't it be ridiculous if this film can be shown in Japan and South Korea, but not China? The best would be if we could show it in all three at once." That he even has to consider such a possibility reflects the enormous post-Koizumi, pre-Beijing 2008 changes in China's approach to its relationship with Japan. As well as how much further China still has to go before it can be a state that no longer systemically manipulates dissent.
In its reference to "the Nanjing Massacre, or Rape of Nanking," Reuters finds a way to avoid attention being diverted to another stage by giving a death-toll estimate of "about 142,000 people, according to Allied estimates> after the war."
I have a couple of quibbles:
The headline Chinese Director Opens Wounds with Yasukuni Shrine Film is misleading. The wound has never closed. And for some, it never will; for there is no answer that will satisfy all.
The wire says, "The film follows Japanese veterans who believe their nation doesn't honor its war dead enough, as well as young Japanese protesters beaten by worshippers at the shrine.
"'I make Yasukuni like a stage, and all these people reveal themselves upon it," explained Li."
But this trope excludes most of the people of Japan, who eschew this stage altogether. They must already have been a majority when he started filming ten years ago. And the future does not look good for the kind of people who beat up protesters. The right wing activists have seen their ranks thin over the years. (Have the end of the bubble economy and the onset of an aging society taken the wind out of their sails?) Would Mr. Li be able to secure the same footage today? The battle seems to be taking place more and more on the Internet and the media, rather than on the streets.
That's about it. Except:
According to the Reuters wire, "Li's film was made with assistance and funding from Japan and Korea, while post-production support came from the Beijing Film Academy and a private Chinese production house." Of course the Japanese support must have been from private sources. But where does the Beijing Film Academy get its money? Japan, like it or not, is a pluralistic democracy. It is important to keep that in mind in interpreting the meaning of actions and attributing responsibility for them, as well as determining the political boundaries of the doable.
I may be giving this some more thought. But this is where I'm at on this.
Media Watch 070714: Let's See What's Cooking on the BBC Front
1. Support for Japan PM "at New Low"
I don't see any reason to have quotation marks around "at New Low"; is that a Britishism? Other that that, nothing to find fault with in the article, I suppose. Two points:
1) The LDP is doing even worse than the Abe Cabinet, which may put some doubts into the minds of his intra-party rivals who might challenge him in the event of a likely post-election scramble to scrape together a working majority. In fact, I have been doing some thinking, and we could be seeing the Abe administration lasting at least into the early months of 2008, even if he fails to achieve it. I'll try to put my thoughts together later.
2) The latest Yomiuri poll (July 10-12) shows a jump in DPJ support since the last one (July 3-5). The percentage of people choosing DPJ candidates in the district (as opposed to proportionate) seats improved from 23% to 27% while LDP supporters fell from 24% to 22%. This latest shift is particularly evident in the townships and villages, which are traditional LDP strongholds, where the DPJ leapt from 15.4% to 29.8%. The last, small-town figures are particularly astonishing. I have been among those who feel that Ichiro Ozawa spending most of his time out of the media spotlight has been bad campaign tactics. But if the DPJ win big, he will be able to make a plausible claim that his strategy of roaming the countryside to wake up voters has been a great success.
2. Toilet Cash Mystery Grips Japan
It appears that someone has traveling around Japan, leaving money in men's toilets in government office buildings, together with nice letters of encouragement. As a former bureaucrat, I'm happy for this show of gratitude from this anonymous benefactor. The story also has cultural resonance; much, if not most, of Japan's greatest classic literature from Kojiki(the national creation epic, officially compiled, but retains its primeval power) to The Tosa Diaries (the first in a long line of great kana (as opposed to Chinese-language) diary literature) to The Tales of Genji (no explanation) to Oku no Hosomichi (the most famous of Matsuo Basho's haiku travelogues) to Tokaidouchu Hizakurige (the great Edo Era comic travelogue and spiritual ancestor of all those Hope-Crosby road movies) is mainly or significantly travel writing. The moralistic dimension of the money giver's act also evokes the travels, real and imagined, of Koubou Daishi, Gyouki Shounin, and other great religious figures. Surely this cultural resonance must have had a substantial role in steering our collective unconsciousness towards this story. Not that the story continued beyond the three to four day flurry of new revelations, as the local news bureaus, following HQ orders, made inquiries at all the town halls and the like. But grip the nation? That's O.J. Simpson, Lacey Peterson, Terry Schiavo. BBC is displaying mutton and selling dog meat.
3. Japanese Interest Rates on Hold
Not much to say here. Just this useless quote:
"But many analysts believe policymakers will act at their next meeting in August, after July's parliamentary elections are out of the way.
This does not mean an August hike is off the cards," said Sharada Selvanathan, currency strategist at BNP Paribas."
Really? In any case, if they do not raise the overnight lending rate, Mr. (Ms?) Selvanathan can always claim, "I didn't say they'd do it either." So what's the point?
4. Japan's Old-Fashioned Campaigning
This article tells the story of the incredibly detailed and restrictive electoral campaigning regulations and does it mainly through the freeze on Internet action during the official campaigning period. It does miss out, however, on the leakage through the political party home page. It seems the authorities are frowning on any alterations during the campaign period, but are in practice letting it slide. Both the LDP and DPJ are on the move, and Komeito and the Communist Party are following suit. The smaller parties likely will follow to the best of their abilities.
And off-topic, but since we are talking about the Internet:
5. China Firm Sues Google over Name
"[Beijing Guge Science and Technology Ltd. Co.] is suing Google Inc.'s China subsidiary for copying its name, saying the U.S. search engine's registered Chinese name is too similar to its own and has harmed its operations."
Apparently, the misdirected calls are wreaking havoc on its telephone service, and it just wants Google to stop using its name. But this is China, and a clue lies in something BBC left out when it lifted the news item from the Reuters wire service. To quote via The Boston Globe:
Tian[ Yunshan, a Beijing Guge official,] declined to comment on [its] operations or its products or services, saying it was "not convenient" to disclose such details.
Oh, inconvenient fact. This not being the US, Mr. Tian did not have to add the otherwise mandatory "It's not about the money" statement either. And the entire Beijing bureau was on its summer holidays, so it couldn't go and check Beijing Guge out. It's not as if BBC lacked space; it did add the following, totally out-of-context paragraph at the end:
"[Google] and other major IT firms such as Microsoft and Yahoo have been criticized for censoring themselves in order to enter the Chinese market."
And rightly so. But what's the point here? Then you realize that the BBC desk is savoring the irony. Fine. But to deliberately ignore what should be the main thrust of this story, which is the possibility that Beijing Guge is part of a much larger phenomenon in China, on the Internet, and indeed on any other economic frontier that have yet to cope adequately with property rights protection, and deliver an underhanded sermon against Google's choice of money over principle in the guise of straight reporting is not what BBC should be doing. Leave that to the editorials and op-eds.
Lot's of petty peeves? Maybe. But you do agree that the picture is not too encouraging, don't you?
I don't see any reason to have quotation marks around "at New Low"; is that a Britishism? Other that that, nothing to find fault with in the article, I suppose. Two points:
1) The LDP is doing even worse than the Abe Cabinet, which may put some doubts into the minds of his intra-party rivals who might challenge him in the event of a likely post-election scramble to scrape together a working majority. In fact, I have been doing some thinking, and we could be seeing the Abe administration lasting at least into the early months of 2008, even if he fails to achieve it. I'll try to put my thoughts together later.
2) The latest Yomiuri poll (July 10-12) shows a jump in DPJ support since the last one (July 3-5). The percentage of people choosing DPJ candidates in the district (as opposed to proportionate) seats improved from 23% to 27% while LDP supporters fell from 24% to 22%. This latest shift is particularly evident in the townships and villages, which are traditional LDP strongholds, where the DPJ leapt from 15.4% to 29.8%. The last, small-town figures are particularly astonishing. I have been among those who feel that Ichiro Ozawa spending most of his time out of the media spotlight has been bad campaign tactics. But if the DPJ win big, he will be able to make a plausible claim that his strategy of roaming the countryside to wake up voters has been a great success.
2. Toilet Cash Mystery Grips Japan
It appears that someone has traveling around Japan, leaving money in men's toilets in government office buildings, together with nice letters of encouragement. As a former bureaucrat, I'm happy for this show of gratitude from this anonymous benefactor. The story also has cultural resonance; much, if not most, of Japan's greatest classic literature from Kojiki(the national creation epic, officially compiled, but retains its primeval power) to The Tosa Diaries (the first in a long line of great kana (as opposed to Chinese-language) diary literature) to The Tales of Genji (no explanation) to Oku no Hosomichi (the most famous of Matsuo Basho's haiku travelogues) to Tokaidouchu Hizakurige (the great Edo Era comic travelogue and spiritual ancestor of all those Hope-Crosby road movies) is mainly or significantly travel writing. The moralistic dimension of the money giver's act also evokes the travels, real and imagined, of Koubou Daishi, Gyouki Shounin, and other great religious figures. Surely this cultural resonance must have had a substantial role in steering our collective unconsciousness towards this story. Not that the story continued beyond the three to four day flurry of new revelations, as the local news bureaus, following HQ orders, made inquiries at all the town halls and the like. But grip the nation? That's O.J. Simpson, Lacey Peterson, Terry Schiavo. BBC is displaying mutton and selling dog meat.
3. Japanese Interest Rates on Hold
Not much to say here. Just this useless quote:
"But many analysts believe policymakers will act at their next meeting in August, after July's parliamentary elections are out of the way.
This does not mean an August hike is off the cards," said Sharada Selvanathan, currency strategist at BNP Paribas."
Really? In any case, if they do not raise the overnight lending rate, Mr. (Ms?) Selvanathan can always claim, "I didn't say they'd do it either." So what's the point?
4. Japan's Old-Fashioned Campaigning
This article tells the story of the incredibly detailed and restrictive electoral campaigning regulations and does it mainly through the freeze on Internet action during the official campaigning period. It does miss out, however, on the leakage through the political party home page. It seems the authorities are frowning on any alterations during the campaign period, but are in practice letting it slide. Both the LDP and DPJ are on the move, and Komeito and the Communist Party are following suit. The smaller parties likely will follow to the best of their abilities.
And off-topic, but since we are talking about the Internet:
5. China Firm Sues Google over Name
"[Beijing Guge Science and Technology Ltd. Co.] is suing Google Inc.'s China subsidiary for copying its name, saying the U.S. search engine's registered Chinese name is too similar to its own and has harmed its operations."
Apparently, the misdirected calls are wreaking havoc on its telephone service, and it just wants Google to stop using its name. But this is China, and a clue lies in something BBC left out when it lifted the news item from the Reuters wire service. To quote via The Boston Globe:
Tian[ Yunshan, a Beijing Guge official,] declined to comment on [its] operations or its products or services, saying it was "not convenient" to disclose such details.
Oh, inconvenient fact. This not being the US, Mr. Tian did not have to add the otherwise mandatory "It's not about the money" statement either. And the entire Beijing bureau was on its summer holidays, so it couldn't go and check Beijing Guge out. It's not as if BBC lacked space; it did add the following, totally out-of-context paragraph at the end:
"[Google] and other major IT firms such as Microsoft and Yahoo have been criticized for censoring themselves in order to enter the Chinese market."
And rightly so. But what's the point here? Then you realize that the BBC desk is savoring the irony. Fine. But to deliberately ignore what should be the main thrust of this story, which is the possibility that Beijing Guge is part of a much larger phenomenon in China, on the Internet, and indeed on any other economic frontier that have yet to cope adequately with property rights protection, and deliver an underhanded sermon against Google's choice of money over principle in the guise of straight reporting is not what BBC should be doing. Leave that to the editorials and op-eds.
Lot's of petty peeves? Maybe. But you do agree that the picture is not too encouraging, don't you?
Friday, July 13, 2007
The Upper House Election Kicks Off. Plus an Update on Mr. Fujimori.
".........
But most damaging to Mr. Abe has been the revelation that over the years the government has lost pension records affecting about 50 million claims.
"Mr. Abe has pledged to shake up the Social Insurance Agency, the department responsible for the mistakes, and to sort out the mess by early next year, our correspondent [in Tokyo, Chris Hogg,] says.
"But it is not yet clear whether that would be enough to reassure angry voters.
"The ruling coalition has a majority in the lower house, and defeat in Upper House polls would not directly threaten the government.
But, analysts say, it would be an embarrassment to Mr. Abe and one that could force him from office." BBC 07/07/12
The 2007 Upper House election began yesterday. As the BBC article dutifully lists, many bad things have happened that on their own might have denied the LDP-Komeito coalition a majority in the post-election Upper House. But the public pension scandal is like the cake under the icing. However, it is clear that a pledge for an early resolution of the issue has only added fuel to the fire because it has become clear that the actual accounts will take many more years to untangle. The article should have focused on the substance of the LDP response and public response to it. I suspect that Chris Hoggs is on vacation.
The BBC article also seems to assume that this is a straight, electoral win-loss situation. But the numbers game has now boiled down to this one question: Will Mr. Abe be able to cobble together a working majority in the Upper House? If he doesn't, his days are numbered; even if does not resign within the week. If he does, he will live to fight another day.
The numbers do not look good for him so far. The most recent polls show the Abe Cabinet and the LDP sliding and the lackluster DPJ edging forward. Ichiro Ozawa may be personally unpopular, but Mr. Abe isn't doing any better.
In a piece of Japan-LatAm news, on July 11, a Chilean judge rejected Peru's bid to extradite former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori. Mr. Fujimori remains under house arrest while the Peruvian government appeals the case to the Chilean Supreme Court (the Chilean Prosecutor's Office supports the Peruvian government), but this could have a major impact on the eventual outcome of the July Upper House election in Japan. Mr. Fujimori is a surprise candidate for the Kokumin Shinto, who, with four Upper House seats (two up for election in July) and powerful LDP roots, looks to be a key player in any post-election maneuverings. If Mr. Fujimori manages to free himself and return to Japan, then this removes a big source of embarrassment for Mr. Abe if he were to entice the Kokumin Shinto into joining the coalition.
Trivia: In another blast from the past, kicking off the campaign for Mr. Fujimori in his absence is… Devi Sukarno, the top Ginza hostess (think, (not-really) geisha in a dress) turned "First" Lady of Indonesia. For those of you unfamiliar with Japanese social history, she is an eclectic mixture of Grace Kelly, Imelda Marcos, Elizabeth Taylor, and Paris Hilton. Without the video.
But most damaging to Mr. Abe has been the revelation that over the years the government has lost pension records affecting about 50 million claims.
"Mr. Abe has pledged to shake up the Social Insurance Agency, the department responsible for the mistakes, and to sort out the mess by early next year, our correspondent [in Tokyo, Chris Hogg,] says.
"But it is not yet clear whether that would be enough to reassure angry voters.
"The ruling coalition has a majority in the lower house, and defeat in Upper House polls would not directly threaten the government.
But, analysts say, it would be an embarrassment to Mr. Abe and one that could force him from office." BBC 07/07/12
The 2007 Upper House election began yesterday. As the BBC article dutifully lists, many bad things have happened that on their own might have denied the LDP-Komeito coalition a majority in the post-election Upper House. But the public pension scandal is like the cake under the icing. However, it is clear that a pledge for an early resolution of the issue has only added fuel to the fire because it has become clear that the actual accounts will take many more years to untangle. The article should have focused on the substance of the LDP response and public response to it. I suspect that Chris Hoggs is on vacation.
The BBC article also seems to assume that this is a straight, electoral win-loss situation. But the numbers game has now boiled down to this one question: Will Mr. Abe be able to cobble together a working majority in the Upper House? If he doesn't, his days are numbered; even if does not resign within the week. If he does, he will live to fight another day.
The numbers do not look good for him so far. The most recent polls show the Abe Cabinet and the LDP sliding and the lackluster DPJ edging forward. Ichiro Ozawa may be personally unpopular, but Mr. Abe isn't doing any better.
In a piece of Japan-LatAm news, on July 11, a Chilean judge rejected Peru's bid to extradite former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori. Mr. Fujimori remains under house arrest while the Peruvian government appeals the case to the Chilean Supreme Court (the Chilean Prosecutor's Office supports the Peruvian government), but this could have a major impact on the eventual outcome of the July Upper House election in Japan. Mr. Fujimori is a surprise candidate for the Kokumin Shinto, who, with four Upper House seats (two up for election in July) and powerful LDP roots, looks to be a key player in any post-election maneuverings. If Mr. Fujimori manages to free himself and return to Japan, then this removes a big source of embarrassment for Mr. Abe if he were to entice the Kokumin Shinto into joining the coalition.
Trivia: In another blast from the past, kicking off the campaign for Mr. Fujimori in his absence is… Devi Sukarno, the top Ginza hostess (think, (not-really) geisha in a dress) turned "First" Lady of Indonesia. For those of you unfamiliar with Japanese social history, she is an eclectic mixture of Grace Kelly, Imelda Marcos, Elizabeth Taylor, and Paris Hilton. Without the video.
My "Other Stuff" Goes to The Cryptic.
Public notice:
SP, bless his heart, told me last night, that he has been recommending my blog (among others) to his acquaintances. I assume that that is his serious side doing the recommending, and I am aware that some people take offence to some of my posts, like this.
So in order to avoid undue emotional distress on the part of any of my dear readers, I have decided to post all such material on the Cryptic blog.
Unless I change my mind.
SP, bless his heart, told me last night, that he has been recommending my blog (among others) to his acquaintances. I assume that that is his serious side doing the recommending, and I am aware that some people take offence to some of my posts, like this.
So in order to avoid undue emotional distress on the part of any of my dear readers, I have decided to post all such material on the Cryptic blog.
Unless I change my mind.
Not Too Little, Not Too Much, Just the Right Amount of Wikipedia Attention the Formula for Success in Upper House Election?
For your convenience, I've done a Wikipedia survey of the twenty-five candidates running for the five Upper House seats in Tokyo.
The lack of a link means that there is no entry.
The description "public figure" means that the candidate is well-known independent of his/her political ambitions. The relevant Wikipedia entry reflects this.
Doctor Nakamatsu (Unaffiliated) Public figure. Bonus points for English language entry
Tetsuo Sawada (Unaffiliated) Bare-bones entry.
Tomoko Tamura (Japan Communist Party)
Hitomi Sugiura (Social Democrat Party) Public figure.
Toshiaki Kanda (Unaffiliated) Has Kanda News Network entry.
Sanzo Hosaka (LDP; incumbent) Bare-bones entry.
Yuko Tojo none. (Unaffiliated) But she has an English-language entry. This says more about Wikipedia than about Yasukuni.
Kisho Kurokawa (Symbiosis New Party) Public figure. Has English-language entry. A long one.
Hidenori Wago (New Party Freeway Club) Refuses to pay highway tolls.
Keiichiro Nakamura (Kokumin Shinto) Bare-bones entry.
Ryuhei Kawada (Unaffiliated) He has a life. Testament to real (in contrast to alternative) medicine. Close to Yasuo Tanaka, head of now-splintered Shinto Nihon.
Kikuo Suda none. (Organization for Halving the Number of Diet Members)
Kan Suzuki (DPJ; incumbent) Bare-bones entry.
Mitsuo Matayoshi (The World Economic Community Party) He is The One God. Also has English-language entry. What did you expect - he's God.
Nobuyuki Suzuki (The New Wind Capitol) Bare-bones entry. Blogs, apparently..
Natsuo Yamaguchi (Komeito; incumbent) Bare-bones entry.
Masako Ohkawara (DPJ) Bare-bones entry.
Mack Akasaka (Japan Smile Party) Does this convince you that he can solve every social problem from bullying to the suicide epidemic? I didn't think so.
Tamayo Marukawa (LDP) Public figure.
Testuo Arai (Unaffiliated)
As you can see, most of the candidates have Wikipedia entries. Going over them one by one, I see a pattern emerging. Clearly, if you don't have a Wikipedia entry, you lose. What is less obvious but just as true is that the one that have English-language entries also have no chance of winning. Is the latter fact related to the inflated reputations some Japanese politicians get in the English-language media? Should I stop blogging in English? Questions, questions.
The lack of a link means that there is no entry.
The description "public figure" means that the candidate is well-known independent of his/her political ambitions. The relevant Wikipedia entry reflects this.
Doctor Nakamatsu (Unaffiliated) Public figure. Bonus points for English language entry
Tetsuo Sawada (Unaffiliated) Bare-bones entry.
Tomoko Tamura (Japan Communist Party)
Hitomi Sugiura (Social Democrat Party) Public figure.
Toshiaki Kanda (Unaffiliated) Has Kanda News Network entry.
Sanzo Hosaka (LDP; incumbent) Bare-bones entry.
Yuko Tojo none. (Unaffiliated) But she has an English-language entry. This says more about Wikipedia than about Yasukuni.
Kisho Kurokawa (Symbiosis New Party) Public figure. Has English-language entry. A long one.
Hidenori Wago (New Party Freeway Club) Refuses to pay highway tolls.
Keiichiro Nakamura (Kokumin Shinto) Bare-bones entry.
Ryuhei Kawada (Unaffiliated) He has a life. Testament to real (in contrast to alternative) medicine. Close to Yasuo Tanaka, head of now-splintered Shinto Nihon.
Kikuo Suda none. (Organization for Halving the Number of Diet Members)
Kan Suzuki (DPJ; incumbent) Bare-bones entry.
Mitsuo Matayoshi (The World Economic Community Party) He is The One God. Also has English-language entry. What did you expect - he's God.
Nobuyuki Suzuki (The New Wind Capitol) Bare-bones entry. Blogs, apparently..
Natsuo Yamaguchi (Komeito; incumbent) Bare-bones entry.
Masako Ohkawara (DPJ) Bare-bones entry.
Mack Akasaka (Japan Smile Party) Does this convince you that he can solve every social problem from bullying to the suicide epidemic? I didn't think so.
Tamayo Marukawa (LDP) Public figure.
Testuo Arai (Unaffiliated)
As you can see, most of the candidates have Wikipedia entries. Going over them one by one, I see a pattern emerging. Clearly, if you don't have a Wikipedia entry, you lose. What is less obvious but just as true is that the one that have English-language entries also have no chance of winning. Is the latter fact related to the inflated reputations some Japanese politicians get in the English-language media? Should I stop blogging in English? Questions, questions.
Wednesday, July 11, 2007
For This Pope, the Reformation Will Never Be Over
He took on heathens, Muslims and Jews. Now, it's the Protestants' (and Orthodox Christians') turn. You get the impression that he would have been mighty handy with the rack.
The Vatican spin doctors are used to it by now; Father Augustine Di Noia, under-secretary for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, went into action.
"The Church is not backtracking on ecumenical commitment," Di Noia told Vatican radio.
"But, as you know, it is fundamental to any kind of dialogue that the participants are clear about their own identity. That is, dialogue cannot be an occasion to accommodate or soften what you actually understand yourself to be."
Nothing can be further from the truth. Cardinal Ratzinger is defining the identities of the Orthodox Churches and the Protestant denominations, not the Catholic Church. Look:
A 16-page document, prepared by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which Pope Benedict used to head, described Christian Orthodox churches as true churches, but suffering from a "wound" since they do not recognize the primacy of the Pope.
But the document said the "wound is still more profound" in the Protestant denominations -- a view likely to further complicate relations with Protestants.
"Despite the fact that this teaching has created no little distress ... it is nevertheless difficult to see how the title of 'Church' could possibly be attributed to them," it said.
The Vatican text, which restates the controversial document "Dominus Iesus" issued by the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in 2000, said the Church wanted to stress this point because some Catholic theologians continued to misunderstand it.
Pope Benedict seems to have stopped growing in the 16th Century.
The Vatican spin doctors are used to it by now; Father Augustine Di Noia, under-secretary for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, went into action.
"The Church is not backtracking on ecumenical commitment," Di Noia told Vatican radio.
"But, as you know, it is fundamental to any kind of dialogue that the participants are clear about their own identity. That is, dialogue cannot be an occasion to accommodate or soften what you actually understand yourself to be."
Nothing can be further from the truth. Cardinal Ratzinger is defining the identities of the Orthodox Churches and the Protestant denominations, not the Catholic Church. Look:
A 16-page document, prepared by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which Pope Benedict used to head, described Christian Orthodox churches as true churches, but suffering from a "wound" since they do not recognize the primacy of the Pope.
But the document said the "wound is still more profound" in the Protestant denominations -- a view likely to further complicate relations with Protestants.
"Despite the fact that this teaching has created no little distress ... it is nevertheless difficult to see how the title of 'Church' could possibly be attributed to them," it said.
The Vatican text, which restates the controversial document "Dominus Iesus" issued by the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in 2000, said the Church wanted to stress this point because some Catholic theologians continued to misunderstand it.
Pope Benedict seems to have stopped growing in the 16th Century.
How Kim Jong Il Lost Japanese Fans: Say That Again?
Here is a generally competent TIME story about the decline of North Korean influence over Koreans who are permanent residents in Japan because of the persistent economic and moral decay of the North Korean regime. Unfortunately, the TIME copy editors have managed to make it sound like a story about Kim Jong Il (not totally off the mark) and the Japanese (completely wrong).
Oh well, to those people, I guess we all look alike.
What's amazing is that the headline is still there. Apparently, nobody has even bothered to point it out. As one who has been annoyed by the media's willingness to extensively rewrite an article then repost it without notice, perhaps I shouldn't complain. But the lack of interest is depressing.
By the way, I say "generally competent" because of the following explanation:
"[I]n the organization's heyday, South Korea was viewed among zainichi as little more than an American poodle."
That will come as a big surprise to the Mindan and its member zainichi. Mindan, established in 1946, is the anti-Communist, pro-South Korean doppelganger of the Chongyron. If you look at their website, you can see that the Mindan makes verifiable claims which show that it has always been a powerful social and economic force among the zainichi. Of course fortune has been much kinder to Mindan than to Chogyron in recent decades. The relative fortunes of the two, like everything else, mirror the relationship between the two Koreas themselves.
Incidentally, the fact that Bryan Walsh uses the word zainichi in its Japanese, not Korean, locution without hesitating may be an indication of the extent to which the Koreans in Japan have become assimilated. Their hearts still beat Korean, but their minds now work in Japanese.
Oh well, to those people, I guess we all look alike.
What's amazing is that the headline is still there. Apparently, nobody has even bothered to point it out. As one who has been annoyed by the media's willingness to extensively rewrite an article then repost it without notice, perhaps I shouldn't complain. But the lack of interest is depressing.
By the way, I say "generally competent" because of the following explanation:
"[I]n the organization's heyday, South Korea was viewed among zainichi as little more than an American poodle."
That will come as a big surprise to the Mindan and its member zainichi. Mindan, established in 1946, is the anti-Communist, pro-South Korean doppelganger of the Chongyron. If you look at their website, you can see that the Mindan makes verifiable claims which show that it has always been a powerful social and economic force among the zainichi. Of course fortune has been much kinder to Mindan than to Chogyron in recent decades. The relative fortunes of the two, like everything else, mirror the relationship between the two Koreas themselves.
Incidentally, the fact that Bryan Walsh uses the word zainichi in its Japanese, not Korean, locution without hesitating may be an indication of the extent to which the Koreans in Japan have become assimilated. Their hearts still beat Korean, but their minds now work in Japanese.
Monday, July 09, 2007
Enablers in The White House
People like Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her successor as national security advisor Stephen J. Handley are often give a pass, with the understanding that these are well-meaning people doing the best they can under difficult circumstances, that is, a vice president who has made up his mind and will never change it and a president who, once he makes up his mind will never change it. As an ex-bureaucrat, I can sympathize (as indeed most people who have spent time in an organization will) with these people. You have done something to make the world better if you have done the doable.
But this report, if true, shows Mr. Hadley in what seems nothing more than a futile exercise, the mindless execution of the president's will in the face of certain failure, a Bizzarro World mirror image of the proverbial bearer of bad messages. He must be thinking, it's either me, or someone who'll make things even worse. That, or he totally lacks a sense of reality and insight into the human mind.
If nothing else, this bureaucrat mentality (and there's nothing wrong with that; we have and need more bureaucrats than politicians; for better or worse, bureaucrats make the world run) should lay to rest any thought that Ms. Rice will ever seek political office through an election, let alone the presidency.
But this report, if true, shows Mr. Hadley in what seems nothing more than a futile exercise, the mindless execution of the president's will in the face of certain failure, a Bizzarro World mirror image of the proverbial bearer of bad messages. He must be thinking, it's either me, or someone who'll make things even worse. That, or he totally lacks a sense of reality and insight into the human mind.
If nothing else, this bureaucrat mentality (and there's nothing wrong with that; we have and need more bureaucrats than politicians; for better or worse, bureaucrats make the world run) should lay to rest any thought that Ms. Rice will ever seek political office through an election, let alone the presidency.
Don't Remember It, So It Didn't Happen; Claims Fred Thompson. (Echoes in Ibaragi)
The headline and lead say it all:
Thompson lobbied for abortion-rights group, it says
A spokesman for the GOP presidential hopeful says he did no such work. An ex-colleague calls the denial 'bizarre.'
Are Mssrs. Sada, Matsuoka (wherever he is), Kyuma, et al thinking, why didn't I think of that?
Seriously, on the face of it, the allegations look pretty convincing. I can see why Fred Thompson can't say that he was just doing his job (a la Mitt Romney as Massachusetts governor), or changed his mind like the other Republican candidates (including Mitt Romney). But is he sure that he has the nerves to withstand the attack from his opponents? The silver lining for the Republicans is that this makes Alberto Gonzales look good. I mean, he only forgot, period.
Speaking of changing minds, MAFF Minister's parents issued a written statement on Sunday retracting his mother's previous claim that, contrary to the filing with the authorities, their home was not being used as his main office. Prime Minister Abe had said as much earlier in the day on TV, stating that it was his understanding that they would be making a clarifying statement later in the day.
Thompson lobbied for abortion-rights group, it says
A spokesman for the GOP presidential hopeful says he did no such work. An ex-colleague calls the denial 'bizarre.'
Are Mssrs. Sada, Matsuoka (wherever he is), Kyuma, et al thinking, why didn't I think of that?
Seriously, on the face of it, the allegations look pretty convincing. I can see why Fred Thompson can't say that he was just doing his job (a la Mitt Romney as Massachusetts governor), or changed his mind like the other Republican candidates (including Mitt Romney). But is he sure that he has the nerves to withstand the attack from his opponents? The silver lining for the Republicans is that this makes Alberto Gonzales look good. I mean, he only forgot, period.
Speaking of changing minds, MAFF Minister's parents issued a written statement on Sunday retracting his mother's previous claim that, contrary to the filing with the authorities, their home was not being used as his main office. Prime Minister Abe had said as much earlier in the day on TV, stating that it was his understanding that they would be making a clarifying statement later in the day.
Sunday, July 08, 2007
The Prime Minister Plays Defense on Sunday Project
Today, the heads of the seven parties contesting the Upper House election made the rounds of Sunday morning talk shows (Fuji TV, NHK, and TV Asahi). The TV Asahi Sunday Project took up the latest MAFF minister's public financing controversy, the public pension scandal, and Defense Minister Kyuma's gaffe over the atom bombs dropped on Japan during WW II. Forced to play defense, Mr. Abe acquitted himself well. He was noticeably better briefed and coached than his opponents, including Ichiro Ozawa, the enigmatic head of the DPJ, and was for the most part articulate without being too voluble.
Mr. Abe did a reasonably good job of explaining the MAFF minister's public financing accounting issues, drawing on the law, the attachment of inherited supporters to the family stronghold, and his own experience (though he himself had discontinued the practice) to conjecture that there had been nothing illegal or improper going on when Mr. Akagi decided to designate his parents' home as his main office and consolidate expenditures to that office in the annual reports to the authorities.
He fared less well on the public pension scandal, but no new hits were scored. The talk was mostly about who knew what and when. Mr. Abe gave a reasonably good account of the measures being taken by the administration and merely casually intimated at the LDP charge (instead of blaming head-on) opposition-friendly labor in the National Insurance Agency for the chronic, pervasive carelessness that led to the debacle. (A comment from Yasuo Tanaka, the ex-governor head of the Shinto Nihon that everybody was neglecting the real issue, which is that the pension system itself is in a meltdown, was quickly shelved by Soichiro Tawara, the emcee, with a quai-promise to revisit the issue on another date.)
On the atomic bombs, Soichiro Tawara pressed Mr. Abe to seek a US apology (as Mr. Ozawa had said should be done when Defense Minister Kyuma's words became public) and criticized the government for accepting US inconsistency in dealing with new nuclear states. Mr. Abe did not answer directly, and reiterated his position that such a thing should not have been done, and repeatedly emphasized Japan's successful efforts to pass UN resolutions for nuclear disarmament against US opposition.
But most voters have more important things to do than watch Sunday Project or the other Sunday talk shows. (Let's just say that they are less colorful that the weekday sex, love-triangle murder, astrology, Korean Drama, etc. fare.) Come Monday, the events will be incorporated in the news reports in the mainstream dailies, stripped of the emotional, impressionistic contents that the audiovisual experience leaves behind, and given the context of the ongoing narrative, which is that the adminstration has messed up royally. There, unpleasant things like the fact that Mr. Akagi has steadfastly avoided full disclosure, shielding himself with the law, just like his deceased predecessor (who, unlike Mr. Akagi, had made absurd and inflammatory claims on the costs incurred by his main office) had done may be juxtaposed against Mr. Abe's willingness to give full faith and credit to whatever explanation he got from Mr. Akagi.
To repeat, Mr. Abe played good defense. But when you're behind, you have to score goals. So barring further major surprises, the ruling coalition continues to look at a big loss. Just based on a hunch, I'd be happy to keep a book at 45 over-under for a 5% cut of all bets. But I won't, because it's illegal you know. So the real question here is, will the coalition loss be small enough to maintain a working majority in the Upper House?
And as a closely related but not identical question, will it be a sufficiently official coalition that it will enable it to maintain the Upper House president's seat and the lion's share of choice committee chairmanships? Those things will make a difference in the extent to which the coalition can push its legislative agenda till 2010, when its next general election changes the complexion of the Upper House.
Generally sympathetic to Mr. Abe (even producing a chart that listed all the policy initiatives that Mr. Abe had pushed through), Mr. Tawara pushed him hard on seeking US apology over the WW II atom bombs. As with Mr. Ozawa's reaction, this is yet another manifestation of a strong, underlying populist sentiment that mostly lies dormant but surfaces from time to time to see redress. This sentiment is not directed solely, or even mainly, against the US. Indeed, I suspect that we place the bulk of it squarely on the shoulders of our leaders who took us into the hellhole and (if the wishes of some of them were to be followed) would have forced us to perish there in a false glory of the damned. Nevertheless, any full-scale debate in Japan on responsibility for actions taken to bring about and conduct the wars will inevitably bring this issue to the fore. And what our ally shall hear then will not be to its liking.
Mr. Abe did a reasonably good job of explaining the MAFF minister's public financing accounting issues, drawing on the law, the attachment of inherited supporters to the family stronghold, and his own experience (though he himself had discontinued the practice) to conjecture that there had been nothing illegal or improper going on when Mr. Akagi decided to designate his parents' home as his main office and consolidate expenditures to that office in the annual reports to the authorities.
He fared less well on the public pension scandal, but no new hits were scored. The talk was mostly about who knew what and when. Mr. Abe gave a reasonably good account of the measures being taken by the administration and merely casually intimated at the LDP charge (instead of blaming head-on) opposition-friendly labor in the National Insurance Agency for the chronic, pervasive carelessness that led to the debacle. (A comment from Yasuo Tanaka, the ex-governor head of the Shinto Nihon that everybody was neglecting the real issue, which is that the pension system itself is in a meltdown, was quickly shelved by Soichiro Tawara, the emcee, with a quai-promise to revisit the issue on another date.)
On the atomic bombs, Soichiro Tawara pressed Mr. Abe to seek a US apology (as Mr. Ozawa had said should be done when Defense Minister Kyuma's words became public) and criticized the government for accepting US inconsistency in dealing with new nuclear states. Mr. Abe did not answer directly, and reiterated his position that such a thing should not have been done, and repeatedly emphasized Japan's successful efforts to pass UN resolutions for nuclear disarmament against US opposition.
But most voters have more important things to do than watch Sunday Project or the other Sunday talk shows. (Let's just say that they are less colorful that the weekday sex, love-triangle murder, astrology, Korean Drama, etc. fare.) Come Monday, the events will be incorporated in the news reports in the mainstream dailies, stripped of the emotional, impressionistic contents that the audiovisual experience leaves behind, and given the context of the ongoing narrative, which is that the adminstration has messed up royally. There, unpleasant things like the fact that Mr. Akagi has steadfastly avoided full disclosure, shielding himself with the law, just like his deceased predecessor (who, unlike Mr. Akagi, had made absurd and inflammatory claims on the costs incurred by his main office) had done may be juxtaposed against Mr. Abe's willingness to give full faith and credit to whatever explanation he got from Mr. Akagi.
To repeat, Mr. Abe played good defense. But when you're behind, you have to score goals. So barring further major surprises, the ruling coalition continues to look at a big loss. Just based on a hunch, I'd be happy to keep a book at 45 over-under for a 5% cut of all bets. But I won't, because it's illegal you know. So the real question here is, will the coalition loss be small enough to maintain a working majority in the Upper House?
And as a closely related but not identical question, will it be a sufficiently official coalition that it will enable it to maintain the Upper House president's seat and the lion's share of choice committee chairmanships? Those things will make a difference in the extent to which the coalition can push its legislative agenda till 2010, when its next general election changes the complexion of the Upper House.
Generally sympathetic to Mr. Abe (even producing a chart that listed all the policy initiatives that Mr. Abe had pushed through), Mr. Tawara pushed him hard on seeking US apology over the WW II atom bombs. As with Mr. Ozawa's reaction, this is yet another manifestation of a strong, underlying populist sentiment that mostly lies dormant but surfaces from time to time to see redress. This sentiment is not directed solely, or even mainly, against the US. Indeed, I suspect that we place the bulk of it squarely on the shoulders of our leaders who took us into the hellhole and (if the wishes of some of them were to be followed) would have forced us to perish there in a false glory of the damned. Nevertheless, any full-scale debate in Japan on responsibility for actions taken to bring about and conduct the wars will inevitably bring this issue to the fore. And what our ally shall hear then will not be to its liking.
Will the Successor to the Deceased MAFF Minister Matsuoka Be the Next to Fall?
The mainstream media as well as the tabloids have pounced on the latest misfortunes of the Abe administration in the personage of Norihiko Akagi, grandson of former MAFF minister and replacement for Toshikatsu Matsuoka, who committed suicide over political financing and other scandals. Mr. Akagi's koenkai (supporters' group), in filing the necessary report with the authorities, had been using his parent's home as his main office and expensed a substantial amount of money there. According to news reports, his own mother stated that they "had not been receiving payments for rent or utilities. (Her son's) private secretary and office personnel would come when an election campaign starts, but they are not here regularly." With a mother like this, could things be any worse for Mr. Akagi? Well his koenkai representative said "it has not used as an office since Mr. Akagi took over."
The opposition is raising the predictable cries for Mr. Akagi’s head. Upper House LDP members and the New Komeito are making their displeasure known as well. Prime Minister Abe is also acting predictably, as, according to an AP report, he "defended Akagi and brushed off the resignation demands. 'That's not the problem,' Abe said, when reporters asked for his response to the opposition calls for Akagi's resignation. 'He has already offered a clear explanation.'" But this was before the media began giving this its full attention. Mr. Abe's penchant for explaining first and thinking later (and tacking with the winds), as well as to defend his ministers then let nature take its course (Genichiro Sada resigns; Hakuo Yanagisawa stays on; Mr. Matsuoka kills himself; Fumio Kyuma resigns) seems to be again in full display.
This is a cabinet that the media can only love.
The AP report was written before the afternoon tabloids and the mainstream evening editions came out.
The opposition is raising the predictable cries for Mr. Akagi’s head. Upper House LDP members and the New Komeito are making their displeasure known as well. Prime Minister Abe is also acting predictably, as, according to an AP report, he "defended Akagi and brushed off the resignation demands. 'That's not the problem,' Abe said, when reporters asked for his response to the opposition calls for Akagi's resignation. 'He has already offered a clear explanation.'" But this was before the media began giving this its full attention. Mr. Abe's penchant for explaining first and thinking later (and tacking with the winds), as well as to defend his ministers then let nature take its course (Genichiro Sada resigns; Hakuo Yanagisawa stays on; Mr. Matsuoka kills himself; Fumio Kyuma resigns) seems to be again in full display.
This is a cabinet that the media can only love.
The AP report was written before the afternoon tabloids and the mainstream evening editions came out.
Friday, July 06, 2007
How Prime Minister Abe Stays on after the Upper House Election
As you may have seen in any number of online articles and here, the ruling coalition needs the consistent support of 64 winners in the upcoming election to maintain a working majority in the Upper House. I use the phrase "consistent support" because it need not be formal participation in the coalition. Let's assume that Komeito, with always reliable Sokagakkai support, takes 13 seats as expected. If the LDP does as badly as in 2004 (for which Mr. Abe took responsibility and resigned as secretary-general of the party) and wins 49 seats, then the coalition needs two more seats. Where will they come from?
A couple of intriguing things happened yesterday (July 6). First, the split in the Shinto Nihon. The two Diet members of the Shinto Nihon, Hiroyuki Arai (Upper House; elected 2004) and Makoto Taki (Lower House) left the party in a split with their non-Diet member leader, the novelist and ex-governor Yasuo Tanaka. Shinto Nihon is one of the two micro-parties formed mainly by some of the LDP Lower House castoffs who voted against Prime Minister Koizumi's Post Office privatization bill. (Mr. Arai, as a member of the Upper House, left of his own volition.) Mr. Abe, only reluctantly voted for the Koizumi plan, as you may remember, and is favorably inclined toward the exiles. Mr. Arai may very well return to the LDP fold; since he was not expelled, he may not even have to put his signature on that humiliating document that Takeo Hiranuma refused to submit. Even if he doesn't, he did vote Mr. Abe for prime in the Upper House designation vote, so we can safely consider him at minimum a de facto member of the post-election coalition.
In another falling out, Shinpei Matsushita (Shin-Ryokufukai, Upper House, elected 2004) left the Upper House "DPJ-Shin-Ryokufukai" joint party group (a virtual party for practical parliamentarian purposes) in a dispute over which of the two independent candidates to support in his electoral district (Miyazaki Prefecture) for the upcoming election. Mr. Matsushita claims he has no intention of returning to the LDP (although elected as an independent by defeating the LDP candidate, he was an LDP provincial assemblyman before that) and will act as an independent. Chalk him up as undecided. It is useful to keep in mind that his independent protégée, if elected, will surely vote with Mr. Matsushita.
So there are two seats not up for election this time that have left the opposition, and one of them is likely to support Mr. Abe. If the ruling coalition manages to hold on to 49 seats as they did in the 2004 debacle, they will be tantalizingly close to, and may even reach, the 51-seat threshold by reaching out to these two incumbent, newly independent Upper House members.
But can the LDP hold on to even that many seats? LDP and Abe administration are even less popular this time around than in 2004. In their favor are the economy, and a turnaround in the relationship with China. Working against them are: engineering the return of 12 of the exiles, which touched off the decline; the string of political scandals large and small culminating in the suicide of one minister and the resignation of two others; the more substantive mess at the National Insurance Agency, and the appearance of fecklessness in the face of the latter two. The DPJ has not been able to take advantage of LDP misfortunes (can anyone please tell me who coined the phrase "snatching defeat out of the jaws of victory"?), and is lacking cohesion and momentum compared to 2004, but its numbers do not look any worse than it was then. Even though it is possible, even likely, that the LDP will pick up the odd independent-conservative winner or two, still, it is definitely not a safe bet that the LDP will gather the 51 votes, including one or two who are not running this time around, to maintain a working post-election majority. And this brings us to the Kokumin Shinto.
The Kokumin Shinto is the larger LDP-exile micro-party, led by former LDP heavyweights Tamisuke Watanuki and Shizuka Kamei. It has four Upper House seats, of which two are up for reelection. For argument's sake, let's assume that it breaks even. If it then joins the coalition, and we are also assuming that the Komeito takes 13 and Mr. Matsui, and the opposition MP who supported Mr. Abe's bid for prime minister, the LDP will need only have won 47 seats to maintain an Upper House working majority. Subtract the usual newly elected odd independent or two that may join the LDP, and it could conceivably make do with 45, or 46.
What are the chances of the Kokumin Shinto joining the coalition? In a formal sense, none. Party leaders have consistently stated that they will maintain their independence. It will be very difficult to go back on that any time soon after the election, and the LDP will not be able make it any easier by waiving the conditions for the return of the outcasts. But Mr. Watanuki in particular has indicated his potential willingness to work ex-cabinet with the coalition, and has openly supported selected LDP candidates.
The Kokumin Shinto is likely, though, to demand the revisiting of the terms of Post Office privatization as the condition for such cooperation. Such a cave-in on the part of the coalition carries serious political costs in terms of public relations. But Mr. Abe may reckon that he lost what there was to lose last December when he welcomed back 12 exiles. Moreover, to repeat, he only reluctantly supported Mr. Koizumi's privatization package, and has strong sympathy for the exiles. So if that were all it takes, I would say that he would go for it, and take his chances that nothing more will happen to take him down, at least until the next LDP presidential (≒prime minister) election in September 2008 and hopefully 2009, when the next Lower House general election comes due. But there's the matter of Mr. Fujimori. The LDP must be hoping that the Kokumin Shinto does just poorly enough to keep Mr. Fujimori out of the Upper House. But Mr. Fujimori is a popular figure in Japan. If I had to guess, I would bet that Mr. Abe will decide that a working virtual majority is worth the international embarrassment . (No U.S. House of Representatives resolution this time.)
For your convenience: the latest Asahi poll chart:
Caveats: I do not know any of the principals personally, and some important parts of what I've written are conjecture or assumptions. The end game that involves the Kokumin Shinto and what goes on in the mind of Mr. Abe is particularly iffy. In fact, Mr. Abe might just call it a day anyway; by all accounts, he is not the kind who seeks power for its own sake.
While doing online research on Mr. Kamei, I found that the owners of the copyright for Doraemon are doing a very good job of protecting it; just thought you'd like to know.
A couple of intriguing things happened yesterday (July 6). First, the split in the Shinto Nihon. The two Diet members of the Shinto Nihon, Hiroyuki Arai (Upper House; elected 2004) and Makoto Taki (Lower House) left the party in a split with their non-Diet member leader, the novelist and ex-governor Yasuo Tanaka. Shinto Nihon is one of the two micro-parties formed mainly by some of the LDP Lower House castoffs who voted against Prime Minister Koizumi's Post Office privatization bill. (Mr. Arai, as a member of the Upper House, left of his own volition.) Mr. Abe, only reluctantly voted for the Koizumi plan, as you may remember, and is favorably inclined toward the exiles. Mr. Arai may very well return to the LDP fold; since he was not expelled, he may not even have to put his signature on that humiliating document that Takeo Hiranuma refused to submit. Even if he doesn't, he did vote Mr. Abe for prime in the Upper House designation vote, so we can safely consider him at minimum a de facto member of the post-election coalition.
In another falling out, Shinpei Matsushita (Shin-Ryokufukai, Upper House, elected 2004) left the Upper House "DPJ-Shin-Ryokufukai" joint party group (a virtual party for practical parliamentarian purposes) in a dispute over which of the two independent candidates to support in his electoral district (Miyazaki Prefecture) for the upcoming election. Mr. Matsushita claims he has no intention of returning to the LDP (although elected as an independent by defeating the LDP candidate, he was an LDP provincial assemblyman before that) and will act as an independent. Chalk him up as undecided. It is useful to keep in mind that his independent protégée, if elected, will surely vote with Mr. Matsushita.
So there are two seats not up for election this time that have left the opposition, and one of them is likely to support Mr. Abe. If the ruling coalition manages to hold on to 49 seats as they did in the 2004 debacle, they will be tantalizingly close to, and may even reach, the 51-seat threshold by reaching out to these two incumbent, newly independent Upper House members.
But can the LDP hold on to even that many seats? LDP and Abe administration are even less popular this time around than in 2004. In their favor are the economy, and a turnaround in the relationship with China. Working against them are: engineering the return of 12 of the exiles, which touched off the decline; the string of political scandals large and small culminating in the suicide of one minister and the resignation of two others; the more substantive mess at the National Insurance Agency, and the appearance of fecklessness in the face of the latter two. The DPJ has not been able to take advantage of LDP misfortunes (can anyone please tell me who coined the phrase "snatching defeat out of the jaws of victory"?), and is lacking cohesion and momentum compared to 2004, but its numbers do not look any worse than it was then. Even though it is possible, even likely, that the LDP will pick up the odd independent-conservative winner or two, still, it is definitely not a safe bet that the LDP will gather the 51 votes, including one or two who are not running this time around, to maintain a working post-election majority. And this brings us to the Kokumin Shinto.
The Kokumin Shinto is the larger LDP-exile micro-party, led by former LDP heavyweights Tamisuke Watanuki and Shizuka Kamei. It has four Upper House seats, of which two are up for reelection. For argument's sake, let's assume that it breaks even. If it then joins the coalition, and we are also assuming that the Komeito takes 13 and Mr. Matsui, and the opposition MP who supported Mr. Abe's bid for prime minister, the LDP will need only have won 47 seats to maintain an Upper House working majority. Subtract the usual newly elected odd independent or two that may join the LDP, and it could conceivably make do with 45, or 46.
What are the chances of the Kokumin Shinto joining the coalition? In a formal sense, none. Party leaders have consistently stated that they will maintain their independence. It will be very difficult to go back on that any time soon after the election, and the LDP will not be able make it any easier by waiving the conditions for the return of the outcasts. But Mr. Watanuki in particular has indicated his potential willingness to work ex-cabinet with the coalition, and has openly supported selected LDP candidates.
The Kokumin Shinto is likely, though, to demand the revisiting of the terms of Post Office privatization as the condition for such cooperation. Such a cave-in on the part of the coalition carries serious political costs in terms of public relations. But Mr. Abe may reckon that he lost what there was to lose last December when he welcomed back 12 exiles. Moreover, to repeat, he only reluctantly supported Mr. Koizumi's privatization package, and has strong sympathy for the exiles. So if that were all it takes, I would say that he would go for it, and take his chances that nothing more will happen to take him down, at least until the next LDP presidential (≒prime minister) election in September 2008 and hopefully 2009, when the next Lower House general election comes due. But there's the matter of Mr. Fujimori. The LDP must be hoping that the Kokumin Shinto does just poorly enough to keep Mr. Fujimori out of the Upper House. But Mr. Fujimori is a popular figure in Japan. If I had to guess, I would bet that Mr. Abe will decide that a working virtual majority is worth the international embarrassment . (No U.S. House of Representatives resolution this time.)
For your convenience: the latest Asahi poll chart:
Caveats: I do not know any of the principals personally, and some important parts of what I've written are conjecture or assumptions. The end game that involves the Kokumin Shinto and what goes on in the mind of Mr. Abe is particularly iffy. In fact, Mr. Abe might just call it a day anyway; by all accounts, he is not the kind who seeks power for its own sake.
While doing online research on Mr. Kamei, I found that the owners of the copyright for Doraemon are doing a very good job of protecting it; just thought you'd like to know.
Thursday, July 05, 2007
Fellow Blogger Brings Article to My Attention.
I'm sure this must be a parody. Or a hoax a la the Sokal affair; the guy juust wanted to see what he could get away with.
Exhibit A:
Win-win-win requires '3 Rs'
Successfully navigating primary interests will allow the three countries to avoid conflict, but win-win-win cooperation also requires high standards for state behavior. These standards include "three Rs": respect, restraint and responsibility. Each principle applies to the United States, China and Japan, but it is useful to emphasize the most relevant policy adjustments for each country.
Why am I reminded of the Jingleheimer Junction video clip?
Exhibit B:
Complex processes of globalization are transforming international relations. Multidirectional socialization is under way among states, international institutions and increasingly intertwined societies. In this dynamic context, it is essential to specify what win-win-win trilateral relations would look like. Those relations would be broader, deeper and more stable than today--and better able to address pressing international problems.
The goal is distant but far from impossible. Realizing win-win-win relations requires new strategic thinking, questioning old assumptions and adjusting to new realities. Japan, China and the United States would navigate each other's primary interests and adhere to high standards for state behavior involving mutual respect, restraint and responsibility.
On this basis, multidirectional socialization would gradually produce shared strategic visions and even a sense of common identity. Only then will Japan-U.S.-China relations truly be win-win-win.
Some of the other headlines on that page are pretty weird too; that's a dead giveaway:
Thai tuna past shelf life used in rolled sushi (07/05)
Nowhere to go (07/05)
NAGOYA: Doctor told to pay for patient's death (07/05)
You know, there's guys I'd pay to see dead.
Since Fellow Blogger is taking a sabbatical, it is my duty to bring this to your attention.
Exhibit A:
Win-win-win requires '3 Rs'
Successfully navigating primary interests will allow the three countries to avoid conflict, but win-win-win cooperation also requires high standards for state behavior. These standards include "three Rs": respect, restraint and responsibility. Each principle applies to the United States, China and Japan, but it is useful to emphasize the most relevant policy adjustments for each country.
Why am I reminded of the Jingleheimer Junction video clip?
Exhibit B:
Complex processes of globalization are transforming international relations. Multidirectional socialization is under way among states, international institutions and increasingly intertwined societies. In this dynamic context, it is essential to specify what win-win-win trilateral relations would look like. Those relations would be broader, deeper and more stable than today--and better able to address pressing international problems.
The goal is distant but far from impossible. Realizing win-win-win relations requires new strategic thinking, questioning old assumptions and adjusting to new realities. Japan, China and the United States would navigate each other's primary interests and adhere to high standards for state behavior involving mutual respect, restraint and responsibility.
On this basis, multidirectional socialization would gradually produce shared strategic visions and even a sense of common identity. Only then will Japan-U.S.-China relations truly be win-win-win.
Some of the other headlines on that page are pretty weird too; that's a dead giveaway:
Thai tuna past shelf life used in rolled sushi (07/05)
Nowhere to go (07/05)
NAGOYA: Doctor told to pay for patient's death (07/05)
You know, there's guys I'd pay to see dead.
Since Fellow Blogger is taking a sabbatical, it is my duty to bring this to your attention.
Sunday, July 01, 2007
Video Clip(s) to Sustain You for the Week: Seventh Installment
Once upon a time in America, lip-synching was legal.
Here's Carole King herself, singing it live.
No, you aren't seeing this. It's your imagination.
Here's Carole King herself, singing it live.
No, you aren't seeing this. It's your imagination.
My Science Test Grade
Here is my 8th grade science test grade score. In fact, I answered all 26 questions correctly.
Yes, at an online dating service.
So I guess my question is, if this didn't help me at all when I was in 8th grade, why should it help me now?
Yes, at an online dating service.
So I guess my question is, if this didn't help me at all when I was in 8th grade, why should it help me now?
Saturday, June 30, 2007
Mr. Fujimori May Complicate Post-Election Maneuvering for Micro-Party.
BBC follows up on the prospective Alberto Fujimori candidacy for this month's Japanese Upper House election. The former Peruvian president, who has dual Japanese-Peruvian citizenship, "is currently under house arrest in Chile, facing extradition to Peru on human rights and corruption charges". Shizuka Kamei, the LDP outcast and Kokumin Shinto leader, had sought him out, and Mr. Fujimori apparently is game.
From a purely electoral perspective, this a smart move for the Kokumin Shinto. Mr. Fujimori is a popular figure in Japan. Not only is he the proverbial hometown boy made good - the political equivalent of Ichiro - he assuages the residual sense of guilt we feel for the hardships that Japanese emigrants underwent in Latin America. He will likely suffer some reputation risk from this incongruous act. (An ex-president of Peru running for a Diet seat in Japan from house arrest in Chile? Peter Sellers would have loved to do the movie.) However, like the case of Kyouko Nakayama, the abductee-and-family minder, or Hiroyuki Yoshiie, the teen-thug-turned-teacher-turned-self-styled education guru, both running for the LDP, the people who are disappointed in his meddling in Japanese politics are not otherwise supporters who will take this hard and turn around and cast their vote for an opponent in protest. Like the two LDP celebrity candidates, he will only add to the party tally for the proportionate representation votes.
No, the problems, if any, will come after the election. Assume that Mr. Fujimori gains a seat, and the Kokumin Shinto is holding the casting votes in the Upper House. The price for cooperation will be steep, and a Cabinet seat is not out of the question. So imagine the embarrassment of having Mr. Kamei or Tamisuke Watanuki in the Cabinet demanding every time there's Cabinet meeting that Mr. Fujimori be released. Not to mention having a Diet member under house arrest in Chile.
It's one thing to refuse to extradite Mr. Fujimori to Peru (the Peruvian indignance was a political stunt, actually, since, lacking an extradition treaty, there was no way the authorities could have detained his against his will and forcibly shipped him out), and totally another to have to keep demanding that Chile return him ASAP so that he can fulfill his political duties.
Can Mr. Abe pull it off? The Kokumin Shinto seems to have made it harder for him to cobble a coalition, and that narrows its options.
The available options, of course, depend on how many seats the LDP manages to scrape together. The DPJ's efforts to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory may yet save the LDP, much of the dire outcry from the LDP is surely designed to push the party faithful to action, and the freefall in public support has bottomed out. But the outlook is still grim for the LDP, and, Mr. Fujimori or no Mr. Fujimori, there is a serious possibility that any talk of Kokumin Shinto joining the ruling coalition will be rendered moot.
From a purely electoral perspective, this a smart move for the Kokumin Shinto. Mr. Fujimori is a popular figure in Japan. Not only is he the proverbial hometown boy made good - the political equivalent of Ichiro - he assuages the residual sense of guilt we feel for the hardships that Japanese emigrants underwent in Latin America. He will likely suffer some reputation risk from this incongruous act. (An ex-president of Peru running for a Diet seat in Japan from house arrest in Chile? Peter Sellers would have loved to do the movie.) However, like the case of Kyouko Nakayama, the abductee-and-family minder, or Hiroyuki Yoshiie, the teen-thug-turned-teacher-turned-self-styled education guru, both running for the LDP, the people who are disappointed in his meddling in Japanese politics are not otherwise supporters who will take this hard and turn around and cast their vote for an opponent in protest. Like the two LDP celebrity candidates, he will only add to the party tally for the proportionate representation votes.
No, the problems, if any, will come after the election. Assume that Mr. Fujimori gains a seat, and the Kokumin Shinto is holding the casting votes in the Upper House. The price for cooperation will be steep, and a Cabinet seat is not out of the question. So imagine the embarrassment of having Mr. Kamei or Tamisuke Watanuki in the Cabinet demanding every time there's Cabinet meeting that Mr. Fujimori be released. Not to mention having a Diet member under house arrest in Chile.
It's one thing to refuse to extradite Mr. Fujimori to Peru (the Peruvian indignance was a political stunt, actually, since, lacking an extradition treaty, there was no way the authorities could have detained his against his will and forcibly shipped him out), and totally another to have to keep demanding that Chile return him ASAP so that he can fulfill his political duties.
Can Mr. Abe pull it off? The Kokumin Shinto seems to have made it harder for him to cobble a coalition, and that narrows its options.
The available options, of course, depend on how many seats the LDP manages to scrape together. The DPJ's efforts to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory may yet save the LDP, much of the dire outcry from the LDP is surely designed to push the party faithful to action, and the freefall in public support has bottomed out. But the outlook is still grim for the LDP, and, Mr. Fujimori or no Mr. Fujimori, there is a serious possibility that any talk of Kokumin Shinto joining the ruling coalition will be rendered moot.
The Blog Plays Assistant as Trend Spotter Flies in from New York New York
JK is in town with his trend spotter wife. As far as I can gather from what he tells me, a trend spotter gets paid to go to fashion hotspots like Tokyo and Shanghai and walk around soaking up the latest next things. JK, who has the face of a Roman senator and the body of an Ivy League fullback, and I decide to help out by doing a little trend spotting of our own. We quickly agree that all the hot Tokyo women are wearing short shorts. That, and denim cutoff microskirts. And we mean micro. I later find out that there are no hot women in Ginza.
Hey, we were only trying to help.
Smelly, dirty, noisy New York, where everybody walks as fast as the rest of the world runs; the big fat capital of the global community; the Naked City where The Naked Cowboy is but one of the eight million stories; what other place could be so American?
Ah, America, the only major power where a serious demographic crunch does not loom. No wonder Russia and China are scared. Russia has the more immediate problem, an imploding male population, but China does not have a natural resource crutch (curse?).
Hey, we were only trying to help.
Smelly, dirty, noisy New York, where everybody walks as fast as the rest of the world runs; the big fat capital of the global community; the Naked City where The Naked Cowboy is but one of the eight million stories; what other place could be so American?
Ah, America, the only major power where a serious demographic crunch does not loom. No wonder Russia and China are scared. Russia has the more immediate problem, an imploding male population, but China does not have a natural resource crutch (curse?).
The Check Is in the Mail; The National Interest
I've been saying to everyone who will listen, i.e. KM, HO, RT, and one family member, that I'm appearing in The National Interest. Well, it turns out that I'd already been published. The catch? Not here, but here. Essentially, I've been telling the world I won a BMW in a raffle, and I come home to find the FedEx guy at my front door with this.
So, was the experience worth losing all my liberal friends? YES, in capital letters. Because they are paying real money, unlike the English language version of Japanese national daily X. My joy is palpable in the following email (slightly edited) I wrote in response when they asked for my mailing address:
"To be truthful, I'd be happy to write for The National Interest for free. But please by all means pretend you didn't read that (I was only speaking hypothetically anyway) and send the money. Since The Communist Institution that disguises itself by the name of The International Banking System rakes off an exorbitant share of the moolah when redeeming a check at an overseas location, my favorite mode of payment is the following:
Mail the money in unmarked hundred-dollar bills to:
Jun Okumura
******
JAPAN.
Barring that possibility, please mail a money order to the same address.
Wiring the money to the following account runs a poor third:
Bank:
Address:
Account number:
Holder of account: Jun Okumura
As for the fourth option, namely a check in the mail, personally serving cognac and salmon roe to Kim Jong-il would be more fun. But it beats not getting paid at all.
Yours sincerely,
Jun Okumura"
So, was the experience worth losing all my liberal friends? YES, in capital letters. Because they are paying real money, unlike the English language version of Japanese national daily X. My joy is palpable in the following email (slightly edited) I wrote in response when they asked for my mailing address:
"To be truthful, I'd be happy to write for The National Interest for free. But please by all means pretend you didn't read that (I was only speaking hypothetically anyway) and send the money. Since The Communist Institution that disguises itself by the name of The International Banking System rakes off an exorbitant share of the moolah when redeeming a check at an overseas location, my favorite mode of payment is the following:
Mail the money in unmarked hundred-dollar bills to:
Jun Okumura
******
JAPAN.
Barring that possibility, please mail a money order to the same address.
Wiring the money to the following account runs a poor third:
Bank:
Address:
Account number:
Holder of account: Jun Okumura
As for the fourth option, namely a check in the mail, personally serving cognac and salmon roe to Kim Jong-il would be more fun. But it beats not getting paid at all.
Yours sincerely,
Jun Okumura"
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
How Media Figures Make Use of Nominally Hostile Mediums and What This Means
dunno, actually.
Here and here, Andrew Sullivan thinks he sees Ms. Coulter "wither and flinch" and "melt". Not so. The discomfort is palpable only in the context of the coolly calculating M.s. Coulter, and she does a workman's job of running out the clock by shamelessly repeating the sound bites that she knows will go down well with her constituency. And you know that she will go back to her turf and tell her fans that she went into the lion's lair (never mind Chris Matthews' bipartisan bark and bite) and faced those hypocrites down, and she knows that they will applaud. Mission accomplished. BIll Kristol repeating on The Daily Show is similar. It's all media jujitsu.
To be fair, you only have to remember the third-tier liberal academics who used to appear on The O'Reilly Show (do they still do that?) for their fifteen minutes of fame in exchange for being for being eaten alive like the Christians in the Forum to know that this phenomenon is not limited to the right.
Even the most serious of politics is spectacle. And those who entertain are rewarded, always handsomely, sometimes disproportionately. (Remember comedian Yukio Aoshima, the comedian and writer winning the Tokyo governorship without campaigning?) I have wondered for at least a couple of years how this can benefit us in the evolutionary sense. Perhaps we have not yet had the time to evolve from the prototypical humanoid who usually spent his/her whole life in a small roaming band of people who come into close contact with each other very day and thus did not have to worry about being fooled by people whose intimacy exists only in our imagination.
Here and here, Andrew Sullivan thinks he sees Ms. Coulter "wither and flinch" and "melt". Not so. The discomfort is palpable only in the context of the coolly calculating M.s. Coulter, and she does a workman's job of running out the clock by shamelessly repeating the sound bites that she knows will go down well with her constituency. And you know that she will go back to her turf and tell her fans that she went into the lion's lair (never mind Chris Matthews' bipartisan bark and bite) and faced those hypocrites down, and she knows that they will applaud. Mission accomplished. BIll Kristol repeating on The Daily Show is similar. It's all media jujitsu.
To be fair, you only have to remember the third-tier liberal academics who used to appear on The O'Reilly Show (do they still do that?) for their fifteen minutes of fame in exchange for being for being eaten alive like the Christians in the Forum to know that this phenomenon is not limited to the right.
Even the most serious of politics is spectacle. And those who entertain are rewarded, always handsomely, sometimes disproportionately. (Remember comedian Yukio Aoshima, the comedian and writer winning the Tokyo governorship without campaigning?) I have wondered for at least a couple of years how this can benefit us in the evolutionary sense. Perhaps we have not yet had the time to evolve from the prototypical humanoid who usually spent his/her whole life in a small roaming band of people who come into close contact with each other very day and thus did not have to worry about being fooled by people whose intimacy exists only in our imagination.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Video Clip, to Sustain You for the Week: Sixth Installment
Missy Elliott. Is my memory failing me, or is this much, much funkier than the version I remember hearing on the radio?
Saturday, June 23, 2007
Can the Communist Party Help the LDP-Komeito Coalition?
Bryan Walsh produces a TIME article on the Japanese Communist Party that identifies it as the go-to party for people whose patience with the mainstream political parties has reached its limits. In fact, in the 1998 Upper House election, a tanking economy and a consumption tax hike allowed the JCP to pick up 15 seats, giving it a total of 23, at the time one more than the now LDP coalition partner Komeito. The voting system for the Upper House has changed somewhat since then. Still, with the enigmatic DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa running well behind the beleaguered Prime Minister Abe in the latest Yomiuri poll (feel-good percentage: Mr. Ozawa 23%, Mr. Abe 35%), a lot of those unaligned voters could vote again for the JCP.
What then, are the consequences of the JCP siphoning off the protest votes from the DPJ? After all, t's not as if the JCP will enter into an unholy union with the LDP-Komeito coalition, will it? As veteran journalist Sam Jameson patiently pointed out to me when I foolishly challenged his formidable knowledge of the Japanese Constitution (as with everything Japanesy), the Lower House can overturn an Upper House vote or, in the absence of an Upper House vote, revote after sixty days, to enact any bill without the consent of the Upper House. And the requirement is a two-thirds supermajority, which the current coalition does have, which is why Sam made this point.
But as we agreed then (I think), the composition of an Upper House opposition majority does matter. For if the LDP maintains a plurality of the seats in the Upper House, it will enable them to maintain control of the House Presidency and a host of important committee chairmanship assignments. That should make it easier to keep the legislative process flowing. The ruling coalition does not want to have to wait sixty days on each and every issue before it can force it to a vote in the Lower House. It won't have to do that if it can control the flow, and that plurality will be much easier to maintain if the JCP splits the protest vote.
In 1998, the LDP muddled along under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi for almost six months with an Upper House minority before cobbling together a shifting coalition, ending up with the current cohabitation with the Komeito that has lasted for the last seven years. But none of the opposition parties threatened to take a plurality at the time.
What then, are the consequences of the JCP siphoning off the protest votes from the DPJ? After all, t's not as if the JCP will enter into an unholy union with the LDP-Komeito coalition, will it? As veteran journalist Sam Jameson patiently pointed out to me when I foolishly challenged his formidable knowledge of the Japanese Constitution (as with everything Japanesy), the Lower House can overturn an Upper House vote or, in the absence of an Upper House vote, revote after sixty days, to enact any bill without the consent of the Upper House. And the requirement is a two-thirds supermajority, which the current coalition does have, which is why Sam made this point.
But as we agreed then (I think), the composition of an Upper House opposition majority does matter. For if the LDP maintains a plurality of the seats in the Upper House, it will enable them to maintain control of the House Presidency and a host of important committee chairmanship assignments. That should make it easier to keep the legislative process flowing. The ruling coalition does not want to have to wait sixty days on each and every issue before it can force it to a vote in the Lower House. It won't have to do that if it can control the flow, and that plurality will be much easier to maintain if the JCP splits the protest vote.
In 1998, the LDP muddled along under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi for almost six months with an Upper House minority before cobbling together a shifting coalition, ending up with the current cohabitation with the Komeito that has lasted for the last seven years. But none of the opposition parties threatened to take a plurality at the time.
Thursday, June 21, 2007
A Nanking Massacre Report from Whom? You Must Be Imagining Things.
A group of MPs from Japan's governing party is claiming the Chinese have exaggerated the number of people killed by Japanese troops in Nanking in 1937.
…………
But the announcement by these lawmakers will make life difficult for Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a well-known conservative.
He will no doubt now be asked repeatedly whether he shares the views of this large contingent of his own party.
But watch for the response of the Chinese.
A measured response will signal that they are not prepared to allow history to dominate discussions between Beijing and Tokyo in the run up to this important anniversary. An angry one could signal trouble ahead.
Actually, the BBC article does a good job of summarizing the issue. What will, then, the response be? The key to the answer, actually, lies in the article itself.
Note that it is "China" on one side and "these lawmakers" and (elsewhere in the article) "some in Japan" on the other. The Chinese authorities know that we are a pluralist society. They understand the difference between the government and the political parties, and are even capable of making finer distinctions. That is why, for example, even in the darkest days they could let the Japanese side know that only the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Cabinet Chief need stay from Yasukuni and all would be forgiven.
Their cognitive powers extend to the LDP as well. As this report shows (read this, if you can read Japanese), on June 19, President Hu Jintao gave a fabulous reception for renowned nationalist and ex-prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and his mutual friendship delegation a fabulous welcome to Beijing, and the Chinese media gave the full monte to the event the following day. But then, why not, when the LDP website pretends that the report by the group of LDP lawmakers or indeed the group itself, doesn't even exist?
No need to watch for the response. It's already there, and it was totally predictable. Both administrations have their own reasons for making nice, and Mr. Abe has had some painful lessons on the need to curb his penchant for overexplaining. And it's a good thing for us.
Seriously, I don't have anything to add to the debate on the number of Chinese casualties or their nature. Instead, I'll focus on a number that I can actually wrap my mind around, and what it's trying to tell us.
One small episode in the Nanking Massacre (if a hundred lives is indeed a small number) is the Contest to kill 100 people using a sword. Mirroring the overall debate, it comes with its own claims of denial.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that it was all a sham. In fact, there is a good argument that fifty each is a technical impossibility. But if everybody in Japan at the time said it happened, and rejoiced in the event, then, for all practical purposes, did it not in fact happen? What then, does it say about the Japanese military, whose reputation denialists seek to resurrect? The media? The public? (In fact, this was but one vignette in a history of media complicity dating back most famously to their role in the rioting that followed the settlement of the 1904-05 war with Russia.)
The two army officers who allegedly conducted the contest were executed, also mirroring the fate of the army commander during the Nanking Massacre. If the two did not in fact commit the acts they were convicted of, that does not diminish in the least the fact that they died real deaths for a metaphorical truth, to atone for the sins of the collective.
…………
But the announcement by these lawmakers will make life difficult for Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a well-known conservative.
He will no doubt now be asked repeatedly whether he shares the views of this large contingent of his own party.
But watch for the response of the Chinese.
A measured response will signal that they are not prepared to allow history to dominate discussions between Beijing and Tokyo in the run up to this important anniversary. An angry one could signal trouble ahead.
Actually, the BBC article does a good job of summarizing the issue. What will, then, the response be? The key to the answer, actually, lies in the article itself.
Note that it is "China" on one side and "these lawmakers" and (elsewhere in the article) "some in Japan" on the other. The Chinese authorities know that we are a pluralist society. They understand the difference between the government and the political parties, and are even capable of making finer distinctions. That is why, for example, even in the darkest days they could let the Japanese side know that only the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Cabinet Chief need stay from Yasukuni and all would be forgiven.
Their cognitive powers extend to the LDP as well. As this report shows (read this, if you can read Japanese), on June 19, President Hu Jintao gave a fabulous reception for renowned nationalist and ex-prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and his mutual friendship delegation a fabulous welcome to Beijing, and the Chinese media gave the full monte to the event the following day. But then, why not, when the LDP website pretends that the report by the group of LDP lawmakers or indeed the group itself, doesn't even exist?
No need to watch for the response. It's already there, and it was totally predictable. Both administrations have their own reasons for making nice, and Mr. Abe has had some painful lessons on the need to curb his penchant for overexplaining. And it's a good thing for us.
Seriously, I don't have anything to add to the debate on the number of Chinese casualties or their nature. Instead, I'll focus on a number that I can actually wrap my mind around, and what it's trying to tell us.
One small episode in the Nanking Massacre (if a hundred lives is indeed a small number) is the Contest to kill 100 people using a sword. Mirroring the overall debate, it comes with its own claims of denial.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that it was all a sham. In fact, there is a good argument that fifty each is a technical impossibility. But if everybody in Japan at the time said it happened, and rejoiced in the event, then, for all practical purposes, did it not in fact happen? What then, does it say about the Japanese military, whose reputation denialists seek to resurrect? The media? The public? (In fact, this was but one vignette in a history of media complicity dating back most famously to their role in the rioting that followed the settlement of the 1904-05 war with Russia.)
The two army officers who allegedly conducted the contest were executed, also mirroring the fate of the army commander during the Nanking Massacre. If the two did not in fact commit the acts they were convicted of, that does not diminish in the least the fact that they died real deaths for a metaphorical truth, to atone for the sins of the collective.
Sunday, June 17, 2007
Romancing the Kokumin Shinto
The LDP will suffer a disastrous loss. To the contrary, this is making us quaver, because if the LDP loses too badly, (the Kokumin Shinto) will lose its significance.
(Shizuka Kamei: June 14, at a meeting held in Tokyo)
Suddenly, everybody is in love with Kokumin Shinto leader Tamisuke Watanuki, whom some affectionately call the ugliest politician in Japan. According to the June 17 Yomiuri:
On the occasion of the House of Counselors Election Kick-off Convention [the Kokumin Shinto」 held in a Tokyo Hotel at night on the 15th, an elated Watanuki… said, "The Upper House Election is a great opportunity. The Kokumin Shinto getting as many seats as possible will change Japanese politics."
Following him, DPJ deputy leader [Naoto] Kan and Socialist Party deputy director-general Fumihiro Himori, as well as former Lower House member from the LDP and former [cabinet minister] Takami Eto stepped up to the podium.
The presence of Eto is particularly revealing. Eto's former Lower House seat is now occupied by his son Taku Eto. If you recognize the name Taku Eto, you are a true Japanese politics otaku. Eto 2.0 was one of the twelve Lower House members who returned to the LDP out of the 37who had been kicked out of the LDP for voting against the privatization of the Japanese Post Office. There is no ill will between the returnees and those who have stayed out. Thus, the presence of the now retired Eto 1.0 at the convention struck a perfect balance for both the LDP and the Kokumin Shinto between tantalizing overture and unseemly flirtation.
The Yomiuri article goes on to tell us:
[Toranosuke] Katayama, the LDP secretary-general for the Upper House, made eyes at the Kokumin Shinto on a commercial satellite TV program on the 13th saying that coordination with the Kokumin Shinto "is possible. Our policies are almost the same. Mr. Watanuki in particular is a most LDP-ish politician."
Perhaps in part to explain what Mr. Katayama meant by "most LDP-ish", the article, after quoting an unnamed LDP source and a wary Yukio Hatoyama, co-deputy heaed of the DPJ, closes with the following:
As if in recognition of these voices, Shizuka Kamei, the Kokumin Shinto deputy leader emphasized at a party held for a [DPJ] Upper House candidate on the night of the 14th, "Our party doesn't have the kind of people who'll go back [to the LDP] sobbing, 'I want to go back to the LDP, I want to go back'". [boo-hoo.]
I think that this is more a matter of nuance, rather than a reflection of any real difference in outlook between the co-leaders. Mr. Kamei has always been known for his combativeness, while Mr. Watanuki is far more the get-along guy, and they are acting out the perfect good-cop, bad-cop routine. Given the numbers in the Upper House election and the dismal outlook for the LDP, the chances are quite good that the Kokumin Shinto's four Upper House seats (of which two are up for reelection; the Kokumin Shinto already has 22 candidates (including the two incumbents) and counting) and possibly more will hold the casting vote in a neatly divided Upper House. In this case, the Kokumin Shinto would do better to wield disproportionate power as the crucial third party in a coalition with the LDP and the Komeito.
Who, then, might lead the coalition? Actually, Shinzo Abe, the current prime minister, very reluctantly voted for Post Office privatization, and expended substantial political capital with the public in bringing back twelve of the thirteen rebels who wanted to return to the LDP. Conveniently for Mr. Abe though with no malice on his part, Takeo Hiranuma, the one rebel who has the gravitas and political capital to make a serious run in the LDP to unseat Mr. Abe, could not return because, unlike the other twelve, he refused to sign what was widely considered a humiliating document. (He stood on principle!) Even more fortunately for Mr. Abe, Hidenao Nakagawa, the fearsome LDP secretary-general, took all the heat for holding the torch for Junichiro Koizumi and keeping Mr. Hiranuma out. Thus, for Mr. Abe, dumping Mr. Nakagawa may be enough to bring the Kokumin Shinto around. It also helps Mr. Abe that there are no pretty LDP faces around poised to take over in the case of defeat.
The LDP-Komeitocoalition losing its Upper House majority and Mr. Abe still in power? Don't bet against it. All it takes might be just a little bit of lovin'.
(Shizuka Kamei: June 14, at a meeting held in Tokyo)
Suddenly, everybody is in love with Kokumin Shinto leader Tamisuke Watanuki, whom some affectionately call the ugliest politician in Japan. According to the June 17 Yomiuri:
On the occasion of the House of Counselors Election Kick-off Convention [the Kokumin Shinto」 held in a Tokyo Hotel at night on the 15th, an elated Watanuki… said, "The Upper House Election is a great opportunity. The Kokumin Shinto getting as many seats as possible will change Japanese politics."
Following him, DPJ deputy leader [Naoto] Kan and Socialist Party deputy director-general Fumihiro Himori, as well as former Lower House member from the LDP and former [cabinet minister] Takami Eto stepped up to the podium.
The presence of Eto is particularly revealing. Eto's former Lower House seat is now occupied by his son Taku Eto. If you recognize the name Taku Eto, you are a true Japanese politics otaku. Eto 2.0 was one of the twelve Lower House members who returned to the LDP out of the 37who had been kicked out of the LDP for voting against the privatization of the Japanese Post Office. There is no ill will between the returnees and those who have stayed out. Thus, the presence of the now retired Eto 1.0 at the convention struck a perfect balance for both the LDP and the Kokumin Shinto between tantalizing overture and unseemly flirtation.
The Yomiuri article goes on to tell us:
[Toranosuke] Katayama, the LDP secretary-general for the Upper House, made eyes at the Kokumin Shinto on a commercial satellite TV program on the 13th saying that coordination with the Kokumin Shinto "is possible. Our policies are almost the same. Mr. Watanuki in particular is a most LDP-ish politician."
Perhaps in part to explain what Mr. Katayama meant by "most LDP-ish", the article, after quoting an unnamed LDP source and a wary Yukio Hatoyama, co-deputy heaed of the DPJ, closes with the following:
As if in recognition of these voices, Shizuka Kamei, the Kokumin Shinto deputy leader emphasized at a party held for a [DPJ] Upper House candidate on the night of the 14th, "Our party doesn't have the kind of people who'll go back [to the LDP] sobbing, 'I want to go back to the LDP, I want to go back'". [boo-hoo.]
I think that this is more a matter of nuance, rather than a reflection of any real difference in outlook between the co-leaders. Mr. Kamei has always been known for his combativeness, while Mr. Watanuki is far more the get-along guy, and they are acting out the perfect good-cop, bad-cop routine. Given the numbers in the Upper House election and the dismal outlook for the LDP, the chances are quite good that the Kokumin Shinto's four Upper House seats (of which two are up for reelection; the Kokumin Shinto already has 22 candidates (including the two incumbents) and counting) and possibly more will hold the casting vote in a neatly divided Upper House. In this case, the Kokumin Shinto would do better to wield disproportionate power as the crucial third party in a coalition with the LDP and the Komeito.
Who, then, might lead the coalition? Actually, Shinzo Abe, the current prime minister, very reluctantly voted for Post Office privatization, and expended substantial political capital with the public in bringing back twelve of the thirteen rebels who wanted to return to the LDP. Conveniently for Mr. Abe though with no malice on his part, Takeo Hiranuma, the one rebel who has the gravitas and political capital to make a serious run in the LDP to unseat Mr. Abe, could not return because, unlike the other twelve, he refused to sign what was widely considered a humiliating document. (He stood on principle!) Even more fortunately for Mr. Abe, Hidenao Nakagawa, the fearsome LDP secretary-general, took all the heat for holding the torch for Junichiro Koizumi and keeping Mr. Hiranuma out. Thus, for Mr. Abe, dumping Mr. Nakagawa may be enough to bring the Kokumin Shinto around. It also helps Mr. Abe that there are no pretty LDP faces around poised to take over in the case of defeat.
The LDP-Komeitocoalition losing its Upper House majority and Mr. Abe still in power? Don't bet against it. All it takes might be just a little bit of lovin'.
Saturday, June 16, 2007
What the LDP-Komeito Coalition Needs in the July Upper House Election: The Arithmetic
The following came out of a dialogue with a few friends, including Ross Schaap at Eurasia Group. I thought it would be useful to show you where that "the LDP needs 20 seats, etc., etc." talk comes from..
Yomiuri (June 7) did a two-page spread, a roster of the 119 incumbents, including their voting records on the main issues. It shows that the LDP has an incumbent in every multiple-seat district (18) except Niigata, but they lost that in a by-election (and should be able to regain this time around), which should be canceled out by the one of the two they currently have in Kanagawa by way of a by-election (of which they will likely lose one in the July election). Unless the LDP-Komeito coalition is so lame that the LDP and Sokagakkai jointly fail to put their LDP man no worse than second place in a two-seat district (four seats, actually, of which two come up for election every three years), this will give them 18 as starters. Add 13 for the pro rata seats they managed to retain in the disastrous 2004 election, and you get 31. Assuming Komeito retains its 13, the LDP needs 20 more out of the 29 single seats (actually, the ones that comes up for election out of the two-seaters, plus/minus the variation in the PR results, to reach the 64 seats needed for a majority in the Upper House. I can see this is where the district-by -information really counts.
Now I would very much appreciate someone pointing me to free online sources that give facts and figures for the candidates, individual districts and overall situation and other information pertaining to the election. Hopefully, someone out there knows someone who just can't help him/herself and has to do that stuff on his/her own.
Yomiuri (June 7) did a two-page spread, a roster of the 119 incumbents, including their voting records on the main issues. It shows that the LDP has an incumbent in every multiple-seat district (18) except Niigata, but they lost that in a by-election (and should be able to regain this time around), which should be canceled out by the one of the two they currently have in Kanagawa by way of a by-election (of which they will likely lose one in the July election). Unless the LDP-Komeito coalition is so lame that the LDP and Sokagakkai jointly fail to put their LDP man no worse than second place in a two-seat district (four seats, actually, of which two come up for election every three years), this will give them 18 as starters. Add 13 for the pro rata seats they managed to retain in the disastrous 2004 election, and you get 31. Assuming Komeito retains its 13, the LDP needs 20 more out of the 29 single seats (actually, the ones that comes up for election out of the two-seaters, plus/minus the variation in the PR results, to reach the 64 seats needed for a majority in the Upper House. I can see this is where the district-by -information really counts.
Now I would very much appreciate someone pointing me to free online sources that give facts and figures for the candidates, individual districts and overall situation and other information pertaining to the election. Hopefully, someone out there knows someone who just can't help him/herself and has to do that stuff on his/her own.
Sunday, June 10, 2007
Friday, June 08, 2007
For Those of You Who Were Disappointed China Didn't Go after the Abe Administration for Letting Lee Teng-Hui Come to Japan…
It could have been worse.
For those of you who cannot read Japanese, the headline reads: Wei Jinsheng, the Chinese Democracy Activist Denied Entry at Narita Heads to the US. I'll be happy to translate the rest of the article for a fee.
For those of you who cannot read Japanese, the headline reads: Wei Jinsheng, the Chinese Democracy Activist Denied Entry at Narita Heads to the US. I'll be happy to translate the rest of the article for a fee.
"Cool Earth 50"?
In an obviously calculated attempt to avoid being blamed for causing this blogger to flip his wig, the authorities have decided to translate Shinzo Abe's "美しい星50 Utsukushii Hoshi 50 (Beautiful Star 50; my translation)" as "Cool Earth 50", no doubt plagiarized from my New Earth 21 (in turn an homage to Gene Wolfe's The New Sun).
2050… If nothing, it's clear that Mr. Abe intends to remain in power well beyond the July elections.
Incidentally, everybody is ready to write off Mr. Abe, what with his poll numbers coming to resemble President Bush's. So let's say the LDP-Komeito coalition falls a few seats short, even after bringing in, as they usually do, a couple of "unendorsed" conservative winners. If Mr. Abe works up the nerve to ditch Big Nakagawa, the Secretary-General, then Shizuka Kamei, with his Kokumin Shinto posse, would find it hard to resist a plea from the very sympathetic sitting prime minister.
Mr. Kamei has been coy recently, batting his eyelashes to all and sundry. But think about it: which would you prefer if you were Mr. Kamei; being a very junior member of the opposition, hoping that Upper House troubles will force the coalition to call a general election for the Lower House and take your chances, or bargaining with the LDP to maximize the price for helping them maintain control?
Actually, for Mr. Abe, steeling himself for making Big Nakagawa fall on his sword shouldn't be that hard to do. He did it himself in 2004.
And the economy really looks good, as far as the July elections are concerned, so that puts a floor on the downside for the coalition.
2050… If nothing, it's clear that Mr. Abe intends to remain in power well beyond the July elections.
Incidentally, everybody is ready to write off Mr. Abe, what with his poll numbers coming to resemble President Bush's. So let's say the LDP-Komeito coalition falls a few seats short, even after bringing in, as they usually do, a couple of "unendorsed" conservative winners. If Mr. Abe works up the nerve to ditch Big Nakagawa, the Secretary-General, then Shizuka Kamei, with his Kokumin Shinto posse, would find it hard to resist a plea from the very sympathetic sitting prime minister.
Mr. Kamei has been coy recently, batting his eyelashes to all and sundry. But think about it: which would you prefer if you were Mr. Kamei; being a very junior member of the opposition, hoping that Upper House troubles will force the coalition to call a general election for the Lower House and take your chances, or bargaining with the LDP to maximize the price for helping them maintain control?
Actually, for Mr. Abe, steeling himself for making Big Nakagawa fall on his sword shouldn't be that hard to do. He did it himself in 2004.
And the economy really looks good, as far as the July elections are concerned, so that puts a floor on the downside for the coalition.
Tuesday, June 05, 2007
Lacking the Wherewithal to Post Properly Today, I Give You Richard Cohen.
This piece is about Fred Thompson. Seriously, how many columnists are as good as this guy?
Sunday, June 03, 2007
Saturday, June 02, 2007
Don't Oil Prices Matter Any More?
It can't be more than three years since analysts were telling us that the world economy could withstand 30-, even 40-dollar/bbl oil, but that it would run into serious difficulties if oil reached 50 and stayed there. Now, it hovers consistently around 70 dollars, and nobody is complaining. Well, only complaining.
I know the emerging market economies and other developing countries are doing just fine too, because the IMF has completely fallen off the radar screen and Paul Wolfowitz is the only reason we hear about the World Bank. (Sidebar: By all accounts, Robert Zellick is the best bureaucrat everybody loves to hate.)
The only reason those analysts haven't been burned at the stake is because they didn't get it wrong the other way. That is, it's harder to make people lose money (in absolute terms) in a rising market.
I know the emerging market economies and other developing countries are doing just fine too, because the IMF has completely fallen off the radar screen and Paul Wolfowitz is the only reason we hear about the World Bank. (Sidebar: By all accounts, Robert Zellick is the best bureaucrat everybody loves to hate.)
The only reason those analysts haven't been burned at the stake is because they didn't get it wrong the other way. That is, it's harder to make people lose money (in absolute terms) in a rising market.
Friday, June 01, 2007
What’s the Most Depressing Thing about the Latest Public Pension Scandal?
Tough question. But for me, it's the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare estimate that approximately 250,000 people may have lost an average of 380,000 Yen each due to the five-year statute of limitations on pension claims. That's a good number of zeroes, but it's a little over 3,000 US Dollars (the rest of the world please do your own math), enough to allow an elderly couple live comfortably, provided they've already paid down their mortgage and don't face catastrophic medical costs (and their kids stay in work, and out of jail), for a month. They could probably stretch it out to two, or even three, provided they didn't go out much.
True, MHLW may have an incentive to underestimate. But it doesn't look like a very generous deal to begin with. What's it like for you back home?
True, MHLW may have an incentive to underestimate. But it doesn't look like a very generous deal to begin with. What's it like for you back home?
Publisher Drops New History Textbook; A Victory for China and South Korea? Not So Fast
Yomiuri and Asahi tell more or less the same story: Fusosha, the publishing arm of the conservative media conglomerate Fuji-Sankei Group, has decided to drop the controversial New History Textbook written by the members of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and publish a new textbook that "receives broader support from all layers of society". After ten years, only 5,000 students, or less than 1% of the national total, use the textbook , and Fusosha could not take it any more, it seems. JSHTR is going to seek a new publisher. The JSHTR named Nobumasa Fujioka to replace the previous chairman, who had opposed the attempt to continue to publish the New History Textbook.
So, a victory for China, South Korea, and Japanese liberals?
No. Mainichi adds some crucial details. Fusosha is going to cooperate with the Nihon Kyouiku Saisei Kikou, or Japan Education Rebuilding Organization (my translation; its website does not display an English name) to produce the new one. Sankei goes even further and gives the name of the new Fusosha partner as the soon-to-be-established Kaisei Kyouiki Kihonhou ni Motozuku Kyoukasho Kaizen wo Susumeru Yuushikisha no Kai (Committee of Learned People Promoting the Improvement of Textbooks Based on the Revised Education Basic Law; my translation again) and the name of its head as Taro Yayama.
If Nihon Kyouiku Saisei Kikou, or Japan Education Rebuilding Organization, sounds familiar, take note that it was established on 22 October 2006, twelve days after the Abe administration's Kyouiku Saisei Kaigi or Education Rebuilding Council (official translation), and one of the six JERO advisors is Taro Yayama, a writer who is reputedly a close confidante of Shinzo Abe. Terumasa Nakanishi, the conservative historian, is a JERO advisor as well, and also has the prime minister's ear. However, neither the NKSK chairman, nor any of its six advisors nor 112 elders serves on the ERC.
Incidentally, one of the 112 elders is Tadashi Kobayashi, the deposed JSHTR chairman, and would be one of the three advisors to the new textbook committee. (The others would be Taro Yayama and Shuji Yagi, the JERO chairman.) There should be other overlaps in membership, which will likely be unwound in JERO's favor.
What does all this mean? I think Mr. Abe or his friends have engineered a masterful coup within the conservative ranks. Or, more gently stated, they put an old workhorse to pasture. Without financial support from the Fuji-Sankei Group, the money losing New History Textbook will surely wither away.
JERO, of course, has a much broader agenda (education rebuilding) than JSHTR; and a distinctly conservative one too, unlike the high profile and sometimes-unpredictable ERC. Mr. Abe may or may not long outlast the July Upper House election, and public acceptance of the conservative agenda becomes highly suspect, once you begin trying, for example, to define "patriotism". Yet, at worst, he will leave a legacy of an institutionalized advocacy in education for the conservative cause with the backing of a powerful national media group.
So, a victory for China, South Korea, and Japanese liberals?
No. Mainichi adds some crucial details. Fusosha is going to cooperate with the Nihon Kyouiku Saisei Kikou, or Japan Education Rebuilding Organization (my translation; its website does not display an English name) to produce the new one. Sankei goes even further and gives the name of the new Fusosha partner as the soon-to-be-established Kaisei Kyouiki Kihonhou ni Motozuku Kyoukasho Kaizen wo Susumeru Yuushikisha no Kai (Committee of Learned People Promoting the Improvement of Textbooks Based on the Revised Education Basic Law; my translation again) and the name of its head as Taro Yayama.
If Nihon Kyouiku Saisei Kikou, or Japan Education Rebuilding Organization, sounds familiar, take note that it was established on 22 October 2006, twelve days after the Abe administration's Kyouiku Saisei Kaigi or Education Rebuilding Council (official translation), and one of the six JERO advisors is Taro Yayama, a writer who is reputedly a close confidante of Shinzo Abe. Terumasa Nakanishi, the conservative historian, is a JERO advisor as well, and also has the prime minister's ear. However, neither the NKSK chairman, nor any of its six advisors nor 112 elders serves on the ERC.
Incidentally, one of the 112 elders is Tadashi Kobayashi, the deposed JSHTR chairman, and would be one of the three advisors to the new textbook committee. (The others would be Taro Yayama and Shuji Yagi, the JERO chairman.) There should be other overlaps in membership, which will likely be unwound in JERO's favor.
What does all this mean? I think Mr. Abe or his friends have engineered a masterful coup within the conservative ranks. Or, more gently stated, they put an old workhorse to pasture. Without financial support from the Fuji-Sankei Group, the money losing New History Textbook will surely wither away.
JERO, of course, has a much broader agenda (education rebuilding) than JSHTR; and a distinctly conservative one too, unlike the high profile and sometimes-unpredictable ERC. Mr. Abe may or may not long outlast the July Upper House election, and public acceptance of the conservative agenda becomes highly suspect, once you begin trying, for example, to define "patriotism". Yet, at worst, he will leave a legacy of an institutionalized advocacy in education for the conservative cause with the backing of a powerful national media group.
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