Sankei says the DPJ
could fall below 100 seats while Yomiuri
says that it has managed to secure around 30 regional proportional district
seats (RPD)—surely based on the Yomiuri
poll—and leading in only 10 single member districts (SMD) and running
neck-and-neck in another 21. When a newspaper says what Sankei is saying at this
point in the campaign, it means that the DPJ is going to miss 100 by a wide
margin. How large? Say the DPJ wins half of the 21 in which it is
co-frontrunner and give it 35 RPD seats by extrapolating from the Yomiuri and Asahi polls; the total comes to around 55 seats. By comparison, in the
2005 postal reform election, the previous DPJ nadir, the count dropped to 113
and Katsuya Okada had to go down.
The LDP-Komeito coalition appears to have a
core support base of a little over 1/3rd of the effective votes (LDP 1/4+, Komeito
1/10+) while the DPJ has 1/5th in the bag at most. Let’s say that the
Communists, SDP, and Ozawa have 1/10th between them. That leaves 1/3rd of the
effective votes unaligned, roughly half of them, or 1/6th overall, unlikely to go
to the LDP-Komeito coalition under any circumstances. If someone can somehow
find a way to add this 1/6th to the DPJ’s 1/5th, you have a roughly 1/3rd of
the total, on a par with the LDP-Komeito coalition. That would be a pretty
stable two-party/coalition system. But with the emergent opposition divided
ideologically temperamentally between what is likely to be the DPJ leadership and
the Ishihara-Hashimoto mutual man-crush, the chances of that happening any time
soon are slim. And the Big Bang that we’ve been waiting for looks distant if the
LDP-Komeito wins big.
In the meantime, a few more details on how
the two main parties have been lining up their candidates.
In 2009, the LDP and DPJ fielded 289 and
271 SMD candidates respectively. This time around, the numbers are down slightly
to LDP 288 and DPJ 264, modest drop-offs, really, especially for the DPJ, given
its massive defections over the past year.
Or are they? Kunio Hatoyama is receiving
local LDP support to seek reelection as an independent and will almost surely
rejoin the LDP if he wins. That makes the 2009 and 2012 slates a wash.
Moreover, Komeito has increased its SMD candidates from eight to nine. So the
LDP-Komeito coalition has at least 299 out of the 300 SMDs effectively covered.
On the other side, the DPJ is no longer ceding a handful of SMDs to former
coalition partner SDP while accommodating far fewer candidates (down to three
from nine in 2009) from coalition partner PNP. In short, the LDP-Komeito
coalition continues to have most if not all—I suspect that there’s an
independent candidate somewhere that I can find if I looked hard enough—of the
300 SMDs covered, while the DPJ-led coalition’s loss is much larger than it
looks at first sight.
And the RPDs further highlight the DPJ
disadvantage. The SMD candidates have taken out zombie insurance in the form of
parallel regional proportional district (RPD) candidacies. But the DPJ “undead”
candidates, the RPD-only candidates, who are more like index futures purchased
by political parties at 6 million yen a pop, has plummeted from 59 to 3 while
the LDP undead has swelled from 37 to 49.
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