Forget
the metaphysical argument around a “mandate” for the Abe administration, PM Abe
moves forward with the same policy priorities and more or less the same number
of seats but maximum four instead of two years to achieve them. Nothing more,
nothing less. End of story.
Now,
at the vote totals for the proportional representation districts—the single-member
district vote totals are of little use here because only the Liberal Democratic
Party and the Japan Communist Party (and the Happiness Realization Party if you
must know) had anything close to across-the-board representation—the JCP was
the big winner, jumping from 3,689,159 (6.13% of the total) in the 2012 general
election to 6,062,962 (11.36%), but the LDP didn’t do too badly either, going
from 16,624,457 (27.26%) to 17,658,916 (33.10%). Coalition partner Komeito
registered a modest gain, going from 7,116,474 (11.89%) to 7,314,236 (13.71%).
The Democratic Party of Japan registered an even smaller gain, going from 9,628,653
(16.00%) 9,775,991 (18.32%), while the Japan Innovation Party (the party
formerly known as the Japan Restoration Party) fell precipitously from 12,262,228
(20.38%) to 8,382,699 (15.71%).
Three
things here: First, say what you will—like me—of how this election was not a
referendum on the Abe administration but a referendum on the fecklessness of the
opposition, both the LDP and Komeito did do better in both absolute and
relative terms than the two main opposition parties in an election with a
record low voter turnout. That should count for something.
Second,
that said, you have to agree that the DPJ and JIP didn’t do too badly for parties
that fielded candidates in only 178 and 77, respectively, of the 275 single-member
districts. Not having a candidate in a single-member district to campaign for
his/her party must be a significant handicap in getting the proportional
representation vote to turn out. Note that the LDP, which has candidates in
almost all of the single-seat districts except where Komeito candidates are
running, and Komeito, which essentially has a captive constituency, are
relatively free from this problem.
Third,
and this is a corollary of the previous point, it’s pretty obvious that the opposition
will have little chance of winning a general election unless the DPJ and JIP actually
merge. The LDP-Komeito coalition always has a minimum of close to 40%, usually
more, of the effective votes that it can reliably deliver much (most in the
case of Komeito) of to its candidate in any single-member district. By contrast,
the less-firmly established DPJ and JIP rely much more on the same independent
voters. They could in theory perfectly align their slates so that they field a
single candidate, no more, in each one of the single-seat districts, and they
would still have the problem of delivering those votes to the other party’s
candidate while keeping them for themselves for the proportional representation
vote.
4 comments:
Thanks for your analysis. As I listened to this podcast about Japanese politics, I was wondering what you’d make of it: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/shinzo-abe27s-election-gamble/5944782
Re the transcript:
“…increases in the consumption tax—the equivalent of our GST—made his popularity plummet.”
Actually, it was the post-consumption economic downturn that contributed to the incremental but steady and no less worrying decline in his popularity. The irony is that the initial tripartite decision to raise the consumption tax rate did not happen when he was the head of the LDP. But that is only fair. In war and politics, everything that happens on your watch accrues to you.
“…households encouraged to keep their consumption low and to save for the good of the nation.”
Maybe “encouraged.” But they were saving to buy houses. And you had to buy NTT bonds if you wanted to secure a telephone line. Etc., etc. Plus, the public pension system had much to be desired.
“But especially in regions like Kyoto which, for various reasons, emerged from the war unscathed, their infrastructure at least, they really became a centre of high-technology manufacturing that has been a real foundation for more recent advances in biotechnology, energy, nano and robotics.”
Kyoto, yes, but it’s really about the metropolitan centers, of which Tokyo remains by far the most important.
“And Japan, a small crowded place with no natural resources, couldn't go on producing those things onshore…”
Wait, isn’t that exactly the kind of place for “producing those things”? Singapore is even more crowded, Luxembourg, Hong Kong… On the other hand, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Mongolia…
“So people were given that hope I think by the big statements that Abe was making.”
Then what explains the droves or voters who decided to abstain? And why did so few of the ones that did vote support the LDP-Komeito coalition. It was a rejection of the DPJ administration, not an endorsement of an Abe resurgence.
“So you have this large single party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and hundreds and hundreds of smaller factions, some of which are descended directly from these very same samurai families, who also happen to be hereditary parliamentarians.”
I prefer to see the LDP as a highly successful association of small business owners.
“But the other thing I'd like to say is really historically the best and the brightest go into civil service, the next best and brightest go into business, and then that other catchall category of hereditary parliamentarians and other folks might go into politics.”
Actually, a very large number of civil servants, mostly fast-track, go into politics. The next President of the House of Representatives happens to be a hereditary parliamentarian who used to be a fast-track civil servant.
“And so really when it comes down to making industrial policy that will move the nation forward in the 21st century and capitalise on the wonderful innovations that the science and technology community produces, the politicians don't really know how to do it.”
Whereas in… where?
“And Japan has become frankly flyover territory in this process of key technologies in solar and biomedical being developed in these other places.”
You could just as plausibly say that “China/Korea/Singapore isn’t “flyover territory in this process of key technologies in solar and biomedical being developed in these other places?” What does “flyover territory” even mean?
“Everybody knows that it happened...”
True, but what was “it”? It’s the unconditional acceptance of national/regime founding myths by New World citizens of European descent that gives room for the nationalist narratives to survive and even thrive among the less ideological Japanese public.
“What these three challenges do (you know, the failure of the third arrow to really materialise, ignoring the rise in competition from other Asian economies, and these right-wing distractions) is really decreasing Japan's attractiveness as a destination, not just in terms of tourists but in terms of trade partners and also investment partners.”
This is a reminder that being a “political economist” does not qualify someone as a “political scientist,” much less a “historian.”
Otherwise, not bad overall.
Thanks so much for your detailed reply. Outside views of your own country are very often off the mark, but interesting nonetheless.
Just a few thoughts: I don’t think that crowded micro-countries like Singapore, Luxembourg or Hong Kong produce a lot of tangible goods (compared to China, Bangladesh or Vietnam). Luxembourg main export seems to be tax avoidance schemes.
Japan is much bigger than all these countries and while its population is not “evenly distributed”, with crowded cities like Tokyo, it’s in a very different league. I don’t remember if they mention any detrimental effect of the nuclear plants closure and fossil fuel use increase having an impact on production, but the move to produce offshore had started before 2011.
I think abstention, like in European countries, shows that people have understood that no politician will ever offer a solution to the problems we face (because they can’t face these problems when their mindset and culture created them), and that voting often has very little effect on policies. The stronger effects are on unimportant (compared to the current and coming crisis) things like “change the constitution or not”.
How can you be “a hereditary parliamentarian who used to be a civil servant”? Do you mean that although the family was hereditary parliamentarian, he or she started a civil servant career before going back to the family trade? Youth rebellion maybe… ^_-
“Whereas in… where?” Maybe Germany, at least for the energy transition.
I don’t think that crowded micro-countries like Singapore, Luxembourg or Hong Kong produce a lot of tangible goods (compared to China, Bangladesh or Vietnam). Luxembourg main export seems to be tax avoidance schemes.
Japan is much bigger than all these countries and while its population is not “evenly distributed”, with crowded cities like Tokyo, it’s in a very different league. I don’t remember if they mention any detrimental effect of the nuclear plants closure and fossil fuel use increase having an impact on production, but the move to produce offshore had started before 2011.
Metropolitan centers produce a higher proportion of high-value-added products compare to the periphery for a good reason. Physical things take more physical space to produce. Yes, city states and quasi-city states like Luxembourg and Singapore attract financial institutions, but they also attract corporate hubs and information industries as well as some processing factories for value-added transit. Take, for example, labor force composition in Singapore with manufacturing 15.5%, construction 13.7%, and services 70.1%; and Japan with manufacturing 27.8%, services including construction: 67.7%. Given the difference between a city state and a full-fledged nation state with 130 million people, I would argue that Singapore does a pretty good job of producing “tangible” goods. Not that there’s anything wrong with “intangible goods” such as movies, TV shows, nursing care, heart surgery…
The nuclear power plant closures and suspensions obviously had an impact on current accounts as well as the bottom line of businesses. But yes, it was but only one of the reasons why production by Japanese companies moved offshore.
I think abstention, like in European countries, shows that people have understood that no politician will ever offer a solution to the problems we face (because they can’t face these problems when their mindset and culture created them), and that voting often has very little effect on policies. The stronger effects are on unimportant (compared to the current and coming crisis) things like “change the constitution or not”.
Perhaps. But almost 70 years after the mother of wars, could it be that the historical weight of path dependency is so heavy that the current political class, the heirloom turkeys hereditary or not, is no longer capable of self-renewal? The initial trajectory of shooting star Hashimoto, not to mention the charismatic nationalists in Europe, suggest that the fields lie in ennui for fecund lightening to strike.
How can you be “a hereditary parliamentarian who used to be a civil servant”? Do you mean that although the family was hereditary parliamentarian, he or she started a civil servant career before going back to the family trade? Youth rebellion maybe… ^_-
Actually, he was a Tokyo University graduate who had managed to pass the civil servant exam with flying colors.
“Whereas in… where?” Maybe Germany, at least for the energy transition.
The Germany that is up its wazoo in solar power that it is able to digest only because it is embedded in a 400 million-people, same-frequency grid and a population that had so far been willing to bear the sky-high tariffs?
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