Election 2016: Yes, I Said It. No, You Don’t Have to Read It

My money is on a last-minute (albeit a year before the 2016 House of Councilors election) compromise on a near-de minimus set of changes that they hope will be enough to keep the Supreme Court from going ape and declaring the whole event null and void. Based on that premise…

The coalition as it currently stands will have 59 seats (including the nominally independent HoC President’s) up for reelection in 2016, with the other 76 seats safe until the 2019 election. This means that it must win 46 for an absolute majority, while 103 will give is a 2/3rds supermajority that would give it the bicameral power to send a constitutional amendment to a national referendum. The coalition’s actual take in 2016 should fall somewhere in the 60-76 range, which means that it will need another 27-43 for a supermajority. What is the arithmetic for that?

The Party for Future Generations (PFG) will support the kind of amendment that Mr. Abe would like to see, but it only has 7 votes, 2 of which will be up for grabs in 2016. Its 2014 HoR collapse suggests that it will face an uphill battle then, but let’s be generous and give it a 5-7 post-election range. The coalition still needs 22-38 for a supermajority. Mr. Hashimoto’s JIP may also look more favorably on a constitutional amendment to Mr. Abe’s liking, although such prospects diminished somewhat after Mr. Hashimoto ditched Shintaro Ishihara and his friends and merged with the more opposition-minded wing of the now-defunct Your Party. In any case, JIP has 11 seats, of which 6 have terms that run to 2019. Could it pick up 16 (22 minus 6) seats, the minimum required to make up a supermajority? That is not implausible, since the JIP took 15.72% of the regional proportional representation votes in the 2014 HoR election, even as the DPJ won 17 seats in the 2013 HoC election with only 13.40% of the national proportional representation votes.

Although the numbers will change a bit even under my de minimus assumption, securing votes for putting a constitutional amendment to Mr. Abe’s liking to a national referendum appears to be within reach…but only barely, for the following reasons.

First, it appears unlikely that the ruling coalition will hit the high end of the 60-76 range. One reason that the LDP did so well in the 2013 election was that there were three politically significant parties (plus the eternal voice of dissent JCP) competing for votes. Now, one of them is gone, and the remaining two at least managed to avoid putting up competing candidates in most single-seat districts in the 2014 HoR election. Other things being equal, this boosts the hopes of the opposition in the single-seat election prefectures, where the opposition—more specifically the DPJ—fared so poorly.

Second, other thing are more likely to be unequal than not, and to the opposition’s favor. It was the DPJ and JIP who were able to capitalize on Your Party’s collapse, while the LDP and Komeito lost out if the 2013 and 2014 party-line voting by the electorate is to be believed. The Abe administration has an upside—the economy could soar, or Mr. Abe could benefit from a really-around effect in the case of a crisis for which the public does not hold him accountable—but it also has a downside—any number of mishaps, plus an economic downturn/anemic recovery. Plus, there is the worrying, slow but steady decline in public support for his cabinet.

Third, the LDP has vastly more seats in HoC than any other party. This means that blame for what are likely to be blatant efforts to protect incumbents will largely fall on the LDP. The opposition parties by contrast will be able to push dramatically anti-incumbent reform, safe in the knowledge that it will hurt them more than it hurts you.

Fourth, even if the coalition and its potential constitutional amendment comrade-in-arms prevail against all odds, there is still the matter of the Komeito/Sokagakkai religio-political complex to consider. Does anyone think that Mr. Abe can make nice with PFG and JIP on constitutional amendment and expect Komeito to go along with it?

Fifth and finally, there is the matter of the national referendum by an electorate in which a healthy plurality oppose the principle of “collective self-defense,” if not its specifics.

It all depends, of course. If there is a sweeping change in sentiment that swings the public mood in Mr. Abe’s favor, now that’s totally different situation.

The ball, actually is in China’s court.

	2010 HoC Election (57.92%)			2013 HoC Election (52.61%)			2014 HoR Election (52.66%)
	NPR Votes	%	Seats	NPR Votes	%	Seats	RPR Votes	%	Seats
LDP	14,071,671	24.07	51	18,460,335	34.68	65	17,658,916	33.11	291
Komeito	7,639,433	13.07	9	7,568,082	14.22	11	7,314,236	13.71	35
Sum	21,711,104	33.27	60	26,028,417	48.90	76	24,973,152	46.82	326
DPJ	18,450,139	31.56	44	7,134,215	13.40	17	9,775,991	18.33	73
JRP/JIP				6,355,300	11.94	8	8,382,699	15.72	41
Your Party	7,943,649	13.59	10	4,755,161	8.93	8
JCP	3,563,557	6.10	3	5,154,055	9.68	8	6,062,962	11.37	21
others	6,732,359	11.53	4	3,802,466	7.14	4	4,139,643	7.76	14
Sum	36,689,704	62.82	61	27,201,197	51.10	45	28,361,295	53.18	149
Total	58,400,808	100.00	121	53,229,615	100.00	121	53,334,447	100.00	475