Quoted
in Al
Jazeera here, so, the full online Q&A below.
1.
Takao Toshikawa, editor-in-chief of Tokyo Insideline, spoke at the FCCJ last
week. He said the overarching intention of Abe's 6 year term (if achieved, of
course) is to revise the Constitution.
Do you agree? Why, why
not?
Not being a mind reader,
I won’t go that far, but I am sure that revising the Constitution is at or near
the top of his list of political goals.
2.
If Abe does continue as PM and LDP president for the next 4 years, rather than
run again for the presidency in 2018 and enjoy the limelight of the 2020
Olympics, he will promote Tanigaki as the president and PM, according to
Toshikawa.
This is because Abe
believes his own ultra-conservative image would block Constitutional revision,
whereas the more liberal Tanigaki has a better chance of getting the two-thirds
majorities in both houses, plus a majority in the national referendum needed to
amend the Constitution.
Do you agree or disagree?
Why?
That’s an interesting
piece of speculation, but I disagree. Tanigaki is unlikely to push for the kind
of amendment that Abe wants. If amending Article 9 had been anything
approaching a priority item for people like Tanigaki, the LDP would have made a
serious push decades ago.
3.
In your opinion, do a majority of Japanese support changes to Article 9 in the
Constitution, perhaps as a matter of national pride?
My understanding is that
a majority or a healthy plurality of us Japanese still prefer to maintain
Article 9 as is. A people that blanches at the idea of collective self-defense
even as it supports individual measures that are justified under that rubric is
not going to support an amendment to a constitutional restriction that
justifies Japan’s minimal role in overseas armed conflict.
4.
If Toshikawa's scenario plays out and the LDP is able to garner the votes to
amend Article 9 in the Constitution, what are the ramifications for Japan?
If my aunt had wheels,
she would be a teacart. That point aside, it would turn on two interacting
factors: the substance of the amendment and the regional security environment. The
Chinese authorities will object in any case, not because it really thinks that
Japan is reverting to militarism (a ridiculous if domestically convenient
charge), but because it enhances Japan’s alliance with the United States to the
detriment of China’s regional policy objectives. The response from the South
Korean authorities will depend on public perception of Japan in general. If the
history issues have been laid to rest by then, the South Korean public will be
less mistrustful of Japanese intentions and the South Korean authorities will
act accordingly. If not, then they will dutifully register their displeasure,
then move on. Japan’s allies and friends in the neighborhood, most notably the
United States, will welcome the amendment. The rest of the world will be
largely indifferent, NYT’s lead
editorial writer on Japan and likeminded people in the Western media
notwithstanding, since it will have little effect on the geopolitical
circumstances beyond Japan’s “near abroad” and economic sea-lanes.
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